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## CONTENTS

The Handbook of Master Peter Chancellor of Chartres.....	V. L. Kennedy C.S.B.	1
Sur la Doctrine de l'Aséité divine.....	Jacques Maritain	39
A List of Photographic Reproductions of Mediaeval Manuscripts in the Library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Part II—Authors.....	R. J. Scollard C.S.B.	51
The Logos as a Basis for a Doctrine of Providence.....	M. M. Marcia I.B.V.M.	75
Greek Works translated into Latin before 1350 (Continuation).....	J. T. Muckle C.S.B.	102
The Conception of Substance in the Philosophy of the Ikwan as-Sefa' (Brethren of Purity).....	Emil L. Fackenheim	115
A Thomistic Glossary on the Principle of the Preeminence of a Common Good.....	I. Th. Eschmann O.P.	123
Maistre Nicole Oresme, <i>Le Livre du Ciel et du Monde</i> , <i>Text and Commentary (continued) Livres III et IV.</i> <i>Critical Introduction</i> .....	A. D. Menut and A. J. Denomy C.S.B.	167
<i>Livre III</i> .....		167
<i>Livre IV</i> .....		200
<i>Introduction</i> .....		239
I. <i>Historical</i> .....		239
II. <i>Oresme's Scientific Writings</i> .....		243
III. <i>Mediaeval Latin Versions of De Coelo et Mundo</i> .....		253
IV. <i>Oresme's Translation and Commentary</i> .....		254
V. <i>Summary of Oresme's Commentary</i> .....		257
VI. <i>The Manuscripts of Du Ciel et du Monde:</i> <i>Description and Dialect Study</i> .....		267
VII. <i>Relationship of the Manuscripts</i> .....		288
VIII. <i>Word Study</i> .....		296
IX. <i>Index to Proper Names</i> .....		328

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# The Handbook of Master Peter Chancellor of Chartres

V. L. KENNEDY C.S.B.

THIS article is meant to be a preliminary survey of the career and the writings of Peter of Roissy, chancellor of Chartres, an early thirteenth century theologian and liturgist. Special emphasis is placed on his most important contribution to the literature of his time, his *Handbook* or *Manuale de Mysteriis Ecclesiae*. This work is quite unique since it is the only known example of a mediaeval treatise that deals both with the church offices and with the seven sacraments. Our study would be more complete, and certainly more accurate, had not the war made it impossible to secure certain manuscript material; perhaps at a later, and we hope a happier, date we may be able to complete it.

## (1) *Peter's Career*

In the last decade of the twelfth century, the city of Paris was the scene of a rather remarkable spiritual revival brought about by the preaching of Fulk, the parish priest of Neuilly.<sup>1</sup> The chronicles of the period record the multitudes who flocked to hear him and the miracles with which he confirmed his preaching.<sup>2</sup> His fame was not confined to Paris, or even to France; we know that Innocent III appointed him to preach the fourth crusade.<sup>3</sup> Fulk's influence seems to have been particularly strong among the masters and scholars of Paris. Peter Cantor the outstanding teacher of the day was his friend and adviser; other schoolmen became his disciples.<sup>4</sup>

Among the latter was a certain Peter of Roissy<sup>5</sup> of whom Rigord in his *Gesta Philippi Augusti*<sup>6</sup> speaks as follows: 'In the year 1198, Fulk took as a companion

<sup>1</sup> A. Charasson, *Un curé plébéien au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1905).

<sup>2</sup> The principal source of his life is: Jacques de Vitry, *Historia Occidentalis* c. v-viii. For the other chronicles which speak of him cf. *Receuil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* vol. xvii and xviii. These sources are all indicated in the study of Charasson.

<sup>3</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* ed. Potthast, no. 406, Nov. 5, 1198. The text of the letter is found in: *Receuil des historiens* vol. xix, p. 369. A translation will be found in Charasson, *op. cit.* p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> *Historia occidentalis* c. vi; Rogeri de Hovedon, *Annalium Pars posterior*, *Richardus Primus* ad an. 1198; Ottonis Frisingensis, *Continuatio Sanblasiana* (MGH, SS XX, 321) etc. Cf. C. E. DuBoulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis* II (Paris, 1665), pp. 509-519; Charasson, *op. cit.* pp. 37-61.

<sup>5</sup> The career of Peter of Roissy has been dealt with briefly in *Histoire littéraire de la France* vol. 7, p. 341-2 where he is placed in the eleventh century; *ibid.* vol. 18, p. 524 where his death is put about 1230. More modern and more exact studies on his career by: M. B. Hauréau, *Mémoire sur quelques chanceliers de l'église de Chartres* (Mémoires de l'Institut de France, Académie des In-

scriptions et Belles-Lettres, XXXI, 1884, pp. 104-122; A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen-âge* (Chartres, 1895), pp. 326-328; Lucien et René Merlet, *Dignitaires de l'église Notre-Dame de Chartres* (Chartres, 1900), p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> *Receuil des historiens* vol. xvii, p. 48: Anno domini MCXCVIII, saepedictus Fulco alium sibi sacerdotem nomine Petrum de Rossiaco, de eodem episcopatu Parisiensi, ad officium praedicationis, associavit, virum scilicet literatum, et, ut nobis videbatur, spiritu Dei plenum. Qui singulis diebus praedicationi insistens divinae, multos a peccato usurarium retraxit et a furore libidinis infinitos revocavit. Mulieres etiam in prostibulo manentes, et omnibus transeuntibus sine delectu personae pro vili pretio et sine rubore se exponentes, ad continentiam conjugalem procreavit. . . . Sed qui scire desiderat qua intentione quisque praedicaverit finem attendat; quia finis intentiones hominum manifestissime declarat: affectus tuus operi tuo finem imponit. The text is also found in the edition of H. F. Delaborde, *Oeuvres de Rigord et Guillaume le Breton* (Paris, 1882), pp. 139-140. Practically the same account is given by Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum Historiale* XXIX, C.59 (Duaci, 1704), col. 1206.

in his preaching another priest, Peter of Roissy of the diocese of Paris, a good and learned man, and in our opinion, one filled with the spirit of God.' He goes on to describe the success of Peter's preaching particularly in converting usurers and prostitutes to a better way of life; he concludes his statement of Peter's work with this warning: 'but if anyone wishes to know with what intention a man has preached, let him look to the end, for the end manifests clearly the intentions of men.'

This account written about 1207<sup>7</sup> indicates that Peter of Roissy did not persevere in his career as a reformer. The nature of his defection is gone into in some detail by Jacques de Vitry.<sup>8</sup> After speaking of the high honor in which the disciples of Fulk were held, he tells us that one of these, Master Peter of Roissy, did not live up to the general standard; 'for he who had embraced the way of perfection and preached poverty became loaded with riches and revenues through his preaching and was made canon and chancellor of the church of Chartres. Thus one who should have produced light from smoke, produced smoke from light and made his teaching despised; this took away much from the other disciples of Fulk.' Despite the harshness of this criticism of Jacques de Vitry, we have no reason for denying his factual information. He is a contemporary and the essential facts of his story can be verified from other sources.

The career of Peter of Roissy at Chartres is vouched for by the obituary notice in the cartulary of Notre-Dame of that city:<sup>9</sup> 'On the eighth of September, died the venerable Peter of Roissy, priest and chancellor of this church; doctor in sacred Scripture, an excellent preacher endowed with eloquence and learning. He bequeathed many books to this church . . . and for the church building, forty silver marks and five gold rings; and to us (the Canons) fifty two pounds in Chartrain money to establish a fund to celebrate his anniversary.'

This laudatory notice shows the high esteem in which Peter was held by his associates at Chartres. Unfortunately it does not reveal the year of his death nor have we any certain information in regard to the date of his becoming chancellor. Three other documents give us some rather contradictory information on these points. The first of these is a judgment given by *P. Cancellarius et . . . Camerarius Carnotenses* in a dispute over some property between the Abbey of Saint Germain-des-Prés and a noble lady Heluisa de Nangiis.<sup>10</sup> It

<sup>7</sup> There were three redactions of the *Gesta*, the first written before 1196, the second carried the story to the year 1200, and the third, which we have, completed the year 1206. The chapters covering 1207 and 1208 are by an unknown continuator. cf. H. F. Delaborde, *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton* (Paris, 1882), p. xi; A. Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France II* (Paris, 1902), No. 2211.

<sup>8</sup> *Historia Occidentalis* ed. Fr. Moschius (Duaci, 1597) pp. 287-288: Sed et discipuli eius [Fulconis] quos ad praedicandum mittebat velut apostoli Christi cum summo honore et reverentia recipiebantur ab omnibus. Quidam autem ex eis, qui praecipuus inter illos et amplius facundus et faecundus videbatur, Magister Petrus de Rusia dictus, maculam posuit in gloria sua. Ipse enim, qui perfectionis iter arripuerat et paupertatem predicabat, occasione praedicationis suffarcinatus est divitiis et redditibus et factus est ecclesiae Carnotensis canonicus et cancellarius; et qui ex fumo lucem producere debuerat, ex luce fumum produxit. Et ob hoc non solum doctrinam suam contemptibilem reddidit, sed et alii

praedicti Fulconis discipulis multum derogatum est in hoc facto.

<sup>9</sup> E. DeLepinois et L. Merlet, *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Chartres III* (Chartres, 1865), p. 171: VI Idus Septembres. Obiit vir venerabilis Petrus de Reisseio, hujus sanctae ecclesiae sacerdos et cancellarius, sacrae Scripturae doctor et egregius praedicator, multae scientiae et facundiae gratia perornatus, qui moriens ligavit et dedit huic ecclesiae libros multos, scilicet Historia Manducatoris, Sententias Longobardi, Psalterium glossatum, Epistolas Pauli glossatas, Moralitates super Bibliothecam, Apocalypsim et duodecim minores prophetas, Epistolas canonicas et Actus Apostolorum glossatos in uno volumine, glossas super Vetus Testamentum in duobus voluminibus, sermones abbatis Claraevallensis, Epistolas Gaii Solini Apollinaris et librum Senecae De naturalibus quaestionibus in uno volumine; et fabricae hujus ecclesiae xl marchas argenti et quinque annulos aureos, et nobis llii libras monetae Carnotensis ad emendum redditum ad suum anniversarium celebrandum.

<sup>10</sup> R. Poupardin, *Receuil des chartes de l'abbaye de Saint-Germain-des-Prés II* (Paris, 1909), pp. 154-155: Omnibus presentes

bears the date 1208. Among those who held the office of chancellor of the church of Chartres in the first quarter of the thirteenth century,<sup>11</sup> there is only one whose name begins with the letter P—Peter of Roissy. We may then assume that he did hold that office in 1208. The letter of Innocent III to the judges, contained within this document, is made out to the chancellor and chamberlain of the Church of Chartres, but the names of these two officials do not appear in this papal commission which is dated 'December the first the seventh year of our pontificate,' i.e. 1204.<sup>12</sup> We have no other record of this letter. As it stands, it would appear that the papal Chancery was ignorant of the name of the chancellor of Chartres in 1204.

The second document is similar in character but is undated. It is a judgment given by *P. Cancellarius et Sy. de Berou Canonicus Carnotensis* in a dispute between the prior of St. Nicholas of Fréteval and the parish priest of St. Hilaire de Gravelle.<sup>13</sup> The judges state that they received their commission from '*domino P. sancte Marie in via lata diacono cardinali et apostolice sedis legato*.' This is Cardinal Peter of Capua the papal legate to France from 1198<sup>14</sup> to January 1200<sup>15</sup> when he returned to Rome after laying France under interdict; his subsequent career<sup>16</sup> as Cardinal-Priest of St. Marcellus and papal legate to the near East need not concern us here. Can we conclude from this commission that Peter of Roissy was already chancellor by 1200? It is undoubtedly true that he was appointed judge in this case by the legate before 1200, and that, when the judgment was given, he was chancellor of Chartres. But how many years elapsed between the two events? Legal disputes, even in church courts were frequently long drawn-out affairs.<sup>17</sup> It seems incredible that Peter of Roissy, who began his preaching career only in 1198, should have abandoned it in less than two years, or that he should in that time have become sufficiently famous to be named chancellor of Chartres. We suspect that this judgment must be dated considerably later than the year 1200.

In Peter's *Handbook*, which is to engage our attention in this article, there is an indication that he continued to carry on his priestly ministry at Paris until

litteras inspecturis P. cancellarius et . . . camerarius Carnotenses, salutem in domino. Notum facimus quod mandatum domini pape recepimus in hunc modum: "Innocentius episcopus, servus servorum Dei, dilectis filiis . . . cancellario et . . . camerario Carnotensibus, salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. Sicut dilecti filii J. abbas et conventus sancti Germani sua nobis conquestione monstrarunt, nobilis mulier Heliusa de Nanglis . . . Data Rome apud sanctum Petrum kal. decembris, pontificatus nostri anno septimo." Cum igitur hujus auctoritate mandati de causa . . . Actum anno gratie M.CC. octavo.

<sup>11</sup> Clerval in his *Ecoles de Chartres* lists the chancellors for this period as follows: Denys vers 1200 (p. 283); Pierre de Roissy 1204-1211 (p. 327-328); Guillaume, comte de Perche 1211-1213 (p. 328); Robert de Berou 1213-1216 (p. 328); Guillaume de Chartres 1216-1235; Constantin 1235-1250 (p. 329).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. text in note 10.

<sup>13</sup> C. Metais, *Marmoutier, Cartulaire Blésois* (Blois, 1889-1891), p. 182; P. Dei gratia cancellarius et Sy. de Berou canonicus Carnotensis, omnibus Xristi fidelibus salutem. Cum controversia esset inter priorem sancti Nicholai de Fractavalle et presbyterum sancti Ylarri de Gravelle, super quibusdam redditibus, quod presbyter

ad jus presbyteri pertinere dicebat, et eadem causa nobis, a domino P. sancte Marie in via lata diacono cardinali et apostolice sedis legato, nobis fuisset commissa . . .

<sup>14</sup> Rigord, *Gesta Philippi Augusti* an. 1198 (*Recueil des historiens* xvii, 50); Dum haec agerentur, Innocentius Papa III misit in Franciam legatum Petrum Capuensem, Sanctae-Mariae in via lata diaconum cardinalem . . .

<sup>15</sup> Roger Hoveden, *Annalium pars posterior* an. 1200 (*Rerum Anglicarum Scriptores* p. 456): Eodem anno mense Ianuarii, statim post natale Domini . . . praedictus Petrus de Capua Cardinalis et Apostolicae sedis legatus dedit sententiam interdicti in regnum Franciae et abiit. Cf. E. B. Krebhiel, *The Interdict, its History and its Operation* (Washington, 1909), pp. 110-113.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Potthast, *Regesta* no. 1667; also p. 464 and p. 466. Peter of Capua is promoted to his new title before November 3, 1201 on which date he signs himself as cardinal-priest of St. Marcellus. For his career as papal-legate in the East, cf. Krebhiel, *op. cit.* pp. 134-135.

<sup>17</sup> For example the case quoted in note 10 above. The commission was given in 1204, the decision not until 1208.

the year 1208 at least. In dealing with the sacrament of Orders, he points out that certain sins are a definite impediment and he denies the right to the ordinary priest to handle these cases. He informs us that he himself obtained special faculties for such cases from Odo and Peter, bishops of Paris.<sup>18</sup> Since Odo of Sully died in July 1208, and Peter of Nemours succeeded to the bishopric of Paris in the same year,<sup>19</sup> we must conclude that Peter of Roissy was engaged in priestly work at Paris as late as the fall of that year. We have then two possible solutions. Either Peter of Roissy became chancellor of Chartres late in 1208 and before the end of that year gave the decision in St. Germain-des-Prés case, or his appointment to Chartres may have been earlier than 1208, and in spite of his duties there, he continued to do sacerdotal work in Paris during the episcopacy of Peter of Nemours.

Clerval in his study on the schools of Chartres places Peter's chancellorship between 1204 and 1211.<sup>20</sup> He adduces no evidence for the first date save the fact that Rigord knew of his defection.<sup>21</sup> But Rigord writing about 1207 has nothing whatever to say about Peter's becoming a canon and chancellor of Chartres;<sup>22</sup> that information comes from Jacques de Vitry (d. 1232). In fact, Rigord's silence on this point is an argument that Peter was not yet chancellor when the chronicle was written. Clerval tells us that Peter was succeeded in 1211 by William of Perche;<sup>23</sup> we can find no contemporary evidence that this is so. We do know that Robert de Berou was chancellor in 1213,<sup>24</sup> so that Peter's tenure of office had certainly come to an end by that year.

Hauréau in a study published in 1884 on the Chancellors of the Church of Chartres placed the chancellorship of Peter of Roissy somewhere between 1215 and 1225.<sup>25</sup> With the information now available, I am sure that he would be the first to recognize that these dates are too late. To Hauréau however must go the credit of correcting the error of the editors of the *Histoire Littéraire*,<sup>26</sup> who assign Peter of Roissy to the eleventh century. Until further evidence is available, we cannot be too definite on the exact dates of Peter's career at Chartres;

<sup>18</sup> Paris B.N. *Nouv. Acq. Ms. Lat.* 232, fol. 138v: 'Graviter tamen ut mihi videtur offendunt simplices sacerdotes (139<sup>v</sup>) confessores qui sine dispensatione et sola sua auctoritate ordinari permittunt periurus fures fornicatores adulteros incestuosos et graviores. Ego autem ad illud vitandum inconveniēns duobus parisiensibus episcopis Odone et Petro habui ut ubicumque eorum auctoritate dispensarem ibi et ipsi dispensarent.'

<sup>19</sup> P.B. Gams, *Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae* (Leipzig, 1931), p. 596.

<sup>20</sup> *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen-âge* (Chartres, 1895), pp. 327-328.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.* p. 327: 'Cette defection, signalée par Rigord, qui termina son histoire en 1207, est antérieure à cette année-là.' The 'defection' referred to is the statement of Jacques de Vitry, given in the previous paragraph, that Peter abandoned his career as reformer and became canon and chancellor of Chartres; cf. note 8 for the text of Jacques de Vitry, and note 6 for the text of Rigord.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. the text in note 6 above.

<sup>23</sup> *Les écoles etc.* p. 328: 'Son successeur fut Guillaume, comte de Perche, Chanoine dès 1196, puis prévôt, il fut chancelier de Chartres de 1211 à 1213; évêque de Chalons en 1215.' We have checked the references given to the *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame* and nothing there suggests the date 1211. His

death is recorded in vol. III, p. 40. Perhaps the correct order is: Peter of Roissy, Robert de Berou, William; cf. B. Hauréau, *Quelques chanceliers de l'église de Chartres* p. 116.

<sup>24</sup> *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Chartres II*, p. 71; cf. Clerval, *op. cit.* p. 328; Hauréau, *Quelques chanceliers de l'église de Chartres* p. 116; Merlet, *Dignitaires de l'église de Chartres* p. 105.

<sup>25</sup> *Mémoire sur quelques chanceliers de l'église de Chartres* (Mémoires de l'Institut de France XXXI, Paris, 1884), pp. 115-116. Hauréau places his chancellorship after 1215 because of the statement in his *Handbook* that he received faculties from Bishop Peter of Paris who began his episcopacy in 1208. He assumes further that Peter of Roissy followed William of Perche and Robert of Berou. He also thinks that Peter's work shows the influence of the council of the Lateran 1215; there is every indication to the contrary: he handles a multitude of problems that were settled at this council and never once refers to it. Further we have sure evidence now that he was chancellor in 1208: cf. note 10 above.

<sup>26</sup> *Histoire littéraire de la France VII* (Paris, 1867) pp. 341-342. Hauréau (*op. cit.* p. 104 ff.) shows how a sixteenth century controversialist, Garet, began the error and how it had been perpetuated by subsequent writers.

but we are sure he was chancellor in 1208 and that he had disappeared from the scene by 1213.

## (2) *Peter's Writings*

Peter of Roissy was famous, we are told, both as a preacher and a doctor of Sacred Scripture.<sup>26</sup> He is referred to by Jacques de Vitry as a Master;<sup>27</sup> he was undoubtedly trained in the schools of Paris, but there is no evidence that he ever taught in that city. As chancellor of Chartres he was in charge of the cathedral school and probably some of the works which he has left were delivered there as lectures.<sup>28</sup> His chief task would be commenting on the Scriptures and some of these commentaries are extant. An early thirteenth century manuscript of the library of Avranches contains a treatise: *Job glossatus secundum Magistrum Petrum cancellarium Carnotensem*.<sup>29</sup> A glose on the *Canticle of Canticles* in Paris B.N. Lat. 14435<sup>30</sup> ascribed to a Chancellor of Chartres may also be his.

Of the sermons preached by him, we know of only five that are extant. They are found in the manuscript Paris B.N. Lat. 14859, which also contains his *Handbook* and a series of sermons by his contemporaries, Praepositinus and Stephen Langton.<sup>31</sup>

Peter's most impressive work in his *Manuale de Mysteriis Ecclesiae*; this appears in two editions; the shorter, and apparently the earlier form, is available in the following manuscripts:

(A) Paris, B. N. Lat. 14500, fol. 112<sup>r</sup>-126<sup>v</sup>. Summa M. Petri cancellarii carnotensis: *Inc.* Frumentum desiderat nubes et nubes spargunt lumen suum . . . Thirteenth century; from the Abbey of St. Victor.<sup>32</sup>

(B) Paris B. N. Lat. 14859, fol. 288<sup>r</sup>-302<sup>v</sup>. Petri cancellarii carnotensis speculum ecclesiae: *Inc.* Frumentum desiderat nubes etc. Thirteenth century; from the Abbey of St. Victor.<sup>33</sup>

(C) Paris B. N. Lat. 14923, fol. 144<sup>r</sup>-169<sup>v</sup>. Hoc est manuale M. Petri cancellarii carnotensis de ecclesiasticis officiis super historias: *Inc.* Frumentum desiderat nubes etc. Thirteenth century; from the Abbey of St. Victor.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Cf. the text of his obituary notice in note 9 above.

<sup>27</sup> *Historia Occidentalis* c. viii; cf. note 8 above. Neither Rigord, nor Vincent of Beauvais who follows Rigord closely, give the title of Master. Roger Hovedon (*Annalium pars post.* ad an. 1198) speak of a 'Magister Petrus' among the disciples of Fulk; this may be Peter of Roissy. Four of the five Mss of his *Handbook* give him the title: *magister*.

<sup>28</sup> For the duties of the chancellor at this period, cf. A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres* p. 323.

<sup>29</sup> Avranches Ms 16, fol. 64; cf. *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques de la France—Départements X* (Paris, 1889). p. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Fol. 143<sup>r</sup>. *Inc.* Ecce Ego hodie et cras daemonia ejicio . . . A complete analysis of this manuscript is given by: P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Notre Dame, 1936). p. 101. Hauréau, (*Quelques chanceliers* p. 121), suggests that Peter is the author; cf. also *Notices et Extraits III* (Paris, 1891), p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> L. Delisle, *Inventaire des Mss Latins conservés à la Bibliothèque nationale sous les*

*nos. 8822-18613* (Paris, 1863-71), Ms. Lat. 14589; G. Lacombe, *La vie et les œuvres de Prévoisin* (Bibliothèque Thomiste XI, Le Saulchoir, 1927), p. 184. These five sermons are analysed briefly by: A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres*, pp. 352-353.

<sup>32</sup> Delisle, *Inventaire des Mss Latins* no. 14500: I. Liber epistolarum s. Gregorii. II. Meditationes s. Bernardi (103). De septuagesima et aliis ecclesie officiis quare fiunt (112). Summa Mag. Petri cancellarii carnotensis (126). Pièces sur l'église S. Jean le Rond de Paris (147): Traité mystique sur les ailes des Seraphims (150). xiii<sup>s</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. note 31 above.

<sup>34</sup> Delisle, *op. cit.* no. 14923: I. Traité sur les vices, xiii<sup>s</sup>. II. Angelica expositio a Mag. Girardo Remensi (16); Sermones ejusdem (20<sup>v</sup>). Thome Haquin (22<sup>v</sup>); fratris Auberti minoris (25<sup>v</sup>); fratris Eustachii (38); Guilhelmi de Luxi (53<sup>v</sup>); Johannis de S. Benedicto (79<sup>v</sup>). Sermo penitentialis (90). Manuale Petri cancellarii Carnotensis de ecclesiasticis officiis super historias (144). xiii<sup>s</sup>. III. Réflexions morales (170). xv<sup>s</sup>. IV. Summa Mag. Joh. Belet (357). Allegorie Mag. Petri (420). Distinctiones morales (443<sup>v</sup>). xiii<sup>s</sup>.

(D) Evreux, Bibl. de la Ville 21, fol. 138<sup>r</sup>-145<sup>r</sup>. No title. *Inc.* Frumentum desiderat nubes etc. Incomplete; thirteenth century; from the Abbey of Lyre.<sup>35</sup>

In this shorter form of his *Handbook*, Peter outlines his purpose and plan in the prologue as follows:

Frumentum desiderat nubes et nubes spargunt lumen suum . . . Nos autem harum nubium exemplo desiderabili quorundam desiderio satisfacere cupientes misteria eorum que in ecclesia Dei fiunt simplicibus etsi magnis proponimus aperire, opusculum in tria distinguentes. Primo dicamus quid singula significant in corporali fabrica ecclesie quantum ad continens sive ad contenta; secundo quid mysticum sit in misteriis ecclesie, tercio de ecclesiastico officio tum in generali tum in speciali prosequemur; et quia hec ad manum reperies manuale potes istud appellare.<sup>36</sup>

The second and much longer edition of the *Handbook* is found, so far as we know at present, in only one manuscript:

(E) Paris, B. N. *Nouv. Acq. Lat.* 232, fol. 4<sup>r</sup>-163<sup>r</sup>. Incipit manuale M. Petri cancellarii carnotensis de misteriis ecclesie per anni circulum: *Inc.* Frumentum desiderat nubes etc. Early thirteenth century.<sup>37</sup>

In this edition of his work, Peter of Roissy plans his *Handbook* as follows:

Frumentum desiderat nubes . . . opusculum presens in quinque distinguentes. Primo dicemus quid singula significant in corporali fabrica ecclesie sive quantum ad continens sive quantum ad contenta; secundo quid mysticum sit in misteriis ecclesie; tercio de officio ecclesiastico in generali; quarto in speciali; quinto de septem sacramentis; et quia hec omnia ad manum reperies manuale id potes appellare.<sup>38</sup>

The difference between the two editions is really more pronounced than the author's two prologues would lead us to believe. In addition to the book on the seven sacraments, the second version contains a long dissertation on the office of the dead which is not to be found in the first.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, even in those parts of the *Handbook* that are common to both editions, we find in the second a much longer development on certain points; this is particularly true of the sections which deal with ecclesiastical orders, vestments and the Mass. On these points, Peter in his second edition made abundant use of the *De sacro altaris mysterio*<sup>40</sup> of Cardinal Lotario (Innocent III). An example will make this clear; both editions have in common the following passage on the episcopacy:

Est autem ordo episcoporum quadripartitus. Sunt enim sic dicti quia superintendunt plebi sibi commisse. Sunt archiepiscopi sive metropolitani sic dicti a mensura civitatum quibus presunt et in quibus sunt eorum suffraganei. Sunt et primates qui presunt archiepiscopis. Sunt et patriarche qui presunt primatibus. Est et dominus papa qui omnibus preest, unde papa dicitur quasi pater patrum.<sup>41</sup>

The first edition then proceeds:

Dictum est quid mysticum attendatur in ordinibus. Consequenter dicendum est quid misterii contineant vestimenta . . .<sup>42</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques de la France—Départements II* (Paris, 1888), p. 414.

<sup>36</sup> Paris B.N. Ms. Lat. 14923, fol. 144<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> L. Delisle, *Manuscrits latins et français ajoutés au fonds des nouvelles acquisitions II* (Paris, 1891), p. 483; *Mélanges de paléographie et de bibliographie* (Paris, 1880), pp. 468-469; B. Hauréau, *Quelques chanceliers de l'église de Chartres* p. 104ff. There are a number of other manuscripts of this *Handbook* which we have not been able to examine; their existence has been signaled

by Montfaucon, *Bibliotheca Bibl.* I, p. 16 and 68; II, p. 1260 and 1264. Another copy once existed at Cologne; cf. P. Jaffé & W. Wattenbach, *Ecclesiae Metropolitanae Coloniensis codices manuscripti* (Berolini, 1874) p. 56.

<sup>38</sup> Paris B.N. Ms. *Nouv. Acq. Lat.* 232, fol. 4<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* fol. 93<sup>v</sup>-99<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> PL 217, 773-914.

<sup>41</sup> B. N. Lat. 14923, fol. 148<sup>r</sup>; *Nouv. Acq. Lat.* 232, fol. 10<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> B. N. Lat. 14923, fol. 148<sup>v</sup>.



The second edition, before proceeding to this new topic, continues with one more chapter on the church orders:

De principatu Romani pontificis. Ad designandum quod dominus papa omnibus preest, Christus Petrum preposuit cui totum ecclesiae principatum et ante passionem et circa passionem et post passionem commisit . . . quia secundum apostolum visus est Cephe, post hoc .XI. deinde plusquam quingentis fratribus simul.<sup>43</sup>

This is, almost word for word the eighth chapter of the first book of the *De sacro altaris mysterio*.<sup>44</sup> So frequently does this type of work appear in the course of his liturgical treatise that we can state with some certainty that the revision of this part of his work is due to the influence of Innocent's book; apparently it was unknown to him when he wrote his first version.

For the purpose of this study we shall confine our attention to the second edition of Peter's work. Since there is no possibility of editing the text at the present time,<sup>45</sup> we shall content ourselves with giving, at the end of this article, the headings from the Paris manuscript *E*; those who are interested in an early thirteenth century treatise on the liturgy and the sacraments will thus be able to see the type of questions treated by Master Peter. We shall now endeavor to give a short analysis of his *Handbook* and indicate some of the sources used by the author. For the purpose of this study, we divide the work into two parts since the first four books really constitute a liturgical treatise on the church services, the last a theological and canonical explanation of the sacraments.

### (3) *Peter's Treatise on the Liturgy*

In his liturgical treatise, Peter of Roissy begins by explaining the various parts of the church building.<sup>46</sup> His explanations, to tell the truth, sound weird to modern ears; in true mediaeval fashion he is interested only in the *mysterium* that underlies each object.<sup>47</sup> For him the columns of the building represent the doctors of the church; the towers, the prelates and preachers.<sup>48</sup> Peter was a doctor of scripture, not an architect, and we look in vain for any description of, or even reference to, the great cathedral of which he was the chancellor.<sup>49</sup> After completing this mystical exposition, he explains in detail the ceremony of the dedication of a church.<sup>50</sup>

The second section treats of the various ecclesiastical orders and the vestments of the old and new law.<sup>51</sup> We have already seen how Peter made use of the *De sacro altaris mysterio* in writing this part of his work. His treatment of the seven orders is based essentially on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.<sup>52</sup> His text on the first of the minor orders is as follows:

*De hostiario.* Post coronam susceptam sequitur officium hostiarii quia in veteri testamento hostiarii templum custodiebant ne ingrederetur immundus. Unde et in ordinatione dantur eis claves ecclesie et dicitur eis:

<sup>43</sup> *Nouv. Acq.* 232, fol. 10<sup>r</sup>-11<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> *PL.* 217, 778-779.

<sup>45</sup> cf. note 37 above.

<sup>46</sup> *Paris B. N. Nouv. Acq.* 232, fol. 4<sup>r</sup>-6<sup>r</sup>. Future references to this Ms will be to the folios only. For the various parts of the church building explained by Peter, see the titles in the final section of this article.

<sup>47</sup> Peter expresses his purpose in these words: quid mysticum attendatur circa fabricam ecclesie materialis vel quantum ad continens vel quantum ad contenta; (fol. 14<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>48</sup> Fol. 4<sup>r</sup>: Columpne in ecclesia minores vel maiores significant doctores. Fol. 5<sup>r</sup>:

Turres significant predicatores vel prelatos ecclesie.

<sup>49</sup> The greater part of the present cathedral was built from 1194 to 1220; Master Peter must have witnessed a great deal of the work. Cf. R. Merlet, *La Cathédrale de Chartres* (Paris, n.d.), p. 38.

<sup>50</sup> Fol. 6<sup>r</sup>-9<sup>r</sup>. After discussing this ceremony in detail and the Mass of the dedication, he gives a short note on the buildings attached to the church; domus ministrorum, domus episcopi, domus pauperum sive hospitale (fol. 9<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>51</sup> Fol. 9<sup>r</sup>-14<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> *Lib. IV, D. 24*; (Quaracchi, 1916), pp. 892-904.

Sic agite tamquam Deo rationem reddituri pro rebus que clavibus istis recluduntur.

*Quando Christus fuit hostiarius.* Hoc officium dominus in sua persona suscepit quando vendentes et ementes de templo eiecit facto funiculo de retibus. In quo docuit quod qui vendunt spiritualia eiciendi sunt ab ecclesia. Hoc officium enim in se dominus implevit cum dicit. *Ego sum ostium, per me si quis introierit salvabitur; ingreditur vere in ecclesiam et egredietur a miseria presenti.*<sup>53</sup>

At the beginning of his third book which he entitled: *De officio ecclesiastico*, he points out that he has completed two parts of his work and announces his plan for the rest of the *Handbook*:

Tercio dicendum est de officio ecclesiastico ubi diutius immorabitur; dicemus primo in generali de his que cotidie locum habent, deinde in quarto loco in speciali de officio prout variatur secundum tempora et dies, quinto de sacramentis ecclesiasticis.<sup>54</sup>

He then proceeds to discuss in detail the canonical Hours<sup>55</sup> and the Mass.<sup>56</sup> His explanation of the Mass is quite extensive, so much so that one can follow the ceremony in detail. He not only comments on each phrase of the Canon but he also introduces into his exposition a discussion of the theological problems connected with the consecration of the elements.<sup>57</sup> This is precisely the method used by Innocent III in his *De sacro altaris mysterio*. Peter of Roissy, however, is not content to borrow only the method of his predecessor; he takes over also most of his material; in fact, most of this treatise has been incorporated into our *Handbook*.<sup>58</sup>

We might expect some explanation of the elevation in the Mass, a ceremony which we know was introduced by Odo of Sully, Bishop of Paris (1196-1208).<sup>59</sup> While Peter does not discuss the problem, he does mention the elevation and asks the question: What should be said when the Host is elevated? His answer gives us the practice in those days:

Unde mos est laudabilis in ecclesia ut omnes iunctis manibus ad celum, ad terram prosternant se quia tunc venit dominus super altare et cum reverentia et honore debent eum suscipere dicentes cum propheta *Domine miserere nostri, te enim exspectavimus. Esto brachium nostrum in mane et salus nostra in tempore tribulationis.* Vel sic: *Ave rex noster filii David redemptor mundi, etc.* Vel sic: *Domine Iesu Christe filii Dei vivi qui ex voluntate patris etc.* sicut reperitur in Missali. Vel sic: *Sacrum corpus Ave Verbum patris, hostia vera, vera caro, deitas integra, verus homo. Parce mihi misero qui solus parcere nosti. Parce tuo clero, parce tuo*

<sup>53</sup> Fol. 9<sup>v</sup>; cf. *Sententiarum* loc. cit. p. 894.

<sup>54</sup> Fol. 14<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> Fol. 14<sup>v</sup>-17<sup>v</sup>. For this section of his treatise he made considerable use of the *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* of John Beleth; PL 202, 31-42.

<sup>56</sup> Fol. 18<sup>v</sup>-51<sup>v</sup>. The liturgy described here is probably that of Paris. As far as the framework of the Mass is concerned, there would be no essential difference between Paris and Chartres; in both cases, it is mediaeval derived rite; that is, it is essentially Roman with local peculiarities in the prayers at the foot of the altar, at the offertory, before and after the communion.

<sup>57</sup> Fol. 34<sup>v</sup>-41<sup>f</sup>. For the problems discussed see the contents of these folios in the last section of this article. This section corresponds roughly to the fourth book of the *De sacro altaris mysterio*; PL 217,851-886.

<sup>58</sup> Not word for word but substantially the content. At times the borrowing is little less

than a mere transcription, compare Innocent's chapter 8 of Book 6 with the following: De ablutione manuum post eucharistiam sumptam. Sumpto eucharistie sacrificio sacerdos abluat manus et perfundit ne quid incaute remaneat ex contactu divinisissimi sacramenti, non quod quidquid immundum ex contactu contraxerit sed ut pocius suam indignitatem commemoret qui se iudicans tantis sacramentis celebrandis indignum secundum id quod dominus ait: *Cum benefecistis, dicite; servi inutiles sumus.* Indignum quidem existit ut manus que corpus incorruptibile contractarunt, corpus corruptibile contingant donec studiose laventur. Ablutionis autem aqua debet in locum mundum infundi honeste ut altitudo sacramenti reverentius honoretur.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. E. Dumoutet, *Le désir de voir l'hostie* (Paris, 1926), pp. 37ff; P. Browe, *Die Verehrung der Eucharistie im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1933), p. 26ff.



*populo. Vel illam orationem quam fecit dominus P. Cancellarius Parisiensis dicens: Ave principium nostre regenerationis. Ave pretium nostre redemptionis. Ave viaticum nostre peregrinationis. Ave premium nostre remunerationis. Conditor et redemptor corporis et anime. Esto mihi custos et medicus utriusque.*<sup>60</sup>

The fourth and final part of his liturgical treatise deals in detail with the ecclesiastical year from Advent to the twenty-third Sunday after Pentecost;<sup>61</sup> to this is appended a rather lengthy dissertation on the office for the dead.<sup>62</sup> In this section of his work, Peter borrows freely from his predecessor John Beleth (d. cir. 1165);<sup>63</sup> his treatment of the church year is, however, much more extensive than Beleth's. On the other hand our author does not concern himself with the feasts of the saints save for those few which follow immediately after Christmas. To illustrate his method, we give his explanation of the feast of the Epiphany:

De Epiphania. Post predicta dicendum est de festo epiphanie. Hoc festum privilegiatur miraculo. Tertia decima die a nativitate domini venerunt magi ab oriente stella duce que apparuit eis ante nativitatem; unde dicitur epiphania a epy quod est super et phanes quod est apparitio quia supra domum apparuit stella; et ipsi tres reges obtulerunt Christo munera mystica; in auro regem, in thure sacerdotem, in myrra mortalem significantem.

Si queratur quomodo tam cito potuerunt venire a partibus tam remotis, dicitur a quibusdam quod stella apparuit eis ante nativitatem; alii dicunt quod in dromedariis qui sunt velocissimi venerunt. Unde dicitur dromedarius a dromos quod est cursus et ares quod est virtus quia virtutem habent ad currendum. Isti autem reges non venerunt soli, immo in comitatu principum.

Eadem die i.e. tertia decima tricesimi anni baptizatus est dominus ut contactum mundissime carnis sue vim regenerandi offerret aquis; et hoc festum dicitur theophania a theos quod est deus et phanes quod est apparitio quia tunc apparuit ipsum esse dominum per vocem patris. Tota enim trinitas ibi apparuit; pater in voce dicens: *Hic est filius meus dilectus etc.*; filius in Iordanis flumine; Spiritus sanctus in columbe specie. Eadem die i.e. tertia decima tricesimi primi anni aqua mutatur in vinum nuptiis. Et dicitur hoc festum bethphania a beth quod est domus et phanes quod est apparitio quia in illa die manifestavit se esse dominum in domo illa. Beda vero dicit in commentario super Lucam quod alio anno revoluto eadem die satiavit quinque milia hominum dominus quinque panibus et dicitur hoc festum phagephania a fagin quod est comedere. Et sic hac eadem die sunt quatuor festivitates: Epiphania pro stella; Theophania pro apparitione trinitatis in baptismo; Bethphania propter miraculum nuptiarum; Phagephania quando satiavit quinque milia hominum de quinque panibus.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Fol. 36<sup>v</sup>. The chancellor of Paris mentioned here could be Peter of Poitiers who held that office from 1193 to 1204, or Praepositinus, chancellor from 1206 to 1210.

<sup>61</sup> Fol. 51<sup>v</sup>-93<sup>v</sup>. This section has a short prologue: Incipit liber quartus de officio ecclesiastico in speciali. Hucusque dictum est de officio divinum in generali. Consequenter dicendum est de his que singillatim pertinet ad singula tempora anni et menses et dies. Incipiamus ergo ab adventu domini.

<sup>62</sup> Fol. 93<sup>v</sup>-99<sup>v</sup>. This section contains some interesting information on mediaeval burial customs. He gives the various cases in which christian burial is to be denied; the manner

in which a person is to be prepared for death and burial; the actual ceremony of burial; the office of the dead; the value of suffrages for the dead. One of his sources is the *Rationale* of John Beleth c. clix-clxii; PL 202, 157-164.

<sup>63</sup> *Rationale divinarum officiorum*; PL 202, 13-166. Mediaeval commentators on the liturgy borrowed so freely from one another that it is quite difficult to be certain of their sources; on this point, see my article 'The Summa de Officiis Ecclesiae of Guy d'Orchelles', *Mediaeval Studies* I (1939), 25ff.

<sup>64</sup> Fol. 62<sup>v</sup>-63<sup>v</sup>. In addition to the passage

(4) *Peter's Treatise on the Sacraments*

The treatise on the sacraments occupies the last sixty-four folios.<sup>65</sup> It is a good example of the type of work that was being done in this field at the end of the twelfth and at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The close relationship between theology and canon law at this time has been noted by many scholars.<sup>66</sup> For men like Master Peter and Robert of Courson, the *Decretum* of Gratian was just as necessary as were the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Practical problems whose solution was to be found in the works of the canonists engaged their attention just as much, if not more, than dogmatic questions on the sacraments. So true is this, that the treatises of these early thirteenth century theologians have, at times, been classed as canonical.<sup>67</sup> We should perhaps call them casuists in the good sense of the term; they seek to apply their knowledge, both theological and canonical, to the solution of specific cases. This is particularly true of Peter's *Handbook*; no doubt his background as a laborer for some years in the priestly ministry has something to do with the practical aspect of his work. Time and again in the course of his treatise, he gives us his own personal way of handling a case. We get the impression of an old and experienced campaigner giving his fellow priests the fruit of his personal experience.<sup>68</sup>

This practical character of Peter's *Handbook* is perhaps most apparent in his tract on penance.<sup>69</sup> True enough, he does concern himself with such fundamental questions as the power of the keys, the essential acts of contrition, confession, absolution and satisfaction, but a great part of the twenty folios devoted to this sacrament deal with the duties of the confessor and the penitent.<sup>70</sup> If we compare his work in this regard with that of his contemporary Robert of Courson, we note at once that the latter deals at length with such sins as usury and simony,<sup>71</sup> whereas in Peter's work, these get little attention. He is more concerned with the problem of absolving the penitent, of handling cases of excommunication and of defining the faculties of the *simplex sacerdos*. We get the impression that here he is thoroughly at home; in such matters, Peter the disciple of Fulk of Neuilly and Peter the practical canonist replace the doctor of Sacred Scripture. His advice to confessors in dealing with penitents

given above, he treats of the office and Mass of the day.

<sup>65</sup>Fol. 99<sup>r</sup>-163<sup>r</sup>. The prologue to this part is as follows: Incipit liber de sacramentis. Quare sacramenta fuerunt instituta. De sacramentis ecclesiasticis dicturi, primo dicamus quare fuerunt instituta; propter humilitatem ut homo dum humiliat se illis que sunt seipso inferiora et magis per hanc humilitatem deo placeat cui per elationem displicuerat. Et propter eruditionem ut per ea que in specie visibili foris videamus ad virtutem interiorem cognoscendam recurramus. Et propter excitationem ne a diabolo ociosi inveniamur et nos ad sua negotia trahat et in agro suo operarios faciat. Cf. *Sententiarum* Lib. IV, D.I, cap. v.

<sup>66</sup>Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* II (Freiburg, 1911), pp. 478ff. J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1914), pp. 338-346.

<sup>67</sup>B. Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits* I, p. 167. In regard to the proper classification of Robert of Courson's work, cf. S. Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* I (Città del Vaticano, 1937), p. 183, n.5; M. & C. Dickson,

'Le Cardinal Robert de Courson. Sa Vie', *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt.* IX, 1934, 72.

<sup>68</sup>Cf. the examples given in the course of this article. Peter's concluding chapter indicates that the work was written for his fellow priests: Conclusio operis. Ecce fratres opusculum de officio ecclesiastico et .vii. sacramentis ex dictis auctorum quod cum magno labore compilavimus. Non enim in hoc opere apposimus nisi quod maiorum commendat auctoritas et doctrina. Et si non qualiter debuimus tamen prout scimus et potuimus deo dante adimplevimus. Accipite igitur opusculum et cum illud perspexeritis mementote mei (fol. 163<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>69</sup>Fol. 108<sup>r</sup>-126<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>70</sup>See the list of questions at the end of this article. Almost eight folios are taken up with the problems of excommunications and relaxations.

<sup>71</sup>For the study of the *Summa* of Robert of Courson, we have used the manuscript *Bruges Ville* 247. Part of his tract on penance has been published: G. Lefèvre, *Le traité De Usura de Robert de Courson* (Lille, 1902).

shows the fervor of the missionary; his exactness in applying the law in cases of excommunication, the zeal of the reformer.

Peter's personal experience in handling practical cases is displayed particularly when he comes to deal with the impediments to Orders.<sup>72</sup> Among these impediments was homicide, even involuntary homicide which was a matter of papal dispensation; we give two of his cases:

Pueris biennibus ludentibus alter alterum in ignem trusit qui et mortuus est, superstitem ut ordinaretur ad papam transmissi . . . Duobus presbyteris simul ludentibus alter ut socium suum non tangeret sed iocose terreret lapidem proiecit, qui non ex ictu directo in eundem socium pervenit sed in parietem et ex revolutione modicum ei vulnus infixit in capite qui sui curam minus caute agens post aliquot dies defunctus est. Superstitem ut ordinis recuperaret executionem ad papam transmissi, quamvis vix tandem cum magna difficultate obtinuit.<sup>73</sup>

On the question of simony he was equally intransigent. Apparently some held that a bishop could dispense from this impediment to further promotion in sacred orders; but not Peter who claims to have the Pope on his side:

Tutius praeterea mihi videtur agere cum papa et eius petere dispensationem quam istam sequi opinionem . . . Unde et symoniaco penitenti quando eum transmittit ad papam dico: Frater non gravet te quod dico, non gravet te quod facio; aliud propter conscientiam meam non audeo dicere tibi; conscientiam meam sequor, animam meam libero. Tu si placet, episcopum tuum consulas vel alios quos volueris; tu videris quid feceris.<sup>74</sup>

For the order of his treatise on the sacraments, Peter follows in general the fourth book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.<sup>75</sup> His lack of interest in purely speculative problems is displayed at the very beginning where he fails to ask the fundamental question: What is a sacrament? On the sacraments in general, he confines himself to the reason for their institution.<sup>76</sup> On the other hand, he introduces into his treatment of the seven sacraments a great number of moral problems untouched by the author of the *Sentences*. Some of these are the result of personal experience, as we noted above, but many of them and their solution are taken from the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries.

These sources are indicated at one point. In dealing with the validity of relaxations from penance granted on the occasion of the consecration of a church,<sup>77</sup> he quotes the opinions of: Simon of Tournai,<sup>78</sup> Peter of Corbeil,<sup>79</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Fol. 137<sup>v</sup>-142<sup>v</sup>. He states the impediments under three heads: crimen, conditio, casus. Under crimen come: homicidium, symonia, excommunicatio, sortilegium, sollempnis penitentia, infamia, rebaptizatus, reordinatus, adhesio heretico, ab heretico ordinatus, qui differt baptismum usque ad mortem vel infirmitatem (fol. 137<sup>v</sup>). Under conditio: servitus, nativitas, officium, coniugium (fol. 140<sup>v</sup>). The third class of impediment i.e. casus he defines as follows: Casum hic voco eventum aliquem in corpore humano ex quo quis promoveri impeditur ut est aliquis morbus vel corporis viciū ex incisione vel lesione proveniens (fol. 140<sup>v</sup>).

<sup>73</sup> Fol. 138<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> Fol. 139<sup>r</sup>. He goes on to quote an opinion of Innocent III: Innocentius tercius tamen dicit quod quando immutatur spirituale purum pro spirituali puro non est symonia sed tamen propter suspicionem questus illicitum est.

<sup>75</sup> For example he gives a rather detailed study of circumcision before treating of baptism, as does the Lombard. His order of the sacraments, however, is somewhat

different; he places Extreme Unction immediately after Confirmation.

<sup>76</sup> The text of this section is given above in note 65.

<sup>77</sup> Fol. 124<sup>r</sup>-125<sup>r</sup>. On this problem of relaxation from penance or indulgences and its treatment by the theologians and canonists of this period, cf. N. Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses in Mittelalter I.* (Paderborn, 1922), pp. 212-252. Our author, Peter of Roissy does not add anything new to the then current solutions; in fact his conclusion is identical with that of Robert of Courson. After stating the various opinions of his predecessors and contemporaries, Peter concludes: Cum ergo nullus mortalium sciat quantum devocio suffragantium et quam efficacem aut quantum sit devocio offerentium, constat quod ipse nescit quantum de pena remittitur ei per tales oblationes. Sed sacerdos non debet consulere penitenti ut cessat a ieiunio sibi iniuncto. Immo ad cautelam debet iniungere ut, ita sicut ei iniunctum est, impleat quia quicumque casus acciderit, valebit ei vel ad remissionem peccatorum vel augmentum

Alanus of Lille,<sup>80</sup> Master Martin,<sup>81</sup> Praepositinus,<sup>82</sup> Robert of Courson,<sup>83</sup> and Peter Cantor.<sup>84</sup> How much he used these authors on other points without any acknowledgment cannot be determined at present; most of their works are

corone (fol. 125<sup>v</sup>). Practically the same statement will be found in the *Summa* of Robert of Courson; Ms *Bruges* 247, fol. 17<sup>v</sup>. Robert claims to be following the opinion of his Master, Peter Cantor.

<sup>78</sup>Fol. 125<sup>v</sup>. Simon of Tournai taught at Paris from 1174 to 1203; cf. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle I* (Paris, 1933), pp. 22-223; J. Warichez *Les disputations de Simon de Tournai* (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense XII, Louvain, 1932), pp. ix-xli. The opinion, quoted by Peter of Roissy, is probably from his unedited *Summa*; it is not found in his *Disputationes* edited by Warichez. The quotation is as follows: Sententia Simonis Tornacensis. Alii dicunt quod ecclesia non solum potest commutare verum etiam ex toto commutare; ut si quis teneatur dare .xxx. S. et det nummum fabricae vere tercia solvitur ex dispensatione ecclesie. Si vero item alii dederit ecclesie non solvitur tercia pars quantitatibus summe residue; unde non relaxatur in secunda donationibus tercia pars .xxx. S. set tantum tercia pars .xx. ut ita per tercias paulatim summa discedat ut semper aliquid restat in propria persona pagandum et sic ad immutabiles discedat absolutiones nec prorsus absolvatur a pena.

<sup>79</sup>Fol. 124<sup>v</sup>. Peter of Corbeil taught at Paris before 1199 when he was named bishop of Cambrai; he was appointed archbishop of Sens in 1200 and died in 1220. Very little is known of his teaching and none of his works are published. For some remarks on his career and doctrine, cf. G. Englhardt, *Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XXX, 4-6, Münster i.w., 1933), pp. 58-59, 116ff. His opinion on relaxations as quoted by Peter of Roissy is as follows: Sententia Petri de Corboil (in margin). Alii vero dicunt quod nulla penitentia relaxatur nisi penitens tantum det ad fabricam ecclesie construendam quantum ipsius bona existimatione vellet dare ut a tali pena absolveretur; prodest tamen dare nummum vel aliquid tale sed nescitur quantum; nec penitens propter talia minuscula debet dimittere aliquam partem penitentiae.

<sup>80</sup>Fol. 124<sup>v</sup>. Alanus of Lille (d.1203) taught at Paris and Montpellier; most of his works are published in PL 210. For his career and doctrine, cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode II*, pp. 452ff. His teaching on indulgences is given by Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses I*, pp. 223-225; the text quoted by Peter of Roissy is from his *Contra Haereticos* but it is wanting in the Migne edition; it will be found in Paulus, *op. cit. I*, p. 225. Alanus of Lille is not to be confused with the canonist Alanus of Bologna who also wrote on this problem in his *Apparatus to the Breviarium Extravagantium* of Bernard of Pavia; cf. Paulus, *op. cit. I*, p. 226.

<sup>81</sup>Fol. 124<sup>v</sup>. Very little is known of this Master Martin; he was probably teaching

at Paris in the early years of the thirteenth century; cf. Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres I*, p. 269; Grabmann, *op. cit. II*, pp. 524-530; P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Notre Dame, 1936), pp. 38-39.

<sup>82</sup>Fol. 124<sup>v</sup>. Praepositinus (Ms Petri prepositi) was chancellor of Paris 1206-1210; cf. G. Lacombe, *La vie et les oeuvres de Prévostin* (Bibliothèque Thomiste XI, Le Saulchoir, 1927), pp. 36-46. His doctrine on indulgences is to be found in his unedited *Summa*; the text of his opinion, quoted by Peter of Roissy, will be found in Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses I*, p. 227 where it is taken from Ms Munich Lat. 6985.

<sup>83</sup>Fol. 124<sup>v</sup>. Robert of Courson (Ms de Corso) was master of theology at Paris from 1200 until 1211; he was made cardinal in 1211-12 and died in 1219-20; cf. Glorieux, *Répertoire I*, pp. 235-237; M & C Dickson, 'Le Cardinal Robert de Courson. Sa Vie,' *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt. M.A. IX* 1934, 53-142. The opinion quoted by Peter of Roissy is as follows: Sententia Roberti de Corso. Alii dicunt quod tales relaxationes que fiunt a prelatibus valent per suffragia ad tria scilicet ad pene diminutionem et ad gratie impetrationem et ad venialium deletionem. Tanta enim est gratia in suffragiis et devotione quod per illa remittitur de pena penitentiae. Et sic per illa infunditur prima gratia quia licet nullus sibi posset mereri primam gratiam tamen alius potest illam alii mereri. Similiter venialia tolluntur per cotidianas orationes et per aspersionem aque benedictae et per sumpcionem eucaristiae; et per orationes fidelium fiunt hec. Remittuntur autem in his absolutionibus pene que per ignorantiam vel infirmitatem aut curialitatem aut ospitalitatem aut oblivionem aut negligentiam aut impotentiam sunt pretermisae.

This text, except for the last sentence, is found in the *Summa* of Robert de Courson; Ms *Bruges* 247, fol. 17<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>84</sup>Fol. 125<sup>v</sup>. On Peter Cantor (d.1197) cf. Grabmann, *op. cit. II*, pp. 478-485. His teaching on indulgences is given in considerable detail in: Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses I*, 215-216. Peter Cantor deals with these relaxations in his *Summa Abel* and in his *Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis*; both are unedited. The opinion quoted by Peter of Roissy is as follows: Sententia P. cantoris parisiensis. Si autem queritur quantum de pena remittitur isti per tales oblationes, dicimus quod nec angelus de celo nec aliquis mortalis nisi ei fuerit divinitus inspiratum potest hanc questionem solvers. Quod per hoc patet quia unuscumque habet intelligentiam quod maioritas vel minoritas remissionis penitentiae attenditur secundum talia; scilicet quantitatem devotionis eius qui accedat, et secundum minorem aut maiorem devotionem suffragantium et secundum pluralitatem vel paucitatem illorum qui suffragantur; quia offerens tripliciter accedere potest scilicet vel tantum aridus et sic nil meretur, vel aliquantulum devotus

still unedited. We have some indication however that he did not hesitate to borrow freely from some of them.

The unedited *Summa* of Robert of Courson in Ms. *Bruges* 247 contains more than one passage that suggests the close dependence of Peter's *Handbook* on Robert's work. There can be no question as to who is the borrower; Robert's *Summa* was written before 1207;<sup>85</sup> Peter's *Handbook* after 1208. Time and again, we find whole paragraphs that are almost identical in both works. A case in point is the problem of the *pseudo-praedicatores*; this apparently was the name given to preachers who went about the country offering relaxations from penance in return for gifts to the church. We gather that it was the practice of bishops to give such collectors a *schedula* stating that anyone, who gave to the building of a church, would receive a partial remission of penance imposed for sins. Moralists such as Robert of Courson and Peter of Roissy raise a series of questions on these relaxations. Are such preachers to be heard? They distinguish: if they preach the truth, they can be tolerated; if they insert heretical teaching to attain their ends, they are to be rejected; the bishop who commissions such preachers is bound to take proper precautions to see that they do not accept donations from usurers and thieves.<sup>86</sup> A further difficulty arises for the

et sic aliquid meretur, vel magis devotus et sic plus meretur; quando devotissime tunc satis plus meretur; quando omnis orat ecclesia pro eo tunc adhuc plus meretur. Si ergo omnia ista concurrant, tunc plus de pena remittitur offerenti; si vero minima aut nulla est omnium devotio tunc parum vel nil minuitur de pena.

We have not been able to find this quotation either in the *Summa* Abel (*Ms Bruges* 234) or in the *Summa de sacramentis* (*Ms Troyes* 276).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. M. & C. Dickson, 'Le Cardinal Robert de Courson', *Archives Hist.* IX 1934, 72.

<sup>86</sup> Fol. 126<sup>r</sup>: Utrum pseudo predicatoris sint audiendi. Queritur enim utrum pseudo predicatoris communes questuarii deferentes scedulas harum relaxationum sint audiendi. R. distinguentes quia tales relaxationes que fiunt ab illis predicatoribus aut admiscunt illi predicatoris heresim et falsitatem aut simpliciter annunciant veritatem. Si heresim interserunt propter questum fures sunt et latrones et non sint audiendi sed ab ecclesia reiциendi. Unde Augustinus ait: *Quidam in ecclesia sunt pastores et sunt imitandi, quidam mercenarii et hii ad horam tolerandi, quidam fures et ipsi sunt expellendi*. Si vero simplices et non adulterantes verbum dei et talia edicta referant relaxationum tolerari possunt.

Queritur enim utrum prelatus qui mittit tales debeat refundere in fabricam ecclesie ea que per adulterinas predicationes collegerunt pseudo passim ab omnibus sive raptoribus sive non, et utrum prelatus cum non habet litteratos quos mittat sed tales salaces caupones, debeat eis committere edictum talium relaxationum ut occasione talis edicti per mendacia que interserunt colligant miseras stipes et viles feneratorum oblationes ad edificandam ecclesiam. R. Quod si aliquis mittat tales, debet in sedula relaxationis scribere et sub pena excommunicationis interdici ne raptiores aut feneratores offerant aliquid in fabricam ecclesie sue de rapina cum hoc pocius cederet in confusionem quam ad penitentiam

relaxationem; nec debet scienter ad hoc caupones mittere sed simplices et timoratos et interdici debet eis ne predicent nisi habeant intelligentiam scripturarum et ne seminent hereses in ecclesia.

The parallel passages in the *Summa* of Robert of Courson from Ms *Bruges* 247 are: Sed queritur utrum isti pseudo communes questuarii deferentes cedulas huiusmodi relaxationum sint audiendi. Videtur quod non quia communiter predicant sub hac forma: Quicumque obtulerit fabricae illius ecclesie nummum quocumque modo accedat particeps erit relaxationis. Preterea dicunt quod si anima alicuius est in inferno per tales oblationes redimi potest vel aliqua pars pene eius tolli. Sed hec omnia heresim sapiunt quia ab inferno nulla est redemptio nec alicui diminutio quia si una pars pene sue ab aliquo posset tolli eadem ratione et alia et ita tota posset deleri quod est impossibile. Solutio. Distinguendum est quia predicantes tales relaxationes aut admiscunt heresim et falsitatem aut simpliciter annuntiant veritatem. Si heresim interserant propter questum ut diximus fures sunt et latrones et non audiendi sed rescidendi ab ecclesia quia sunt caupones miscentes aquam vino et veniunt ad nos in vestimentis ovium, intrinsecus autem sunt lupi rapaces. Unde Augustinus sic distinguens ait: *Quidam in ecclesia sunt pastores et sunt imitandi, quidam mercenarii et ad horam tolerandi, quidam fures et ipsi sunt expellendi*. Si vero simplices sunt et non adulterantes verbum dei et talia edicta referunt relaxationum ad nos tolerari possunt. Item de eisdem similis oritur questio utrum prelatus qui mittit tales debeat refundere in fabricam ecclesie ea que sic per adulterinas predicationes collegerint pseudo passim ab omnibus sive raptoribus sive non et utrum prelatus cum non habeat litteratos quos mittat sed tales fallaces caupones debeat eis committere edictum talium relaxationum ut occasione talis edicti per mendacia que interserunt colligant miseras stipes et viles feneratorum oblationes ad edificandam ecclesiam. Videtur

ordinary priest. Is he to receive these *pseudo-praedicatores*? Should he do so, he would be untrue to his flock; should he refuse, he will be in difficulty with his dean and his bishop. The answer given by Peter, and of course previously by Robert, is that the priest must obey the Lord's command: *Beware of false prophets*, and suffer excommunication and expulsion rather than allow his people to be deceived.<sup>87</sup> Another instance of Peter's copious use of the *Summa* of Robert of Courson will be given when we come to the tract on Extreme Unction.

Peter also borrows freely from the *Contra Haereticos* of Alanus of Lille.<sup>88</sup> In dealing with the question of transubstantiation, he adopts as his own the opinions put forth by Alanus; a substantial part of chapter 58 of the latter's first book is given word for word, including this definition of transubstantiation:

Transsubstantiatio est illa species mutationis secundum quod mutatur et materia et substantialis forma sed remanent accidentalia i.e. accidentia. Unde dicitur transsubstantiatio quia nihil de substantia remanet scilicet quantum ad materiam vel quantum ad substantialem formam. Talis mutatio fit in consecratione panis. Panis enim ita mutatur in Corpus Christi quia nil de materia panis remanet; substantialia enim non remanent, sed quaedam accidentalia.<sup>89</sup>

The same source is used, along with the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, when he discusses the problem of wherein reside the accidents of bread and wine after the consecration. On this question, he seems at first sight to lean to the view that the accidents are only apparently present but he finally concludes that they remain *sine subjecto*.<sup>90</sup>

In dealing with the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, our author appeals to

quod non debeat hoc aliquatenus pati neque illis in talibus auctoritatem prestare quia ille facit cuius auctoritate res sit et dicit auctoritas: Non offeres precium canis vel scorti super altare meum, et qui offert de rapina idem est ac si mactet filium in conspectu patris. Cum ergo sciat predictos offerentes de rapina potius sibi obesse quam prodesse in aliquo non debet eis prestare hoc incentivum delinquendi quod concedimus. Unde si mittat aliquis tales debet in cedula relaxationis scribere et sub pena excommunicationis interdiciere ne raptores aut feneratores offerant aliquid ad fabricam ecclesie sue de rapina cum hoc cederet potius ad confusionem quam ad penitentiae relaxationem. Nec debet scienter ad hoc caupones mittere sed simplices laicos et timoratos et interdiciere debet eis ne predicent nisi habeant intelligentiam scripturarum et ne seminent hereses in ecclesia (fol. 17<sup>v</sup>-18<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>87</sup> Fol. 126<sup>v</sup>: Queritur enim quid faciet devotus et simplex sacerdos gerens curam ovium suarum cum videt talem transmissum ei ab episcopo suo vel metropolitano deferentem schedulas continentes relaxationes et interserentem hereses et mendacia ut sibi quocumque modo et quascumque oblationes sibi acquirat. Si recipit talem scit pro certo quod tota eius plebecula confundetur per scandalum quia ipse seminabit. Si repellit eum statim insurgunt ruralis decanus et episcopus in eum sevientes et minas excommunicationis pretendentes ut eius pecuniam emungant et a parrochia expellant. R. Hic non est nisi unicum consilium salubre ut cum sacerdos sciat esse talem cauponem nullatenus eum recipiat sicut nec furem nec latronem, iuxta id: *Attendite a falsis prophetis* etc. Et iterum: si aliud precipiat

consul et aliud proconsul, precepto consulis est obediendum. Permittet ergo potius se excommunicari et a parrochia expelli quam tantum gregi sue iacturam paciatur.

The *Summa* of Robert of Courson has the same almost verbatim: Ms. *Bruges* 247, fol. 18<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>88</sup> PL 210, 305-430.

<sup>89</sup> Fol. 128<sup>r</sup>; cf. PL 210, 360.

<sup>90</sup> Fol. 128<sup>v</sup>: In quo est forma panis post consecrationem et ubi sunt accidentia. Nulla accidentia sunt ibi post transubstantiationem sed videntur esse cum non sint. Unde nec est ibi albedo vel rotunditas sed sacramentaliter albedo et sacramentaliter rotunditas et est ibi ymaginaria albedo et ymaginaria rotunditas et sic de aliis. Et ut ita loquor ibi est mistica sive sacramentaliter fractio et sic de reliquis; omnia enim illa fiunt in misterium et sacramentum i.e. in figura. Non ergo frangitur corpus Christi sed panis frangitur in sacramento. Non atteritur corpus Christi dentibus sed est ymaginaria atteritio in misterium, nec est ibi prestigium sed sacramentum. Sunt enim fallacie visus. Una est quando non videmus quod oculis presentatur quam aorisia i.e. avidentia qua percussi sunt illi qui querebant Heliseum et qui euntes in Emaus Christum videbant nec agnoscebant. Alia est quod dicitur prestigium quando arte magica ita prestigiuntur oculi ut videatur aliquid esse quod non est nec videatur quod est, et ista fit a magis ad decipiendum. Alia vero est quae fit ad instruendum et in sacramentis iuxta quod prophetis videbatur videre ea quae non videbant; unde Ieremie videbatur ollam succensam videre ab aquilone. Similiter sapor et color videntur esse in sacramento altaris nec tamen ibi est prestigium quia hoc non fit ad decipiendum

the opinion of Peter Cantor: *sicut dicit magister P. Cantor parisiensis*.<sup>81</sup> In this case, as in the question of relaxations mentioned above, he is giving almost verbatim an argument of Robert of Courson; in both instances Robert also quotes the opinion of the Chanter: *Dicit Magister Noster Petrus Cantor*.<sup>82</sup> We may presume that these quotations in our *Handbook* are second hand; moreover, since Peter of Roissy drops the qualification: *Magister Noster*, we may reasonably assume that he did not study under the famous twelfth century master.

The type of problem relative to the sacraments that engaged the attention of Peter and his contemporaries was twofold; speculative and practical. This is well illustrated in his treatment of the Eucharist.<sup>83</sup> From the speculative point of view he is concerned with such questions as: the institution; the matter of the sacrament; the change operated by the words of consecration; the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament; what happens when the Host is broken; whether the good and the bad both receive the Body of Christ, etc.<sup>84</sup> In general it may be said that practically every problem that was to engage the attention of St. Thomas Aquinas<sup>85</sup> and the later scholastics is to be found here in rudimentary form. From the practical or moral viewpoint, Peter discusses the obligation of receiving this sacrament; the dispositions necessary in the communicant; the care that is to be observed by the celebrant in the administration of the sacrament, etc. On these points, he makes frequent use of canonical authorities.<sup>86</sup>

The influence of Canon Law on the teaching of Peter and his fellow schoolmen is especially apparent when they deal with such problems as the impediments to the sacraments of Orders and Matrimony. Occasionally a whole chapter will be little else than a series of references to canonical authorities, particularly the *Decretum* of Gratian. For example, in treating bigamy as an impediment to Orders he defines his term as follows:

Bigamus dicitur qui nupsit deo et postea homini, ut XXVII. q. 1. *Quotquot*; qui uxorem suam agnovit postquam adulterata est, ut .d. XXXIII. *Sicut*; qui cum vidua contraxit, ut .d. XXXIII. *Si quis viduam*; qui insimul plures uxores retinet, ut .XXIII. q. ii. *annon*, et d. XXXIII. *christiano*; qui unam de facto, aliam de iure habuit, ut in ex. *de sponsa duorum*, *Licet*; qui duos habuit legitime et diversis temporibus, ut .d. XXVI. *Acutius*; qui duxit in uxorem ab alio cognitam, ut .d. XXXII. *Seriatim* et *L. Qui in alio crimine*.<sup>87</sup>

sed potius ad instruendum et in sacramentum quod enim accidentia que remanent sine subiecto sunt. Ille qui accidentia creavit ut in subiecto essent potest facere ut sint sine subiecto quod enim hoc modo vel alio modo sunt a deo est. Corpus autem Christi ideo dicitur videri quod forma panis sub qua velatur videtur. Sicut dicitur quod manus velatur cyroteca vel pes tectus a bota videtur. Cum ergo aliquod verbum vel ad sensus pertinet vel ad corruptionem aliquam inconueniens de corpore Christi dicitur non ad ipsam essentialiter sed ad formam referendum est. Et illa accidentia scilicet: sapor, pondus, color et huiusmodi, de quibus si quiesieris in quo substantia fundatur, credo respondendum quod Augustinus ait super Iohannem: Potius videtur mihi hec accidentia esse sine subiecto quam in subiecto quia ibi non est substantia nisi corporis et sanguinis domini quia illum non afficitur accidentibus; non enim corpus Christi in se habet talem formam sed qualis in iudicio apparebit. Cf.

*Contra Haereticos* I, c. 58; PL 210, 361-2; *Sentences* IV, D. xii, c.1.

<sup>81</sup> Fol. 107<sup>r</sup>. The complete text of his tract on this sacrament is given below.

<sup>82</sup> Ms *Bruges* 247, fol. 150<sup>r</sup>; cf. note 77 above.

<sup>83</sup> The tract on the Sacrament of the Eucharist runs from fol. 127<sup>r</sup> to fol. 134<sup>r</sup>. Many of the problems are treated in the third book on the ecclesiastical office, where he is discussing the Mass, particularly from fol. 35<sup>r</sup> to fol. 41<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>84</sup> For the complete list, cf. the last section of this article: *The Contents of Peter's Handbook*. For an example of his method, cf. n. 90.

<sup>85</sup> Compare the list of questions in the *Contents of Peter's Handbook* (fol. 35<sup>r</sup>-41<sup>r</sup>; 127<sup>r</sup>-134<sup>r</sup>) with *Summa Theologica* III, qu. 73-83.

<sup>86</sup> For example in the chapter: *De negligentia corporis et sanguinis domini* (fol. 133<sup>v</sup>) he quotes Gratian's *Decretum*, *De Consecr.* D.2. c.28 and 29.

<sup>87</sup> Fol. 142<sup>v</sup>. We give the text exactly as it



All but one of the above references are from the *Decretum*,<sup>98</sup> the one exception (*ut in ex. de sponsa duorum. Licet.*) is found in the *Breviarium Extravagantium* or *Prima Compilatio*<sup>99</sup> composed by Bernard of Pavia between 1188 and 1192.<sup>100</sup> The frequent quotations from Alexander III found in our manuscript indicate clearly that Master Peter was familiar with this or a similar collection of decretals.<sup>101</sup>

Space does not permit an analysis of each sacrament. We refer the reader to the list of questions published at the end of this article; that better than anything else will show the comprehensiveness if not the thoroughness of his treatment. To illustrate his method we give in full the text of his tract on Extreme Unction; it is relatively brief but at the same time quite characteristic. To show his rather slavish borrowing from his contemporary Robert of Courson, we give in the notes the latter's tract on the same sacrament. By comparing these treatises with the corresponding sections in the *Sentences* of Lombard, the reader can judge the progress that had been made in this field;<sup>102</sup> at the same time, he can, by a comparison with the work of St. Thomas, see the relative insufficiency of the work of these early thirteenth century Masters.

### (5) *Peter's Tract on Extreme Unction*

(fol. 107<sup>r</sup>) *Incipit de Extrema Unctione*.<sup>103</sup> *Quid sit Extrema Inunctio. Extrema Inunctio non est actio inungentis vel passio inuncti sed est sacramentum proveniens ex intentione inungentis et ex benedictione verborum vel forma facta super infirmum et ex sacri olei delibatione rite facta super membra infirmi.*

*Unde dicitur Extrema Inunctio. Hoc sacramentum dicitur signum quia exterior inunctio significat interiorem i.e. gratie collationem que percipienti digne hoc*

is found in the manuscript: the references to the *Decretum* are quite accurate and precise. The references to the modern Leipzig edition are, in the order in which they come: (1) C.24.q.1.c.24; (2) C.32.q.1.c.1; (3) D.24.c.13. (4) C.24. q.3.c.19; D.34.c.5; (6) D.26.c.2; (7) D.32.c.14; D.51.c.5. The fifth reference is to the *Prima Compilatio* 4.4; *Quinque Compilationes Antiquae* ed. A. Friedburg (Lipsiae, 1882), p. 46.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. the previous note.

<sup>99</sup> A. Friedburg, *Quinque Compilationes Antiquae* (Lipsiae, 1882), pp. 1-65; cf. note 97.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. S. Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* I (Studi e Testi 71, Città del Vaticano, 1937), p. 322.

<sup>101</sup> Examples: Respondeo cum Alexandro III<sup>o</sup> in quodam decretali eum esse privandum officio et beneficio (fol. 141<sup>r</sup>); Alexander III dicit: Capellanam quem benedictionem cum secunda tibi constituerit prestitisse ab officio beneficioque suspensum cum litterarum testimonio appellatione cessante ad sedem apostolicam nullatenus destinare postponas (fol. 142<sup>r</sup>); Alexander III ait: Nullus fidelium cuiuscumque conditionis sit occulte faciat nuptias sed benedictione accepta publice nubat in domino. Si ergo sacerdos tales nuptias benedixisse inventus fuerit triennio suo officio suspendatur (*ibid.*). The second and the third of these examples are found in the *Compilatio Secunda*, 1210-1215 (Friedburg op. cit., p. 92 and 96). Master Peter could hardly have used this collection; for

the various collections of decretals which could have been available to him about 1208, cf. S. Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* I, pp. 272-321. Of the commentators of Gratian, our author mentions only Huguccio (fol. 140<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>102</sup> For an excellent study on this sacrament in the writings of Peter's predecessors, cf. H. Weisweiler, 'Das Sacrament der Letzten Oelung in den systematischen Werken der ersten Frühscholastik', *Scholastik* VII 1932, 321-353; 524-560.

<sup>103</sup> The text of Robert de Courson's treatise on Extreme Unction in Ms Bruges 247, fol. 149<sup>v</sup>:

De Extrema Inunctione.

Sequitur ut dubia de extrema inunctione prosequamur. Unde videndum est quid sit extrema inunctio et a quo et quando fuerit instituta et que persone habeant inungere et que inungi et quando et quotiens et sub qua forma verborum. Que obiecta sunt de confirmatione hic possunt obici.

Unde ut breviter pertranseamus dicimus quod extrema inunctio non est actio inungentis vel passio inuncti sed est sacramentum proveniens ex intentione inungentis et ex benedictione verborum vel forma facta super infirmum et ex sacri olei delibatione rite facta super membra infirmi. Hoc sacramentum dicitur signum quia exterior inunctio figurat interiorem i.e. gratie collationem que percipienti digne hoc sacramentum confertur. Non enim stat in sacramento vel in aliis, ut predictum est, novi testamenti sacramentis quin in



sacramentum confertur. Non enim stat in hoc sacramento vel in aliis novi testamenti sacramentis quin in summentibus ea significant que figurant i.e. quin conferant gratiam vel augmentum gratie, sed malitia summentis eam quandoque obstat sicut malitia aegroti obstat quandoque ne medicus curet eum qui alias eum curaret; significat enim hoc sacramentum spirituale inunctionem.

*A quo fuit Extrema Inunctio instituta.* Fuit autem institutum hoc sacramentum a Jacobo Ierosolimitano episcopo post missionem apostolorum. Unde ipse ait; *Infirmatur aliquis ex vobis, adducet presbyteros ecclesie ut orent super infirmum ungentes eum oleo sancto in nomine domini et oratio fidei salvabit infirmum et alleviabit eum dominus et dimittentur ei peccata.*

*Utrum unus sacerdos possit inungere.* Dicimus autem quod unus solus sacerdos sufficit ad talem inunctionem faciendam ubi plures haberi non possunt. Sed tamen utile est plures interesse presbyteros ad multiplicanda suffragia pro infirmo. In necessitate autem solus sacerdos potest inungere. In III<sup>o</sup> Sententiarum hoc invenitur: Si ex contemptu vel negligentia hoc sacramentum pretermittitur periculosum est et damnabile.

*Quo oleo debet fieri Extrema Inunctio.* Dicimus autem illo oleo quod dicitur oleum infirmorum debet fieri extrema inunctio. De hoc oleo scilicet infirmorum dicitur in Marco: *Discipuli inungebant multos oleo et curabant.*

*Utrum Extrema Inunctione dimittantur peccata.* Oleo autem inunctio exterior

summentibus ea efficiant quod figurant i.e. quin conferant gratiam vel augmentum gratie sed malicia summentium ea quandoque obstat sicut malicia aegroti obstat quandoque ne medicus curet eum qui alias eum curaret. Item hoc sacramentum quandoque dicitur sacrum secretum scilicet non exterius signaculum sed interius collatum beneficium scilicet ipsum signatum quod est spiritualis anime inunctio. Fuit autem hoc sacramentum institutum ut plerique asserunt primo a Jacobo Ierosolimitano episcopo post missionem apostolorum ut habetur in canonica epistola caput ultimum ubi dicitur: *Infirmatur quis in vobis inducat presbyteros ecclesie ut orent super infirmum inungentes eum oleo sancto in nomine domini et oratio fidei salvabit infirmum et alleviabit eum dominus. Et si in peccatis sit, dimittentur peccata.* Non enim hoc semper contingit.

Quarta questio est de tempore inungendi. Nescitur enim an in principio egritudinis sit inungendus infirmus an expectandum sit semper usque dum periculose egrotet. Si autem verum est quod dicitur quod presbyteri sunt inducendi ad inungendum et hoc habemus ex canonica scriptura, videtur quod non sufficiat unus solus sacerdos ad illam inunctionem faciendam nisi hoc possit probari per canonicam scripturam. Sed nusquam invenitur hoc probatum in canonica scriptura. Quomodo ergo possumus asserere quod unus sacerdos sufficiat ad talem inunctionem faciendam?

Solutio. Credimus quod divina inspiratio revelatum fuit ecclesie unum presbiterum sufficere ad extremam inunctionem faciendam ubi plures non possunt haberi. Unde Iacobus non constituit vim in numero; tamen pluraliter dixit *inducat presbyteros* quia utile est plures interesse presbyteros ad multiplicanda suffragia pro

infirmo. Ad sequens dicimus quod cum quadrupartita sit inunctio, una in baptismo, secunda in confirmatione, tertia in hoc sacramento, quarta pro egrotantium curatione, in prima exigitur crisma et oleum sanctum, in secunda crisma tantum et in tertia et in quarta tantum oleum. Sed in hoc est differentia quod quarta inunctio iam recessit ab usu. Illa etenim [uti] solebant non solum apostoli sed viri sancti in faciendis miraculis inungentes quoscunque infirmos oleo quod dicebatur infirmorum quia tali oleo curabant infirmos. Unde legimus quod beata Genovepha deferebat oleum secum ab episcopo consecratum et illo inungebat infirmos et curabat et si quando deficiebat ei oleum adibat episcopum qui aliud ei oleum benedicebat. Sed non utimus oleo ad curandum infirmos nisi in extrema inunctione. De eodem oleo scilicet infirmorum dicitur in Marco: *Discipuli inungebant oleo multos egrotos et curabant.* Sed hodie inunctio extrema non ita sanat egrotum sicut illud oleum infirmorum nec per ipsam dimittuntur peccata. Quid est ergo quod dicitur a Iacobo *alleviabit eum dominus et si in peccatis est dimittentur ei?* Solutio. Nunquam oleum vel inunctio exterior vel (fol. 150<sup>r</sup>) manuum impositio vel benedictio vel consecratio aliqua dimittit peccatum. Sed (Ms: si) dicuntur in talibus et per talia dimitti peccata quia sunt quedam occasio et excitatio devotionis ad peccata dimittenda et ad suscipiendam gratiam vel augmentum gratie.

De tempore autem inunctionis vel vocationis sacerdotum ad inunctionem extremam faciendam dubitari potest. Ubicumque enim aliquid est certum et aliud incertum, tenendum est certum et dimittendum incertum. Sed incertum est an egrotus futurus sit compos sui usque ad finem

vel manuum impositio vel benedictio vel consecratio aliqua non dimittunt peccata sed dicuntur in talibus vel per talia dimitti peccata quia sunt quedam occasio et excitatio devotionis ad peccata dimittenda et ad suscipiendam gratiam vel augmentum gratie.

*Utrum in principio egritudinis an in medio an in fine sit danda Extrema Inunctio.* Sicut dicit Magister P[etrus] Cantor parisiensis quod sacramentum est conferendum egroto, sive periculose egrotet sive non, si fieri potest dum est compos sui, quia si cronica egritudo et periculosa consultius est si in principio conferatur.

*Utrum Extrema Inunctio sit iteranda.* Si autem hoc sacramentum fuerit semel collatum in anno, in eodem anno vel in brevi tempore non est necesse (fol. 107<sup>v</sup>) conferri quia sufficit ut semel in anno conferatur. Si vero in breviori tempore iterato conferatur non sit contra canonicam scripturam quia nihil est super hoc diffinitum.

*Que sacramenta sunt necessitatis.* Sunt autem quedam sacramenta impressiva characteris ut baptismus, confirmatio et ordo et illa semel collata nunquam sunt iteranda. Alia sunt cotidiane necessitatis contra ruinas nature fragilitatis ut penitentia et extrema inunctio. Et quia cotidianis contra infirmitates nostras egemus remediis, ideo sepius hec sacramenta sunt iteranda.

*Quando fuit Extrema Inunctio instituta.* Dicunt quidam quod extrema inunctio

egritudinis sue et certum est quod in principio sue egritudinis est compos sui; ergo in principio egritudinis sui potius est ei hoc sacramentum conferendum quando ei valere poterit quam in fine. Item si statim petat eucharistiam statim ei danda est. Et longe maius est sacramentum eucharistie quam extreme inunctionis; ergo pari ratione quandocumque postulat extremam inunctionem est ei conferenda. Si autem quis dicat quod tantum in extrema necessitate vel imminente periculo est dandum hoc sacramentum, ergo si nimia est aeris pestilentia vel alia causa mortis subitaneae emineat, vel si aliquid periculosum prelium sunt aggressuri, vel per mare periculosum et tempestuosum navigaturi, vel per sicarios in discrimine mortis transaturi, ipsi debent hoc sacramentum in omni tali periculo petere et sacerdotes, scientes quod poterit eis prodesse, non debent illud eis denegare. Solutio. Hoc est sacramentum. Quia hec in nulla canonica scriptura sunt diffinita, nolumus hic aliquid temere asserere vel diffinire. Quidam tamen asserunt hoc sacramentum quia finis est et conclusio omnium sacramentorum. Ideo ad finem et ad conclusionem debere conferri; tamen nobis consultius videtur hoc sacramentum conferendum egroto sive periculose egrotet sive non, sicut asserit Magister noster Cantor parisiensis. Sed obicitur: nonne etas decrepita et cronica egritudo periculosa est? Ergo videtur quod talibus sit dandum hoc sacramentum in medio vel in fine. Solutio. De hiis et de existentibus in periculis possumus dicere quod tamen extrema inunctio non sit sacramentum necessitatis sicut baptismus eo quod sine eo non est salus; hoc sacramentum nec in omni periculo petitur nec in omni periculo datur, tamen si cronica est egritudo et periculosa consultius agitur si in eius initio conferatur.

Sed si collatum fuerit semel in anno alicui hoc sacramentum an idem sit iterato illi in eodem anno conferendum et in breviori tempore vel in prolixiori et si hoc sacramentum est pluries iterandum quare similiter alia sacramenta non sunt iteranda? Solutio. Quedam sacramenta sunt cum impressura characteris ut baptismus, confirmatio et ordo et illa semel collata non sunt iteranda; alia sunt cotidiane necessitatis contra ruinas nostre fragilitatis ut penitentia, eucharistia, extrema inunctio et quia cotidianis contra infirmitates nostras egemus remediis ideo sepius iteramus huiusmodi sacramenta. Sed non ita sepe iteratur extrema inunctio sicut alia sed sufficit secundum consuetudinem Clarevalentium ut semel in anno conferatur et non iterum in eodem anno confertur. Tamen si breviori tempore iterato conferatur hoc non fit contra canonicam scripturam quia nichil est super hoc diffinitum in veteri vel in novo testamento vel in sacris canonibus. Sunt alii qui aliter sentiunt quam predicti de tempore institutionis huius sacramenti dicentes quod extrema inunctio instituta est a domino ante editionem canonice epistole Iacobi quando misit dominus ad curandum omnem languorem. Unde in evangelio Luce et Marci dicitur: *Exeuntes autem discipuli predicabant ut penitentiam agerent et multa demonia eiciebant et ungebant oleo multos egrotos et sanabant.* Et intelligendum est hoc non tantum de oleo extreme inunctionis sed de oleo energumenorum et obsessorum a demonio quos oleo sacro inungentes apostoli fugabant demonia et curabant infirmos. Unde hec inunctio que modo non usitatur in ecclesia dabatur impenitentibus et indignis que, non solum ab episcopis sed ad alios, infirmis ministrabatur sicut de beata Genovefa ostendimus. Simili modo ad expellendas aerias potestates et

instituta est a domino quando misit apostolos ad curandum omnem languorem. Unde in evangelio Luce et Marci dicitur: *Euntes autem discipuli predicabant ut penitentiam agerent et multa demonia ejiciebant et inungebant oleo multos egrotos et sanabant.* Et est intelligendum hoc non tantum de oleo extreme unctionis sed de oleo energumensorum et obsessorum a demonibus quos oleo sacro inungentes apostoli fugabant demonia et curabant infirmos.

*Utrum Extrema Inunctio debeat dari parvulis.* Dicimus autem quod extrema inunctio non debet dari parvulis cum in eius collatione dicatur: *Quidquid peccasti per visum vel per auditum remittat tibi dominus;* et parvulus non sic peccavit nec aliter, et ideo non est ei conferenda. Sacramentorum aliud est remedium prime nativitatis ut baptismus quo purgatur originale peccatum; aliud est remedium cotidianum infirmitatis ut extrema unctio et penitentia et eucharistia et talia sacramenta non habent locum nisi in illis qui peccaverint.

*Quare potius iteratur Penitentia vel Eucharistia quam Extrema Inunctio.* Haec est causa quare potius iteratur eucharistia quam alia quia magis nobis prodest sumptio eucharistie tamquam cotidianum nostrum viaticum et quia excellentius est sacramentum et quia ecclesia instituit ita ut sepius conferatur quam extrema inunctio. De penitentia nulla est questio quia sepius debeat iterari quam omnia alia. Unde cum justus cadat in die septies et in omni casu necessaria sit penitentia, ideo ipsa sepius est iteranda.

pestilentias utimur hodie aqua benedicta et in veteri testamento utebantur aqua expiationis per aspersorium factum de yzopo et filo coccineo ad emundandum populum et tabernaculum et vasa tabernaculi. Item cum extrema inunctio soleat fieri propter remedium egritudinis in corpore et ad augmentum gratie in anima queritur quare non datur parvulis si forte (fol. 150<sup>v</sup>) aliqua detinentur egritudine. Videmus enim quod maiora eis conferuntur sacramenta sicut baptismus, confirmatio, eucharistia. Sed dicit aliquis quod Iacobus noluit hoc sacramentum pertinere nisi ad adultos quod videtur ostendere per hoc quod ait: *Inducat presbyteros.* Non enim est parvulorum inducere aliquos sed adultorum. Si quis sophistice vult solvere, dicit paratione baptismus non pertinet nisi ad adultos. Nam dicitur in evangelio; *Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit.* Sed ipsorum non est adhuc credere cum non habeant fidem nisi in habitu et non in actu. Unde debet ita exponi clausula illa: *Qui crediderit* per se vel per alium, *salvus erit.* Nam parvulus qui contraxit originale per se vel per alium ideo per fidem alterius potest liberari ab originali. Item dicit aliquis ideo parvulo non convenit extrema inunctio quia in eius collatione dicitur: *Quidquid peccasti per visum, quicquid per auditum etc. remittat tibi dominus.* Sed parvulus nec sic nec aliter peccavit et ideo non est ei conferenda extrema inunctio. Solutio. Recurre ad distinctionem predictam. Sacramentorum aliud est remedium prime nativitatis ut baptismus quo purgatur originale i.e. originalis culpa, aliud est remedium cotidianae infirmitatis ut extrema inunctio et penitentia et talia sacramenta non habent locum nisi in illis qui peccaverunt et ideo parvulis non est conferenda extrema inunctio.

Item queritur quare sepius iteratur

eucharistia vel penitentia quam extrema inunctio, quia non confertur nisi semel in anno, sed eucharistia singulis diebus sumitur a pluribus et penitentia sepius in die. Respondeo. Non videmus hic aliam causam nisi quia magis prodest nobis sumptio eucharistie tamquam cotidianum viaticum et quia excellentius est sacramentum et quia ecclesia instituit ita ut sepius conferatur quam extrema inunctio. De penitentia nulla est questio quin sepius debeat iterari quam alia omnia. Unde cum iustus septies cadit in die et in omni casu necessaria est penitentia ipsa sepius omnibus est iteranda.

Item hoc sacramentum secundum usum nostri temporis non datur nisi poscenti. Unde hec inolevit consuetudo cum apostoli non poscentes unctionem inungerent oleo ut energuminos lunaticos, qui petere non poterant nec volebant, etiam curabant. Quid ergo fiet si egrotus non possit petere etiamsi speraret quod per unctionem consequeretur alleviationem tam in anima quam in corpore? Preterea apostoli de mandato domini inungebant energuminos et curabant infirmos et multi tales in ecclesia hodie egerent tali unctione. Unde ergo presumpsit ecclesia subtrahere talem unctionem a lunaticis energuminis freneticis qui de facili curarentur nunc per tale oleum sicut et tunc? Solutio. Non credo quod debeamus unctionem extremam soli poscenti dare; immo si infirmus differt eam petere, eius petitionem debemus prevenire et suggerere ei ut eam petat. Et credimus quod apostoli attenderunt duobus generibus hominum esse conferenda duo genera unctionum. Quidam enim adeo periculose egrotabant et adhuc egrotant in ecclesia quod sui compotes non sunt ut energumini et frenetici et ideo familiari consilio spiritus sancti instituerunt ut tales oleo consecrato ab episcopo inungerentur et sic per preces

*Utrum hoc sacramentum debeat dari nisi poscenti.* Extremam inunctionem non credimus soli poscenti dari; immo si infirmus differt eam petere eius petitionem debemus prevenire et suggere ut eam petat. Quia si petat eucharistiam quod maius est multo fortius videtur petere quod minus est scilicet extremam inunctionem.

*Utrum uno membro inuncto Extrema Inunctio ad alia membra descendat.* Bene potest esse quod, inuncto uno membro sensato, derivatur ab illo membro inunctionis virtus ad alia membra facta insensata. Et cum velit inungi et non potest, supplet voluntas quod non potest facultas.

*Utrum aliqua necessitate cogente hoc sacramentum possit celebrari ab alio quam a sacerdote et utrum illud oleum possit benedici nisi ab episcopo et utrum alio die quam in die cene.* Haec inunctio non debet celebrari nisi a sacerdote nec aliqua necessitate illud oleum potest benedici nisi ab episcopo nec alio die quam in die cene est oleum illud benedicendum nisi post generale concilium ampliata esset illa ad alios dies per internam inspirationem.

*Quare in hoc sacramento fit duplex benedictio.* Si collatio baptismi expectaret benedictionem aque precedentem, iam immineret sepe periculum puero baptizando propter dilationem et ideo confertur sepe sine benedictione. In

inungentium et per sacramentum talis inunctionis redierunt ad cor et curabantur; et quia in ecclesia sepe talis accidit egritudo, adhuc necessaria esset simul curatio quamvis iam evanuerit per consuetudinem abutentium in contrarium. Alii quidem ita egrotant quod compotes sui maneant et ad remedium talium in anima et in corpore instituta est extrema inunctio.

Videtur ergo quod extrema inunctio nichil valeat insensatis. Sic ergo videtur quod bene fecerit ille egrotus qui omni intellectu et sensu privatus inunctus est extrema inunctione et postmodum convaluit et nesciens se inunctum ideo fecit se iterum inungi quia non habuit sensum aliquem quando inunctus est primo et ideo pro infecto habuit. Dicimus quod bene fecit. Sed contra. Parvulus nichil intelligit de hiis que fiunt ei in baptismo vel in confirmatione et tamen prosunt ei. Quare non similiter prodest extrema inunctio facta insensato? Solutio. Secus est de illis sacramentis necessitatis et de inunctione que non est sacramentum necessitatis que ideo non confertur parvulo quia non peccavit ille per membra illa que inunguntur in adultis. Sed queritur utrum uno membro inuncto, intellectu manente egroti, valeat ei inunctio per cetera membra (fol. 151<sup>r</sup>) facta insensata? Videtur quod valeat sicut circa parvulum qui si moriatur post primam immersionem baptizatus est. Item voluntas in via pro facto reputatur. Quia quod vis et non potes deus pro facto reputat. Sed non est ita in invio quia plus damnat voluntas et opus quam voluntas per se, eo quod contemptus plus crescit per illa duo quam per alterum. Sed in via pluralitas operum non facit maius premium nec unquam crescit meritum nisi crescit caritas. Sit ergo quod iste laborans in extremis oportet inungi et desidia sacerdotis sit in causa quare non inungitur dum est in sensu

suo. Videtur ergo quod nichil amittat hic egrotus sicut nec si optet eucharistiam et non habeat cum velit. Solutio. Bene potest esse quod inuncto uno membro sensato derivatur ab illo membro inunctionis virtus ad alia etiam facta insensata; et cum quis vult inungi et non potest, supplet voluntas quod non potest facultas. Alii tamen asserunt quod non derivatur virtus inunctionis ab uno membro ad alia. Sed nec eius contrarium diffinitum est in aliqua canonica scriptura. Ex iam dictis innuit quid sit extrema inunctio et a quibus instituta et que persone et quot habeant inungere et que inungi et quotiens et quis eius effectus.

Sed queritur utrum pro aliqua necessitate possit hoc sacramentum ministrari ab alia persona quam a sacerdote cum baptismus in articulo a quolibet potest conferri; et utrum ab alio quam ab episcopo possit consecrari oleum inunctionis; et utrum episcopus possit in alia die benedicere oleum inunctionis quam in die cene precipue ubi infirmus laborat in extremis et non habetur oleum benedictum? Solutio. Dicimus quod non potest pro aliqua necessitate vel oleum benedici nisi ab episcopo nec inunctio potest celebrari nisi a sacerdote, nec in aliquo die quam in die cene est oleum illud benedicendum nisi per generale concilium ampliata esset benedictio illa ad alios dies per internam inspirationem. Nec est simile de baptismo quod est sacramentum necessitatis. Sed queritur quare in hoc sacramento sit duplex benedictio et non in aliis. Prima benedictio fit cum ipso crismate, secunda fit in extrema inunctione. Sed baptismus confertur sine omni precedenti benedictione aque et sine sequenti benedictione. Eucharistia autem etsi recipiat benedictionem in consecratione tamen non fit alia benedictio in eius collatione. Solutio. Si collatio baptismi expectaret benedictionem aque precedentem immineret sepe

perceptione vero eucaristie non debet fieri aliqua benedictio, nam totus Christus confertur in ea qui est actor omnis benedictionis. Et quia sufficiens benedictio precessit in consecratione ei aliquam superaddere presumptuosum esset. In hoc autem sacramento (fol. 108<sup>r</sup>) prima benedictio fit in oleo, secunda in collatione ipsius sacramenti.

*Sub qua forma fiat hoc sacramentum.* Verba autem que proponunt modo sacerdotes inungentes infirmos de institutione ecclesie processerunt scilicet a sanctis patribus et ideo nunc sunt iteranda.

## (6) *The Content of Peter's Handbook*

(fol. 4<sup>r</sup>) Incipit Manuale Magistri Petri Cancellarii Carnotensis de misteriis ecclesie per anni circulum.

[Prologus] Frumentum desiderat nubes et nubes spargunt lumen suum, etc.

### [I. De corporali fabrica ecclesie]

In quibus fuit figurata ecclesia in veteri testamento.—[De cortinis]—De fundamento ecclesie—De parietibus—De quadratis et policione—De cemento—De fenestris vitreis (fol. 4<sup>r</sup>) De columnis—De hostio—De tignis—De cancello et navi ecclesie—De forma ecclesie—De pulpito—De reclinatoriis et dorsalibus—De sede episcopi—De altari (fol. 5<sup>r</sup>) De vestimentis et ornamentis altaris—De gradibus et interiori ornatu ecclesie—De turribus ecclesie—De campanis seu tintinnabulis (fol. 5<sup>v</sup>) De varietate campanarum—De forma campanarum—De diversa pulsatione campanarum in diebus festis et in profestis—De classicis principalibus (fol. 6<sup>r</sup>) Quare non pulsantur campane ecclesie in interdicto—Qualiter in obitu hominis vel mulieris pulsari debent—Unde usus campanarum habuit originem—Quare campane pulsantur ad ignitegium—De plectro campane—De ligno unde pendet campana et ligata—De corda—De annulo corde—De gallo qui ponitur super ecclesiam.

Que sunt preparatoria dedicationis ecclesie et quid exigitur ad dedicationem (fol. 6<sup>v</sup>) Quid significet dedicatio—Quid debet fieri in dedicatione—Quare in consecratione ecclesie aqua benedicitur cum qua parietes ecclesie asperguntur—Quare in illa sal admiscetur (fol. 7<sup>r</sup>) Quare de ysopo fit aspersorium—Quare episcopus ter ecclesiam circuit et ter parietes aspergit—Quare episcopus cum virga ter ianuas percutit—Quare diaconus interrogat: *Quis est iste rex glorie*—Quare episcopus intrans ecclesiam dicit *Pax huic domui* (fol. 7<sup>v</sup>) Quare episcopus postquam intravit ecclesiam prosternit se—Quare cum surgit non dicit *Dominus vobiscum*—Quare duo alfabeti scribit—Quare cum baculo—Quare in modo crucis—Quare in cynere—Quare episcopus incipit scribere a sinistro cornu orientis—Quare episcopus dicit ter *Deus in adiutorium*—De aqua benedicta mixta [cum vino sale et cinere] (fol. 8<sup>v</sup>) De oratione episcopi post aquam aspersam—Quid

periculum puero baptizando propter dilationem et ideo confertur sine benedictione sepe. Item in porrectione eucharistie non debet fieri aliqua benedictio nam totus Christus confertur in eo qui est auctor omnis benedictionis et quia sufficiens benedictio precessit in consecratione cui aliam superaddere presumptuosum esset. Si autem queritur sub qua forma conferatur illud sacramentum, et quibus verbis utebantur apostoli inungentes, et cuiusmodi oleo utebantur, utrum simplici et pura adhibita benedictione, an oleo prius consecrato, non habemus determinatum plene ex canonica aliqua scriptura. Hoc autem

habemus ex Iacobo et ex Marco quod inunctio fiebat ab illis per oleum et quod orationes fiebant ab illis super infirmos; et credendum quod oleum fuerit ab eis benedictum et cum orationibus etiam benedictiones adiungebant; et verba que proponunt modo sacerdotes inungentes infirmos de institutione ecclesie processerunt, videlicet a sanctis patribus, et ideo non sunt immutanda; a quibus etiam institutum est ut vestimenta sacerdotalia et corporalia et calix et patena sicut et vasa tabernaculi et vestes Aaron in veteri testamento ad mandatum domini benedicebantur.

cantat episcopus cum ad altare accedit—De aqua effusa super basam—De linteo cum quo altare extergitur—Quid significat altare in dei ecclesia—De unctione altaris—Quid significat oleum—Quid significat chrisma—De panno cerato cum quo altare tergitur—Quare reliquie sanctorum in altari ponuntur—De unctione parietum ecclesie—De .xii. crucibus in parietibus—De .xii. cereis qui ibi accenduntur (fol. 9<sup>r</sup>) De albo panno quo tergitur altare—De introitu misse in ipsa dedicatione—De epistola—De evangelio—Quid significant .v. generalia que fiunt in dedicatione—Quibus de causis ecclesia consecratur—De locis que sunt juxta ecclesiam—De atrio—De cymeterio—De domis ministrorum ecclesie—De domibus episcopi—De domo pauperum—De immunitate predicatorum locorum.

## [II. De Ordinibus et Vestimentis]

De ordinibus ecclesiasticis et que attenduntur circa ministros ecclesie—Quare .vii. ordines in ecclesia distinguuntur (fol. 9<sup>r</sup>) De tonsura et corona clericorum—De habitu quo debent indui qui tonsorantur—Quid debeat cantare cum tonsoratur—De hostiario—Quando Christus fuit hostiarius—Unde hic ordo habuit originem—De lectore—Unde originem habuit hoc officium—Quando Christus fuit lector—De exorcista—Unde hoc officium habuit originem—Quando Christus fuit exorcista—De acolito (fol. 10<sup>r</sup>) Quando Christus fuit acolitus—Unde hoc officium originem habuit—De subdiacono—Quando Christus fuit subdiaconus—Unde hoc officium habuit originem—De diacono—Quando Christus fuit diaconus—Unde hoc officium inicum habuit—De sacerdote (fol. 10<sup>r</sup>) Quando Christus fuit sacerdos—Unde hoc officium habuit originem—De psalmista—Quando Christus fuit psalmista—[De episcopo]—Unde ordo iste habuit inicum—Quando Christus fuit episcopus—De quadripartito ordine episcoporum—De principatu romani pontificis.

(fol. 11<sup>r</sup>) Quid significant vestimenta veteris legis—De feminalibus—De tunica linea—De balteo—De poderi—De superhumerali—De rationali (fol. 11<sup>r</sup>) De cydari vel tyara—De colore vestimentorum—De vestimentis novi testamenti—De sandaliis et caligis episcopi (fol. 12<sup>r</sup>) De corporali ablutione manuum—De amictu—De alba (fol. 12<sup>r</sup>) De zona—De stola—De tunica talari (fol. 13<sup>r</sup>) De dalmatica—De cyrothecis—De casula (fol. 13<sup>r</sup>) De manipula—De mitra—De anulo—De baculo—(fol. 14<sup>r</sup>) De palleo—De casula rubea domini pape et mitra rotunda et quare summus pontifex non utitur baculo et quare crux ante ipsum defertur—De coloribus vestimentorum (fol. 14<sup>r</sup>) Qua vestimenta sunt presbyteris et episcopis communia et que specialia episcopis.

## [III. De Officio Ecclesiastico]

[Prologus]—Quare septies laudetur Deus in die et octies de nocte—(fol. 15<sup>r</sup>) De nocturno officio—De *Domine labia mea*—De *Deus in adiutorium*—De *Gloria patri*—De hymno—De antiphonis—De neuma in fine antiphonarum—De tribus nocturnis—De versiculo—De dominica oratione (fol. 15<sup>r</sup>) Quare finis orationis dominice dicitur alta voce—De *Jube domine*—De benedictione—De *tu autem*—De *Deo gratias*—De responsorio—De *Te Deum laudamus*—De matutinis laudibus—De *Deus in adiutorium*—De *Gloria patri*—De antiphoniis—(fol. 16<sup>r</sup>) Quare antiphona primo notatur et post psalmum tota decantatur—De capitulo et hymno et versiculo—De neuma que fit post antiphonam—De collecta—De *Benedicamus*—De horis diei (fol. 16<sup>r</sup>) De prima—De .v. psalmis qui tunc cantantur—De *Quicumque vult*—De *Exsurge domine*—De *Pater noster*—De *Credo in Deum*—De precibus—De collecta—De tercia—De sexta (fol. 17<sup>r</sup>) De nona—De officio tercie sexte et none—De vesperis—De completorio (fol. 17<sup>r</sup>) Quare tria cantica evangelica dicantur tribus horis diei—De precibus que dicuntur in horis—Quare versiculi dicuntur versus orientem—De genuflectione (fol. 18<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter debet fidelis corpus suum castigare—De tunsione pectoris—Quare fit processio in

diebus dominicis (fol. 18<sup>v</sup>) Quid significant hore divini officii—Quare de die septies deum laudamus—De armata sacerdotis.

De officio Missae—De *Iudica me deus*—De .v. psalmos quos dicit episcopus (fol. 19<sup>v</sup>) De edicula a qua egreditur episcopus—De processione que fit episcopo quando ad altare accedit—De Iohanne Baptista—De adventu Christi (fol. 19<sup>v</sup>) De stupa que incenditur in choro—De tribus sacerdotibus qui occurrunt summo pontifici—De ordine huius processionis—De confessione que fit ante altare—De incenso quod post confessionem ponitur in thuribulo—De triplici osculo altaris diaconum et pectoris episcopi (fol. 20<sup>v</sup>) De thurificatione altaris et forma thuribuli—Quare sacerdos primo vertit se ad dextrum cornu altaris—De ministris sedentibus et stantibus—De introitu misse et quare missa incoatur cantando—De desiderio prophetarum adventus Christi (fol. 20<sup>v</sup>) De tropis—Quare dominicis diebus et festivitibus populus ad ecclesiam confluit—Quare *Kyrie eleison* novies dicitur—De *Gloria in excelsis deo* (fol. 21<sup>v</sup>) De candelabris et cruce que super altare media collocatur—Quare missa non debet celebrari sine lumine—De salutatione maioris et minoris sacerdotis (fol. 21<sup>v</sup>) Quot vicibus populus salutatur in missa—Utrum solus sacerdos cum clerico solo debeat celebrare—Quare sacerdos dicit *Oremus*—De mutatione sacerdotis ab una parte altaris ad alteram—De oratione et conclusione (fol. 22<sup>v</sup>) De responsione—Quare orationes dicuntur collecte et quot sint in missa dicende (fol. 22<sup>v</sup>) De extensione manuum in missa—De epistola que premittitur evangelio in missa (fol. 23<sup>v</sup>) De officio Iohannis Baptiste—De graduali (fol. 23<sup>v</sup>) De *Alleluia* versu et prosa (fol. 24<sup>v</sup>) De tractu—De mutatione sacerdotis ab una parte altaris ad aliam lecturus evangelium—Quare diaconus qui lecturus est evangelium dexteram pontificis osculatur—De benedictione quam diaconus petit et accipit (fol. 24<sup>v</sup>) De susceptione codicis ab altari—De his qui precedunt diaconem cum cereis et incenso—Quare subdiaconus sequitur et in redeundo precedit referens evangelium—De pulvillo quod defert subdiaconus—Quomodo defertur liber et de his que precedunt—Quare per unam partem diaconus ascendit in pulpitem et per aliam descendit (fol. 25<sup>v</sup>) Quare versus aquilonem legitur evangelium—Quare qui legit evangelium signat librum pectus os et frontem—De consideratione crucis—Quare auditores evangelii consignant se signo crucis—Qualiter debent stare auditores evangelii—Quare evangelia audiuntur in silentio et in fine vox extollitur—Quomodo signum crucis sit exprimendum (fol. 25<sup>v</sup>) De salutatione diaconi ad populum quando lecturus est evangelium et responsione populi—Quid debeat populus dicere evangelio finito (fol. 26<sup>v</sup>) Quare lecto evangelio liber et thuribulum ad pontificem reportantur—Quibus de causis evangelium legitur—Quare symbolum post evangelium decantatur—De .xii. partibus utriusque symboli apostolici et niceni (fol. 26<sup>v</sup>) Quibus diebus debeat symbolum decantari—A quibus et ubi symbolum sit cantandum cum summus pontifex celebrat (fol. 27<sup>v</sup>) Quare post symbolum cantatur offertorium et de offerendis—Quid debeat dicere ille qui offert et quid ille qui offerendam accipit—De silentio post offertorium—Quibus nominibus secretum appellatur—Quare fuit instituta celebratio misse (fol. 27<sup>v</sup>) De ablutione manuum antequam sacrificium offeratur—De corporalibus—Quare sacerdos totum undique incensat altare—De modo et ordine sacrificium offerendi (fol. 28<sup>v</sup>) Quare episcopus aquam mittit in calice—Quare in appositione aque pocius signum crucis imponitur quam in appositione panis et vini—Quomodo calix et hostia debent poni super altare—De patena super quam sacrificium offertur (fol. 28<sup>v</sup>) Quare osculatur sacerdos altare cum incipit secretum—Quid debeat respondere populus cum sacerdos dicit *Orate fratres*—Quod eadem ordine debet secretas dicere quam dixit ante epistolam orationes—Quid significant secreta que dicuntur super oblata post offertorium (fol. 29<sup>v</sup>) Quid significat littera que est in principio prefationis—Unde dicitur prefatio et quot sunt prefationes (fol. 30<sup>v</sup>) Que attenduntur in officio misse—De silentio quod sequitur post prefationem—Quare canon dicitur

demissa voce—De audientibus diverso modo missam—Quare ymago crucifixi debet depingi inter prefationem et canonem.

(fol. 31') De expositione canonis et quare sacerdos hic facit tres cruces (fol. 31') De tribus ecclesie sacrificiis—Que apponuntur in sacrificio misse (fol. 32') Quibus et pro quibus et qualiter et quare sacrificium altaris offeratur (fol. 32') Pro quibus sacrificium eucaristie offertur—Quare hoc sacrificium offertur (fol. 33') Qualiter debemus deo vota nostra offerre—De trina commemoratione sanctorum que fit in missa—Quod sanctorum suffragium nobis est necessarium—Quare in canone non fit commemoratio confessorum (fol. 33') Quare ter oramus in missa et ter sacerdos osculatur altare—De quinque crucibus quas hic facit sacerdos (fol. 34') De signis eucaristie que precesserint in veteri testamento—Quare in specie panis et vini Christus hoc instituit sacramentum—Quare panis azimus debet offerri in sacrificio eucaristie (fol. 35') Quando Christus confecit—Quod Christus corpus proprium demonstravit quod sub forma panis latebat—Quod totus panis in totum corpus convertitur (fol. 35') Quod sub singulis partibus est totus Christus—Quod ad prolationem verborum que Christus protulit transubstantiatur panis in corpus et vinum in sanguinem—Quod forma panis frangitur et corpus Christi integrum manet—Quid comeditur cum sacramentum a mure corroditur—Quare in cena corpus dedit Christus discipulis—Quare Christus dedit Iude eucaristiam cum sciret se eum traditurum (fol. 36') Utrum ad bonum vel ad malum Christus dedit eucaristiam Iude—Utrum Christus ei dedit corpus suum digne vel indigne—Quod nullus debet panem intinctum suscipere—Quod corpus Christi dupliciter comeditur et dupliciter intelligitur—Quid fiat de corpore Christi postquam assumptum fuerit (fol. 36') Quod corpus Christi numquam est sine sanguine et sanguis sine corpore—Quod corpus Christi sub forma divisa integrum sumitur—Quod forma verborum quam Christus ipse expressit non debet minui vel augeri vel mutari—Quid debemus dicere cum sacerdos hostiam elevat—De tribus que sunt in hoc sacramento (fol. 37') Quare post comestionem agni Christus confecit et dedit—Utrum Christus corpus suum sacramentaliter accepit—Utrum aliquis seipsum debeat communicare—Utrum ab heretico sit accipienda eucaristia—Utrum sacerdos duas partes hostie debet accipere et terciam infirmis dare—Utrum sacerdos consecret hostias que sunt sub palla altaris—Quod sacerdotes lunatici vel caduci vel tremulas manus habentes non debent celebrare—Utrum sacerdos in necessitate si eucaristia defuerit possit conficere sub hac sola forma verborum *hoc est corpus meum* etc. et *hic est sanguis meus* etc. (fol. 37') Utrum sacerdos debeat ei porrigere panem purum pro eucaristia—Utrum ille incurrat iudicium qui panem purum [petit] et sacerdos dat ei eucaristiam—Utrum aliqua de causa debeat sacerdos dare alicui simplicem panem vel benedictum pro eucaristia e.g. si timetur de nausea—Utrum ille cui offertur eucaristia debeat inquirere utrum sit ibi corpus Christi (fol. 38') Quod sanguis sumitur sub specie corporis et econtra—Quid faciendum est si post prolationem horum verborum *hoc est corpus meum* sacerdos obiit—Utrum sine vino possit eucaristiam consecrari—Quid faciendum est si post consecrationem vinum comperiat pretermissum—Cum plures sacerdotes cum papa verba pronunciant quis eorum conficit—Quare post cenam dedit Christus corpus et sanguinem apostolis (fol. 38') Quod uno eodemque tempore totus est Christus in celo et totus est in altari—Quod unus est calix et unum corpus Christi quamvis diversis locis celebretur eucaristie sacramentum—Quare sanguis Christi dicitur novum testamentum—Quare aqua vino miscetur—Utrum convertatur in sanguinem (fol. 39') Quod tantum debet poni de aqua quod saporem retineat—Quare prius vinum ponatur in calice quam aqua—Quod cum musto vel aceto potest confici hoc sacramentum—Utrum purum vinum si admisceatur cum sanguine transeat in sanguinem—Utrum solum vinum convertatur in sanguinem si aqua non apponatur—Quare sub hac specie sacramenti veritas lateat et



veletur—Quibus de causis Christus sub alia specie corpus suum sumendum tradidit (fol. 39<sup>r</sup>) Quare Christus instituit ut sub specie vini et panis eucaristia sumeretur—Quare sub his duabus speciebus instituit—Quod sacramentum altaris et veritas est et figura—De tribus que sunt in hoc sacramento—In quibus unitas ecclesiastica consistit—Qualiter Christum semper habemus nobiscum (fol. 40<sup>r</sup>) Utrum species panis sit sacramentum corporis et species vini sit sacramentum sanguinis—Utrum species panis et veritas corporis sit unum sacramentum an diversa—Pro quibus sanguis Christi effusus est—Que discretio est adhibenda in perceptione corporis Christi—Utrum cotidie sit communicandum—Quare Christus instituit hoc sacramentum fieri in suam commemorationem (fol. 40<sup>r</sup>) Quod Christi corpus cibus est animarum—Quare Christus carnem suam dedit ad manducandum—Quod si digne corpus Christi accipimus remissionem peccatorum consequamur—Quod Christus secundum divinam naturam tribus modis in rebus existit (fol. 41<sup>r</sup>) Quare in hoc loco fiunt tantum due cruces—Quare in hoc loco potius quam in aliis substantia panis et vini in corpus et sanguinem Christi transeant.

(fol. 41<sup>r</sup>) Quare debemus esse memores passionis et resurrectionis et ascensionis—Quare in hoc loco fiunt .v. cruces—Quando Christus fuit hostia pura hostia sancta hostia immaculata (fol. 42<sup>r</sup>) Quare post consecrationem signa super eucaristiam fiunt—Quare eucaristia dicitur hostia pura hostia immaculata (fol. 42<sup>r</sup>) De signis novi sacramenti que precesserunt in veteri testamento (fol. 43<sup>r</sup>) De signis que fiunt in quarto loco super oblatam—Qualiter angelus dicitur orationes nostras offerre Deo (fol. 43<sup>r</sup>) Quod angeli in sacrificio presentes adstant—Quare sacerdos tenet manus cancellatas ante altare—Que petimus in sublime altare deferri—[Quare] hic debet sacerdos agere memoriam defunctorum (fol. 44<sup>r</sup>) De secunda commemoratione sanctorum que fit in missa—Qualiter Deus *creat sanctificat vivificat et benedicit* (fol. 44<sup>r</sup>) De signis que fiunt super calicem et oblatam—De signis que fiunt cum oblata super calicem et ante calicem (fol. 45<sup>r</sup>) Quare in crucibus faciendis tanta diversitas hic ostenditur—Qualiter cruces hic sunt faciende—Quare in crucibus faciendis corpus domini integrum manu tenetur—Quare in hoc loco potius quam in aliis locis oratio dominica dicatur—Alia expositio de .v. crucibus (fol. 45<sup>r</sup>) De remotione corporalis desuper calicem—De elevatione et depositione calicis—Quare sensus .v. corporis in hoc sacramento exercentur—Quod sacerdos hic debet exaltare parumper vocem et pectus tondere (fol. 46<sup>r</sup>) De elevatione vocis a sacerdote—De prephatione orationis dominice—De domina oratione (fol. 46<sup>r</sup>) Quare in tribus primis petitionibus orationis dominice sacerdos elevat calicem et postea deponit—Quare in profestis diebus omnes prosternunt se ad terram dum canon dicitur et ad orationem dominicam se erigunt—De silentio post orationem dominicam (fol. 47<sup>r</sup>) Quare hec oratio secrete dicitur—Quid significat *Oremus preceptis et Pater noster et libera nos quesumus domine*—De regressu levite ab altari postquam patena reliquit—De regressu subdiaconorum ad altare—Quare patena tenetur discooperta a subdiacono—De resumptione patene (fol. 47<sup>r</sup>) Quare sacerdos cum patena sibi facit crucem in facie—De fractione hostie—De commixtione panis et vini—Quare signum crucis ter fit cum particula hostie super calicem—De multiplici pace (fol. 48<sup>r</sup>) De triplici vita ubi pax est necessaria—Quare iste tres cruces fiunt infra calicem—Quare in his crucibus faciendis tertia pars dominici corporis manu teneatur—Quare tertia pars infra calicem ponitur et alie extra calicem remanent—Quid significant partes que fiunt de sacrificio (fol. 48<sup>r</sup>) Quare *Agnus dei* ter dicitur (fol. 49<sup>r</sup>) De osculo pacis—Quare institutum fuit ut pax daretur ad missam—Quare sacerdos ter osculatur altare (fol. 49<sup>r</sup>) Quare summus pontifex diacono et subdiacono communicat eucaristiam—Quare summus pontifex alium in communicando modum observat (fol. 50<sup>r</sup>) De ablutione manuum post eucaristiam sumptam—De tertia ablutione manuum sacerdotis—De communione et quare post communionem in quibusdam

locis datur panis benedictus—De oratione novissima que dicit sacerdos ad dextrum cornu altaris—De *Ite missa est* et *Benedicamus domino* et *Requiescant in pace* (fol. 50<sup>v</sup>) De benedictione extrema—Quare sacerdos qui assistit altari mensam altaris et armum dextrum pontificis osculatur—Quid debet dicere sacerdos post missam.

Quare officium misse cotidie iteratur—Quid operatur sacramentum altaris (fol. 51<sup>r</sup>) Quibus horis missa regulariter celebratur—Que misse quibus feriis debeant celebrari—Quod non debet sacerdos eadem celebrare si ablutionem accepit—Quod non debet cras celebrare si de nocte non dormit—Quod non debet bis celebrare in die (fol. 51<sup>r</sup>) Quid debeat facere si vinum congelatur in calice—Quid debeat si sacramentum cadat de calice—Quod sacerdos non debet celebrare nisi cum instrumentis ad hoc deputatis. Explicit liber tercius de officio ecclesiastico in generali.

### Incipit Liber Quartus de Officio Ecclesiastico in Speciali

Quare ecclesia suum incoat officium ab adventu—De quadruplici adventu—(fol. 52<sup>r</sup>) Que cantica in adventu tacentur—Quod in adventu non debet fieri commemoratio alicuius sancti (fol. 52<sup>r</sup>) Quod in diebus abstinentie non fiunt nuptie—Quid legendum sit a kalendis novembris usque ad natale domini—De tribus septimanis que sunt in adventu domini—De tribus versibus qui cantantur sub uno responsorio in adventu domini—Quare non fit commemoratio sancte crucis in adventu—Quare in principio adventus legitur evangelium de passione (fol. 53<sup>r</sup>) Quare non fit commemoratio sanctorum in adventu domini—Quare in adventu cantatur alleluia et cantica alia letitie subticentur—Quare in adventu cantatur alleluia et in aliis ieiuniis non—Quare in diebus ieiuniorum non dicitur *Ite missa est*—De fine collectarum huius temporis—De quatuor dominicis que eveniunt—De officio prime dominice adventus domini (fol. 53<sup>r</sup>) De officio secunde dominice (fol. 54<sup>r</sup>) De officio tercie dominice—De ieiuniis quatuor temporum (fol. 55<sup>r</sup>) De lectionibus que leguntur ad missam (fol. 56<sup>r</sup>) Quare in ieiuniis quatuor temporum potius clerici ordinantur quam in aliis temporibus—Quare clerici potius consecrantur in sabbato quam in aliis diebus—Quod nullus eodem die bis debet ordinari—Quare ordinatio episcopi potius fit in dominica die quam in aliis diebus—De officio quarte ferie ieiuniorum (fol. 56<sup>r</sup>) De officio sexte ferie eiusdem (fol. 57<sup>r</sup>) De officio sabbati ieiuniorum—De quarta dominica adventus domini—De illis septem antiphonis que ante nativitatem Christi cantantur ad vespas (fol. 58<sup>r</sup>) De duabus maioribus festivitibus quas ecclesia celebrat.

De vigilia nativitatis Christi—De officio vigilie nativitatis Christi (fol. 58<sup>r</sup>) De vespas vigilie—De completorio in vigilia nativitatis Christi—De matutinis in die nativitatis Christi (fol. 59<sup>r</sup>) De matutinis laudibus (fol. 59<sup>r</sup>) De tribus missis que cantantur in die natalis domini (fol. 60<sup>r</sup>) De prima missa natalis domini—De secunda missa natalis domini—De tercia missa natalis domini (fol. 61<sup>r</sup>) De neumis que fiunt in missis—Quid significant oblationes fidelium—De festo sancti Stephani—De festivitate sancti Iohannis evangeliste—De festivitate innocentium (fol. 61<sup>r</sup>) De dominica infra octabas natalis domini—De circumcisione (fol. 62<sup>r</sup>) De festo stultorum—De epiphania (fol. 62<sup>r</sup>) De officio huius diei—De officio misse—Quare potius in die apparationis de baptismo fiat officium quam de aliis miraculis eodem factis (fol. 63<sup>r</sup>) Quo devenit stella que magis apparuit—De prima dominica post epiphaniam—De secunda dominica—De tercia dominica—De purificatione beate Marie.

(fol. 63<sup>r</sup>) De LXX<sup>a</sup> (fol. 64<sup>r</sup>) De officio LXX<sup>a</sup> (fol. 64<sup>r</sup>) De officio L<sup>a</sup>—De officio in capite ieiunii (fol. 65<sup>r</sup>) De privilegiis huius quarte ferie—Quare non ieiunamus eodem tempore quo Christus ieiunavit (fol. 65<sup>r</sup>) Quare in tempore XL<sup>a</sup> carnes deponimus et pisces comedimus—De auctoritate et

commendatione XL<sup>o</sup> (fol. 66<sup>r</sup>) Quare in XL<sup>a</sup> cantica leticie subticentur—De his que sese in XL<sup>a</sup> commutantur—Quid dicendum est a sacerdote et a populo cum dicitur *Flectamus genua*—De benedictione que datur in fine misse in XL<sup>a</sup>—De variatione officii in tempore XL<sup>o</sup> (fol. 66<sup>r</sup>) De pulsatione campanarum in hoc tempore—Qualiter ornanda est ecclesia in tempore XL<sup>o</sup>.

(fol. 67<sup>r</sup>) De prima dominica XL<sup>o</sup>—De officio huius dominice (fol. 67<sup>r</sup>) De secunda feria prime septimane XL<sup>o</sup>—De tertia feria—De quarta feria (fol. 68<sup>r</sup>) De quinta feria—De sexta feria—De officio sabbati ieiuniorum—De secunda dominica—De secunda feria—De tertia feria (fol. 68<sup>r</sup>) De quarta feria—De quinta feria—De sexta feria—De sabbato—De tertia dominica—De secunda feria tercie septimane XL<sup>o</sup>—De tertia feria (fol. 69<sup>r</sup>) De quarta feria—De quinta feria—De sexta feria—De sabbato—De quarta dominice XL<sup>o</sup>—Quare officium istius dominice fere totum est in laude (fol. 69<sup>r</sup>) De secunda feria—De tertia feria—De quarta feria (fol. 70<sup>r</sup>) De quinta feria—De sexta feria—De sabbato—De quinta dominica XL<sup>o</sup> (fol. 70<sup>r</sup>) De secunda feria—De tertia feria—De quarta feria—De quinta feria—De sexta feria—De sabbato (fol. 71<sup>r</sup>) De dominica palmarum—De secunda feria sexte septimane (fol. 71<sup>r</sup>) De tertia feria—De quarta feria.

De die cene—De officio huius diei (fol. 72<sup>r</sup>) De consecratione crismatis et olei—Quare episcopus ter hanelat in oleo et crismate cum consecrat (fol. 72<sup>r</sup>) De reconciliatione penitentium—Quod facta istorum quatuor dierum spectant ad tempus antichristi—De ablutione pedum in die cene (fol. 73<sup>r</sup>) Quare eodem modo in his tribus diebus matutine celebrantur—Qualiter est celebrandum officium in istis matutinis (fol. 73<sup>r</sup>) Quare in his matutinis *Benedictus* dicitur altius quam ceteri psalmi—De tropis qui cantantur his tribus diebus in fine matutinarum—De candelis que accenduntur ad tenebras (fol. 74<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter candeled predictae debent extingui—Quare his tribus diebus nocturnum officium alte cantatur et diurnum voce dimissa—Quare his diebus non pulsatur cum campanis—Que fuit causa quare Iudas vendidit Christum (fol. 74<sup>r</sup>) Quare in die cene in vespera denudantur altaria et pavimenta ecclesie mundantur—Quid significat altaris nudatio—De ablutione altaris cum vino et aqua—De ramis quibus altare fricatur—Quid debeat dici dum altare lavatur—De officio misse in die cene (fol. 75<sup>r</sup>) De officio parasceves (fol. 75<sup>r</sup>) Quare novem collectae dicuntur in die parasceves—De tribus antiphonis que cantantur quando crux portatur—De trina genuflectione ante crucem—Quare tres antiphonas dicimus quando crux discooperitur (fol. 76<sup>r</sup>) De salutatione crucis cum ipsa discooperitur—Quare non adoramus asinam super quam sedit Christus sicut et crucem in qua passus fuit—Qualiter missa celebranda est in die parasceves—De vesperis huius diei—Qualiter debemus in die parasceves incedere—Qualiter (*sic*) in die parasceves corpus Christi non consecratur (fol. 76<sup>r</sup>) Quare corpus Christi reservatur in die cene et non sanguis—Quid significant instrumenta passionis Christi—Quod Christus per omnia membra passus est—Qualiter Christus passus est (fol. 77<sup>r</sup>) Quare Christus alia morte mori noluit nisi morte crucis et de quatuor divisionibus crucis Christi—De quatuor lignis que fuerunt in cruce Christi—Quare Christus mori et sepeliri voluit (fol. 77<sup>r</sup>) Quare ipso die quo Christus passus est non resurrexit—Quare diem passionis Christi cum tristitia celebramus—Quibus modis fuit crux Christi in veteri testamento figurata—De sabbato ante pascha—De tribus noctibus ante pascha—De officio huius sabbati ante pascha—De cereo—De duobus parvis cereis (fol. 78<sup>r</sup>) De illuminatione cerei—De cruce que fit in cereo cum incenso—Quid debeat scribi in cereo—A quibus benedicendus est cereus—De lectionibus et tractatibus huius sabbati (fol. 79<sup>r</sup>) De benedictione fontium—Que preveniuntur baptismum—Qualiter fit exorcismus—Quare patrinus respondet pro parvulo ter *abrenuncio* (fol. 79<sup>r</sup>) De diversa unctione pueri—Qualiter puer est baptizandus—De crismali (fol. 80<sup>r</sup>) De patrinis—Quare in aqua pura celebratur baptismum—Quare pueri potius bap-

tizantur in vigilia pasche et pentecostes quam in alio tempore (fol. 80<sup>r</sup>) De .vii. donis spiritus sancti que sunt in .vii. donis baptismi—Quod ubicumque in necessitate potest baptizari—Quis instituit exorcismus—Qualiter est facienda immersio—De officio misse huius sabbati (fol. 81<sup>r</sup>) De vespers in sabbato sancto—De ornatu templi spiritualis—De ornatu templi materialis (fol. 81<sup>r</sup>) Quare thesaurus ecclesie in festivis diebus in apertum deducitur.

De pascha (fol. 82<sup>r</sup>) De matutinis huius diei—De huius diei officio—De missa huius diei—De vespers huius diei—De officio ab hac die usque ad pentecosten (fol. 82<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter hac die est communicandum—Quot modis in ecclesia communicatur—Que debeat quilibet fidelis hac observare die—Qualiter est salutandum in septimana paschali—Quare in tempore paschali non ieiunamus nec genua flectamus—De feria ii<sup>a</sup> post pascha (fol. 83<sup>r</sup>) De iii<sup>a</sup> feria—De iiiii<sup>a</sup> feria—De v<sup>a</sup> feria—De vi<sup>a</sup> feria—De sabbato (fol. 83<sup>r</sup>) De tribus septimanis privilegiatis—De octabis pasche—De ii<sup>a</sup> dominica post pascha—De iii<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 84<sup>r</sup>) De iiiii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De v<sup>a</sup> dominica post pascha—De letaniis—Quid sit letania—Quare una letania dicitur maior et alia minor—Quare letanie sint institute (fol. 84<sup>r</sup>) De letania que tribus diebus celebratur—Quis hanc letaniam instituit et quare—Qualiter est ieiunandum in his letaniis—Qualiter itur ad processionem—Quare hoc tempore has letanias celebramus—De vexillis que in processione portantur (fol. 85<sup>r</sup>) De officio ii<sup>a</sup> ferie letaniarum (fol. 85<sup>r</sup>) De iii<sup>a</sup> feria rogationum—De vigilia ascensionis domini—De die ascensionis domini (fol. 86<sup>r</sup>) De dominica post ascensionem—De vigilia pentecostes (fol. 86<sup>r</sup>) De die pentecostes—De tribus quinquagesimis dierum que celebrantur in ecclesia—De officio diei—De ii<sup>a</sup> feria post pentecosten (fol. 87<sup>r</sup>) De iii<sup>a</sup> feria—De iiiii<sup>a</sup> feria—De v<sup>a</sup> et vi<sup>a</sup> feria (fol. 87<sup>r</sup>) De sabbato post pentecosten—De octabis pentecostes—De prima dominica post octabas pentecostes (fol. 88<sup>r</sup>) De ii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De iii<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 88<sup>r</sup>) De iiiii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De v<sup>a</sup> dominica—De vi<sup>a</sup> dominica—De vii<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 89<sup>r</sup>) De viii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De viiii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De x<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 89<sup>r</sup>) De xi<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xiii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xiiii<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 90<sup>r</sup>) De xv<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xvi<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xvii<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 90<sup>r</sup>) De xviii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xix<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xx<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xxi<sup>a</sup> dominica (fol. 91<sup>r</sup>) De xxii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De xxiii<sup>a</sup> dominica—De ieiuniis que fiunt in festis quorundam apostolorum (fol. 91<sup>r</sup>) De multiplicitate ieiunii (fol. 92<sup>r</sup>) De concordantia quatuor temporum anni cum quatuor temporibus mundi (fol. 92<sup>r</sup>) Quos libros debeat ecclesia legere in ipsis quatuor temporibus (fol. 93<sup>r</sup>) Explicit de officio ecclesiastico.

Incipit de officio mortuorum et primo de inventione cimeterii—De locis sacris et sanctis et religiosis (fol. 94<sup>r</sup>) De diversis nominibus cimeterii—Qui debeant sepeliri in cimeterio christianorum et qui non—Quid faciendum est de malis qui in cimeterio sunt sepulti—Quid faciendum est de illis qui cimeterium non possunt habere—Qui sunt in ecclesia sepeliendi—Quod crux fieri debet in sepultura—Qualiter debet mortuus preparari et sepeliri—Quod corpus mortui debet lavari—Qualiter debet corpus preparari cum laborat in extremis—Quod passio debet legi cum laborat in extremis (fol. 95<sup>r</sup>) Quod crux debet poni ad pedes morientis—Qualiter debent campane pulsari cum homo mortuus fuerit—Qualiter corpus extrahendum est de domo—Qualiter debent offerre cum missa pro illo celebratur—Qualiter debet corpus ad speluncam deferri—Quod mulieres corpora mortuorum deferre non debent—Quid debet poni in spelunca cum corpore (fol. 95<sup>r</sup>) De institutione officii mortuorum—Quare in officiis mortuorum cantica letitie subticentur—Quare officium mortuorum non habet secundas vespas—Quare in missa mortuorum pax non datur—Quare discretas dies observamus in exequiis mortuorum (fol. 96<sup>r</sup>) Quot modis liberantur iusti a domino—Quibus prosint suffragia ecclesie (fol. 97<sup>r</sup>) An plus iuvent spiritualia suffragia quam generalia—Utrum orationes ecclesie prosint omnibus—Utrum per orationes ecclesie minuatur pena illorum qui sunt mali (fol. 97<sup>r</sup>) Utrum

sacerdos tenetur orare indifferenter pro omnibus—An eque prosit missa a digno vel indigno sacerdote celebrata—De sacerdote celebrante intuitu vane glorie vel pro lucro vel ut placeat populo—Qualis quisque apparuerit in iudicio—An melius sit esse in purgatorio quam in hoc seculo (fol. 98<sup>r</sup>) Utrum sacerdos teneatur orare pro infantibus recenter baptizatis et mortuis—Utrum pueri qui decedebant cum originali puniantur pena materiali annon—De tribus partibus inferni—Utrum pueri sine baptismo morientes resurgant in status bonorum vel malorum—Utrum pro eis sit orandum—Utrum sint membrum diaboli annon—Utrum orationes ecclesie prosint infidelibus (fol. 98<sup>r</sup>) Utrum ecclesie suffragia valeant dampnatis ad bonum—Utrum in inferno possit esse plena remissio—An possibile sit aliquem ferre secum cinerabilia et non transire per ignem—Utrum pro una missa decantata possit unum veniale remitti—Utrum plus cognoscat unus de deo in patria quam alius.

### Incipit Liber de Sacramentis Ecclesiasticis

(fol. 99<sup>r</sup>) Quare sacramenta fuerunt instituta—Quid sit circumcisio—Quando incepit circumcisio—Quibus de causis sit instituta—Quare octavo die et cultro lapideo (fol. 99<sup>v</sup>) Quibus fuit precepta—Quare masculinis et non feminis—Quare in partibus genitalibus—Quid conferebat circumcisio—De parvulis qui ante diem octavam moriebantur—Quare post circumcisionem secutus est baptismus—De baptismo Iohannis.

Quid sit baptismus—Que sunt que baptismus efficit (fol. 100<sup>r</sup>) Que preveniunt dignitatem baptismi—Quare lumen apponitur in baptismo—De forma baptismi—Quid pertinet ad substantiam baptismi—Utrum puer sit baptizatus si fiat transpositio vel adiectio personarum—Utrum baptizatus si verba truncata fuerint (fol. 100<sup>v</sup>) Utrum sit baptizatus si unus dicat verba et alius mergat—Utrum intencio baptismatis sit necessaria—Utrum intencio baptizandi sit necessaria—Utrum baptismus conferatur si super dormientem vel morientem vel furiosum aqua spargatur—Quid confert baptismus—Utrum ille qui contra velle suum baptizatus sit compellendus ad observandum catholicam fidem—Utrum qui invitus baptizatur recipit sacramentum—Utrum aliquis seipsum possit baptizare—Utrum spiritualis conpaternitas contractus (*sic*) si quis tenuerit infantem ad sacramenta que precedunt baptismum—Utrum baptismus in omnibus efficiatur quod figurat (fol. 101<sup>r</sup>) Que persona sit idonea ad celebrandum baptismum—Utrum hereticus vel malus Christianus possit ipsum baptismum conferre—Utrum paganus si mergat baptizet—Utrum Christus auctoritatem baptizandi potuit dare Paulo vel alio—Quare dominus in baptismo potestatem dimittendi peccata sibi retinuit—Utrum aliquis sit baptizatus si verba corrupte dicantur—Utrum si aliquis in latino baptizat et alius in greco verum baptismum conferant—Utrum baptismus sit eque bonus a bono vel a malo datus—Quando baptismus fuit institutus—Quare baptismus fuit institutus (fol. 101<sup>v</sup>) Utrum baptismus possit conferri si aliquis liquor aque admisceatur—Ad quem dirigatur interrogatio que fit a sacerdote cum baptizat—Sub quo sensu patrinus respondet pro parvulo: *Credo* etc.—Utrum ad baptismum conferendum exigantur confessiones patrinorum et benedictiones fontium et adjurationes—Utrum exorcismi et adiurationes valeant puero—Quid confert exorcismus parvulo (fol. 102<sup>r</sup>) Quid debeat fieri si sacerdos puerum non vult baptizare sine pecunia—Utrum ille qui fecte accedit ad baptismum sacramentum baptismi recipiat—Qualiter in baptismo Christus induitur—Utrum ille qui fecte accedit ad baptismum et postea conteritur sit rebaptizandus—Utrum rebaptizandus qui nescit esse baptizatus—Quod non est baptizatus si baptista non dicit *baptizo te* (fol. 102<sup>v</sup>) Utrum in aliquo casu licitum sit iterare baptismum—Utrum ille qui ludo immergitur in aqua sit baptizatus—Utrum mulier a viro separari si teneat proprium puerum super fontes—Utrum vir si baptizat proprium filium in necessitate sit ab uxore

separandus—Utrum qui uxorem baptizat sit ab ea separandus—Quare infirmitas non amovetur cum aliquis baptizatur, cum peccato (*sic*) in baptismo delcantur—Quare in baptismo immortalitas non conferatur—Utrum aliquis possit salvari sine baptismo (fol. 103<sup>v</sup>) De pueris qui moriuntur cum ad baptismum deferuntur—Utrum si parvulus rapiatur ad gentes et non possit habere baptismum pro baptizato habeatur—Quid remittitur adulto qui accelerat ad baptismum et in via moritur—Utrum exterior satisfactio adultis remittitur in baptismo—Quare mors et alie pene in baptismo non remittuntur—Quare ab aliquo suscipitur baptismus cum in contritione sint prius ei peccata remissa—Utrum solis electis peccata remittantur (fol. 103<sup>v</sup>) Utrum pueri in baptismo gratiam recipiunt—Utrum parvulus virtutes conferantur in baptismo—Quam efficaciam habet baptismus in adultis—Quem effectum habet baptismus in illis qui mundi baptizantur—Que erat differentia inter baptismum Iohannis et baptismum Christi—Sub qua forma Iohannes baptizabat—Que differentia erat inter baptismum Iohannis et baptismum discipulorum Christi (fol. 104<sup>r</sup>) Que verba Iohannis Christum baptizans protulit et utrum Christus Iohannem baptizabat—Utrum oportebat rebaptizari baptizatos baptismo Iohannis baptismo Christi—Quare Iohannes ante baptismum Christi baptizavit—Utrum aliquis possit regnare antequam sit natus—Utrum diverse institutiones sint unum sacramentum—Utrum baptismus adultis sine contritione valeat—Utrum plus indigeat adultum baptismo quam parvulus (fol. 104<sup>r</sup>) Utrum plus remittatur in uno quam in alio—De triplici genere baptismi—Utrum spiritualis contrahitur inter infantem et infidelem qui eum baptizat—Utrum baptismus equalem effectum habent in omnibus—Utrum sacramentum baptismi efficiat quod figurat—Utrum baptismus sit in anima vel in corpore—Utrum quis debeat puerum non baptizatum in puteum deicere causa baptizandi si aqua defuerit—Utrum baptismus possit fieri in rore vel in duabus vel tribus guttis aque—Utrum aliquis sine aqua possit baptizari (fol. 105<sup>r</sup>) Utrum baptismus sit aqua vel aliud—Utrum illi qui plus diligit uxorem et filios illud peccatum remittatur—Quare puer dicatur salvari in fide patrinorum—De duobus currentibus ad baptismum et unus in via moritur et alius statim post baptismum decedit—Qualiter dicitur parvulus credere per patrinum—Utrum baptismus prosit illi qui sua culpa cadit in amentiam antequam baptizetur—Utrum si aliquis necessitate baptizetur pretermissa debeant postea suppleri (fol. 105<sup>r</sup>) Quid confert inunctio que confertur parvulo post baptismum—Utrum baptismum possit celebrari sine patrinis—Utrum exorcismus aliquid conferat parvulo—Utrum parvulus possit salvari in fide patrinorum—Utrum si sibila transeat ad actum contrarium et interrumpit verba verum baptismus tradatur—Utrum apostoli fuerint baptizati (fol. 106<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter peccatum remittatur in baptismo—Que sit pena originalis peccati et actualis—Utrum ille qui invitus trahitur ad baptismum sacramentum suscipit—Utrum dormientes vel amentes baptismi suscipiant sacramentum—De virtute et efficacia baptismi—Utrum debet baptizari qui nescitur esse baptizatus—De peccato originali quod remittitur in baptismo—Quare originale peccatum dicitur esse peccatum—Quare dicitur in baptismo remitti (fol. 106<sup>r</sup>) Utrum baptismus plus conferat uni quam aliis. Explicit de baptismo.

Incipit de confirmatione—Quid sit confirmatio—Quid refert quoad effectum inter confirmationem et baptismum—A quo et quando fuit instituta confirmatio—Quis sit effectus confirmationis—Que persone habeant confirmare et que confirmari et quando—Utrum confirmatio valeat si baptismus fuerit pretermisus—Sub qua forma fieri debeat confirmari (fol. 107<sup>r</sup>) Utrum sacramentum confirmationis sit maior sacramento baptismi—Utrum confirmatio debeat iterari.

Incipit de extrema unctione—Quid sit extrema inunctio—Unde dicitur extrema inunctio—A quo fuit extrema inunctio instituta—Utrum unus sacerdos possit inungere—Quo oleo debet fieri extrema inunctio—Utrum extrema inunctione

dimittantur peccata—Utrum in principio egritudinis an in medio an in fine sit danda extrema inunctio—Utrum extrema inunctio sit iteranda (fol. 107<sup>v</sup>) Quando fuit extrema inunctio instituta—Utrum extrema inunctio debeat dari parvulis—Quare potius iteratur penitentia vel eucaristia quam extrema inunctio—Utrum hoc sacramentum debeat dari nisi poscenti—Utrum uno membro inuncto extrema inunctio ad alium membrum descendat—Utrum necessitate cogente hoc sacramentum possit celebrari ab alio quam a sacerdote et utrum illud oleum possit benedici nisi ab episcopo et utrum alio die quam in die cene—Quare in hoc sacramento sit duplex benedictio (fol. 108<sup>r</sup>) Sub qua forma fiat hoc sacramentum.

Quid sit penitentia—Utrum quis penitere possit de uno et non de aliis—De .ix. gradibus peccatorum—De gradibus .v. peccati—Qualiter omnia peccata nascuntur a peccato primi parentis (fol. 108<sup>v</sup>) Qualiter designantur tres mortui quos dominus suscitavit per tria genera peccati—De his qui mundant triplicem modum peccandi—Qualiter homo debet iudicare se ipsum—Quid sit contritio et quibus speciebus dividatur (fol. 109<sup>r</sup>) Quid dimittitur a sacerdote in confessione—Qualiter deus dimittat peccatum et qualiter sacerdos—Quot modis remittit deus peccatum et quot modis sacerdos—Qualiter solvit deus hominem et qualiter sacerdos—De triplici vinculo a quo si sacerdos digne absolvit deus absolvit—Quod non sufficit cordis contritio nisi sequitur confessio (fol. 109<sup>v</sup>) Quod ea que confessi sumus semper in memoria habere debemus—De his que suadent confiteri—De cotidiana pectoris tunsione—Quod confessio debet esse universalis—Quod pro singulis peccatis sacerdos non debet iniungere diversas penitentias—Quot sint que arcent hominem a confessione (fol. 110<sup>r</sup>) Que impediunt confessionem—Quod exterior satisfactio valeat ad remissionem peccati—Quid debeat facere peccator si sacerdos maiorem vel minorem penitentiam quam debuisset iniunxit—Utrum penitentia sit efficiens causa remissionis peccati—Quod penitentia valet iterari nisi publica (fol. 110<sup>v</sup>) Quod in necessitate possit confiteri proximo si defuerit sacerdos—Utrum maior contritio sit necessaria ad delendum maius peccatum quam ad delendum minus—Utrum quis tantum puniatur pro peccato quantum meruit puniri pro eo—Utrum peccata semel dimissa redeant—Utrum quis teneatur omnia que confessus est et postea incidit sacerdoti revelare (fol. 111<sup>r</sup>) Utrum peccata remittantur sine contricione confessione et sacerdotis absolutione—Utrum mortalia remittantur sine venialibus et eontra—In quibus exterior penitentia consistit—Quod satisfactiones sunt arbitrarie—Utrum ille qui claustrum intrat teneatur omnia confiteri de quibus confessus est—Utrum teneatur parrochianus novo sacerdoti omnia que confessus fuerat confiteri—De mercenariis sacerdotibus (fol. 111<sup>v</sup>) Utrum satisfactio possit expleri ab eo qui in mortale relabitur—Quomodo reviviscunt opera que non vixerunt—Ad quid prosunt bona opera que fiunt ab his qui sunt in mortalibus—Utrum penitens ad arbitrium suum sibi possit penitentiam indicere—Utrum sacerdos de iure possit temporalem satisfactionem ex toto vel ex parte remittere—Utrum quis teneatur confiteri peccatum quem non fecit—De confessione que fit a sacerdotibus ante altare—Quod discretus sacerdos est inquirendus (fol. 112<sup>r</sup>) Quod nullus sacerdos debet alterius parrochianum iudicare sine licentia proprii sacerdotis—Quod sacerdos debet deponi qui secreta confitentis publicat—Quo tempore debet sacerdos specialiter convocare parrochianos ad penitentiam—Utrum sacerdos possit specialiter aliquem ab iniuncta penitentia absolvere—Quando sacerdos potest penitentiam variare—Qualiter debet sacerdos penitentiam variare (fol. 112<sup>v</sup>) Que virtutes contra que vicia sint opponende—Quod amore vel odio ductus non debet penitentiam diminuere vel augere—Qualiter quidam pervertunt penitentiam—Qualiter debet penitens supplicare sacerdoti ut pro eo celebret—Utrum sacerdos possit penitentiam super se accipere—Utrum impleat in purgatorio penitentiam si non implevit in hoc seculo—Utrum sacerdos debeat penitentiam morientis iniungere

caris ipsius (fol. 113<sup>r</sup>) Utrum ille qui laborat in extremis absolvatur si amici eius penitentiam illius super se acceperint et antequam moriatur perfecerint—Quod remittitur mortuo cum sacerdos dicit in ecclesia *remittite illi si quid vobis malefecerit*—Utrum in presenti vel in futuro remittantur peccata—Utrum salvandi transeant cum culpa—Utrum privata persona possit relaxare de rigore canonice penitentiae sine licentia prelati maioris—Utrum extranei prelati possint relaxare de penitentia iniuncta alicui publice penitenti—Que debent considerari in relaxatione (fol. 113<sup>v</sup>) Quid dimittat privata persona circa peccatum—Utrum ille qui est in mortali peccato possit orare vel psalmos in ecclesia dicere vel missam celebrare (fol. 114<sup>r</sup>) Quod peccator non debet velare peccata sua per helemosinas qui non confiteatur ea—Quod peccator debet cavere ne diu iaceat in peccato—Quod quamdiu manet quis in ipso peccato penitentia eius peccati non valet ad salutem—Quod minor sacerdos non debet iniungere penitentiam maiori (fol. 114<sup>v</sup>) Quod sacerdos mulieri quam cognovit non debet penitentiam iniungere—Qualiter mulier cognita a sacerdote ei confiteri debet si alium sacerdotem habere non poterit—Qualiter sacerdos alterius parrochianum ad penitentiam potest suscipere—Quod claustrales non debent audire confessiones—Que evellunt hominem a peccato—Quare sub septenario numero frequentius penitentiae iniunguntur—Quid pertinet ad maiores et ad minores sacerdotes—Quod in periculo mortis constituto penitentia non est deneganda—Quod in ultimo tempore vera confessio potest esse (fol. 115<sup>r</sup>) Utrum pro illo sit orandum qui ad sacerdotem veniebat et in via moritur—Qualiter in periculo mortis constituto sit penitentia indicenda—Quod inconsulto episcopo non debet presbyter penitentem reconciliare—Que sufficiunt ad delenda venialia—Que sint pro gravioribus adhibenda—Utrum quis in ultimo articulo possit penitere—Utrum plus peccet qui secunda vice peccat quam cum prima peccaret—Utrum aliqua peccata in alia vita dimittantur—Utrum aliquis in presenti vita veram penitentiam possit perficere—Utrum alicui salvando post hanc vitam remittantur peccata (fol. 115<sup>v</sup>) De tribus gradibus venialium—Utrum Iudas modo penitentiam habeat—Utrum sancti aliquem dolorem modo habeant de peccatis preteritis—Qualiter peccator debet confiteri peccata que prius confessus est—Qualiter debet confiteri peccatum quod hodie fecit—Qualiter debet sacerdos consulere illi qui usuram accepit (fol. 116<sup>r</sup>) Quid debeat fieri de pecunia qualicunque causa illicite acquisita—Quid debeat facere symoniacus—Quid debeat fieri de re inventa—Qualiter debet se gerere sacerdos circa peccatorem (fol. 116<sup>v</sup>) Quomodo debet sacerdos confitentem inquirere (*one column blank but no break in the text*) (fol. 117<sup>r</sup>) Quid sacerdos debet monere peccatorem ne fecte accedat ad penitentiam—Quomodo debet se gerere sacerdos circa illum qui peccata sua confiteri noluerit—Qualiter sacerdos debet reum instruere—Quid debet facere sacerdos de illo qui non vult penitere—Quomodo debet consulere illi qui dicit se non posse abstinere a peccato—Quomodo debet sacerdos penitentiam iniungere (fol. 117<sup>v</sup>) Quid sacerdos debet monere peccatorem ne gravitatem penitentiae abhorreat—Quare antiqui patres tam graves iniunxerunt penitentias—Que circumstantiae sunt attendende in iniungenda penitentia (fol. 119<sup>r</sup>) De clavibus que date sunt Petro et eius successoribus—Quando et quibus dentur—Utrum sacerdos qui habet curam animarum habeat utramque clavem—Utrum omnibus sacerdotibus sunt date due claves—Utrum sacerdos qui est in mortali peccato habeat potestatem ligandi et solvendi—Utrum omnis sacerdos possit ligare et solvere—Utrum prelatus liget vel solvat sua auctoritate (fol. 120<sup>r</sup>) Utrum prelatus suum possit purgare peccatum.

Quid sit excommunicatio et quot modis dicatur—In quibus debemus vitare excommunicatos—De participantibus nominatim excommunicato—Quare excommunicatio non transit in tertiam personam—Quot modis excusatur communicans excommunicato—De triplici excommunicatione (fol. 120<sup>v</sup>) Utrum ille qui est in mortali peccato est excommunicatus—Ad quid nocet generalis excom-



municatio—Quam postestatem habet diabolus in excommunicatis—Utrum ecclesia debet orare pro excommunicatis—Utrum maior sit excommunicatus si excommunicato communicavit—Utrum excommunicatus possit aliquem convenire vel accusare—Utrum sacerdos excommunicatus possit accusari vel conveniri—Utrum vassallus teneatur sequi dominum excommunicatum—Utrum si excommunicatus fuerit absolutus a maiori postea maior possit eum excommunicare—Utrum aliquis possit excommunicari post mortem—Utrum tot sunt excommunicationes quot sunt communiones (fol. 121') Que sit differentia inter excommunicationem et anathemata—A quo datur excommunicatio—De excommunicatione que datur a canone—De excommunicatione que datur a persona—Qualiter datur maior et minor excommunicatio—De illo qui scienter communicat excommunicato—Qualiter est absolvendus sollempniter excommunicatus—Qualiter est absolvendus minori excommunicatione (fol. 121') Qualiter est absolvendus qui excommunicatus est a persona—Qui sunt specialiter mittendi ad dominum papam pro absolutione—Utrum furiosus si percutit clericum cadat in canonem—Utrum ebrius si percutit clericum cadat in canonem—De illo qui falsavit litteras pape—De incendiariis (fol. 122') Utrum parem par vel maior maiorem possit excommunicare—Utrum quis seipsum possit excommunicare—Utrum episcopus sit excommunicatus qui communicat ei quem excommunicavit—In quibus possum communicare excommunicato—De illo qui habet prebendas in diversis episcopatibus et unus ex illis episcopis eum excommunicat—Qualiter quis nominatim excommunicatur—In quantum est excommunicatus vitandus—Qualiter est absolvendus qui infirmitate est positus—Qualiter simplex sacerdos excommunicat se vel maiorem—Quid debeat facere qui scit aliquem privatum excommunicatum—In quibus casibus non tenetur excommunicatus ire ad papam (fol. 122') De illis qui rationabili causa impediende ad apostolicam sedem non possunt accedere—Utrum illi qui occidunt clericos qui reliquerunt clericalem habitum incidunt in canonem late sententie—Quod iniectores manuum in clericos et incendiarii publicati sunt ad sedem apostolicam mitti—Quod post mortem quis excommunicatur et absolvitur—Utrum pro illo qui excommunicatus moritur et habet signa penitentie manifesta sit orandum ab ecclesia (fol. 123') De clericis excommunicatis celebrantibus—Utrum clericis excommunicatis ecclesiastica beneficia possint conferri—De illis qui clericis excommunicatis ecclesiastica beneficia conferunt—Qua pena falsarii puniri debeant—An sit communicandum excommunicato qui iuravit quod staret mandatis ecclesie—Utrum aliquis teneatur communicare excommunicato—Que pena iniungatur his qui nolentes vel inviti excommunicatis communicant (fol. 123') Utrum sacerdos possit alterius parrochianum excommunicare—Utrum illis qui clericos in custodia detinent sine lesione cadant in canonem late sententie—Utrum qui excommunicatis communicant scienter possint a simplici sacerdote per confessionem absolvi—Utrum absolutio que fit in consecrationibus ecclesiarum vel in aliis locis sit rata habenda—(fol. 124') Sententia Symonis tornacensis—Sententia aliorum—Sententia Petri de Corboil (fol. 124') Sententia Alani—Sententia Martini—Sententia Petri Prepositi—Sententia Roberti de Corso (fol. 125') Sententia Petri cantoris parisiensis—Quod relaxatio que fit ab episcopo non debet fieri indeterminate—Utrum sit absolutus a penitentia si dat tribus predicatoribus si unus quisque relaxat terciam partem penitentie (fol. 125') Utrum in tali relaxatione pariter absolvatur pauper et dives si dives dat nummum et pauper affectum—Utrum tantum remittatur illi qui plura commisit quam qui pauca si pariter dent fabrice ecclesie—Utrum illi qui par beneficium offerunt ecclesie par recipiant propter relaxationem emolumentum—Utrum episcopus possit usuarium absolvere a restitutione (fol. 126') Quare introducte sunt huiusmodi relaxationes—Utrum episcopus in his absolutionibus possit absolvere alterius parrochianum—Utrum simplex sacerdos possit illum absolvere quem episcopus ligavit—Utrum prelatus possit generaliter omnes absolvere ad

dedicationem accedentes—Utrum pseudo predicatorum sint audiendi—Utrum prelati debeant refundere in fabricam ecclesie ea que per falsam predicationem acquiruntur et utrum laicos debeant ad hoc mittere cum non habet litteratos—Utrum simplex sacerdos debeat suscipere pseudo predicatorum a prelati missos—Utrum prelati debeant conferre litteras suas et reliquias predicatoribus propter questum.

(fol. 127<sup>v</sup>) De sacramento corporis Christi—Quid dicatur hoc sacramentum—Quando fuit institutum—De quo fiat hoc sacramentum—Qua forma fiat hoc sacramentum—Quo auctore conficitur hoc sacramentum (fol. 127<sup>v</sup>) Utrum sacerdos excommunicatus vel hereticus vel precisus possit conficere—Utrum sacerdos conficiat preter intentionem conficiendo (sic)—Utrum omne sacramentum novi testamenti efficiat quod figurat—Utrum ante consecrationem vel post panis transubstantietur in corpus Christi—De transsubstantiatione panis in corpus Christi (fol. 128<sup>r</sup>) De substantiali et formali conversione—Utrum fractio fit in corpore Christi annon—Quod Christus est integer sub qualibet forma consecrata in altari—Utrum in consecratione panis desinit esse vel non—Utrum panis transubstantietur in corpus Christi (fol. 128<sup>r</sup>) In quo est forma panis post consecrationem et ubi sunt accidentia que ibi videntur—Utrum aliquis possit saturari corpore Christi sine alio cibo (fol. 129<sup>r</sup>) Utrum forma visibilis sit sacramentum—Utrum sit articulus fidei panem transubstantiari in corpus Christi—Utrum sit transsubstantiatio si sacerdos abmutescit post prolationem *hoc est corpus meum etc.*—Utrum ille qui sumit speciem panis sumat sanguinem Christi—Utrum si in tempore passionis Christi aliquis celebret panis transubstantiaretur in corpus animatum vel inanimatum—Utrum panis transubstantietur in corpus animatum vel inanimatum (fol. 129<sup>v</sup>) Utrum sacramentum altaris sit miraculosum—Que sit caro Christi sacramentalis et spiritualis (fol. 130<sup>r</sup>) Utrum Iudas accepit eucaristiam—Utrum Christus dedit Iude corpus suum ea intentione quam et Petro—Quare non ammonuit Christus Iudam ne indigne sumeret eucaristiam—Utrum licitum sit diacono vel subdiacono vel heretico eucaristiam ministrare (fol. 130<sup>v</sup>) Utrum ecclesiastica sacramenta sint danda illis qui sunt in notorio crimine—Utrum in sumptione corporis et sanguinis Christi sit duplex sumptio et utrum solum corpus sumatur—Qualiter per fidem spem et caritatem sumimus vitam eternam—Utrum corpus Christi sit circumscribibile loco (fol. 131<sup>v</sup>) Utrum caro Christi erat apta ad manducandum ante passionem—Quare ecclesia maleficio prestat patrocinium cum vetet ei eucaristiam dari (fol. 132<sup>r</sup>) Utrum illi qui trahitur ad suspendium debeat ei eucaristia dari—Quod in extremo mortis posito non debet viaticum denegari—Utrum Christus localiter descendat de celo cum exhibet suam presentiam et utrum faciat localem distanciam—De numero signorum que fiunt super oblata et calicem (fol. 132<sup>v</sup>) Quot sunt in sacramento eucaristie necessaria—Quod verum corpus Christi est in altari sub forma panis—Utrum aliquid immoletur in consecratione corporis Christi—Utrum qui nocturnam pollutionem patitur crastina die debeat celebrare—Quod post sumptionem eucaristie debet quislibet per aliquot horas cessare a commestione—Utrum si una pars eucaristie ceciderit laicus debeat eam sublevare (fol. 133<sup>r</sup>) Utrum duas hostias confectas debeat quis simul accipere—Quam similitudinem habet corpus Christi materiale cum ecclesia—Utrum forma candoris vel rotunditatis que videntur sint sacramentum—Qualiter boni et mali sumunt corpus Christi—De diversis diverso modo corpus Christi sumentibus (fol. 133<sup>v</sup>) In quibus est fides incarnationis et transsubstantiationis panis in corpus Christi—De negligentis corporis et sanguinis domini—De illo qui per ebrietatem vel voracitatem sacrificium evomit—De illo qui sacrificium evomit—De illo qui sacrificium accepit pollutus—De illo de cuius manu sacrificium cadit (fol. 134<sup>r</sup>) De periculis que circa corpus et sanguinem eveniunt—De quibusdam miraculis que acciderunt circa corpus Christi.

(fol. 134<sup>v</sup>) De ordinibus ecclesiasticis—Quid sit ordo (fol. 135<sup>r</sup>) A quo

instituitur minister ecclesiasticus—De prima tonsura—De septem ecclesiasticis ordinibus—Qua etate debent ordines conferri (fol. 135<sup>v</sup>) Quibus temporibus debeant ordines conferri—Que sunt de substantia ordinis—Quod sexus est de substantia ordinis—Quod baptismus est de substantia ordinis—De potestate ordinantis—Utrum hereticus vel suspensus vel excommunicatus possit ordines conferre (fol. 136<sup>r</sup>) Quot sunt casus in quibus non licet dispensare nisi a domino papa—Quod intentio ordinantis est de substantia ordinis—Quod intentio ordinati est de substantia ordinis—Quod verba sint de substantia ordinis—De dispensatione ordinatorum vel ordinandorum—De examinatione in sacris ordinibus facienda—Quod nullus debeat suscipere alterius episcopatus clericum nisi cum litteris proprii episcopi—Quis primus in episcopum fuit ordinatus—Quomodo minores sacerdotes consecrant maiores (fol. 137<sup>r</sup>) Utrum numerus ternarius sit de substantia sacramenti—Utrum aliquis sit cogendus ad suscipiendum maiores ordines—De illo qui effectus est sacerdos ceteris omissis ordinibus—Quid esset si Iudeus vel paganus vel mulier acceperint ordinum consecrationem—Utrum corpore vitiatum possunt ad ordines promoveri—Qua pena debeant puniri qui indigne ordinati sunt—(fol. 137<sup>v</sup>) Utrum aliquis debeat ordinari sine titulo—Utrum ad sacros ordines debeat quis promoveri sine beneficio ecclesiastico—Qualis debet ad sacros ordines eligi—Que impediunt ordinem et ordinis executionem—Quod crimen impedit ordinem—Que crimina sunt que promovendum impediunt et promotum deiciunt (fol. 138<sup>r</sup>) Quod homicidium impedit ordinem—Quod homicidium casuale quandoque impedit quandoque non (fol. 138<sup>v</sup>) Utrum physicus ad sacros ordines possit promoveri—Utrum periuri vel homicide vel falsi testes vel adulteri convicti debeant ad sacros ordines promoveri—Quare homicidium plus impediat promotionem quam cetera crimina—Utrum apostolicus possit dispensare circa homicidam—Qualiter vim vi repellere licet (fol. 139<sup>r</sup>) Utrum potius debeat aliquis interficere quam interficiatur—Quod symonia impedit promotionem—Utrum licitum sit episcopis cum symoniaciis et homicidis dispensare (fol. 139<sup>v</sup>) Quod excommunicatio impedit promotionem—Quod sortilegium impedit promovendum et deicit promotum—Quod sollempniter penitentes non promoventur—Quod infamia impedit promotionem—De quibusdam aliis criminibus que impediunt promotionem (fol. 140<sup>r</sup>) Que conditio impedit promotionem—Quod servitus impedit promotionem—Quod nativitas impedit promotionem—Quod officium impedit promotionem—Quod coniugium impedit promotionem—Quod diversus seu eventus impedit promotionem (fol. 141<sup>r</sup>) De his que non impedit ordinem sed ordinis executionem—Quare clerici non debent habere uxores—Quare sacerdotibus interdicta sunt—Quid iuris sit si clericus unius ecclesie consuetudinis transierit ad ecclesiam consuetudinis contrarie—Utrum clericus uxoratus possit fungi suo officio—Utrum clerici coniugati debeant ecclesiastica beneficia detinere—Utrum clerici debeant tenere mulieres in domibus suis (fol. 141<sup>v</sup>) Utrum clericus uxoratus convictus de crimine sit in monasterio detrudendus—Utrum clericus degradatus debeat in monasterium detrudi vel pro flagicio suspendi—Qualiter debent puniri clerici adulterio vel latricinio vel alio scelere deprehensi—Utrum illa possit alii nubere que consentit viro ut monasterium ingrederetur—Utrum aliquis possit facere votum et post a voto resilire—Utrum uxor que promisit viro ut intraret monasterium teneatur semper—Utrum ille qui aliam defloravit et postea in uxorem duxit possit promoveri (fol. 142<sup>r</sup>) Utrum ille qui fornicatus est cum vidua possit ordinari—Utrum ille qui alterius desponsatam per verba de presenti et non cognitam duxit possit promoveri—Utrum debeat arceri a sacris ordinibus qui sponsa mortua incognita in aliam consentit—Utrum ille qui cum diversis contraxit de facto sed non de iure promoveri possit—Utrum ille possit promoveri qui duxit illam cui alius prius consenserat consensu de futuro—Quare bigamus non potest promoveri ad sacerdotium vel diaconium—Utrum esset sacerdos bigamus si papa eum ordinavit (fol. 142<sup>v</sup>) Quis bigamus appellatur—Quare

bigamus ad sacros ordines promoveri non potest—Que mulier vidua vocatur—Qua pena puniatur sacerdos qui viduam ad secundas nuptias transeuntem benedicit—Qua pena puniatur qui occulte nubentes benedicit.

Quid sit matrimonium (fol. 143<sup>r</sup>) Unde dicitur matrimonium—Quare dicitur potius matrimonium quam patrimonium—De institutione coniugii—Quod sensus coniugii spiritualement copulam Christi et ecclesie significat (fol. 143<sup>r</sup>) De causis coniugii ante tempus gratie et in tempore gratie—De diversis statibus coniugii—Que sint bona coniugii (fol. 144<sup>r</sup>) Utrum inter furiosos possit contrahi matrimonium—Utrum muti et surdi possint contrahere—Utrum pueri ante annos legitimos possint contrahere—Quot exiguntur ad matrimonium—Utrum ille qui amisit genitalia possit contrahere—Utrum naturaliter frigidi possint contrahere—Cui credendum sit si uxor dixerit virum esse frigidum et vir dixit se non esse (fol. 144<sup>r</sup>) Usque ad quod tempus debet virum frigidum expectare mulier ne ab eo discedat—Quid faciendum sit de illo qui duxit virginem et non potuit deflorare et postea aliam duxit et defloravit—Quid faciendum est de illa que non potest esse habilis ad cognoscendum—De diversis causis per quas contrahitur matrimonium—De triplici casu qui debet esse in matrimonio—Que conditio sit admittenda in matrimonio—Utrum ille qui iuravit se non consensuram (sic) in aliquam possit matrimonium contrahere (fol. 145<sup>r</sup>) Utrum matrimonium consummatum sit separandum—Utrum omnes precepto nature ad coniugium teneantur—Que excusant coitum coniugale a mortali peccato—Utrum inter decrepitos possit matrimonium contrahi—Utrum sit matrimonium inter eos qui duxit quandam sub conditione et postea cognovit eam—Utrum sit matrimonium inter eos qui iuravit aliquam et eam citra carnis copulam desponsavit (fol. 145<sup>r</sup>) Utrum vir teneatur uxori consanguinee debitum [reddere] si non potest probare consanguinitatem—Utrum opus coniugale sit matrimonium—Utrum coire sit de naturali iure—Utrum ille qui cognoscit uxorem suam timens lubricum carnis mereatur—Utrum vir habeat potestatem in uxorem menstruatam vel emeroissam—Utrum quis cum uxore propria possit adulterium committere—Utrum fornicacio ex sui natura an exhibitione sit mortale peccatum—Utrum licitum esset in veteri testamento solutam cognoscere (fol. 146<sup>r</sup>) An licitum sit alicui plures uxores simul habere—De illo qui duas insimul habet uxores—Utrum quis teneatur uxori debitum reddere in sacris noctibus—Utrum voluntate filium generandi debeat quis facere adulterium—Utrum licitum sit alicui secundas nuptias contrahere—Utrum si aliquis fuerit resuscitatus et uxor sua interim duxerit virum an possit eam repetere—Utrum sola suspicione debeat uxor dimitti (fol. 146<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter sit dimittenda uxor pro fornicacione—De triplici dimissione uxoris—Utrum vir sit dimittendus ab uxore si peccat contra naturam vel econtra—Utrum ille debeat uxorem dimittere qui polluit sororem eius—Utrum vir teneatur post divorcium providere necessaria uxori—Utrum causa odii vir possit dimittere uxorem—Utrum esset matrimonium inter illos qui uxores dimittebant et alias ducebant—Utrum ille qui sola suspicione [uxorem dimittebat] cogatur eam recipere—Utrum vir possit uxorem dimittere si ab aliquo iniuste cognita fuerit (fol. 147<sup>r</sup>) Utrum sit matrimonium inter illos que duxit maritum cum vir esset in aliena regione—Utrum possit mulier alii nubere si longa vir alienatur peregrinatione—Utrum ei dari debeat uxor qui est in regione longinqua et habet uxorem (fol. 147<sup>r</sup>) Utrum inter illos sit coniugium qui ducit unam ignorans utrum prima sit mortua—Utrum mulier possit salvare animam suam que accepit maritum alterius mulieris ignorans ipsum esse coniugatum—Utrum ecclesia peccet dum cogat istos manere insimul—Utrum vir peccet mortaliter qui cum secunda manet et habet propositum quod cum prima revertatur—Utrum propter spirituale fornicacionem sit uxor dimittenda—Utrum pro mortali peccato possit uxor dimitti (fol. 148<sup>r</sup>) Utrum vir possit uxorem leprosam dimittere et an leprosus debeat uxorem sanam ducere—Que impediunt matrimonium—De voto—De simplici voto—Que persona potest vovere

et que non (fol. 148<sup>r</sup>) De sollempni voto—Quare sollempne votum potius matrimonium dirimit quam simplex—De communi et singulari voto (fol. 149<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter sollempne votum revocatur—Quot modis votum sollempnizatur (fol. 149<sup>r</sup>) Utrum simplex votum possit commutari—Utrum simplex votum dirimat matrimonium contractum (fol. 150<sup>r</sup>) Quod aliquis non potest dispensare contra votum sed commutare—Quod votum est commutabile quod non—Utrum impuberes a parentibus monasteriis traditi proposito religionis sint astricti—Utrum inter Mariam et Ioseph fuit coniugium cum ambo deo virginitatem vovissent (fol. 150<sup>r</sup>) Utrum licuit beate virgini nubere post votum—Qualiter beata virgo maledictum legis evasit cum post votum nupsit—Utrum ante conceptionem Christi vel post sit contractum matrimonium inter Mariam et Ioseph—Utrum dominus fuerit actor divorcii cum matrem suam Iohanni commendavit—Utrum inter sponsum et sponsam sit verum coniugium (fol. 151<sup>r</sup>) Utrum licitum sit sponso vel sponse sine licentia alterius facere votum continencie—Utrum liceat alicui ad aliam transire qui desponsavit aliquam—Utrum desponsatio facta de futuro cum iuramento faciat matrimonium—Utrum sit matrimonium inter eos qui consentiunt consensu de futuro—Utrum causa maleficii possit sponsa a sponso separari (fol. 151<sup>r</sup>) Utrum si propter maleficiu separatus fuerit a prima et secundam duxerit postea facultas coeundi ei reddita fuerit debeat ad primam redire—Quid iuris sit si sponsa non vult intrare monasterium nec viro reddere debitum—Utrum sponsa compelli debeat ad reddendum sponso debitum—An liceat alicui habere in matrimonium quam polluit per adulterium—Utrum ille possit eam habere in coniugem quam vivente viro de facto desponsavit—Utrum adulter possit ducere illam cui fidem dedit quod mortuo viro eam duceret—Utrum mulier adultera possit virum adulterum dimittere (fol. 152<sup>r</sup>) Utrum licitum sit meretricem ducere in uxorem—Quod ordo et habitus impediunt matrimonium et dirimunt—Que cognatio impedit et dirimit matrimonium—De fratribus qui ducebant uxores fratrum qui moriebantur sine semine—Quid faciendum sit si aliquis cum sorore vel consanguinea uxoris dormit—Utrum inter cognatos sit matrimonium et utrum peccent mortaliter cum carnaliter commiscantur (fol. 152<sup>r</sup>) Quod non omnis fornicacio est mortale peccatum—Utrum inter septimum gradum possit aliquis consanguinee sue copulari—Quare ecclesia prohibuit aliquos inter septimum gradum coniungi—Quod dispar cultus impedit et dirimit matrimonium—Quod inter fideles sit matrimonium (fol. 153<sup>r</sup>) Utrum inter Iudeos sit matrimonium—Utrum Iudeus et Iudea cognati coniuncti, si baptizentur, sint separandi—Utrum matrimonium Iudeorum careat culpa—Utrum Iudei derelinquant cum in tertio vel quarto gradu per matrimonium coniunguntur—Utrum si Iudei si coniuncti fuerint infra septimum gradum et postea convertantur ad fidem sint separandi—Utrum alter coniugium ad fidem convertatur et reliquus non, propter hoc sint separandi—Utrum possit matrimonium si alter eorum apostatavit et alius in fide permanserit—Utrum mulier surda ydolata sit a viro separanda (fol. 153<sup>r</sup>) Utrum excommunicatus possit contrahere matrimonium cum ea que non est excommunicata—Utrum vir habens uxorem infidelem possit aliam ducere—Quod error persone impedit matrimonium—Quod error conditionis impedit matrimonium—Quis error non impedit matrimonium—Utrum servus alicuius et ancilla alterius possint contrahere matrimonium (fol. 154<sup>r</sup>) Utrum ancilla uxor servi teneatur sequi maritum si dominus mariti eum vendiderit—Utrum debeat matrimonium separari qui contraxit cum ancilla ignorans esse eam ancillam—Utrum vir liber teneatur reddere debitum ancille antequam conperta sit conditio—Utrum ille qui habet uxorem duceretur aliam, mortua prima possit a secunda discedere—Utrum inter absentes possit matrimonium contrahi—Utrum solus consensus per verba faciat matrimonium—Quot sunt necessaria in matrimonio contrahendo (fol. 154<sup>r</sup>) Quare dirimuntur sponsalia inter adultos—Que dirimunt sponsalia sicut et matrimonium (fol. 155<sup>r</sup>) Quod delicti enormitas impedit matrimonium—Quare

uxoricide perpetua continentia indicatur et non matricide—Que impediunt carnalem copulam matrimonii (fol. 155<sup>v</sup>) Quod cognatio spiritualis impedit et dirimit matrimonium (fol. 156<sup>r</sup>) Quot modis spiritualis proximitas contrahitur—Utrum aliquis duas commatres possit diversis temporibus accipere in uxores (fol. 156<sup>v</sup>) Utrum filius sacerdotis possit penitentialem patris sui ducere in uxorem—Utrum filia sacerdotis cum penitentiali patris sui vel baptizato ab eo possit contrahere—Qui sunt filii naturales, qui legitimi, qui legitimi et naturales, qui spirituales—Utrum spiritualis filius et spiritualis filia eiusdem hominis possint inter se contrahere—Utrum filii ante vel post conpaternitatem geniti possint matrimonio copulari (fol. 157<sup>r</sup>) Utrum natus ante conpaternitatem filiam conpatris sui vel commatris possint in matrimonium ducere—Utrum aliquis possit filiam sue commatris in uxorem accipere—Qua etate debent contrahi sponsalia—Utrum ille sit ab uxore separandus qui eam infra nobiles annos desponsavit et cognovit et postea matrem eius agnovit—Utrum illi [sit] filia copulanda cui fidem vir dedit ut eam duceret et postea matrem eius cognovit—Utrum ille sit ab uxore separandus qui infra annos nobiles firmavit et postea sororem cognovit (fol. 157<sup>v</sup>) Utrum sit dirimendum matrimonium inter eos qui ante conversionem fuerint coniuncti infra gradus a canone denotatos—Utrum sit matrimonium inter eos si contraxerit cum minore—Ad quid obligant sponsalia infra nobiles annos acta—Utrum sit matrimonium inter puberes si ante annos pubertatis se carnaliter cognoverint—Utrum inter puberes possint matrimonium contrahi—Utrum etas sit necessaria ad matrimonium—Utrum ille qui quamdam desponsavit et antequam cognovisset aliam duxit sit a secunda separanda—De clandestina desponsatione (fol. 158<sup>r</sup>) Utrum clandestina coniugia sint solvenda—Quod raptus impedit matrimonium—Quando separatur matrimonium quantum ad cohabitationem sed non dirimitur (fol. 158<sup>v</sup>) Que sunt delicta que perpetuo et universaliter matrimonium impediunt—Utrum sollempniter penitentibus liceat contrahere—Utrum incestuosi possint contrahere—Quid iuris sit cum impossibilitas coeundi inter coniugatos allegatur (fol. 159<sup>r</sup>). Utrum propter impossibilitatem coeundi sit uxor a viro separandus—Utrum si post separationem frigidus aliam cognoscit teneatur ad primam redire—Qualiter sit fides facienda ecclesie de facultate coeundi reddita—Utrum inter frigidos possit esse matrimonium—Utrum si mulier consensit in impotentem sit ab eo separanda (fol. 159<sup>v</sup>) Quod publice honestatis iustitia impedit matrimonium—Quod tempus feriarum et interdictum ecclesie impedit matrimonium—Utrum feriarum sollempnitas dirimit matrimonium contractum—Quare in veteri testamento fuit permissum ut aliquis consanguineam duceret et in novo testamento fuit prohibitum (fol. 160<sup>r</sup>) Quid sit consanguinitas—Quid sit linea consanguinitatis—Qualiter gradus canonicus computatur—Qualiter legalis est gradus computandus—Qualiter gradus consanguinitatis sit computandus (fol. 160<sup>v</sup>) Qua pena puniuntur qui infra septem gradus coniunguntur—Quare in legibus sunt gradus inventi—Quare in canonibus sunt inventi—Quod eadem est computatio graduum secundum leges et canones (fol. 161<sup>r</sup>) Quod affinitas impedit et dirimit matrimonium—Quid sit affinitas—Quot sunt genera affinitatis (fol. 161<sup>v</sup>) Unde nascitur affinitas et usque ad quem gradum affinitatis abstinendum sit a matrimonio (fol. 162<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter gradus in affinitate sint computandi—Quare proles secundarum nupciarum consanguineis prioris viri copulari prohibetur—Utrum proles ex secundis nupciis orta mutet gradum et non genus (fol. 162<sup>v</sup>) Quod coactio impedit contrahendum matrimonium et dirimit contractum—Quid sit libido, quid luxuria, quid fornicatio, quid adulterium, quid incestum, quid raptus, quid peccatum contra matrimonium (fol. 163<sup>r</sup>) Qualiter Christus in se septem sacramenta suscepit et qualiter nobis fidelibus sumenda. Conclusio operis.

# Sur la Doctrine de L'Aséité Divine

JACQUES MARITAIN

## I.

SI nous considérons les développements de la pensée issue de Descartes, en fin de compte est-ce qu'on ne peut pas dire que dans la ligne d'un grand idéalisme métaphysique tel que celui de Fichte, le Dieu cartésien apparaîtra logiquement après deux siècles comme une existence sans essence, comme un moi pur et sans visage qui se pose par sa propre volonté, en posant le devenir?

La raison péremptoire pour laquelle, selon un des aspects, une des "coupes" de la pensée de Descartes, l'essence divine est proprement inaccessible à la raison, ce serait alors que, selon les virtualités secrètes de la pensée cartésienne, Dieu n'a pas d'essence, ou de nature, Dieu est seulement Existence et Efficience. Que le Dieu cartésien est une existence sans essence, cela est si vrai que les essences idéales elles-mêmes sont une expression de sa liberté créatrice. Ne trouvant pas en lui, si nous pouvons ainsi parler, la raison des choses, Dieu crée cette raison des choses arbitrairement, il est cause efficiente, cause créatrice des nécessités intelligibles comme il l'est du monde et comme en définitive il l'est de son propre être, de sa propre existence. Dieu aurait pu faire des montagnes sans vallées et des cercles carrés. Les nécessités intelligibles impliquées dans l'essence du cercle et dans l'essence de la montagne étaient pour Descartes l'oeuvre de la liberté créatrice de Dieu, et non pas une participation créée de l'essence nécessaire de Dieu telle qu'il la voit éternellement.

Tout à l'heure je faisais allusion à Fichte. Avec Hegel nous avons une Idée qui se pose elle-même et qui se développe dialectiquement. Ici nous ne pouvons pas dire que nous soyons en face d'une existence sans essence ni d'une liberté sans nature, au contraire c'est une idée—une "essence"—qui va tout donner par son auto-développement; mais le coup de force existentiel, si je puis ainsi parler, est transporté alors à l'intérieur de cette essence, celle-ci est intrinsèquement contradictoire, antinomique, l'être absolument indéterminé étant identique au non-être, et alors a lieu le fameux développement dialectique hégélien. Et c'est ainsi grâce à ce développement, que l'exister sous les espèces du devenir—l'exister qui est désormais un devenir—est réintroduit dans l'Essence même et dans la Logique (en brisant l'une et l'autre).

D'autre part, si nous considérons maintenant des formes d'idéalisme non plus grandiosement métaphysiques, comme l'idéalisme de Hegel et de Fichte, mais plutôt anti-ontologiques, nous constatons, avec M.Brunschwig, par exemple, que ces formes d'idéalisme se caractérisent avant tout comme refusant toute nature ou toute structure, toute essence à la pensée, la pensée connaissante étant conçue sur le modèle de la liberté morale et comme avançant de découverte en découverte, d'invention en invention, mais étant elle-même sans forme, sans structure; nous pouvons dire que c'est une existence sans essence, un dieu sans visage.

Enfin, si nous considérons certaines réactions anti-idéalistes, à tendance ontologique, comme celle de M.Louis Lavelle, nous voyons que dans son livre sur "l'Acte", M.Lavelle, sans donner du reste, je crois, une valeur systématique à cette expression, appelle en passant Dieu "une liberté sans nature". Chez lui je crois que ce n'est qu'un mot dit en passant, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait là un

sens doctrinal systématique, j'imagine que cette manière de parler dépend plutôt de l'acception de l'idée de nature entendue univoquement, au sens des natures que nous connaissons ici-bas; ce serait toute une histoire à faire; beaucoup de philosophes de nos jours ne saisissent pas la portée analogique du mot nature et réduisent la nature à la nature matérielle; dans ce cas-là il est logique de la refuser à Dieu.

Mais laissons cette parenthèse. Je disais qu'il y a une ligne philosophique qui part de Descartes, et qui va dans le sens d'un certain *libertisme*, représenté par Secrétan, Lequier (et peut-être, selon un tout autre esprit, Fichte dépend-il aussi de Descartes à ce point de vue); au terme de cette ligne *libertiste* on trouverait cette idée que Dieu existe *parce qu'il le veut*. C'est là l'extrême limite de la notion de *causa sui* quand on la transporte à l'Acte pur, et dans cette acception-là on quitte la ligne de la liberté de spontanéité pour passer à celle de la liberté de choix. Voilà une manière extrémiste d'entendre l'actualité pure de Dieu tout en lui refusant une essence ou une nature proprement dite. Dieu existe de par sa liberté, ou il existe comme une plénitude absolue de liberté, le mot liberté étant pris au sens de liberté de choix, d'absence de nécessité; c'est-à-dire que Dieu, si on peut ainsi parler, est au sommet, au comble de l'absence de nécessité, *il existe sans aucune nécessité*, par un pur acte de libre arbitre, par conséquent il pourrait s'anéantir, assurément, il faut aller jusque là! comme il pourrait faire des montagnes sans vallées et des cercles carrés. Voilà une des extrémités auxquelles conduit cette notion d'existence sans essence prise comme caractérisant l'acte pur.

Pour les thomistes les problèmes que je viens d'indiquer ne se posaient pas, on ne constate jamais chez eux cette tendance. Toute leur métaphysique baignait dans l'analogicité de l'être, en telle sorte qu'ils ne pouvaient même pas supposer qu'on pût penser que la notion d'essence, notion essentiellement analogique, puisse être refusée à Dieu.

Seulement, nous trouvons chez eux quelque chose qui à certains moments ressemble à cela, tout en ayant en réalité un sens bien différent. Ce que nous trouvons chez eux c'est une affirmation de portée générale, de portée universelle, qui ne concerne pas seulement la notion d'essence, mais toutes les notions qu'on peut dire de Dieu, c'est ce thème de portée générale et universelle que la théologie dite apophatique ou négative est supérieure à la théologie dite cataphatique ou affirmative. Ce qui veut dire en définitive, dans la pensée des auteurs scolastiques, que la théologie dite mystique, par mode de contemplation unitive, est supérieure aux concepts et supérieure à la théologie *per modum cognitionis*, par mode de connaissance.

Cette position signifie en général que même les perfections qui existent en Dieu d'une manière formelle-éminente, c'est-à-dire en conservant là leur intelligibilité typique et propre, comme la bonté, l'intelligence, la sagesse, etc., n'existent pas en lui selon le mode dont nous les connaissons et dont elles existent dans les choses. Alors il est également vrai, ou même il est plus vrai en ce sens-là, de les nier de Dieu que de les affirmer de lui. C'est une thèse que le Pseudo-Denys avait rendue classique au Moyen-Age.

On pourrait voir par exemple ce texte de la *Somme Théologique* où l'une des objections rappelait la doctrine de Denys selon laquelle tous ces noms, bonté, sagesse, etc., il est plus vrai de les écarter de Dieu que de les lui attribuer. Et S. Thomas répond<sup>1</sup> que "Denys a dit qu'il fallait nier de Dieu ces noms parce que ce qui est signifié par le nom ne convient pas à Dieu selon le mode de signification du nom, mais selon un mode meilleur". C'est à ce point de vue du *mode de signification* qu'il convient d'écarter même ces perfections de l'être divin, c'est-à-dire de connaître Dieu selon une 'ignorance' qui introduit l'intel-

<sup>1</sup> Ia. q.13, a.3. ad 2.



ligence elle-même dans la transcendance du mode selon lequel ces perfections existent en Dieu—connaissance par mode d'ignorance qui par-là même ne peut plus procéder par concepts, c'est-à-dire par attribution à Dieu de telles ou telles perfections—et qui est meilleure que la connaissance notionnelle et rationnelle, meilleure que la théologie qui s'enseigne ou que la connaissance par mode de connaissance.

Cette doctrine est vraie, d'après les Anciens, même en ce qui concerne l'existence. Et cependant S.Thomas déclare à chaque instant que Dieu est *ipsum esse subsistens*. Si nous considérons le mode selon lequel le mot et le concept 'exister' signifie son objet, ce mode qui répond lui-même au mode, à la façon dont les choses que nous connaissons existent, une connaissance telle qu'elle dépasse l'attribution de l'existence à Dieu, est la connaissance suprême que nous pouvons acquérir de lui, ou plutôt recevoir de lui, en vertu de l'union à lui.

Voici un texte du premier livre du *Commentaire sur les Sentences*:<sup>2</sup> "Lorsque nous procédons vers Dieu par voie de rémotion, [les deux autres voies sont les voies de causalité et d'éminence], nous nions en premier lieu de lui les choses corporelles; et en second lieu les choses intellectuelles aussi, selon que ces attributs se trouvent dans les créatures, comme la bonté et la sagesse . . ." Il est bon, mais pas comme les choses sont bonnes; il est sage, mais pas comme les créatures sont sages. "Alors demeure seulement dans notre intellect l'existence divine, et rien d'autre", *quia est*, qu'il existe, voilà tout ce qui reste notionnellement dans notre intelligence. "C'est pourquoi il est là comme dans une certaine confusion. Mais au degré ultime, l'exister lui-même selon qu'il est dans les créatures, nous le nions de Dieu; c'est alors qu'il demeure dans une sorte de ténèbre d'ignorance, selon laquelle, autant qu'il convient à l'état de voie, nous sommes le plus parfaitement joints à Dieu, comme dit Denys, et c'est là la ténèbre dans laquelle Dieu est dit habiter". On voit donc que cette doctrine s'applique aussi bien à l'esse qu'aux autres perfections.

Cependant S.Thomas a toujours regardé l'esse—l'acte d'existence considéré cette fois dans sa transcendance analogique et non plus selon le mode de signification du mot 'exister'—il a toujours regardé l'esse comme le constitutif formel (selon notre manière de concevoir) de la nature divine.

Il y a entre autres le texte suivant tiré du *Commentaire sur le Livre des Causes*:<sup>3</sup> "Selon les platoniciens la cause première est au-dessus de l'être, *supra ens*, en tant que l'essence de la bonté et de l'unité, qui est selon eux la cause première, surpasse l'être séparé lui-même, *ipsum ens separatum*". Même l'être, ce n'est pas dans la perspective de l'acte d'être, de l'esse, que les Platoniciens le concevaient, c'est dans la perspective, à vrai dire limitée au créé, de l'ens, de l'étant, de l'ayant l'existence; et il était logique qu'ils missent le bon et l'un au-dessus de l'étant; car l'idée de l'ens n'est plus celle du bon ou de l'un; et en la séparant nous la laissons telle quelle; l'ens séparé n'est pas la bonté, et la bonté sera au-dessus de lui. Parce que l'ens séparé (comme le bon séparé, ou l'un séparé!) c'est du créé sublimisé, ce n'est pas l'incrée, ce n'est pas Dieu. Dieu est l'esse subsistant, ce qui implique toutes les autres perfections en acte pur. Selon les Platoniciens Dieu est *supra ens*, parce que le Bon séparé est au-dessus de l'Existant séparé. "Mais selon la vérité des choses, la cause première est *supra ens*, au-dessus de l'existant, en tant qu'elle est l'exister lui-même infini, *ipsum esse infinitum*".

Sur cette doctrine générale il y a une expression très belle dans un autre texte de S.Thomas:<sup>4</sup> "Ce que j'appelle exister est l'actualité de tous les actes, et à cause de cela c'est la perfection de toutes les perfections",—*hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium per-*

<sup>2</sup> Sent., Lib.I, dist.viii, q.1, a.1, ad 4

lect.VI.

<sup>3</sup> *Expositio super Librum de Causis*,

<sup>4</sup> *De Potentia*, q.VII, a.2, ad 9.

*fectionum*. On pourrait voir d'autres textes où c'est toujours la même doctrine: "Le degré le plus élevé de la connaissance humaine au sujet de Dieu, c'est de savoir qu'on est ignorant de Dieu, est *quod sciat se Deum nescire*, en tant que l'on sait que ce que Dieu est excède tout cela même que nous atteignons de lui par l'intelligence".<sup>5</sup> De même dans le *Commentaire sur les Noms Divins*: "Cela même est connaître Dieu, que de savoir que nous ignorons de Dieu quelle est son essence . . . Et ainsi celui qui connaît Dieu dans un tel état de connaissance, est illuminé par la profondeur elle-même de la sagesse divine, que nous ne pouvons pas scruter".<sup>6</sup>

Connaissance non par concepts, mais par illumination; S.Thomas pense bien ici à la connaissance mystique, et non pas à la théologie par mode de science rationnelle: "Que nous percevions en effet que Dieu est au-dessus de toutes choses, non seulement qui sont, mais même que nous pouvons atteindre par l'intelligence, cela provient pour nous de l'incompréhensible profondeur de la divine sagesse".<sup>7</sup> Et ainsi: "Au sommet de notre connaissance nous connaissons Dieu comme inconnu". C'est le mot de Denys, dans la *Théologie Mystique*, que S.Thomas reprend: *in finem nostrae cognitionis Deum tanquam ignotum cognoscimus*. Même doctrine dans la *Somme contre les Gentils*:<sup>8</sup> "Et cela est le sommet et la plus haute perfection de notre connaissance en cette vie, comme le dit Denys dans la *Théologie Mystique*, que nous soyons joints à Dieu comme inconnu".

Cela ne veut pas dire évidemment que nous devons, dans l'ordre de la théologie cataphatique, de la théologie comme doctrine, là où nous procédons par concepts et par notions, refuser à Dieu l'existence, la bonté, l'intelligence, etc. Cette doctrine n'a à aucun titre et en aucun sens la moindre valeur d'agnosticisme. Elle affirme seulement que tout ce que nous connaissons valablement et certainement de Dieu, reste encore infiniment au-dessous de Dieu.

Et alors, ce que nous venons de dire de toutes les perfections divines, bonté, intelligence, justice, sagesse, miséricorde, et même de l'esse divin, nous devons évidemment le dire aussi de l'essence. Il n'y a pas lieu de nous étonner que les scolastiques l'aient dit de l'*essentia* comme de l'esse, et c'est pourquoi Albert le Grand a pu dire: "Je dis: Dieu est une essence; mais tout de suite et avec plus de force je le nie, disant: Dieu n'est pas une essence, puisqu'il n'est pas de ces choses qui se définissent pour nous par genre, différence, et nombre".<sup>9</sup> C'est-à-dire, nous devons nier de Dieu la notion d'essence, nous devons l'écarter de Dieu quant au mode selon lequel ce mot signifie, et selon lequel il convient aux choses créées, dont nous avons tiré la notion d'essence. C'est pourquoi Albert le Grand continue: "Et après cela, de cette opposition j'infère: Dieu est une essence au-dessus de toute essence, et, procédant ainsi, mon intelligence s'établit dans l'infini, et s'y noie".<sup>10</sup>

Il ne s'agit en aucune façon de concevoir Dieu comme une existence sans essence, bien qu'il ait l'air de dire cela, si on n'y fait pas attention, si on note simplement une expression dont il s'est servi: "Et avec plus de force je le nie, disant: Dieu n'est pas une essence". Il ne le dit pas au sens où les philosophes modernes ont pu le penser. Il s'agit d'une doctrine qui a une portée absolument générale, qui concerne toutes les perfections divines, toutes les notions que nous pouvons dire de Dieu, et qui se rapporte à la supériorité de la théologie apophatique ou négative sur la théologie cataphatique ou affirmative.

Chez les Pères on trouve des textes semblables. Par exemple chez S.Jean Damascène: "De Dieu, il est impossible de dire ce qu'il est en lui-même, et il est plus exact d'en parler par le rejet de tout. Il n'est en effet rien de ce qui

<sup>5</sup> *De Potentia*, q.VII, a.5, ad 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Cap.VII*, lect.4.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Contra Gent.*, Lib.III, cap.49.

<sup>9</sup> *Ia*, tract.iii, q.13, membrum 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

est. Non qu'il ne soit d'aucune manière, mais parce qu'il est au-dessus de tout ce qui est, et au-dessus de l'être même".<sup>11</sup> S.Basile: "Les oeuvres de Dieu sont diverses, mais son essence est simple. C'est par ses oeuvres que nous disons connaître Dieu, mais nous ne prétendons pas monter jusqu'à son essence". Si on détachait cette phrase du contexte on pourrait dire que pour S.Basile aussi Dieu est une existence sans essence. Mais il continue: "Si les opérations de Dieu, en effet, descendent jusqu'à nous, son essence reste hors de notre atteinte; savoir que nous ne pouvons la saisir, telle est la connaissance que nous en avons".<sup>12</sup> Dans l'instant qu'ils disent que l'essence de Dieu est au-dessus de nos pensées et de nos atteintes, ils attribuent à Dieu une essence bien déterminée.

Pour toute la tradition de la philosophie chrétienne, la notion d'essence a en théodicée et en théologie une telle importance que la béatitude c'est de voir l'essence divine, de connaître Dieu par son essence.

## II.

Ce que nous venons de discuter, c'est la question de savoir si ce privilège de Dieu d'être sans aucune sorte de potentialité doit se traduire par la formule proprement thomiste: "En Dieu l'essence et l'existence sont identiques", l'essence de Dieu c'est d'exister, ou bien au contraire, par une autre formule qui au premier abord semblerait dire presque la même chose, et qui en réalité est foncièrement différente: "Dieu n'a pas d'essence," Dieu est une existence sans essence, un acte d'exister, un *esse*, sans *essentia*.

Je voudrais signaler maintenant que la formule en question: "Dieu n'a pas d'essence", qui a pris une grande importance dans la pensée moderne depuis Descartes, bien que Descartes ne l'ait pas explicitement proposée, cette formule se trouve déjà chez les Anciens, et S.Thomas la connaissait. Voici ce qu'il dit dans son opuscule *De Ente et Essentia*: "D'après les considérations exposées dans les chapitres précédents, on voit de quelle façon l'essence se rencontre dans les différents êtres (ou aux différents degrés de l'être). On trouve en effet dans les substances une triple manière d'avoir une essence. Un premier mode est celui de Dieu dont l'essence est son acte d'exister lui-même, et c'est pourquoi il s'est trouvé certains philosophes pour dire que Dieu n'a pas de quiddité ou d'essence", et S.Thomas ajoute tout de suite: "parce que son essence n'est pas autre chose que son existence".<sup>13</sup>

Qu'est-ce que c'est que ces *aliqui philosophi*, ces certains philosophes qui ont dit que Dieu n'a pas de quiddité ou d'essence? Dans son commentaire sur le *De Ente et Essentia*, Cajetan écrit: "Il s'agit là de certains platoniciens", il ne précise pas davantage. "Ils disent que Dieu n'a pas d'essence et qu'il est une pure existence, *quasi pura existentia sit*".<sup>14</sup> Plutôt que de platoniciens il s'agit de philosophes arabes et en particulier d'Avicenne, comme le montre le P.Roland-Gosselin dans son édition du *De Ente et Essentia*.<sup>15</sup>

Dans la métaphysique d'Avicenne nous trouvons les formules suivantes qui sont très caractéristiques: "Tout être qui a une quiddité (tout être qui a une essence) est causé . . . et le premier Etre, lui, n'a pas de quiddité (n'a pas d'essence)".<sup>16</sup> Un peu plus loin: "Il est manifeste que le Premier n'a pas de genre ni de quiddité." Et encore: "L'univers a un principe qui est nécessairement l'esse, le pur exister non contenu sous un genre ni sous une définition, . . . pur de qualité, de quantité et de quiddité."<sup>17</sup> Pour Avicenne c'est la même

<sup>11</sup> *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, 4 (PG 94, 800).

<sup>12</sup> *Lettre I à Amphiloque* (PG 32, 869).

<sup>13</sup> *De Ente et Essentia*, au début du chapitre 6; ce sixième chapitre des anciennes éditions est devenue le chapitre 5 dans l'édition établie par le Père M.D. Roland-

Gosselin (Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1926).

<sup>14</sup> Ed. M.H. Laurent (Turin, 1934), p. 170.

<sup>15</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Lib. VIII, cap. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Lib. IX, cap. 1.

chose de dire que Dieu est sans essence et de dire qu'il est non définissable, non contenu sous une définition, ou encore qu'il n'est pas dans un genre. D'où il résulte que pour Avicenne le mot essence ou quiddité désigne un élément de ressemblance ou si on veut une étoffe intelligible qui se trouve en plusieurs réalités d'une manière univoque, comme la nature générique et la nature spécifique, et donc une étoffe intelligible distincte de l'esse, distincte de l'acte d'exister.

Sur ce dernier point S.Thomas est d'accord avec Avicenne; c'est la doctrine qu'il a rendue classique; il y a une distinction réelle entre l'*essentia* et l'*esse*, entre l'essence et l'acte d'exister, partout où l'*essentia* est enfermée dans un genre, est une nature univoquement commune à plusieurs.

Ces remarques nous expliquent les formules qu'Avicenne employait tout à l'heure, c'est que pour lui le mot *essentia* connote: nature *enfermée dans un genre*; et si le mot *essentia* a cette signification, alors il faut bien dire que Dieu n'a pas d'essence; c'est comme si on disait: Dieu n'est pas enfermé dans un genre, Dieu n'a pas d'essence générique, ni d'essence spécifique.

Ces considérations nous font comprendre aussi pourquoi S.Thomas, dans le texte du *De Ente* que j'ai cité; tout en faisant allusion à ces 'certains philosophes' qui disent "Dieu n'a pas de quiddité ou d'essence", semble excuser immédiatement cette formule, qu'il paraît regarder comme une simple hyperbole de langage, ne signifiant pas autre chose que *ejus essentia est suum esse*. Et plus loin dans le même chapitre S.Thomas nous dit que "Dieu est seulement exister, *Deus est esse tantum* . . . , et c'est par la pureté elle-même de cet exister qu'il est distinct de toute autre existence", laquelle est l'acte d'une essence distincte d'elle; et c'est pourquoi, "bien qu'étant seulement exister", il possède toutes les autres perfections et les autres 'noblesses' qui sont dans les choses, mais sous un mode plus excellent. Quand il nous dit: "Dieu est *tantum esse*, seulement exister", il entend: Dieu n'a pas d'autre essence que d'exister, ou encore, comme il le dit dans les *Commentaires sur les Sentences*, son exister est sa quiddité, *esse suum est quidditas sua*.<sup>18</sup>

Maintenant j'arrive à la discussion à laquelle ces pages sont consacrées. Si on donne à cette expression *Deus est esse tantum*,—Dieu est seulement existant, Dieu est seulement acte d'exister, si on lui donne un sens d'*exclusion* par rapport à la notion d'essence, si cela signifie non plus: Dieu n'a pas d'autre essence que d'exister, mais si cela signifie dans toute la force du terme: Dieu n'a pas d'essence, Dieu est une existence sans essence, alors nous avons une formule qui rejoint beaucoup de tendances plus ou moins secrètes, plus ou moins cachées de la métaphysique chez les modernes; mais alors c'est une formule qui mérite une critique spéciale et c'est une formule parfaitement erronée.

Quelles sortes de critiques pouvons-nous faire valoir contre cette assertion: Dieu est une existence sans essence? La première critique c'est qu'une telle proposition vient d'une conception univoque de la *nature* ou de l'*essence*. C'est si vrai que dans l'ordre créé lui-même certains philosophes, comme nous le remarquons au début de cette étude, refusent déjà à ce qui est spirituel, d'avoir une nature. Ils se font de la nature ou de l'essence une conception tellement univoque que cette notion ne convient plus qu'aux natures composées de matière et de forme, aux natures comprenant en elles de la matérialité. S'il en est ainsi, si la matérialité est nécessairement et intrinsèquement impliquée par la notion d'essence ou de nature, il faudrait dire que les esprits n'ont pas, ou que l'esprit n'a pas de nature. Et il est bien clair que si on refuse aux esprits créés, ou à l'esprit créé d'avoir une essence, d'avoir une nature, une structure essentielle, à plus forte raison il faudra le refuser à Dieu.

Qu'est-ce que signifie cette notion de nature, d'essence? Reportons-nous au

<sup>18</sup> Sent., Lib. I, dist. viii, q.4, a.2.

*De Ente et Essentia*; nous trouvons là des explications fort intéressantes de S.Thomas lui-même. Il nous dit<sup>19</sup> que "le Philosophe, au V<sup>e</sup> Livre de la *Métaphysique*, enseigne que l'être (*ens*) se dit par soi d'une double façon. D'une première façon lorsqu'il se divise selon les dix catégories; d'une seconde façon lorsqu'il signifie la vérité de la proposition. Et dans ce second sens, on peut appeler *ens*, être, tout ce au sujet de quoi on peut former une proposition affirmative, même si l'objet de pensée en question ne pose rien dans les choses. C'est de cette façon qu'on peut appeler êtres (*entia*) même les privations et les négations." Nous pouvons en effet former des propositions vraies au sujet des êtres de raison, telles que les privations et les négations. Nous pouvons dire que l'affirmation est opposée à la négation, et que la cécité est dans l'oeil. "Mais au contraire, dans le premier sens, ne peut être appelé être (*ens*) que ce qui pose quelque chose dans l'existence extra-mentale. En ce premier sens, la cécité et les êtres de raison ne sont pas des êtres (*non sunt entia*)."<sup>20</sup> Cela posé, S.Thomas continue: "Le nom d'essence n'est pas pris de l'être entendu au second sens; les privations en effet sont appelées des êtres au second sens (on les appelle des êtres de raison) et elles n'ont pas d'essence. Mais la notion d'essence est prise de l'être entendu au premier sens, c'est pourquoi le Commentateur dit au même endroit: l'être entendu au premier sens est ce qui signifie l'essence de la chose. Et parce que l'être entendu en ce sens se divise en les dix catégories, il faut que le mot essence signifie quelque chose de commun à toutes les natures par lesquelles les divers êtres trouvent place dans les divers genres et les diverses espèces. C'est ainsi que l'humanité est l'essence de l'homme."

On voit donc que tout de suite S.Thomas affirme l'analogicité de la notion d'essence, puisque la notion d'essence se retrouve à travers les dix catégories d'Aristote; si elle était enfermée dans un genre, elle serait enfermée dans une de ces dix catégories, c'est bien la preuve qu'elle est une notion non pas prédicamentale, mais analogique.

"Et parce que", continue-t-il,<sup>20</sup> "ce par quoi une chose est constituée dans son propre genre ou dans sa propre espèce, est ce qui est signifié par la définition indiquant ce qu'est la chose, il s'ensuit que le nom d'essence a été changé par les philosophes en celui de quiddité. C'est ce qu'Aristote appelle fréquemment le *quod quid erat esse*, traduisons le constitutif intelligible, c'est-à-dire ce par quoi quelque chose a d'être tel ou tel constitutivement, *hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid*. On l'appelle aussi forme, selon que par le mot forme est signifiée la certitude, la valeur intelligible, de chaque chose," parce que la forme est la raison de la cognoscibilité et de la certitude des choses. "Et en troisième lieu on lui donne aussi le nom de nature" selon que l'essence a "un ordre à l'opération propre de la chose".

Ainsi la *nature* signifie l'essence selon qu'elle a un ordre à l'opération; la *quiddité* désigne l'essence selon qu'elle est le constitutif intelligible capable d'être défini, et enfin le mot *essence* lui-même s'emploie selon que par elle et en elle l'être a l'exister, *essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse*.

Ainsi dès le début S.Thomas, après Aristote, nous montre que la notion d'essence est une notion analogue, commune aux dix prédicaments; elle pourra donc, puisqu'elle est analogue, émigrer, si je puis ainsi parler, jusqu'à la cause de l'être, elle pourra donc demeurer valable si on l'applique non seulement à l'être créé, mais à l'être incréé qui est au-dessus de toute définition humaine, mais qui peut se dire lui-même à lui-même. Si donc on dit que Dieu n'a pas d'essence, c'est qu'on se fait de l'essence une conception univoque, alors que c'est une notion essentiellement analogique.

Remarquons ici, en passant, qu'un autre mot, le mot substance, crée plus de

<sup>19</sup> *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 1.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

difficultés à S.Thomas. Le mot substance ne peut pas être aussi immédiatement, aussi facilement délivré de sa référence primitive à l'être créé. Pourquoi? Parce que le mot substance désigne en propre un des prédicaments, le premier, un des genres suprêmes. A la question:<sup>21</sup> "Est ce que Dieu est dans le prédicament de la substance?" S.Thomas répond qu'il n'en est pas ainsi. Dieu est au-dessus de tout prédicament. Dieu est en dehors de tout prédicament et de tout genre, et il explique plus loin<sup>22</sup> que Dieu n'est absolument pas accident, mais que cependant il ne peut pas être dit tout à fait en propre, substance, pour deux raisons: parce que le nom de substance vient de *substare*,— se tenir sous les accidents,—par conséquent il est corrélatif de l'accident; et en second lieu parce que la substance signifie une quiddité, une essence qui est autre que son existence.

Si on prend le mot substance en son sens tout à fait strict et propre, il signifie une essence qui est autre que son existence, il est enfermé dans le premier prédicament, il ne peut pas s'appliquer à Dieu, c'est une division de l'être créé. "Si cependant on n'insiste pas sur ce sens tout à fait propre du mot substance, on peut dire en un sens large que Dieu est substance, ce qui veut dire alors au-dessus de toute substance créée, en considérant seulement ce qu'il y a de perfection dans la substance, comme de ne pas être dans un autre, etc." "... Et ainsi, à cause de la manière foncièrement diverse dont on attribue la substance à Dieu et aux créatures, ce mot se dit non pas univoquement, mais analogiquement de Dieu et des créatures."<sup>23</sup> Même doctrine dans la *Somme Théologique*:<sup>24</sup> "Le nom de substance ne signifie pas cela seulement qui est d'exister par soi; parce que ce qui est d'exister ne peut pas être un genre, [alors que la substance est une catégorie]; le nom de substance signifie une essence à laquelle il convient d'exister *per se*, *non in aliud*; lequel exister n'est pas cependant l'essence elle-même de la substance. [Le mot substance pris au sens tout à fait propre, se rapporte à une essence distincte de son existence.] Ainsi il est évident que Dieu n'est pas dans le genre de la substance." Mais plus loin en traitant de la Trinité, lorsqu'il s'agit de montrer que le nom de personne peut se vérifier en Dieu, S.Thomas recourt à la notion de substance cette fois élargie, puisque la personne se définit: *rationalis naturae individua substantia*—une substance individuelle de nature intellectuelle. Alors: "Le mot substance convient à Dieu en tant qu'il signifie l'existence par soi, *existere per se*."<sup>25</sup> en tant qu'on l'a délivré de sa signification tout à fait propre, selon laquelle il désigne une essence distincte de son existence.

On voit que le mot substance est rendu transférable à Dieu; la notion de substance est rendue transférable à Dieu par une opération spéciale, si je puis dire, de purification et d'extension qui "transcendantalise" et rend analogue une notion primitivement univoque, puisque primitivement, au sens tout à fait propre, ce mot désigne une catégorie, un genre suprême. Il en va de même, par parenthèse, de la notion de relation qui désigne primitivement et en propre une des catégories, et qui cependant peut être, elle aussi, transcendantalisée pour être transférée à Dieu même, où elle s'applique aux personnes divines.

La notion d'essence, au contraire, est du premier coup, comme l'être lui-même, analogue et transcendantale, et si on a bien compris ce caractère analogue et transcendantal de la notion d'essence, on voit tout de suite que la notion d'essence ou de nature—ce qu' une chose est, ou le constitutif intelligible d'un être—n'enveloppe *nécessairement* ni matière, ni potentialité. Si elle enveloppait nécessairement la matière, la notion d'essence se rapporterait à des natures déterminées *ad unum* en ce sens qu'elles seraient toutes déterminées à *un effet particulier*, comme c'est le cas des natures matérielles; et cela selon les

<sup>21</sup> *Sent.*, Lib. I, dist. viii, q.4, a.2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Ia, q.3, a.5, ad 1.

<sup>25</sup> Ia, q.29, a.3, ad 4.

conditions de construction de ces natures; en ce sens-là le premier analogué, quant à notre manière de connaître, du mot essence, se rapporte aux choses matérielles qui, en effet, sont déterminées à un effet particulier en raison de leurs conditions de construction. Mais si nous passons aux esprits, aux natures spirituelles, la notion de nature ne signifie plus être déterminé à un effet particulier, mais être déterminé à un certain infini, puisque la nature intellectuelle est déterminée à l'être lui-même; c'est là un océan infini, ce n'est pas un effet particulier. De même la volonté est déterminée au bien, la notion de détermination *ad unum* se retrouve là, mais d'une manière tout à fait analogique. Il y a une transfiguration lorsqu'on passe de la détermination *ad unum* d'une nature matérielle à la détermination *ad unum* de l'intelligence ou de la volonté. Et ce n'est pas non plus selon leurs conditions de construction, mais c'est selon leur relation à l'objet, qu'intelligence et volonté se trouvent ainsi déterminées.

La notion d'essence ou de nature n'enveloppe pas nécessairement matière, elle n'enveloppe pas nécessairement potentialité. C'est seulement en tant que créée qu'elle signifie puissance. C'est là une condition absolument nécessaire de toute essence créée, d'être puissance à l'égard de l'existence.

Il ne faut pas que cette thèse fondamentale de S.Thomas, que l'essence dans toutes les choses créées est puissance à l'égard de l'existence, nous empêche de voir un autre aspect des choses, à savoir que l'essence est foncièrement acte et perfection; c'est un acte, c'est une perfection, c'est le constitutif intelligible des choses; c'est un acte, c'est une perfection qui est encore puissance par rapport à un autre acte, par rapport à l'acte d'exister.

Rappelons-nous ce mot de S.Thomas dans le *De Potentia* que nous avons déjà cité: "Ce que j'appelle être ou exister, *hoc quod dico esse*, est l'actualité de tous les actes, *actualitas omnium actuum* [il ne dit pas *omnium potentialium*], et à cause de cela c'est la perfection de toutes les perfections."<sup>26</sup> Et remarquons que c'est le même cas pour les autres perfections, telles que l'intelligence et la volonté, qui dans les créatures impliquent potentialité; ce sont des 'puissances opératives',—ce mot lui-même, bien qu'il s'agisse là d'énergies et d'activités, nous fait comprendre que quelque chose de potentiel subsiste en elles, elles ne sont pas leur acte même, d'intellection ou de volition. Il y a une distinction réelle entre *intellectus* et *intellectio*, entre *voluntas* et *volitio*. Ainsi, la relation de l'essence à l'existence chez les créatures est précisément la même que la relation de l'*intellectus* à l'*intelligere* ou de la *voluntas* au *velle*. La relation de la faculté intellectuelle à cette sorte d'existence ou de surexistence en acte qu'est intellection, est une relation de puissance à acte chez les créatures.

Cependant nous disons qu'en Dieu il y a *intellectus* comme il y a *intelligere*, il y a intelligence comme il y a intellection, il y a volonté comme il y a volition. Il n'y a pas en Dieu distinction, même virtuelle, entre *intellectus* et *intellectio*; il n'y a pas en Dieu distinction, même virtuelle, entre *voluntas* et *velle*, précisément parce que ces choses-là dans les créatures sont distinctes selon la puissance et l'acte; il n'y a donc pas en Dieu de quoi fonder une distinction même virtuelle mineure, entre *voluntas* et *velle*, ou entre *intellectus* et *intelligere*. En Dieu il n'y a pas distinction, même virtuelle mineure, entre ces choses-là, mais l'*intellectus*, la perfection désignée par le mot *intellectus*, et la perfection désignée par le mot *voluntas* sont attribuées à Dieu en propre, formellement-éminemment. Et c'est de la même façon qu'entre essence et existence il n'y a pas en Dieu de distinction même virtuelle mineure, mais la notion d'essence convient à Dieu formellement-éminemment. Il ne faut pas dire: Dieu n'a pas d'essence, ou est une existence sans essence; il faut dire qu'il a une essence qui est l'infinité même de l'existence *a se*.

<sup>26</sup> *Supra*, n.4.

Notre premier argument consistait à remarquer que refuser à Dieu d'avoir une essence c'est se faire une idée univoque de l'essence, de la *quiddité*. Le second argument consiste à remarquer que cela implique une conception univoque de l'existence elle-même, de l'exister lui-même, univocité qui n'est pas pensable, qui va contre l'intelligibilité même de ce premier intelligible qu'est l'être.

Tout *esse*, remarquons-le, implique une *essentia*, tout acte d'exister implique une essence, un *quod quid est*, un constitutif intelligible, (puisque c'est cela l'essence. Un *esse*, un exister sans essence, serait un *esse* sans intelligibilité). Reportons-nous ici à toutes les discussions qui concernent l'abstraction de l'être; il n'est pas possible de faire abstraction parfaite de l'esse, de l'existence, en laissant tomber toute nature, toute détermination intelligible. On peut penser à l'animal sans penser confusément aux diverses espèces d'animaux; l'animalité, se réalisant *de la même manière* en toutes ses espèces, peut s'abstraire parfaitement des différences spécifiques, qui lui sont extrinsèques: *perfecte praescindit a differentiis specificis*; les notions univoques peuvent s'abstraire parfaitement de leurs différences spécifiques. Mais l'être lui-même, *ens*, (décrit comme 'ce dont l'acte est d'exister'), l'être ne peut pas s'abstraire parfaitement des divers êtres, il enveloppe implicitement ou confusément ceux-ci. Et de même, l'esse, l'acte d'exister ne peut pas s'abstraire parfaitement des essences qui l'exercent, des essences dans lesquelles il est reçu, comme la surface ou la ligne mathématique peuvent s'abstraire du sujet matériel étendu.

Il y a là, je crois, chez certains philosophes, ce qu'on pourrait appeler une pseudo-mathématisation des concepts métaphysiques. Ils conçoivent les concepts métaphysiques, par exemple le concept d'esse, la notion d'esse, comme si cette notion pouvait s'abstraire de ses sujets de la même façon, aussi complètement qu'une notion mathématique s'abstrait du sujet matériel où elle est réalisée. C'est confondre l'ordre métaphysique avec l'ordre mathématique, et c'est se faire de l'esse, de l'existence elle-même, une conception tout à fait erronée. Plus souvent qu'on ne croit, on perd de vue, en fait, l'intelligibilité propre et l'analogicité essentielle de la notion d'existence, pour la remplacer par une notion où l'imagination a autant de part que l'intelligence; par une notion de l'existence qui demande, comme les notions mathématiques, à se résoudre dans l'imaginable; et c'est alors qu'on s' imagine que l'esse peut être complètement abstrait de ses 'inférieurs', comme on dit en logique: ce qui est absolument faux.

### III.

Lorsqu'on cherche, non pas à définir, ce qui est évidemment impossible, mais à décrire l'existence, l'esse, on dit souvent que c'est la *positio extra nihil*, hors du néant; c'est en considérant cette expression que nous pouvons le mieux nous rendre compte de l'équivoque, de la pseudo-mathématisation dont je parlais à l'instant. Cette position mathématique *extra nihil*, hors du néant, est tout autre chose que la position d'un point dans l'espace. Il s'agit, dans le cas de l'existence, d'une effectuation qui varie avec la nature elle-même existante, et qui lui vient du premier Être. On se rappelle le mot de S.Thomas: "*Deus, simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit*"; Dieu en même temps qu'il donne existence, produit ce qui reçoit l'existence. Représentons-nous que l'influx de Dieu passant par les causes qui produisent un être fait *exister* cet être.

En d'autres termes nous pourrions dire, pour essayer de rendre plus sensible cette idée métaphysique, que la nature de cet être est traversée tout entière par quelque chose de transcendant qui la vivifie, qui 'l'existentialise' intrinsèquement, en telle sorte que la nature en question exerce elle-même, et du fond

<sup>22</sup> De Pot., q. III, a. 1, ad 17.



de soi, l'acte d'esse, l'acte d'exister, comme sa perfection propre de nature ou d'essence. Exister, c'est une certaine énergie, c'est même l'énergie par excellence, et cela ne se voit nullement lorsque nous nous représentons l'existence à la façon de la position mathématique d'un point dans l'espace.

Ainsi donc l'existence est reçue, mais elle est reçue comme une *activité exercée*, comme un acte exercé par l'essence, et cet acte est différent suivant les natures qui l'exercent. Ce n'est pas une simple position dans l'espace, pure répétition du même aux yeux de l'imagination qui se représente un point, et un autre point, désignés dans l'espace. L'atome a une manière d'exister qui n'est pas celle du vivant; nous pourrions dire que dans l'atome, comme dans tout être, l'existence est exercée, mais pas pour soi, elle est exercée par la substance individuelle et comme *d'elle* (en ce sens que l'existence d'un atome n'est pas celle d'un autre atome), mais d'elle comme partie de l'univers, elle n'est pas précisément 'sienne' (au sens de 'à elle' or 'pour elle'). L'atome, le corps non vivant, participe à l'esse de l'univers, qui, certes, n'est pas un seul et unique *esse*, qui se diversifie en chaque substance corporelle, mais qui en chacune dépend de toutes les autres comme causes de cette existence (*con-causae*), et est tourné vers le tout; l'existence même du non vivant est orientée vers le tout, destinée au tout, à l'univers tout entier, son action est orientée vers le dehors, et il en est de même de son *esse*, auquel l'action est consécutive; tandis que le vivant exerce l'existence d'une autre façon, l'existence du vivant n'est pas seulement de lui, elle est à lui et pour lui, son *esse* dépend sans doute de l'univers; mais de plus en plus, à mesure qu'on monte dans l'échelle des êtres vivants et qu'on se rapproche de l'esprit, de plus en plus à titre de *condition* (l'univers fournit les conditions d'existence du vivant, notamment du vivant corporel-spirituel), de moins en moins à titre de *cause* proprement dite; l'existence du vivant est orientée vers lui-même, pour surabonder ensuite au dehors.

Les auteurs spirituels aiment la comparaison du canal et de la vasque. Il ne faut pas être un canal déversant les dons de Dieu qui passent à travers nous, mais il faut être une vasque recevant la grâce pour ensuite, lorsqu'elle atteint une certaine plénitude, la reverser sur les autres. Cette comparaison a une valeur qui n'est pas seulement spirituelle, elle a une valeur métaphysique, et nous pourrions dire que l'existence dans les non vivants est symbolisée par un canal; et dans les vivants, plus nous avançons dans l'immanence de la vie et de l'activité, plus l'existence prend la forme de la vasque, plus elle s'enrichit intérieurement, plus elle a d'intensité interne pour se déverser ensuite, en telle sorte que le vivant en question soit capable de *se donner*. Il faut être à soi d'abord pour pouvoir se donner.

Ces remarques avaient pour objet de souligner le fait que l'intelligible 'existence', qui est signifié par un seul mot, est en réalité varié à tous les degrés de l'échelle ontologique. Les choses n'existent pas de la même manière parce que chaque essence exerce l'existence à sa manière et comme l'expression et l'actualité fondamentale de ses réserves ontologiques typiques. En d'autres termes, l'existence n'est pas une notion univoque, mais une notion analogue.

En poursuivant cette chaîne de réflexions, nous comprenons que si on imaginait l'Acte Pur comme un pur exister sans nature, sans essence, on serait conduit à toutes les impossibilités impliquées par l'idée de l'univocité de l'être, par une conception univoque de l'être; car alors la transcendance infinie de Dieu serait cherchée en *dissociant*, par hypothèse, *esse* et *essentia* (puisque dans cette manière de voir on considère que l'*essentia* implique nécessairement et de soi potentialité, alors pour avoir un acte pur il faut avoir une pure existence, sans essence). On disjoint *esse* et *essentia*, existence et nature, et on rejette toute *essentia*, on rejette toute nature, *mais pour garder l'esse*, pour garder l'acte d'exister, je dis celui du couple essence-existence, dont on a fait

tomber le premier terme. De sorte que dans cette manière de concevoir, en réalité on pense un *esse* agrandi à l'infini, mais qui est le même *esse* en définitive que celui qui est livré à notre intelligence par les choses, qui est toujours l'*esse* avec le mode de signifier que le concept d'être a dans notre esprit, mais en supposant que l'être ainsi signifié est élargi à l'infini, d'une façon, si on peut ainsi parler, quantitative. C'est là une fausse conception de l'analogie. On passe d'un degré à un autre et à un degré suprême le long de la même ligne, on n'est pas en analogie, on est en univocité. C'est ce que Mr. Penido a très bien montré dans son livre sur *Le Rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique*.<sup>28</sup> Il a mis en garde contre cette fausse conception de l'analogie.

La notion exacte de l'analogie échapperait à celui qui verrait les choses de la façon que nous venons de dire. Ainsi on croirait assurer la transcendance de Dieu, et en réalité on lui attribuerait le même *esse*, la même existence que celle des choses, mais 'infinitisée'. En vertu de sa logique interne une telle conception impliquerait une sorte de position émanatiste (terme ultime de la tendance secrète, plus forte que le philosophe, de toute philosophie univociste au monisme), on se représenterait la source de toutes choses comme un pur *esse* sans essence, qui se multiplierait, se pulvériserait en devenant l'*esse* d'innombrables essences jaillies de lui.

La notion exacte de l'analogie comporte, et c'est cela qu'on oublie dans cette manière de voir, une transfiguration intrinsèque, qualitative, non quantitative, de l'objet d'intellection; en sorte que le signifié de nos concepts, le *significatum* demeure, mais en Dieu leur mode de signifier tombe, sans que nous sachions comment; le *mode de signifier* de nos concepts—mode que nous continuons nécessairement à employer, puisque c'est notre mode à nous de concevoir—reste essentiellement imparfait et déficient à l'égard de l'objet signifié, lorsque cet objet signifié est Dieu, la cause première.

Et cette déficience, cette imperfection radicale du mode de signifier de nos concepts vaut aussi bien pour l'*esse*, pour l'exister, que pour l'*essentia*, pour la nature. L'un et l'autre objets de notion, tout en se réalisant formellement en Dieu (formellement-éminemment), sont transfigurés en Dieu. Ils sont en Dieu formellement, mais transfigurés d'une manière que nous ne pouvons absolument pas nous représenter. C'est en ce sens-là que la théologie négative ou apophatique est supérieure à la théologie affirmative ou cataphatique, parce que Dieu n'est comme aucune des choses qui sont, et cela vaut, encore une fois, pour l'*esse* même, autant que pour la bonté, la justice, etc.

Cette transfiguration de la notion lorsqu'elle passe à Dieu vaut à la fois pour l'acte d'exister et pour la nature. La notion d'essence convient formellement-éminemment à Dieu comme celle d'existence; et l'existence divine comme l'essence divine, nous les connaissons non pas selon ce qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes, mais imparfaitement et par analogie. Bref, l'infirmité comme la validité à l'égard de Dieu du concept d'*esse*, d'exister, sont les mêmes que celles du concept d'essence.

<sup>28</sup> M.T.L. Penido, *Le Rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris, 1931).

# A List of Photographic Reproductions of Mediaeval Manuscripts

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ROBERT J. SCOLLARD C.S.B

THIS list of authors represented in the collection of photostats and microfilms of mediaeval manuscripts at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies complements the list published in the preceding volume, pp. 126-138, and has been prepared for those who are studying an individual or group and who have not a list of known manuscripts.

The reproductions have been read by Fathers A. J. Denomy, G. B. Flahiff, V. L. Kennedy, J. R. O'Donnell of the Institute Faculty and by myself to make certain that each treatise here listed actually was photographed, and at the same time an effort was made to check older attributions with recent findings; but the present list does not intend to settle questions of authorship. For this reason doubtful works have been listed under an author and not placed among the anonymous treatises. Anonymous works of five or more folios have been placed at the end of the list under broad headings and within each group they have been arranged by Incipit.

In compiling this list a certain amount of uniformity has been introduced in the spelling of names. The list regularly follows the form adopted by the Library of Congress when known, otherwise preference has been given to a Latin form. Cross references have been made for important variant forms and for the surname when the entry has been placed under the forename, and vice versa. Initials after a name designate the Religious Order to which the man belonged. The name of the library possessing the original has been omitted when it is a "Public Library" or a "National Library"; in all other cases it has been given in full after the place. Thus 'Paris Lat.' stands for 'Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Latins'; London means the *British Museum*; Assisi the *Biblioteca Comunale*.

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BARLO, Guilelmus de. *See* Guilelmus de Barlo.

BARRO, Petrus de. *See* Petrus de Barro.

BARRO-DUCIS, Nicolaus. *See* Nicolaus, de Barro Ducis.

# MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

BARTHOLOMAEUS, of Bologna, O.F.M., 13th cent.

Quaestiones Disputatae. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17. sin. cod. 8, fol. 77-97, 115-47; *Paris* Lat. 14726, fol. 225; *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 361, fol. 167-72.

BARTHOLOMAEUS de Brugis, d. 1356.

In libros I-V, VII-VIII Physicorum Aristotelis. *Vatican* Lat. 845, fol. 37-156.

BATE, Henri, b. 1246.

Speculum Divinorum et Quorundam Naturalium. *Brussels* 7500 (2960) fol. 1-365.

BEQUIN, Raymundus, Patriarch of Jerusalem, O.P., d. 1328.

Quodlibet I. *Avignon* 314 (110) fol. 1-41.

BERNARDUS de Arvernia, O.P. fl. 1294-1307.

Contra Dicta Henrici de Gandavo. *Troyes* 662, fol. 1-187; *Vatican* Cod. Ottob. Lat. 471, fol. 1-167.

Improbationes contra Godefridum de Fontibus. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 298, fol. 1-153.

Impugnations contra Jacobum de Viterbio. *Toulouse* 744, fol. 156-91; *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 298, fol. 157-201.

BERNARDUS de Gannato. See Bernardus de Arvernia.

BERNARDUS de Trilia, O.P., d. 1292.

De cognitione animae conjunctae. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 156, fol. 1-76.

De cognitione animae separatae. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 156, fol. 77-115.

Quodlibet I-III. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 156, fol. 154-81.

Postilla super Apocalypsim. *Avignon* 88 (91) fol. 2-190.

BERNOLD, von Constanx, 1054-1100.

Micrologus de ecclesiasticis observationibus. *Bamberg* Ed. II. 16, fol. 87-105; *Brussels* 1996, fol. 8-25; *Budapest, Kir. M. Pazmany Peter Tudomany-egytemi Konyvtar* 387, fol. 3-13, 312-30; *Cambrai* 169 (164) fol. 55-75; *Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek* 527, fol. 1-57; *Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek* Lat. 668, fol. 1-45; *Munich* Lat. 12612, fol. 94-112; 14628, fol. 74-106; 17189, fol. 1-30; 19602, fol. 278-90; *Paris* Lat. 1232, fol. 1-26; *Salzburg, Bibliothek der Benediktiner-Erzabtei St. Peter* A.VI.28, fol. 72-101; A.VI.33, fol. 67-103; *Vatican* Cod. Palat. Lat. 482, fol. 1-45; 483, fol. 1-43.

BEROUT, Etienne. See Stephanus Berot.

BERTAUDUS de Sancto Dionysio, bp. of Orléans, d. 1307.

De motu coeli. *Paris* Lat. 14726, fol. 183-84.

Quodlibet. *Paris* Lat. 14726, fol. 170-81.

BIBLE. N.T. Epistles.

Epistolae S. Pauli. *Bruges* 78, fol. 104-27.

BISINIANO, Simon de. See Simon de Bisiniano.

BITUNTINUS, Antonius. See Antonius Bituntinus.

BLENEAU, Godefrid de. See Gaufridus de Blevello.

BOCFELD, Adam. See Adam de Bocfeld.

BOEMUS, Damasus. See Damasus Boemus.

BOETIUS de Dacia, 13th cent.

De modis significandi. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 131-40.

BOLOGNA, Bartholomaeus of. See Bartholomaeus, of Bologna.

BOMBOLOGNINUS de Bononia, O.P., 13th cent.

In I Sententiarum. *Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria* 753 (1506) fol. 1-117.

In III Sententiarum. *Assisi* 155, fol. 1-104; *Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria* 755 (1508) fol. 1-103.

BOMBOLOGNUS de Gaviano. See Bombologninus de Bononia.

BONAVENTURA, Saint, cardinal, O.F.M., 1221-1274.

In I-III Sententiarum abbreviatum. *Assisi* 124, fol. 1-179.

Quaestiones super Sententias. *Assisi* 186, fol. 2-130.

- Quaestiones Disputatae. Vatican Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 7-26.
- BOUCHERMEFORT, Adam de. *See* Adam de Bouchermefort.
- BOZON, Nicole, O.F.M., fl. 1300-1320.
- Anglo-French lives of saints. *London* Cotton Domitian XI, fol. 91-106.
- BRABANT, Siger de. *See* Siger de Brabant.
- BRADWARDINE, Thomas, abp. of Canterbury, 1290?-1349.
- De causa Dei contra Pelagium. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 317, fol. 1-342; *Vatican* Lat. 1040, fol. 1-315.
- BRITO, Herveus. *See* Hervaeus Natalis.
- BUCKINGHAM, Thomas de. *See* Thomas de Buckingham.
- BUNGAY, Thomas. *See* Thomas of Bungay.
- BURIDAN, Jean, fl. 1328-1358.
- Defensiones Determinationis De Diversitate Generis ad Speciem. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 291, fol. 172-205.
- Super libros De Coelo et de mundo. *Munich* Lat. 761, fol. 49-86; 19551, fol. 70-105.
- Quaestio de dependentiis et convenientiis et diversitatibus. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 291, fol. 163-72.
- BURLEY, Walter, O.F.M., 1275?-1345?
- De logica. *Turin, Biblioteca Universitaria* 965 (G.II.4) fol. 1-12.
- In libros Ethicorum. *Bruges* 502, fol. 1-185.
- Super Perihermenias. *Turin, Biblioteca Universitaria* 965 (G.II.4) fol. 69-83.
- In libros Predicamentorum Aristotelis. *Turin, Biblioteca Universitaria* 965 (G.II.4) fol. 14-52.
- Super sex principiis Porphyrii. *Turin, Biblioteca Universitaria* 965 (G.II.4) fol. 52-68.
- CAMERINO, Angelus de. *See* Angelus de Camerino.
- CANDIA, Petrus de. *See* Petrus de Candia.
- CANTOR, Petrus. *See* Petrus Cantor.
- CAREW, Robert. *See* Robert Carew.
- CASTELLO Theodorici, Gualterus de. *See* Gualterus, of Chateau-Thierry.
- CASTRO Novo, Hugo de. *See* Hugo de Castro Novo.
- CASTRO Radulphi, Gerardus de. *See* Gerardus Odonis.
- CASTRO Radulphi Odo de. *See* Odo de Chateauroux.
- CATHOLIC Church. Liturgy and ritual. Ordo.
- Ordo Missalis Fratrum Minorum secundum consuetudinem Romanae Curiae.
- Paris* Lat. 826, fol. 134-51; 828, fol. 103-08, 111-18; 10503, fol. 132-40; *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 426, fol. 149-59; *Vatican* Lat. 2048, fol. 121-84; 4743, fol. 192-210; *Cod. Ottob. Lat.* 15, fol. 290-93; 574, fol. 137-46; *Cod. Reg. Lat.* 2048, fol. 121-35.
- CEFFONA, Petrus de. *See* Petrus de Ceffona.
- CERVO, Jean de. *See* Joannes de Cervo.
- CHARTRES, Pierre de. *See* Petrus Carnotensis.
- CHATEAUROUX, Odon de. *See* Odo de Chateauroux.
- CHATEAU-THIERRY, Gauthier de. *See* Gualterus, of Chateau-Thierry.
- CLAPOEL, Richardus. *See* Richard of Knapwell.
- CLAREMARESTO, Renerus de. *See* Renerus de Claremaresto.
- CLARICON.
- Quaestiones morales editae a Magistro Claricon de Anglia.
- Bruges* 503, fol. 51-79.
- COLONNA, Egidio, O.S.A., d. 1316.
- De esse et essentia. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 156, fol. 140-46.
- De Eucharistia. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 144-46, 253-56.

- De resurrectione mortuorum. *Vatican Lat.* 19095, fol. 94-105.  
 De universalibus. *Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek* 213, fol. 81-83.  
 In libros Physicorum Aristotelis. *Avignon* 1091 (106 Suppl.) fol. 1-286.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Bruges* 491, fol. 113-18, 121-56.  
 Quodlibeta. *Bruges* 491, fol. 119-20, 158-213. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 298, fol. 202-25.
- CONRADUS de Ebraco, O. Cist., d. 1399.  
 In I-II Sententiarum. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 292, fol. 1-158.  
 In III-IV Sententiarum. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 293, fol. 1-124.  
 Utrum latitudo cuiuslibet culpa ymaginaliter sit mesuranda. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 293, fol. 124-32.
- CONSTANZ, Bernold von. *See* Bernold von Constanz.
- CORNWALL, Richard. *See* Ricardus Rufus.
- COURCON, Robert de. *See* Robert de Courçon.
- COWTON, Robert. *See* Robert Cowton.
- CREMONENSIS, Praepositinus. *See* Prepositinus, Cremonensis.
- CREMONENSIS, Rolandus. *See* Rolandus Cremonensis.
- CREMONENSIS, Sicardus. *See* Sicardus, bp. of Cremona.
- CYPRIANUS, Saint, bp. of Carthage.  
 Sermo de habitu virginum. *Paris Nouv. Acq. Lat.* 1455, fol. 25-30.
- DACIA, Boethius de. *See* Boetius de Dacia.
- DAMASUS Boemus, canonist, fl. 1210-1215.  
 Summa decretalium. *Paris Lat.* 15000, fol. 1-136.
- DORMIENS, Joannes. *See* Joannes Quidort.
- DURANDUS de Sancto Porciano, O.P., d. 1334.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Paris Lat.* 12330, fol. 1-224; 14572 pt.I, fol. 1-14.  
 In I Sententiarum. *Paris Lat.* 14454, fol. 31-114.  
 In I-II Sententiarum. *Bruges* 175, fol. 1-194.  
 In III-IV Sententiarum. *Bruges* 176, fol. 1-233.  
 Quodlibeta III-V. *Toulouse* 744, fol. 51-74.
- EBORACO, Thomas de. *See* Thomas of York.
- EBRACO, Conradus de. *See* Conradus de Ebraco.
- ECKHART, Meister, O.P., d. 1327.  
 Utrum in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 113.  
 Utrum intelligere angeli ut dicit actionem sit suum esse. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 116-17.
- EGIDIO Colonna. *See* Colonna, Egidio.
- ETIENNE Bérout. *See* Stephanus Berot.
- ETIENNE de Poligny, O.P., fl. 1240.  
 De locis animarum exutarum a corpore. *Assisi* 138, fol. 8-9.
- ETIENNE de Tournai. *See* Stephanus Tornacensis.
- EUDES de Chateauroux. *See* Odo de Chateauroux.
- EUDES Rigauld. *See* Odo Rigaldi.
- EUDES de Sully. *See* Odo, de Soliaco.
- EUSTACHIUS, bp. of Coutances, O.F.M., 1225 (ca.)-1291.  
 Quaestiones in II Sententiarum. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 139, fol. 104-34.  
 De aeternitate. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 139, fol. 58-69.  
 De agente creato. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 139, fol. 153-54.  
 De anima. *Vatican Cod. Palat. Lat.* 612, fol. 89-92.



- De animabus rationalibus. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 1-3.*  
 De ascensu animarum. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 8-21; Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 85-88.*  
 De corruptione caritatis seu gratiae. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 47-57; Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 80-82.*  
 De divinarum personarum distinctione. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 3-8.*  
 De exitu animarum a corporibus. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 21-47.*  
 De fide et scientia in patria. *Paris Lat. 15906, fol. 3-10.*  
 De jejunio. *Vatican Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 40-43.*  
 De maternitate divina. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 158-70; Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 92-97.*  
 De motu corporis gloriosi. *Vatican Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 112-13.*  
 De naturali dilectione. *Paris Lat. 15906, fol. 15-28; Vatican Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 1-7.*  
 De oratione. *Vatican Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 43-46.*  
 De ordine caritatis. *Paris Lat. 15906, fol. 10-15; Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 70-104; Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 88-89.*  
 De veniali peccato. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 170-74; Cod. Palat. Lat. 612, fol. 27-38.*  
 Quodlibet III. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat. 139, fol. 140-53.*  
 EUSTACHIUS de Grandicuria, fl. 1291-1314.  
 Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris Lat. 15850, fol. 28, 35, 36, 39.*
- FALCO, Petrus de. *See* Petrus de Falco.  
 FAVENTINUS, Joannes. *See* Joannes Faventinus.  
 FISHACRE, Richard. *See* Ricardus Fitsacre.  
 FONTAINES, Godefroid de. *See* Godefroid de Fontaines.  
 FOUGERES, Laurent de. *See* Laurent de Fougères.  
 FOUR, Vital du. *See* Vitalis a Furno.  
 FRANCISCUS de Marchia, O.F.M., fl. 1320.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Vatican Lat. 1096, fol. 1-189.*  
 Quodlibet I. *Paris Lat. 16110, fol. 125-46.*  
 FRANCISCUS Mayronis, O.F.M., fl. 1323-1327.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Vatican Lat. 891, fol. 1-252.*  
 De virtutibus. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften 361, fol. 1-51.*  
 Quaestiones theologicae. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften 361, fol. 51-131.*  
 Quodlibet I. *Assisi 157, fol. 1-125; 179, fol. 1-80.*  
 FULBERT, bp. of Chartres, d. 1028.  
 Sermo de nativitate Mariae. *Paris Lat. 3003, fol. 1-7; Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1455, fol. 87-90.*  
 FURNO, Joannes Vitalis a. *See* Vitalis a Furno.
- GANDAVO, Joannes de. *See* Joannes de Janduno.  
 GANTERUS, Anfredus. *See* Anfredus Gonterus.  
 GAUFRIDUS de Blevello, O.P., d. 1250.  
 Postilla super Epistolas Sancti Pauli. *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 180, fol. 1-134.*  
 GAUTHIER de Bruges. *See* Gualterus de Brugis.  
 GAUTHIER de Chateau-Thierry. *See* Gualterus, of Chateau-Thierry.  
 GAVIANO, Bomolognus de. *See* Bombologninus de Bononia.  
 GEOFFROI de Blavez. *See* Gaufridus de Blevello.

- GERARDUS de Abbatisvilla, 1220 (ca.)-1272.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Paris* Lat. 15906, fol. 31-215.  
 De cogitatione. *Bruges* 177, fol. 1-45.  
 De ordine consiliorum. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 143-44.  
 Quaestiones disputatae. *Paris* Lat. 16405, fol. 5-25, 68-69, 104-06.  
 Quodlibeta. *Bruges* 177, fol. 45-51; *Paris* Lat. 14726, fol. 137-43; 16297, fol. 147-65; 16405, fol. 25-46, 48-68, 69-80, 83-95, 107-21; *Vatican* Lat. 1015, fol. 1-112.  
 Sermones. *Paris* Lat. 16405, fol. 1-3, 46-48, 80-82, 99-104.  
 Utrum licitum sit confessoribus religiosis parvos inducere. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 165-66.
- GERARDUS de Bononia, O.Carm., d. 1317.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Paris* Lat. 17485, fol. 188-212.  
 Quodlibeta I-IV. *Paris* Lat. 17485, fol. 85-188.
- GERARDUS Odonis, O.F.M., d. 1348?  
 Reportationes libri Sententiarum secundum lecturam Gyrardi Odonis. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 291, fol. 1-161.
- GERSON, Joannes, 1363-1429.  
 Epistola de libro Johannis Ruysbrocki qui intitulatur De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum. *Trier* 719, fol. 39-53.
- GERVASIUS, abbot of Mont-Saint-Eloi, d. 1314.  
 Quodlibeta. *Paris* Lat. 15350, fol. 269-90.
- al-GHAZZALI, 1058-1111.  
 Logica. *Vatican* Lat. 2186, fol. 9-16.  
 Metaphysica. *Paris* Lat. 6552, fol. 43-62; *Vatican* Lat. 4481, fol. 1-73.
- GILBERT de la Porée, bp., 1070(ca.)-1154.  
 Commentaria in Epistolas S. Pauli. *Bruges* 78, fol. 1-104.
- GILLES de Rome. See Colonna, Egidio.
- GODEFROID, de Fontaines, 13th cent.  
 Compilatio abbreviata Quodlibetorum. *Bruges* 491, fol. 215-18, 237-58.  
 Quodlibeta V-XIII & III-IV (abridged and with the Improbationes of Bernardus de Arvernia). *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 298, fol. 1-153.
- GODEFROID, bp. of Poitiers, fl. 1231.  
 Summa theologica. *Bruges* 220, fol. 1-138.
- GONSALVUS Hispanus, O.F.M., d. 1313.  
 Conclusiones metaphysicae. *Paris* Lat. 15450, fol. 67.  
 De laude divina. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 107-13.  
 Quod quando ex minore caritate sit maior minimo non corrumpatur. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 117-19.  
 Utrum potentia qua Deus laudatur mentaliter sit nobilior quacumque alia potentia. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 114-16.  
 Utrum laus Dei in angelis et animabus . . . sit unius rationis. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 119-20.  
 Utrum laus Dei in patria sit nobilior. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 120-21.  
 Utrum, ratione ditante Deum esse laudandum voluntas possit non acquiescere. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 123-25.
- GONTERUS.  
 Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris* Lat. 15850, fol. 18, 24.
- GONTERUS, Anfredus. See Anfredus Gonterus.
- GRANDCOURT, Eustache de. See Eustachius de Grandicuria.
- GREGORIUS de Arimino, O.S.A., d. 1358.  
 In I Sententiarum. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 307, fol. 127-246.  
 In I-II Sententiarum. *Troyes* 151, fol. 1-220.
- GRENESEBY, Master at Cambridge, fl. 1270-80.

- Quaestiones Disputatae. *Assisi* 158, fol. 45, 49, 52-53, 69-71, 73-74, 75.
- GROSSETESTE, Robert, bp. of Lincoln, d. 1253.
- Dicta. *Cambridge, Peterhouse College* 204 pt. ii, fol. 1-79.
- Dicta 50, 21, 37, 38, 41, 35. *Cambridge, Trinity College* B.15.38 (373) fol. 35-42.
- Hexameron. *London Royal* 6.E.V., fol. 140-84; *Oxford, Queen's College* 312, fol. 38-102; *Prague, Narodni Museum* XII.E. 5, fol. 3-26.
- Templum Domini. *London Royal* 8.C.IV., fol. 1-7.
- Super De celesti hierarchia Dionysii. *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 787, fol. 1-123.
- Super De ecclesiastica hierarchia Dionysii. *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 787, fol. 39-70.
- Super De divinis nominibus Dionysii. *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 787, fol. 71-119.
- Super De mystica theologia Dionysii. *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 787, fol. 119-23.
- De accessu et recessu maris. *Assisi* 138, fol. 261-62.
- De decem mandatis. *Cambridge, Trinity College* B.15.38 (373) fol. 32-33; *London Royal* 11.B.III., fol. 319-28.
- De lingua. *Cambridge, Trinity College* B.15.35 (370) fol. 158-232.
- De oculo morali. *Cambridge, Trinity College* B.15.35 (370) fol. 232-51.
- De septem vitiis principalibus. *Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek* 221, fol. 151-60.
- De subsistentia rei. *Assisi* 138, fol. 262.
- De triplici rectitudine. *Cambridge, Trinity College* B.15.38 (373) fol. 33.
- De venenis. *Cambridge, Trinity College* B.15.35. (370) fol. 251-56.
- GUALTERUS Anglicus. *See* Burley, Walter.
- GUALTERUS de Brugis, O.F.M. 1225 (ca.)-1307.
- In IV Sententiarum. *Vatican Cod. Chi. B.VI.94*, fol. 99-206.
- GUALTERUS Burlaeus. *See* Burley, Walter.
- GUALTERUS, of Chateau-Thierry, bp., d. 1249.
- De praedicatione. *Assisi* 138, fol. 286-91; *Toulouse* 737, fol. 25-32.
- Quaestiones theologicae. *Toulouse* 737, fol. 48-60, 139-42.
- GUARRO, Guilelmus. *See* William of Ware.
- GUERICUS de Sancto Quintino, O.P., d. 1245.
- Quaestiones theologicae. *Assisi* 138, fol. 116-17, 158-62.
- Quodlibeta I-VII. *Vatican Lat.* 4245, fol. 62-70.
- GUIARD, bp. of Laon, fl. 1230-1238.
- Quaestiones theologicae. *Assisi* 138, fol. 139-58, 168-75, 176-82, 184-200.
- GUIBERVILLE, Simon de. *See* Simon de Guiber ville.
- GUIDO, abbot of Aumône, O.Cist., fl. 1256.
- Summa de diversis quaestionibus theologicae. *Paris Lat.* 14891, fol. 176-212.
- GUIDO de Cluniaco, bp. of Toul, fl. 1303-1306.
- Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris Lat.* 15850, fol. 19, 40.
- GUIDO de Orchellis, fl. 1220-1229.
- Summa de officiis ecclesiae. *Paris Lat.* 17501, fol. 140-69.
- GUIDO Terreni, bp., O. Carm., d. 1342.
- De perfectione vitae evangelicae. *Avignon* 299 (154) fol. 1-77.
- Defensorium tractatus De perfectione vitae evangelicae. *Avignon* 299 (154) fol. 77-180.
- Super libros Ethicorum. *Paris Lat.* 3228, fol. 1-59; *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 328, fol. 1-35.
- Quodlibeta I-VI. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 39, fol. 14-241.
- GUILELMUS, Antissiodorensis, d. 1231.
- Summa de divinis officiis. *Paris Lat.* 14145, fol. 41-76.

- GUIELMUS Arvernus**, bp. of Paris, d. 1249.  
 De bono et malo. *Oxford, Balliol College* 287, fol. 1-28, 200-16.  
 De paupertate spirituale. *Oxford, Balliol College* 287, fol. 27-38.  
**GUIELMUS de Barlo**, O.F.M., fl. 1266-1267.  
 Quaestiones theologiae. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17. sin. cod. 7, fol. 93-95.  
**GUIELMUS Guarro**. See William of Ware.  
**GUIELMUS de Magno Saltu**, fl. 1275-1277.  
 Quodlibet. *Paris* Lat. 14726, fol. 225-31.  
**GUIELMUS de Mara**. See William, de la Mare.  
**GUIELMUS de Melitona**, O.F.M., d. 1260.  
 In IV Sententiarum. *Vatican* Lat. 4245, fol. 214-314.  
 De praedestinatione. *Toulouse* 737, fol. 1-25.  
 De sanctificatione B.V.M. *Toulouse* 737, fol. 36-39.  
**GUIELMUS Occamus**. See Ockham, William.  
**GUIELMUS Parisiensis**. See Guilelmus Arvernus.  
**GUIELMUS, Peraldus**, O.P., 13th cent.  
 Summa de virtutibus. *Vatican* Lat. 1187, fol. 131-87.  
**GUIELMUS Petri de Godino**, cardinal, d. 1336.  
 Lectura Thomasina super Sententias. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 281, fol. 1-133.  
**GUIELMUS Shirwoodus**. See William of Shyreswood.  
**GUILHA, Raymond**. See Raymundus de Guilha.  
**GUIRAL Ot**. See Gerardus Odonis.  
**GUNDISSALINUS**, Dominicus, 12th cent.  
 De anima. *Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College* 504 (271) fol. 146-69;  
*Paris* Lat. 8802, fol. 143-71; 16613, fol. 2-43; *Vatican* Lat. 2186, fol. 104-10;  
*Venice* 181 a 203, 1.144, fol. 1-38.  
 De invisibilibus Dei. *Lisbon* 2299, fol. 144-51.  
**GUY de Beaulieu**, abbot. See Guido de Cluniaco, bp. of Toul.
- HALES, Alexander de**. See Alexander de Hales.  
**HALIFAX, Robert**. See Robert Halifax.  
**HEINRICH von Oyta**, O.Carm., d. 1397.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 342, fol. 4-182.  
 Quaestiones theologiae circa Psalterium. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 388, fol. 1-138.  
 Lectura Adami de Wodham super Sententias abbreviata per Henricum de Oyta. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 296, fol. 1-267.  
**HENRICUS Batenus**. See Bate, Henri.  
**HENRICUS de Gandavo**, fl. 1277-1293.  
 Quodlibeta I-XV (with the criticism of Bernardus de Arvernia). *Troyes* 662, fol. 1-187; *Vatican* Cod. Ottob. Lat. 471, fol. 1-167.  
**HERBERTUS**, Antissiodorensis, d. 1259.  
 De sacramentis. *Troyes* 1750, fol. 122-82.  
 Summa Magistri Guilelmi Antissiodorensis abbreviata a Magistro Herbeto. *Troyes* 1966, fol. 1-219.  
**HERVAEUS Natalis**, O.P., d. 1323.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Bordeaux* 147, fol. 6-178.  
 In I-II Sententiarum. *Troyes* 262, fol. 1-91.  
 Quaestiones super primam distinctionem primi libri Sententiarum *Bordeaux* 147, fol. 1-4

- Quaestiones theologicae. *Bruges* 491, fol. 220-35.  
 De beatitudine. *Toulouse* 743, fol. 203-22.  
 De creatione. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 131-56.  
 De quatuor materiis. *Bordeaux* 147, fol. 204-75. (contra Henricum Gand-  
 avensem)  
 De verbo. *Bordeaux* 147, fol. 178-202.  
 Quodlibeta I-IV. *Toulouse* 743, fol. 1-203.  
 HERVE Nedellec. *See* Hervaeus Natalis.  
 HERVEUS Brito. *See* Hervaeus Natalis.  
 HINTON, Simon de. *See* Simon de Hinton.  
 HOLCOT, Robert, O.P., d. 1349.  
     In libros Sententiarum. *Assisi* 198, fol. 1-196.  
 HUGH of Newcastle. *See* Hugo de Castro Novo.  
 HUGO de Castro Novo, O.F.M., fl. 1322.  
     In I Sententiarum. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. XXX  
     cod. dext. 2, fol. 1-93.  
 HUGO Ferrariensis. *See* Huguccio, Pisanus.  
 HUGO de Sancto Charo, cardinal, O.P., 1190 (ca.)-1263.  
     In libros Sententiarum. *Bruges* 178, fol. 1-135; *Brussels* 11422-23 (1424) fol.  
     1-121.  
     Filia Magistri (Abbreviatio libri Sententiarum). *Bruges* 80, fol. 133-73.  
 HUGO Sneyt. *See* Sneyt, Hugo.  
 HUGUCCIO, Pisanus, bp. of Ferrara, d. 1210.  
     Summa decretorum. *Paris* Lat. 3892, fol. 1-217.  
 HUGUES de Saint-Cher. *See* Hugo de Sancto Charo.  
 HUMBERT de Preuilly. *See* Humbertus de Prulliac.  
 HUMBERTUS de Prulliac, O. Cist., d. 1298.  
     In libros Sententiarum. *Bruges* 180, fol. 1-162; *Troyes* 1393, fol. 1-140.  
 ILDEPHONSUS, Saint, abp. of Toledo, d. 667.  
     De virginitate perpetua Sanctae Mariae. *Paris* Lat. 2885, fol. 93-139.  
     Contra Jovinianum De virginitate. *Paris* Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1455, fol. 1-5.  
     Sermones. *Paris* Lat. 14302, fol. 32-38.  
 INNOCENTIUS V, Pope. *See* Petrus de Tarentaria.  
 INSULIS, Alanus de. *See* Alanus de Insulis.  
 ISAAC Israeli. *See* Ishak ibn Sulaiman, *al-Isra'ili*.  
 ISHAK ibn Sulaiman, *al-Isra'ili*.  
     De definitionibus. *Munich* Lat. 8001, fol. 151-54; *Paris* Lat. 6443, fol. 187-90;  
     14700, fol. 153-60; *Vatican* Lat. 2186, fol. 36-50.  
 JACOBUS de Altavilla, O. Cist., d. 1393.  
     In libros Sententiarum. *Bruges* 181, fol. 1-252.  
 JACOBUS de Appamiis, O.S.A., 14th cent.  
     Quodlibet I. *Avignon* 314 (110) fol. 60-92; *Bordeaux* 167, fol. 92-116.  
 JACOBUS Asculanus, O.F.M., fl. 1310.  
     Quaestiones Disputatae. *Vatican* Lat. 1012, fol. 60-66.  
     Quodlibet I. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften*  
     307, fol. 105-20; *Vatican* Lat. 932, fol. 36-68; 1012, fol. 46-60.  
 JACOBUS de Metis, O.P., fl. 1295-1309.  
     Additiones in I Sententiarum. *Troyes* 992, fol. 7-25.  
     Quaestiones in I-II Sententiarum. *Troyes* 992, fol. 2-6, 34-68, 86-105, 106-  
     22, 123-33.  
 JACOBUS de Viterbio, abp. of Naples, O.S.A., d. 1308.  
     Quaestiones 32 De Praedicamentis in divinis. *Bordeaux* 167, fol. 1-91.

- Quodlibeta I-IV. *Bordeaux* 167, fol. 117-223.  
 Quodlibeta I-II. *Paris Lat.* 14569, fol. 118-87; *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 889, fol. 105-83; *Troyes* 269, fol. 84-135.  
 Quodlibeta I-II (with the criticism of Bernardus de Arvernica). *Toulouse* 744, fol. 156-91; *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 298, fol. 157-201.
- JACQUES de Pamiers. *See* Jacobus de Appamiis.
- JANDUNO, Joannes de. *See* Joannes de Janduno.
- JEAN de Béthune. *See* Buridan, Jean.
- JEAN de la Mote.  
 Voie de Paradis et le Voie de Infer. *Paris Fr.* 12594, fol. 169-97.
- JEAN Lesage. *See* Joannes Sapiens.
- JEAN de la Rochelle. *See* Joannes de Rupella.
- JEAN du Tour. *See* Joannes de Turno.
- JOANNES Buridanus. *See* Buridan, Jean.
- JOANNES de Cervo.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Bologna Serie A* 1029, fol. 1-105.  
 De latitudinibus specierum. *Bologna Serie A* 1029, fol. 105-10.
- JOANNES, of Damascus, Saint.  
 Traditiones orthodoxae fidei, a Burgundione de greco in latinum translatae. *Bruges* 515, fol. 32-62.
- JOANNES Dormiens. *See* Joannes Quidort.
- JOANNES Faventinus, bp. of Faenza, d. 1190.  
 Summa decretalium. *Paris Lat.* 14606, fol. 1-166.  
 Summa decretalium, pars III (de sacramentis). *Paris Lat.* 14997, fol. 187-97.
- JOANNES Gerson. *See* Gerson, Joannes.
- JOANNES de Janduno, d. 1328.  
 Quaestiones in Averrôes "De substantia orbis". *Vatican Lat.* 845, fol. 272-307.
- JOANNES de Monte Sancti Eligii, fl. 1308-18.  
 Utrum illorum quae sunt idem, re unum possit aliquid connotare quod non aliud. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 156, fol. 124-26.
- JOANNES de Murrho, cardinal, O.F.M., d. 1312.  
 Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris Lat.* 15850, fol. 21.
- JOANNES de Neapoli, O.P., fl. 1310-1336.  
 Quodlibeta I-II. *Toulouse* 744, fol. 1-51.
- JOANNES Peccamus. *See* Peckham, John.
- JOANNES de Poliac, fl. 1306-1321.  
 Quaestiones theologicae. *Paris Lat.* 3228, fol. 151-55.  
 De scientia Dei. *Paris Lat.* 3228, fol. 105-42.  
 De virtutibus. *Paris Lat.* 15371, fol. 288-337.  
 Quodlibeta I-V. *Vatican Lat.* 1017, fol. 1-242.  
 Quodlibeta IV-V. *Paris Lat.* 15372, fol. 99-190.
- JOANNES Quidort, O.P., d. 1306.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 889, fol. 1-102.  
 De confessionibus fratrum. *Vatican Cod. Borgh. Lat.* 156, fol. 133-35.
- JOANNES de Ripa, O.F.M., fl. 1325-1357.  
 In I Sententiarum. *Vatican Lat.* 1083, fol. 1-284.
- JOANNES de Rodinchon. *See* Rodington, John.
- JOANNES de Rupella, O.F.M., d. 1245.  
 Summa de anima. *Bruges* 515, fol. 1-31; *Brussels* 2793-96 (1610) fol. 1-46.  
 Summa de sacramentis. *Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense* 1473, fol. 68-88.  
 Summa de vitiis. *Bruges* 228, fol. 1-41; *Troyes* 1339, fol. 2-92.  
 De beatitudine. *Assisi* 186, fol. 83, 86.  
 De multiplici divisione potentiarum animae et de virtutibus. *Brussels* 12042-49 B (1138) fol. 224-85.

- De sanctificatione. *Toulouse* 737, fol. 33-36.  
 De transfiguratione Domini. *Toulouse* 737, fol. 39-41.  
 JOANNES Sapiens, 14th cent.  
     Quodlibet. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 125-30.  
     Utrum libertas voluntatis requirat quod voluntas moveat se per se. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 121-23.  
 JOANNES de Sterngassen, O.P., fl. 1390.  
     In libros Sententiarum. *Vatican* Lat. 1092, fol. 1-107.  
 JOANNES de Trevisa, O.P., 13th cent.  
     Summa Theologica. *Vatican* Lat. 1187, fol. 187-236.  
 JOANNES de Turno, O.P., fl. 1275-1286.  
     Quaestiones Disputatae. *Paris* Lat. 14726, fol. 225, 226.  
 JOHANN Eckhart. *See* Eckhart, Meister.  
 JOHN Peckham. *See* Peckham, John.  
 JOHN Rodington. *See* Rodington, John.  
 JULIANUS, Saint, abp. of Toledo, d. 690.  
     Beati Hildefonsi elogium. *Paris* Lat. 2885, fol. 91-93.
- KILWARDEY, Robert, abp. of Canterbury, O.P., d. 1279.  
     In II Sententiarum. *Toulouse* 61, fol. 191-267.  
     De consensia. *London* Harleian 106, fol. 353-64.  
     De fide. *London* Harleian 5431, fol. 261-64.  
     De ortu scientiarum. *Bruges* 424, fol. 1-70.  
     De tempore. *Bruges* 491, fol. 87-88.  
 KNAPWELL, Richard. *See* Richard of Knapwell.  
 KYLMINGTON, or Kylmeton, Richard, d. 1361.  
     In I Sententiarum. *Bruges* 503, fol. 79-105.  
     Commentarium in libros Ethicorum. *Paris* Lat. 15561, fol. 172-96.  
     Quaestiones super librum De Generatione. *Bruges* 503, fol. 20-50.
- LANGTON, Stephen, cardinal, abp. of Canterbury, d. 1228.  
     Summa. *Cambridge*, *St. John's College* 57, fol. 147-70.  
     Summa de vitiis et virtutibus. *Paris* Lat. 14526, fol. 147-60.  
     Glossa in septem epistolas canonicas. *Paris* Lat. 14443, fol. 434-66.  
     Postilla super Apostolum. *Paris* Lat. 14443, fol. 254-433.  
     Postilla in Actus Apostolorum. *Paris* Lat. 14526, fol. 174-80.  
     Quaestiones Disputatae. *Paris* Lat. 14526, fol. 161-74.  
     Quaestiones Theologicae. Type A, *Cambridge*, *St. John's College* 57, fol. 171-257; Type B, *Paris* Lat. 14556, fol. 164-266; Type C, *Paris* Lat. 16385, fol. 3-117.  
 LA ROCHELLE, Jean de. *See* Joannes de Rupella.  
 LAURENT de Fougères, O.P., fl. 1230-1244.  
     De veritate humanae naturae. *Paris* Lat. 16406, fol. 110-13.  
 LESAGE, Jean. *See* Joannes Sapiens.  
 LINCOLNIENSIS, Robertus. *See* Grosseteste, Robert.  
 LULL, Ramon, d. 1315.  
     Opera. *Paris* Lat. 15450, fol. 1-561; 17829, fol. 1-540.
- MAGNO Saltu, Guilelmus de. *See* Guilelmus de Magno Saltu.  
 MARCHIA, Franciscus de. *See* Franciscus de Marchia.  
 MARE, William de la. *See* William de la Mare.  
 MARKETTA, Reinerus de. *See* Reinerus de Claremaresto.

- MARSTON, Roger, O.F.M., d. ca. 1303.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Assisi* 158, fol. 28-29, 57, 58-60, 63-64, 123-28, 155-74, 256-63, 329.  
 Quodlibeta I-II. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Conv. Sopp. 123, fol. 114-58.
- MARTIN, 13th cent.  
 Summa Theologica. *Paris* Lat. 14526, fol. 61-144; *Toulouse* 209, fol. 1-235.
- MATTHAEUS de Aquasparta, cardinal, O.F.M., d. 1302.  
 In II Sententiarum. *Assisi* 132, fol. 1-225, 298-309.  
 In IV Sententiarum. *Assisi* 132, fol. 226-97.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Todi, Biblioteca S. Fortunati* 44, fol. 74-86, 91-170, 178-96, 204-16, 223-52, 260-302, 309-15.  
 Quodlibeta I-VI. *Todi, Biblioteca S. Fortunati* 44, fol. 86-91, 170-78, 196-204, 216-23, 252-60, 302-09.  
 Utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse vel plura. *Assisi* 158, fol. 236-39.
- MAYRONIS, Franciscus. *See* Franciscus Mayronis.
- MEDIA VILLA, Ricardus de. *See* Ricardus de Media Villa.
- MELTON, William. *See* Guilelmus de Melitona.
- METZ, Jacques de. *See* Jacobus de Metis.
- MIDDLETON, Richard de. *See* Ricardus de Media Villa.
- MONT-SAINT-ÉLOI, André de. *See* Andreas de Monte Sancti Eligii.
- MONT-SAINT-ÉLOI, Jean de. *See* Joannes de Monte Sancti Eligii.
- MURRHO, Jean de. *See* Joannes de Murrho.
- NATALIS, Herveus. *See* Hervaeus Natalis.
- NEAPOLI, Joannes de. *See* Joannes de Neapoli.
- NEWCASTLE, Hugh of. *See* Hugo de Castro Novo.
- NEDELLEC, Hervé. *See* Hervaeus Natalis.
- NICHOLAS Ockham. *See* Ockham, Nicholas.
- NICHOLAS Trivet. *See* Trivet, Nicholas.
- NICOLAS d'Amiens. *See* Nicolaus Ambianensis.
- NICOLAS de Bar-le-Duc. *See* Nicolaus, de Barro Ducis.
- NICOLAS d'Oresme. *See* Oresme, Nicolas.
- NICOLAUS Ambianensis, 1147-1203?  
 Ars Fidei Catholicae (De articulis fidei). *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 167-73.
- NICOLAUS, de Autricuria, fl. 14th cent.  
 Tractatus universalis. *Oxford, Bodleian Library* Misc. Can. 43, fol. 1-24.  
 Quaestio de qua respondit. *Paris* Lat. 6559, fol. 191-93; 14576, fol. 212-13.
- NICOLAUS, de Barro Ducis, bp. of Mâcon, d. 1310.  
 Quaestiones collectae de diversis quolibet. *Paris* Lat. 15850, fol. 10-42.
- NICOLAUS de Presorio, d. 1302.  
 Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris* Lat. 15850, fol. 30.
- NICOLE Bozon. *See* Bozon, Nicole.
- NIGER, Ralph. *See* Ralph Niger.
- OCKHAM, Nicholas, O.F.M., fl. 1282-1320.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Assisi* 152, fol. 1-60.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Assisi* 158, fol. 96, 239-90, 295-97, 341.
- OCKHAM, William, O.F.M., d. ca. 1349.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Oxford, Balliol College* 299, fol. 1-132.  
 In I Sententiarum. *Assisi* 199, fol. 87-179; *Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College* 101 (53) fol. 1-34; 285 (678) fol. 157-68; 325 (525) fol. 1-18; *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 894, fol. 32-199; *Troyes* 718, fol. 1-140.



- Prologus in I Sententiarum. *Assisi* 199, fol. 1-5; *Oxford, Merton College* 100, fol. 1-9; *Paris Lat.* 15904, fol. 1-22.  
 Dialogus. *Avignon* 324 (111) fol. 1-312.  
 De potestate Papae. *Avignon* 1087 (342) fol. 134-205.  
 Summa totius logicae. *Assisi* 647, fol. 1-135; 666, fol. 1-44; *Bruges* 497, fol. 1-40; 498, fol. 1-135; *Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College* 464 (571) fol. 1-67; *Erfurt Amplon.* F. 301, fol. 1-113; *Amplon.* Q. 257, fol. 1-71; *London Arundel* 367, fol. 1-153; *Naples VIII.G.98*, fol. 1-162; *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine* 3521, fol. 2-62; *Vatican Cod. Ottob. Lat.* 2071, fol. 12-48.  
 Odo de Chateauroux, cardinal, d. 1273.  
 Commentarium in epistolas Beati Pauli. *Paris Lat.* 15605, fol. 1-154.  
 Quaestiones Theologicae. *Paris Lat.* 16406, fol. 221-30.  
 Odo Rigaldi, abp. of Rouen, O.F.M., d. 1275.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Brussels* 11614 (1542) fol. 1-253; *Troyes* 1206, fol. 1-208.  
 In I-III Sententiarum. *Bruges* 208, fol. 1-488.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Assisi* 138, fol. 201-05; *Toulouse* 737, fol. 167-273.  
 Odo, de Soliaco, bp. of Paris, d. 1208.  
 Constitutiones. *Paris Lat.* 14443, fol. 290-91.  
 Odonis, Gerardus. *See* Gerardus Odonis.  
 OLIVERUS, de Tréguier, O.P., d. 1296.  
 Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris Lat.* 15850, fol. 27.  
 ORCHELLES, Gui de. *See* Guido de Orchellis.  
 ORESME, Nicolas, d. 1382.  
 De communicatione idiomatum in Christo. *Bruges* 181, fol. 253-64.  
 Gloss in Old French on Aristotle De Coelo et De Mundo. *Berne, Biblioteca Bongarsiana* 310, fol. 28-152; *Paris Fr.* 565, fol. 23-171; 1082, fol. 1-209; 1083, fol. 1-125; 24278, fol. 1-146.  
 Gloss in Old French on Aristotle De Spheris. *Berne, Biblioteca Bongarsiana* 310, fol. 1-27; *London Sloane* 2542, fol. 55-59; *Paris Fr.* 565, fol. 1-22; 1052, fol. 1-38; 1350, fol. 1-38; 2240, fol. 61-96; 24278, fol. 140-46.  
 OSBERT Pickenham. *See* Pickenham, Osbert.  
 OT, Guiral. *See* Gerardus Odonis.  
 OYTA, Heinrich von. *See* Heinrich von Oyta.  
  
 PALU, Pierre de la. *See* Petrus de la Palu.  
 PAMIERS, Jacques de. *See* Jacobus de Appamiis.  
 PASCHASIUS Radbertus, Saint, abbot of Corbie, d. ca. 860.  
 De Corpore et Sanguine Domini. *Paris Lat.* 2885, fol. 2-62.  
 Sermones in Assumptione B.M.V. *Paris Lat.* 2334, fol. 1-26.  
 Versus de Corpore Christi. *Paris Lat.* 2885, fol. 62.  
 PECKHAM, John, abp. of Canterbury, O.F.M., d. 1292.  
 De mysteriatione numerorum in Sacra Scriptura. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17 sin. cod. 8, fol. 1-7.  
 De persona Spiritus Sancti. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. sin. cod. 7, fol. 95.  
 De unitate intellectus. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17 sin. cod. 8, fol. 167-69.  
 Utrum mundus potuit ab aeterno creari. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17 sin. cod. 8, fol. 97-101.  
 Quodlibet de Curia (Quodlibet III). *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17 sin. cod. 7, fol. 37-50.  
 PERALDUS, Guilelmus. *See* Guilelmus Peraldus.

- PETRUS de Ang., O.F.M., fl. 1300.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Aedil.* 164, fol. 18-32.  
 Quodlibeta I-II. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Luarenziana Aedil.* 164, fol. 1-18.
- PETRUS Anglicus, O.F.M., fl. 1303-1316.  
 Quodlibeta I-III. *Vatican Lat.* 932, fol. 175-218.
- PETRUS de Aquila, bp. of Triventinus, O.F.M., fl. 1344-1370  
 In I-III Sententiarum. *Vatican Lat.* 1077, fol. 1-193.
- PETRUS de Arvernia, bp. of Clermont, d. 1304.  
 In libros De Anima. *Paris Lat.* 16170, fol. 42-53.  
 In libros Metaphysicorum. *Paris, Bibliothèquē Mazarine* 3481, fol. 133-216;  
*Vatican Lat.* 845, fol. 156-271.  
 Quodlibeta I-VI. *Troyes* 269, fol. 136-94; *Vatican Lat.* 932, fol. 102-71.
- PETRUS de Aterrania, O.F.M.  
 In I Sententiarum. *Troyes* 767, fol. 1-107.
- PETRUS Aureoli. *See* Aureoli, Petrus.
- PETRUS de Barro, cardinal, d. 1252.  
 Quaestiones Theologicae. *Paris Lat.* 14726, fol. 194.
- PETRUS de Candia, O.F.M., 1340-1410 (Pope Alexander V)  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Brussels* 3699-3700 (1555) fol. 11-188.  
 Quaestiones Theologicae. *Assisi* 199, fol. 6-86, 180-325.
- PETRUS Cantor, O. Cist., d. 1197.  
 Summa Abel. *Bruges* 234, fol. 1-157.  
 Summa de sacramentis. *Troyes* 276, fol. 1-172.
- PETRUS Carnotensis, fl. 1300.  
 Manuale de officiis ecclesiasticis. *Evreux* 21, fol. 138-46; *Paris Lat.* 14500, fol. 126-46; 14923, fol. 144-69; *Nouv. Acq. Lat.* 232, fol. 1-165.
- PETRUS de Ceffona, O. Cist., fl. 1280-1300.  
 In libros Sententiarum. *Troyes* 62, fol. 1-223.
- PETRUS de Falco, bp. of Viviers, O.F.M., d. 1297.  
 Quaestiones Disputatae. *Bruges* 185, fol. 14-68; *Paris Lat.* 14526, fol. 181-275.  
 Quodlibeta I-II. *Bruges* 185, fol. 1-14.
- PETRUS, de la Palu, O.P., d. 1342.  
 In II Sententiarum. *Vatican Lat.* 1073, fol. 1-189.  
 De potestate Papae. *Toulouse* 744, fol. 119-42.  
 Quodlibet I. *Toulouse* 744, fol. 75-118.
- PETRUS Pictaviensis, 1130 (ca.)-1205.  
 Sententiarum libri quinque ad Guillelmum Senonensem archiepiscopum.  
*Troyes* 909, fol. 1-174.
- PETRUS Pictaviensis, canon of St. Victor, fl. 1180-1200.  
 Summa de mysteriis Incarnationis Christi. *Paris Lat.* 14886, fol. 85-179.
- PETRUS de Sancto Odomaro, fl. 1289-1308.  
 Quaestiones de quolibet. *Paris Lat.* 15850, fol. 26, 36, 37.
- PETRUS de Tarantaria, O.P., d. 1276. (Pope Innocent V).  
 In I-III Sententiarum. *Bruges* 186, fol. 1-406.  
 In IV Sententiarum. *Bruges* 187, fol. 1-186.  
 Quodlibet. *Vatican Cod. Borgh.* Lat. 139, fol. 134-37.
- PETRUS de Trabibus, O.F.M., 13th cent.  
 In I Sententiarum. *Assisi* 154, fol. 1-125.
- PHILIPPUS, cancellarius, d. 1236.  
 Summa de bono. *Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana con Museo IX*, 156 (214) fol. 1-212; *Toulouse* 192, fol. 1-148.
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UDO, fl. end of 12th cent.

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Ideo quemadmodum populus Dei.

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De ordine Missae et de Corpore et Sanguine Domini Jesu Christi. *Paris* Lat. 1006, fol. 1-15.

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Elegantius in iure divino vernantia comatico sermone adunare intendimus.

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Magister Gratianus in hoc opere antonomasice dictus magister.

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Omnis qui iuste iudicat, statuam in manu gestat.

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Quoniam igitur duobus regitur naturali jure scilicet et moribus.

Summa 'Et est sciendum'. *Rouen* 710 (E.29) fol. 118-41.

Si mulier eadem hora . . . Contra in penitentiali Theodori.

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Utrum usura sit crimen ecclesiasticum? Videtur quod non, set civile.

*Toulouse* 744, fol. 142-55.

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Scientia speculativa ad philosophiam essentialiter pertinet.

In De Physico. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 242-46.

Universale secundum quod tale non existit in rerum natura.

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Utrum sunt aliqua scientia necessaria praeter philosophicas disciplinas.

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## 6. COMMENTARIES ON THE SENTENCES.

Cum convenit igitur quaeritur an unio naturae divinae ad humanum sit.

In III-IV Sententiarum. *Troyes* 1936, fol. 62-194.

Cupientes in studio et contemplatione veritatis bene vivere.

Quaestiones in I Sententiarum. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 117-31.

Frater Petrus in primo Sententiarum suo, quaestio prima, distinctio tertia.

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Incipit opus Schaele super Sententias.

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Queritur cum gratia sacramentalis sit totius Trinitatis quare appropriatur filio.

In IV Sententiarum. *Troyes* 829, fol. 1-126.

Quid sit uti secundum rem.

In I Sententiarum. *Assisi* 160, fol. 8-133.

Samaritanus enim vulnerato approprians etc.

In IV Sententiarum. *Assisi* 576, fol. 69-148.

Utrum fornicatio sit peccatum mortale.

Quaestiones in I, III Sententiarum. *Paris* Lat. 14454, fol. 126-37.

Utrum objectum scientiae theologicae sit conclusio.

In libros Sententiarum. *Bruges* 189, fol. 1-291.

Utrum sit actus solius voluntatis. Arguitur quod non.

In libros Sententiarum. *Troyes* 501, fol. 1-142.

Utrum sit possibile aliquid per creationem in esse producere.

In Libros Sententiarum. *Troyes* 505, fol. 76-84.

Utrum theologia nobis a Deo revelata sit scientia proprie dicta.

In I Sententiarum. *Troyes* 767, fol. 107-262.

Veteris ac novae legis.

In I Sententiarum. *Assisi* 576, fol. 1-12.

Veteris ac novae legis continentiam, etc. Hic quaeruntur duo principaliter.

In I-III Sententiarum. *Troyes* 1229, fol. 1-197.

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Anno domini 845 Inc. X.C.D.N. calculus iste id est mensura trium digitorum.

Arithmetical treatise. *Paris* Lat. 2885, fol. 63-68.

Cum omne desiderii compos et maxime creatura rationalis.

Compendium philosophiae. *Paris* Lat. 15879, fol. 125-76.

Deinde circa hominem quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad ipsum.

Quaestiones theologicae. *Paris* Lat. 15371, fol. 353-75.

Deus apparebat et loquebatur Moysi.

Against Joachim of Flora and Peter Olivi. *Avignon* 1087 (342) fol. 220-29.

Doctor quidam reverendus determinavit de natura numeri et unitatum.

Quaestiones philosophicae. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 291, fol. 205-71.

Ens videtur esse subiectum metaphysice quia rationem subiecti.

Quaestiones metaphysicae. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 81-87.

Et si aliquo modo de actibus rationis sit logica.

Quaestio philosophica. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 246-51.

In principio eorum quae hucusque docuimus.

De rerum creatione. *Vienna* 1050, fol. 138-73.

Intellectionem intellectualem naturam praecedere.

Libellus theorematum Magistri Joannis Scoti (Pseudo). *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 307, fol. 120-26.

Magistri sumus quia verax est.

Quaestio philosophica. *Assisi* 576, fol. 149-57.

Nos cupientes mittere.

De mysterio Trinitatis. *Vienna* 1050, fol. 114-38.

Personarum quaedam sunt ecclesiasticae.

Tractatus componendi brevia sive litteras sive salutationes. *Cambridge, Gonville and Gains College* 205 (111) pp. 255-85.

Quaestio est de libero arbitrio humano.

De libero arbitrio. *Vatican Cod. Palat.* 612, fol. 66-77.

Quoniam me saepius rogasti, Petre, postquam sacerdotii.

Tractatus de sacramentis. *Troyes* 822, fol. 115-79.

Sciendum est quod Thomas in prima parte summae.

Correctorium corruptorii. *Bruges* 491, fol. 1-51.

Utrum ad philosophiam pertineat eodem modo determinare de justitia.

Quaestio philosophica. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 328, fol. 36-42.

Utrum aliquis necessario vel voluntarie possit offendere Christum.

Quaestiones sex dogmaticae-morales. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 307, fol. 1-18.

Utrum aliquo fundamento reali.

Quaestiones Scotistae. *Assisi* 187, fol. 1-62.

Utrum Deus habeat scientiam contingentium futurorum.

Quaestiones theologicae. *Paris* Lat. 15371, fol. 229-88.

Utrum dialectica sit scientia.

Quaestiones logicae. *Paris* Lat. 16297, fol. 111-17.

Utrum intellectus magis elevetur in obiectum suum quam affectus.

Quaestiones philosophicae. *Florence, R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana* Plut. 17 sin. cod. 8, fol. 101-15.

Utrum intellectus sit altior et nobilior potentia quam voluntas.

Quaestio philosophica. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 156, fol. 116-22.

Utrum perfectiones creaturarum virtualiter contente in essentia divina.

Quaestiones De Deo. *Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner-Chorherrenstiften* 307, fol. 97-105.

Utrum sicut Deus esse est demonstrabile, ita ipse est omnino simplex.

Summa theologica. *Avignon* 333 (6 Suppl.) fol. 1-165. (Beginning is lacking in manuscript and incipit is from first complete question, number 3).

Utrum sit vel fuerit possibile mundum semper fuisse.

Quaestio philosophica. *Vatican* Cod. Borgh. Lat. 156, fol. 128-33.

Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distinguetur a Filio, si non procederet ab eo.

De essentia Dei. *Avignon* 1071, fol. 73-91.

Utrum virtutes morales ad invicem sint connexe.

Quaestiones theologicae. *Paris* Lat. 15371, fol. 31-93.

Vita Joannis Rusbrochii.

Annotationes in Joannes Rusbrochium. *Vatican* Lat. 6207, fol. 1-6.

Voluit Deus, fecit in coelo et in terra unde est.

Opiniones Parisiis damnatae. *Troyes* 262, fol. 129-49.

# The Logos as a Basis for a Doctrine of Providence

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## I. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

IF, as Aristotle<sup>1a</sup> says, philosophy is born of wonder, the environment of that offspring has repercussions more or less fundamental on its subsequent development, or the direction given. Thus Descartes, professing to cast aside the entire philosophic tradition of the past, fostered his newborn 'clear and distinct idea' under the fascinating aegis of the mathematical outlook of his age. So the philosophers of the post-Aristotelean period, face to face with a Greece politically and morally exhausted, turned from purely intellectual enquiry which was justified in its own right<sup>2</sup> to an essentially practical mode of thinking.<sup>3</sup> "Stoic apathy, Epicurean self-contentment and Sceptic imperturbability, were the doctrines which suited the political helplessness of the age, and they were therefore the doctrines which met with the most general acceptance."<sup>4</sup> No longer was there the opportunity for the Greek ideal of disinterested public service to find an opening. Denied that activity, inevitably the emphasis was laid on private life, concentrating on the individual, searching for an ethics which would provide a basis for happiness independent of the misfortunes of the times.

It is likewise because of the historical context that a more cosmopolitan character replaces the exclusiveness of the Schools. National independence gone,

<sup>1</sup> References to the more frequently quoted authors are given to the following editions: Plato, *Dialogues*, (Eng. trans. by B. Jowett, 5 Vol., 3rd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1892); Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (Eng. trans. by R. D. Hicks, 2 Vol., London and New York, 1925); Seneca, *Opera Quae Supersunt*, ed. O. Hense and others, (3 Vol., Leipzig, Teubner, 1905-14); Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, (Eng. trans. by C. R. Haines, London and New York, 1916); Plutarch, *Moralia*, VI, ed. G. N. Bernardakis, (Leipzig, Teubner, 1895); Cicero, *Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia*, ed. Karl Azert and others, (Leipzig, Teubner, 1914-38); H. Von Arnim, *Stoicorum Vetus Fragmenta*, (4 Vol., Leipzig, Teubner, 1903-24); Epictetus, *Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae*, ed. H. Schenkl, (Leipzig, Teubner, 1894); Plotinus, *Enneads*, (Fr. trans. by E. Bréhier, Collection G. Budé, 6 Vol., Paris, 1924-38; Eng. trans. by K. S. Guthrie, 4 Vol., Platonist Press, Alpine, N. J., 1918).

<sup>1a</sup> I *Metaph.* 2, 982b12. Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155D.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aristotle, I *Metaph.* 2, 982b19.

<sup>3</sup> The question of the emphasis laid on the practical side of philosophy by the Stoics is a moot point. E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, (Eng. trans. by O. J. Reichel, London, 1892), p. 57, says that morality is the central point towards which all other enquiries converge, and many authors support this view. Cf. A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, II, (London, 1882),

p. 47; E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, (Oxford, 1913), pp. 30-32; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, (New York, 1910), p. 54; P. E. More, *Hellenistic Philosophies*, (Princeton Univ. Press, 1923), p. 90.

On the other hand, A. Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der Griechischen Philosophie*, (Leipzig, 1896), p. 100, n. 3, says that too often Stoicism has been seen only as an ethical novelty. R. Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, (Edinburgh and London, 1908), p. 261, believes that there are good grounds for selecting physics as the fundamental doctrine. The thesis that the deepest motive of Stoic doctrine was a "practical" one is subjected to scathing criticism in an article by J. R. Mattingly, 'Early Stoicism and the Problem of its Systematic Form', *The Philosophical Review*, XLVIII, (1939). His opinion is that "the logical, physical and ethical doctrines of the Stoa are all equally possessed of absolute value in that they constitute different moments of rational insight" (p. 274, n. 1).

There is no doubt that the Stoics considered all as integral parts of their philosophy. Physics might be considered as the fundamental part since their ethics rested on their physical and metaphysical principles, but it can equally well be argued that their goal was a virtuous life. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII, 22 (Von Arnim, II, 44). Logic, ethics, physics—such, according to this text, is the order both in study and in importance.

<sup>4</sup> E. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

the former rigid division into "Greeks and barbarians" was forced to give way (though it would be obviously false to suppose that the underlying idea of a race superiority disappeared from world history). Nonetheless, Greek philosophy came into contact with Oriental thought and with the practically minded Roman character. So the history of Stoic thought, although originating in Athens, has numbered among its early exponents men from Asia Minor, Syria and the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, while it terminates its career as a specific school (but not its influence) in Rome, made illustrious by such men as Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

For the purpose of the present study, it does not seem necessary to go into detailed account of the individual representatives of the Stoic School. It is sufficient to indicate its general growth. Zeno, the founder, a native of Citium in Cyprus, appeared in Athens about 320 B.C.,<sup>5</sup> and having studied under the Cynics and Megarians, finally commenced lecturing in the Stoa Poecile, whence his followers derived their name. To him succeeded Cleanthes,<sup>6</sup> and Chrysippus; the latter by reason of his forceful argumentation and learning is recognized as the second founder of Stoicism.<sup>7</sup> Less important Stoic teachers continued to propagate the doctrine and spread its influence beyond Athens. Through the medium of Panaetius of Rhodes, who visited Rome around 140 B.C., Stoicism entered the Roman world, not, however, without undergoing internal changes in the transition.<sup>8</sup> Mention must also be made of another important Stoic philosopher, Posidonius of Rhodes, who was highly esteemed among the Romans,<sup>9</sup> and whose contributions are being more and more highly evaluated by present-day scholars. Bevan<sup>10</sup> says that one would gather that he was the one man whose mind penetrates and informs all the philosophical writing which has come down to us from that day. The outstanding members of the later Stoic School have already been indicated—Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, but in them Stoic doctrine has been either fused with other philosophic traditions, e.g., Cynicism, or Stoic principles have been modified by external circumstances, confronted in their final stage as in their birth, by a decadent age.

While the early leaders of the Stoic School were voluminous writers, a very small portion of such writings is extant. That is the initial difficulty which confronts any attempted exposition of their doctrine. Second-hand authorities, invaluable to the extreme under such circumstances, nevertheless do not always clearly or accurately distinguish individual contributions, nor give the system as a whole. It is true that the writings of the Roman Stoics remain, but a difficulty arises from another quarter. New elements have been amalgamated in the course of the centuries, old elements transmuted. There is a world of weary melancholy in the counsels of Marcus Aurelius on submission to the universal providence which contrasts with the much more vigorously optimistic expression of the doctrine in the early exponents. Yet it is the doctrine that all things are ultimately one and that man lives in a cosmos guided by reason which Marcus Aurelius<sup>11</sup> considers so convincing that it cannot be doubted.

Here the last of the Stoics transmits a fundamental dogma vouched for by Zeno himself. That the world as a whole is governed by providence is not only the explicit doctrine of the Stoic system but every part of their philosophy implies that all things are subject to the same unchangeable law.

It is the signification of this essential feature of Stoic teaching which we wish to elaborate, for the doctrine is fraught with meaning for later philosophers and had had its genesis before the days of Zeno.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 37, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 174.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 183.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1911), pp. 102-103.

<sup>9</sup> Seneca, Ep. 90, 20. "ecce Posidonius, ut

mea fert opinio, ex is qui plurimum philosophiae contulerunt."

<sup>10</sup> *Stoics and Sceptics*, pp. 85 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *The Communings with Himself*, IV, 40; VII, 9; VI, 10.

## II. THE LOGOS

(i) *As Universal Reason*

For the Stoics the aim of philosophy was the moral conduct of man, in other words, "the study of virtue is virtue itself".<sup>12</sup> But when virtue is conceived of as bringing one's actions into harmony with the laws of the universe, it follows that ethics must take its rise in a consideration of the universal order and arrangement of the world. Such knowledge is indispensable as a means, and only by a preliminary study of nature and of God can one arrive at any satisfactory conclusion concerning good and evil.<sup>13</sup> Logic also had its place as a contributory means to the avoidance of error, and we shall see later that their theory of logical necessity was carried over into physical science.

Philosophy, however, is not a mere amalgam of independent sciences; it is a whole where all these divisions blend. The illustrations made use of are illuminating. Philosophy is compared to an animal, with logic the bones and sinews, ethics the flesh, and physics the soul. Or it is compared to an egg—the shell is logic, the white is ethics and the yolk is physics. Again it is likened to a fertile field. Logic is the encircling fence, ethics the fruit, and physics the soil or trees.<sup>14</sup> To discover the roots of their ethical standards, these very comparisons show the necessity of investigating the inner principles of their physical and metaphysical doctrine.

If one wishes to place the Stoics under some one of the generally accepted classifications, rather paradoxically at first glance, they have been commonly placed in the two pigeon-holes, "materialists" and "pantheists". Paradoxically, for a true materialist to our way of thinking eliminates God from his idea of the universe, whereas for the pantheist the universe is God. But like all such labels, some aspects escape their significance and if there is an inherent inconsistency in their position, it is not so obvious as might appear at first glance. For though the Stoics make use of dualistic terminology, speaking of soul and body, matter and force, substance and quality, ultimately all is reduced to one primary element, identified with ethereal fire, ether, or pneuma. Here Stoicism not only incorporates the Heraclitean doctrine of fire but also the theory of the Logos. That primary substance is not only essentially active but is creative; inherent in its very nature is a power, a creative force which may be compared to the *semen* (*sperma*) of animals or plants.<sup>15</sup> At the very origin of all things then is Creative Reason (*Logos Spermatikos*) which rules the universe, nay, which is the universe, manifesting itself in the various phenomena (gradations of the divine). It is only by a more careful examination of this theory of the Logos that the Stoic notion of providence falls into its proper alignment.

It was from the evidence of this world as a harmonious whole that the Stoics inferred that it must be governed and caused by one force.<sup>16</sup> That cause must be material for only that which is material can act or be acted upon,<sup>17</sup> and since warmth is the cause of growth and life in individual things, the first cause must be fire or heat,<sup>18</sup> not gross and earthly fire but ethereal, subtle, all-pervasive. But were it not itself possessed of a soul and reason it could not endow beings with soul and reason.<sup>19</sup> At times the Stoic philosophers emphasize

<sup>12</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 89, 8. "Philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem: nec virtus autem esse sine studio sui potest nec virtutis studium sine ipsa."

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, 9, 1035D.

<sup>14</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 39-40.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 136.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 7, 19.

<sup>17</sup> Cicero, *Acad.* I, 11, 39. "[Zeno] nullo

modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natural] quae expers esset corporis . . . nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus." Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 106, 9. "etiam nunc cui tanta vis est, ut impellat et cogat et retineat et inhibeat, corpus est."

<sup>18</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 9, 23, ff.

<sup>19</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 143. Cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, III, 10, 25.

the materialistic aspect of this doctrine; again they stress the rational side. Their terminology might lead one to infer a dualistic interpretation of the universe.

They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e., matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is, God. For he is everlasting and the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter.<sup>20</sup>

But while Aristotelean terminology is employed, there can be no doubt of the general monistic viewpoint. In reality God or the activity of thought and primary matter are but one, distinctions depending upon our point of view, for Reason or God is that fiery material, and efficient and material cause merge into one. As we turn now to investigate the origin of particular things, it is already evident that we are face to face with a strict pantheism. The deity is at once the matter of all things and the creative force which moulds this matter into individual substances.<sup>21</sup> God and the world are essentially one,<sup>22</sup> although, as we shall see, it is possible to make distinctions with a real basis in the nature of things as they are now.

### (ii) *The Logos as Creative Force*

In applying the term 'creation' to a Stoic doctrine, it is obvious from what has preceded that it is far from the Christian concept of a creation *ex nihilo*. But it is applicable in so far as the universe is a result of that creative force in primary being. Despite the profound difference underlying a Christian and a Stoic interpretation of the beginning of the Gospel of St. John, the text, materially speaking, is quite apt to signify the Stoic view.<sup>23</sup> "In the beginning was the Word (*Logos*) and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

From primary fire, that is, the *Logos* or deity, by the inner law of its nature necessarily develops that procession of creatures which makes up this changing universe.

In the beginning he [God] was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation.<sup>24</sup>

That primary substance was transformed by a process of condensation and expansion into the four elements whence the earth was formed,<sup>25</sup> and from the various intermingling of these elements in different degrees of tension (*tonos*) arises the diversity of beings. Yet in this perpetual change to which the primary being is subjected, it must be remembered that it is still primary being which is capable of such protean forms. Hence reason pervades every part of the world "just as the soul does in us"<sup>26</sup>, but in varying degrees. In inorganic beings it takes the form of a simple quality (*hexis*), in plants nature (*phusis*), in animals a soul (*psyche*) and in rational beings a rational soul (*nous*).<sup>27</sup>

Just as the gradual sifting out of the elements accounts for the generation of all things, so at the end of the present cycle of world history all things will

<sup>20</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 134.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 148.

<sup>22</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 17, 45. Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, I, Prol. 13. "quid est deus? mens universi. quid est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum."

<sup>23</sup> J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, (4th ed., London, 1930), p. 133, n. 1, says that there is no connection between the Christian

and Stoic *logos*. B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy*, (New York, 1938), pp. 24, 272, believes that the Christian doctrine derives much from the Greek.

<sup>24</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 136.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 142.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 138.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 208, and n. 2.

be resolved back to their primary form<sup>28</sup> in a general conflagration. Thence once more the creative element begins perforce the formation of another universe, exactly corresponding to the one which had gone before. This idea of cyclic returns, probably of Babylonian origin in this context, was also the embodiment of the earlier Greek notion of a cycle, notably from Heraclitus, and one which adapted itself to the Stoic theory of necessity. For it is evident that a world produced from one primary substance by virtue of an inherent active necessity within it evolves in accordance with an absolutely inviolable law of cause and effect. Considered from this point of view, the universe is embraced by the all-powerful force of fate or destiny (*heimarmene*).<sup>29</sup> But that fate is at the same time a rational force, acting according to law, and as such may just as well be called Universal Reason, Soul of the world, Universal Law. Viewed as the source of the orderly arrangement and government of the universe, it is designated as providence, and colloquial language identifies it with the great god Zeus. In reality these are attributes of the primary being. "God is one and the same with Reason, Fate or Zeus; he is also called by many other names."<sup>30</sup>

But in discussing the origin of things, the term *Logos Spermatikos* is especially apt as it denotes the inner law of reason dominating the process as well as the fact that it is at the same time the *sperma* from which all is generated. Here form or logos and matter are absolutely inseparable, but while the material element is subject to constant change, the logos persists unchanged, determining all things in accordance with the law which is its very being. It is the presence in nature of this original creative force that permits and explains the production of plants and animals from seed,<sup>31</sup> the *logoi spermatikoi* denoting the individual participations or rather manifestations of what is in reality the one *Logos Spermatikos* diffusing itself. "The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first momentum to the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs of future existences, and assigning to them productive capacities of realisation, change and phenomenal succession."<sup>32</sup> But while the universe and God are, strictly speaking, one, it is possible to distinguish: God is universal being, viewed as a whole; the world is the total of the present orderly form of its progressive manifestation. Since we may consider things as derived from God and hence not so immediately divine as primary being, God may be said to be the ruling part (*to hegemonikon*) (just as we attribute to the human soul a dominating position), in which case God and the world could be described as two parts of the one cosmos.<sup>33</sup>

### (iii) *The Logos as Pronoia*

Since Stoic physics is a comprehensive term covering natural science,

<sup>28</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 141.

<sup>29</sup> Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, I, 79, 1W. (Von Arnim, II, 913); Diogenes Laertius, VII, 149.

<sup>30</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 135; Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, II, 45. "Ne hoc quidem crediderunt, Iovem, qualem in Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu sua fulmina, sed eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt: rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit; vis illum fatum vocare, non errabis: hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum; vis illum providentiam dicere, recte dices: est enim, cuius consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inoffensus exeat et actus suos explicet; vis illum naturam vocare, non peccabis: hic est, ex quo nata sunt omnia, cuius spiritu

vivimus; vis illum vocare mundum, non falleris: ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, partibus suis inditus, et se sustinens et sua."

<sup>31</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 148-49. It is interesting to note the use that Justin Martyr makes of this term *logos spermatikos*. In his *Apology*, II, 13 (PG 6, 465) he says that the doctrines of Plato and the Stoics were not entirely different from those of Christ because each, seeing through a part of the Seminal Divine Logos that which was kindred to those, discoursed rightly. Cf. also II, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, IX, 1.

<sup>33</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 137-38, 148. Cf. Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, I, Pro<sup>1</sup> 13.

metaphysics and natural theology, and led them, as has been seen, to positing a first principle begetting all things necessarily according to a reasonable and unalterable law, which orderly plan and its fulfilment is called providence, additional arguments in its favour seem almost superfluous. Yet there are difficulties to be met: from without, from the advocates of a doctrine of chance, or from the upholders of traditional gods; from within, for the identification with fate might eliminate the idea of purpose and value, leaving only a blind mechanism of cause and effect. Or again, could the doctrine of providence explain apparent lack of purpose in the universe?

For the Stoics the general consent of mankind carried great weight, not indeed positive proof, yet such "inborn conceptions" were not lightly to be disregarded. Now throughout the ages the belief in gods and their providential care of the universe had persisted.<sup>34</sup> (For the moment we leave aside the question of the gods and their place in a monistic universe.) The very notion of a providential ordering was inseparable from the idea of a perfect God<sup>35</sup> for happiness consists in activity, not selfish idleness, (as in the case of the Epicurean divinities).

The strongest evidence on behalf of providence is the manifest order and beauty of the world, its harmonious subordination of means to ends, all of which is inconceivable apart from a reasonable cause.<sup>36</sup> Is it not absurd to maintain that mere chance could produce these wonders? Try shifting a sufficient quantity of letters of the alphabet to produce the verses of Ennius!<sup>37</sup> Perhaps the force of this challenge is missing for us, mindful of some modern verse!

It is on analyzing the nature of this orderly government of the universe, however, that the Stoics faced their real problem. Seneca<sup>38</sup> enumerates three possible explanations:

dicet aliquis: quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si deus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat? . . . quicquid est ex his, Lucili, vel si omnia haec sunt, philosophandum est: sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disposuit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine inpellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet.

The Stoics accept both inexorable fate and the deity. Are fate and providence then absolutely synonymous? "All things happen by fate".<sup>39</sup> "The philosophers say that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he provides for all things."<sup>40</sup>

The essence of Stoic fatalism lies in their principle that nothing happens without its cause *per se*, nor could it happen otherwise. Were this not so, the endless series of effect and cause which led back to one divine power would be broken and the unity of the world disrupted. Hence the causal series is *all-embracing* and not susceptible to change. What is to happen will happen, what is not to happen cannot happen. Could one know all the causes, one could trace out all the events which inevitably follow. Fate equals necessity; it is "the linked cause of things that are, or the system by which the universe is conducted,"<sup>41</sup> the "ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 4, 12. "inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos." Seneca, *Ep.* 117, 6. "tamquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat."

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 30, 76-77.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 5; II, 32 ff. Cf. Seneca, *De Providentia*, I, 1.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 37, 93.

<sup>38</sup> *Ep.* 16, 4, 5. Cf. Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, XII, 14.

<sup>39</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 149. Cicero, *De Fato*, 15, 33. "[Stoic] omnia fato fieri dicunt."

<sup>40</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, 14, 11.

<sup>41</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 149.



ex se gignat."<sup>42</sup> But while one speaks of a series of causes, it must be remembered that the Stoic doctrine of causation, as opposed to the Aristotelean, posited a unique cause. The whole cosmic evolution was but the working out of the nature of things by a unitary destiny. The effect is coincident with the cause, not substantial but something attributed to substance.<sup>43</sup> But beside this impersonal necessity, which could equally well be the explanation of a mere sequence of events involving no purpose or finality, must be placed the declaration that the inexorable cause is at the same time the Logos. "Fate is a power which stirs matter by the same laws and in the same way; it may equally well be called providence or nature."<sup>44</sup> Thus it is a wise and active force which rules according to such necessity.

"In the God's work there is providence everywhere; for the action of chance is the course of nature, or the web and woof of the disposition of providence. From providence flows all, and side by side with it is necessity and the advantage of the universe of which you are a part."<sup>45</sup>

Strictly speaking, the doctrine of the Logos as providence does not add any note of the personal. According to Stoic physics the first active principle, ethereal fire, does not involve personality and while called the deity (indicative of supreme) is just as well called cosmos. But even as early in Stoic teaching as Cleanthes, we meet the personal note in the idea of the deity, although his *Hymn* also introduces the characteristic doctrine of the essential unity of all—"one Word (Logos) through all things everlastingly". In the later Stoics, Seneca and Epictetus, the personal spiritual aspect of the deity is more and more stressed, and man's corresponding subordination.<sup>46</sup> Marcus Aurelius, however, tends to retain a more strictly pantheistic view.<sup>47</sup> Once a personal element is ascribed to the first principle, the notion of providence tends to become attached to the purposive plan in the mind of the deity, while fate has its reference to the inherent necessity according to which events take place. Cleanthes<sup>48</sup> apparently made a distinction between fate and providence, assigning a wider scope to the former, since he perceived the difficulties of explaining satisfactorily the source of evil in a world of iron necessity, unless God were the cause of it. But theoretically at least, such a distinction is foreign to Stoic

<sup>42</sup> Cicero, *De Divinatione*, I, 55, 125-126. "fatum autem id appello quod Graeci *heimarmenen*, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat, ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id quod superstitiose sed id quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint et quae instant fiant et quae secuntur futura sint." Cf. Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, II, 36; *De Providentia*, 5, 8.

<sup>43</sup> Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, p. 138, 14W (Von Arnim, I, 89). Cf. J. R. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

<sup>44</sup> Aëtius, *Placita Philosophiae*, I, 27, 5. (Von Arnim, I, 176).

<sup>45</sup> Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, II, 3.

<sup>46</sup> J. R. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, pp. 293, n. 79, sees in this a distortion of the original systematic structure of Stoicism. "Logos, which once denoted what man is in his deepest self, threatens in the end to become something alien to him which weighs upon him

from without. Destiny becomes destructive of man's individuality and selfhood, and need arises to find in inner resignation a *modus vivendi* with the world and a consolation for man's helplessness. The original intuition of Stoicism had found salvation for man in rational insight into himself." It is hardly true to say that the Logos becomes alien but the weight of destiny was apparently more poignantly felt.

<sup>47</sup> Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, IV, 40.

<sup>48</sup> Chalcidius, *Commentarius in Timaeum Platonis*, 142, ed. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, II, (Paris, Didot, 1881), p. 214. "Itaque nonnulli putant praesumi differentiam providentiae fatique, cum res una sit; quippe providentiam, dei esse voluntatem, voluntatem porro ejus seriem esse causarum; et ex eo quidem, quia voluntas providentia; porro quia eadem series causarum est, fatum cognominatum. Ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt, etiam ex providentia sint. Eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam, ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus. Alii vero quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire: nec tamen quae fataliter, ex providentia, ut Cleanthes."

dogma.<sup>40</sup> Yet it is fairly easy to see how a personal element could be introduced. It would be difficult to conceive of any particularly strong emotion of reverence or worship arising in one at the contemplation of Universal Reason. But Stoic philosophy, as has been said, was practical in its outlook, and physical and metaphysical principles were not so much important *in se* as in relation to ethics. Man must evidently worship something, and the readiness to identify the Logos with Zeus and the increasing tendency in Stoic teachers to stress a personal element in the first principle was probably due to an effort "to adjust its pantheism to the deeper personal needs of human nature".<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the doctrine of an all-embracing providence such as the Stoics conceived it was capable of such an extension. For *their* pantheism was not a vaguely formulated notion of a divine immanence in all parts of the universe. It meant a progressive manifestation of the Logos in diminishing degrees of participation. Obviously man held a privileged position, alone among visible creatures sharing in a positive manner the rational nature. Why should there not be higher beings in the scale, possessing a spark of the divine to a still greater degree? It was in this way that Stoic doctrine could adopt to itself the traditional gods and take on a more popular appeal. Strictly speaking, such polytheism did not radically interfere with any fundamental principle, for no matter how many gods were retained, they were all just intermediary beings in the great chain leading up to the Logos, or First, or more exactly, that chain was the Logos. That Zeno and early Stoics should have held 'atheistical' views, denouncing the crudities and anthropomorphic notions associated with the gods, and that later Stoics seem to have had an actual belief in a great variety of gods, really is beside the point, provided the fundamental dogma is one Logos pervading all. It is comparatively easy to identify this first principle with Zeus, lord of gods and men,<sup>42</sup> and thus combine the result of philosophical speculation with religious tendencies.

The fact of providence was manifest from the order and beauty of the world—a theme the Stoics enlarge upon, to the point of asserting that this is the best possible world.<sup>43</sup> Viewing this great world order, it is easy to discover many instances of a teleological principle where the parts subserve the whole. There is, of course, a difficulty how there can be the relation of parts to a whole where all is but one. Stoicism anticipates criticism from this quarter by insisting that the whole and the part are neither the same nor different.

The Stoics say that the part is neither 'other than' the whole nor the same as the whole. The hand, for example, is neither the same as a man, for it is not man, nor 'other than' a man, for with it a man is thought of as a man.<sup>44</sup>

Always the lower levels of beings are at the service or use of the higher. It can hardly be supposed that in an order rationally designed, all beneath man in the scale of being was not purposed for his use.<sup>45</sup> Chrysippus passed from more obvious examples to details that over-reached the ridiculous—as in maintaining that the mouse was created for the purpose of preventing man from

<sup>40</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I, 15, 39; II, 22, 58. Cf. *supra*, notes 30, 44.

<sup>41</sup> W. L. Davidson, *The Stoic Creed*, (Edinburgh, 1907), p. 98.

<sup>42</sup> Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, p. 31, 11W. (Von Arnim, II, 1062).

<sup>43</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 34, 86. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 30C. Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, (Cambridge, 1936), for a discussion of some of the implications and difficulties involved in the theory of the best possible world.

<sup>44</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* IX, 336.

(Von Arnim, II, 524). Quoted in J. R. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

<sup>45</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 61, 154. "Restat ut doceam atque aliquando perorem, omnia quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata." Cf. Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, V, 16 and 30. But compare Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, VII, 30. "neque enim omnia deus homini fecit, quota pars operis tanti nobis committitur?"

carelessly leaving the cheese about.<sup>55</sup> Does providence then extend to such details? It would seem not to individuals as such, since it is the beauty and order of the whole that counts, and the suffering endured by any one person may be required in the interests of a wider good. "The gods care for great things and neglect the small."<sup>56</sup> But in reality the Stoic system demands a particular providence, for the Logos penetrates each part, and while it may be granted that it is directly interested in the universal order, it must indirectly be concerned with the individuals who make up that order. "It is impossible," says Chrysippus, "that even the least particulars can fall out otherwise than in accordance with the will of God, with his word, with law, with justice and with providence."<sup>57</sup>

The intimate connection of part to part, and the intrinsic beauty of the resultant whole, led naturally to a doctrine of harmony or, as the Stoics called it, the sympathy of all the parts.<sup>58</sup> The term connotes little more than the natural connection of the parts of one organic, living whole, but the idea is at the basis of the later Neoplatonic notion of sympathy as a spiritual tie, and even ultimately degenerated into a sort of magical force.

In a world so harmoniously ordered, with providence extending to details and a beneficent deity ordaining all for the good of gods and men, it is difficult to fit in any explanation for the evil which exists. The most tempting solution is to deny that it exists, but the Stoics were too keenly alive to ethical problems to undermine their whole system by such a denial. However, their very ethical doctrine eliminated practically all difficulty concerning physical evil. So much that is called evil is really not so for the good man, but actually a gift from the gods as a trial for his virtue.<sup>59</sup> Further, how should we know the existence of good but by its opposite, evil?<sup>60</sup> As in a play, the introduction of a coarse jest vile in itself adds to the general charm by force of contrast,<sup>61</sup> so evil sets forth the beauty of goodness. Where the parts are completely subordinated to the whole, it is inevitable that imperfections may occur in the parts which serve the interests of the whole, a means to a higher end. It is a necessary consequence of the functions of the parts that their very structure should, in certain cases, leave them subject to easy injury.

But even in the explanation of physical evils, the Stoic theory hardly meets the difficulties besetting any theory of necessity even though combined with a notion of intelligent purpose, which rather enhances the difficulty than eliminates it. Hence the Stoics were obliged to admit that necessity outweighs purpose and that the "sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity".<sup>62</sup> There is a rational purpose pervading everything, for the Stoic dogma leaves absolutely no room for chance, but what is must be, and even the Logos is incapable of determining that things should be otherwise than they are.<sup>63</sup> The most one can say is that evil and suffering find their justification in the universal harmony of creation. In the words of Cleanthes:

Thou [Zeus] knowest how to make even that which is uneven and to order what is disordered, and unlovely things are lovely to thee. For

<sup>55</sup> Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantibus*, 21, 1044D: 32, 1049A.

<sup>56</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 66, 167. Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, II, 46. sic omnia esse disposita, ut etiam quae ab illo [love] non fiunt, tamen sine ratione non fiunt, quae illius est . . . singulis non admovet manum, sed vim et causam omnibus dedit." The same question as to Divine Providence over particulars is discussed at length by Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, with arguments derived from Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*. Cf. chap. 10, 17 and 32.

<sup>57</sup> Plutarch, *op. cit.*, 34. 1050D. *De Com-*

*munitus Notitiis adversus Stoicos*, 34, 1076E. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 65, 164.

<sup>58</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 140. Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, IV, 40; VI, 11.

<sup>59</sup> Seneca, *De Providentia*, V, 9-10.

<sup>60</sup> Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, VII, 1, 3-4. ed. C. Hosius, I, (Leipzig, Teubner, 1903).

<sup>61</sup> Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis adversus Stoicos*, 14, 1065D.

<sup>62</sup> E. V. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>63</sup> Seneca, *De Beneficiis*, II, 29, 4. "Quidquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit."

so thou bringest together all things in one, the good with the bad, that there results from all one reasonable order abiding forever.<sup>64</sup>

The difficulties which beset the Stoic doctrine become more keenly manifest when it is confronted with the question of moral evil, and in general with the status of man in this great chain of being. Absolutely speaking, man is but one manifestation of the Logos, holding a seemingly unique position in that he combines in himself various gradations of that one immanent substance, part spirit, part matter, but still just one level of being, taking his place as inevitably as any other. Where will freedom or moral evil find an entry in such a universe? The Stoics refused to be hampered by the ideals of logical consistency which would bind them to the exigencies of their own doctrine, for the goal of all their philosophizing was to arrive at some workable scheme of ethical values, and moral evil seemed too patent to be denied.

In reality their solution of this problem duplicates their conclusions as to providence and necessity in the universe, and this is not surprising for man as the microcosm is a fundamental principle. While one may speak of soul and body, or of 'parts' of the soul, it is important to bear in mind their essential unity. The parts are more strictly 'activities'<sup>65</sup> eight in number: the mind or ruling part (*hegemonikon*), the five senses and the powers of speech and reproduction. The soul, and more especially the soul in its reasoning faculty is God dwelling within the human body,<sup>66</sup> in a manner analogous to God as the soul of the universe. The body as a masterpiece of the divine workmanship bespeaks what care providence has for man.<sup>67</sup> In the reproduction of the individual, we have a miniature facsimile of the creation of the universe for the procreative principle is a part of the soul,<sup>68</sup> which in turn is one with the *Logos Spermatikos* whose activities permeate all the individual *logoi spermatikoi*. Just as the Logos comprehends the plan and purpose of the universe which is unalterable, so the human seed contains within it all that the man will be.<sup>69</sup> Similarly, as we were able to distinguish between the cosmos and its more specific ruling principle, called God or providence or fate, so in man reason, which most closely manifests his nearness to deity, should govern and rule the lower appetites. Man, therefore, is not only a fragment of the divine; in a measure he too may be called providence, for he is an instrument of and co-operates with the Universal Reason. Seneca<sup>70</sup> speaks of providence as "the noblest blessing of the human race". Over the little universe which is himself, man must exercise a rule of reason, aiming at the Stoic ideal of a life in accordance with nature, that is, with human nature, and so an eminently rational one, "a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is

<sup>64</sup> Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, 1, 12. (Von Arnim, I, 537).

<sup>65</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima*, 14. (PL 2, 710A). "Hujusmodi autem, non tam partes animae habebuntur, quam vires et efficaciae et operae."

<sup>66</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 31, 11. "Quid aliud voces hunc quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem?"

<sup>67</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 54-58.

<sup>68</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 157.

<sup>69</sup> Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, III, 29, 2-3. "sive animal est mundus sive corpus natura gubernabile ut arbores ut sata, ab initio eius usque ad exitum quicquid facere quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est ut in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est et legem barbae canorumque nondum natus infans habet (totius enim

corporis et sequentis actus in parvo occultoque liniamenta sunt) . . ."

<sup>70</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 5, 8. Cf. Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, VI, 42. "We are all fellow-workers towards the fulfillment of one object, some of us knowingly and intelligently, others blindly; just as Heraclitus, I think, says that even when they sleep men are workers and fellow-agents in all that goes on in the world. One is co-agent in this, another in that, and in abundant measure also he that murmurs and seeks to hinder or disannul what occurs. For the Universe had need of such men also. It remains then for thee to decide with whom thou are ranging thyself. For he that controls the Universe will in any case put thee to a good use and admit thee to a place among his fellow-workers and coadjutors."

identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is.<sup>71</sup> Chrysippus<sup>72</sup> says:

As long as what lies before me is obscure, I cling to those things which are more suitable by nature with a view to achieving that which is according to nature; for the God himself has given me the choice of these things. Had I known that illness were foreordained for me, I should have striven for it; and had my foot a mind of its own, its own impulse would carry it toward being covered with mud.

But if life is but one grand concatenation of cause and effect which cannot be hindered, there seems little opportunity of shaping one's own career or of doing anything which Universal Law forbids. It is true that it is quite idle to rebel against the circumstances in which we are, or the dispositions which nature has bestowed. God has given us what he could; anything else was beyond his power.<sup>73</sup> Why then act at all if the results will infallibly happen anyway? The answer of Chrysippus to such quietistic arguments was that fate has conjoined the activity and the effect. Both are predestined, e.g., not merely that a sick person should be cured, but that he should be cured by calling in the doctor.<sup>74</sup> The point is illustrated by the anecdote of Zeno and his slave.

Zeno was beating his slave because he had committed a theft, they say; the latter said, "I was fated to steal", and Zeno replied, "Yes, and you were fated to get a thrashing."<sup>75</sup>

The human will is not exempt from this universal chain of cause and effect and there can be, absolutely speaking, no place in Stoic doctrine for a freedom of the will independent of the law of destiny. Actually the opposition of individual responsibility and fate is not a problem, in early Stoicism at least. Man is not so much submitted to an exterior destiny as actually his own destiny. The activity of that one all-determining power or Logos is in accord with the natures of the particular beings in which it is operative, and thus the mode of causality exercised by a rational being will vary from that of irrational or inorganic beings. Man's freedom consists in the fact that he can assent to the working out of the Universal Law, and by this assent place himself in harmony with the universe and achieve a frame of mind productive of happiness, but in actual fact, dissent does not interfere with the great causal chain, it only produces a rebellious and an unsubmitive spirit.<sup>76</sup> Since there is this possibility of assent or dissent of the will, the action belongs to the individual, whether the opposite course was possible or not.<sup>77</sup> Rightly then mankind has bestowed praise or blame, rewards or punishments on certain actions. In the realm of knowledge, it is the wise man who gives assent to convincing perceptions; and the fool rejects them; in the realm of ethics the wise man assents to the universal law while the fool rebels. Resignation under such circumstances may not have a highly magnetic quality but it wears a different aspect when we recall that the law to which we submit is the expression of a reason like to, but eminently higher than, our own. We must follow destiny but it is a human prerogative to be able to put our will in accord with the divine will, even though it will realize itself independently of our will. "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou Destiny, whithersoever I am ordained by you to go. I will follow without hesitation. And even if, in evil mood, I will not, none the less must I follow."<sup>78</sup>

There still remains the problem of moral evil. Because the Stoics refused to

<sup>71</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 88. Cf. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis Ministrorum*, I, 46, (PL. 16, 96B-C).

<sup>72</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, 6, 9. Quoted in J. R. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 1, 10-12.

<sup>74</sup> Cicero, *De Fato*, 12, 28 ff.

<sup>75</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 23. Quoted in

J. R. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

<sup>76</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 107, 11.

<sup>77</sup> Cicero, *De Fato*, 18, 41.

<sup>78</sup> Epictetus, *Manual*, 53, 1-2. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 107, 11, who adds: "ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt." St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, V, 8. (PL. 41, 148).

consider degrees of virtue—one was either perfect or vicious<sup>77</sup> just as one drowns in a few feet of water as surely as in the ocean—the problem of accounting for its manifest prevalence was thereby extended even if it were not made more profound. It was a difficulty for which the Stoics never found a consistent solution. Theoretically, the responsibility could not be laid on man if necessity pervades all. Yet they felt an inner repugnance to attributing evil to the deity. So Cleanthes<sup>80</sup> sings:

O King of kings,  
Through endless ages, God, whose purpose brings  
To birth, whate'er on land or in the sea  
Is wrought, or in high heaven's immensity,  
Save what the sinner works infatuate.

In some way man can introduce evil which even the deity is not able to prevent. One way of surmounting the difficulty was to assert that in some mysterious way evil was necessary as a foil for good<sup>81</sup> and ultimately would work into the good of the whole universal order.<sup>82</sup> As was said above, there seems to be a residue of necessity in the order of events after one assigns to providence all that has meaning. Even if we concede that the Universal Reason is superior to ours which is but a participation, the system postulates that it cannot be otherwise. So in the cosmos which is man there is an irrational as well as rational element. The former does not always submit to reason, but by irregular and violent emotions transgresses the mean of right reason and hence there happens sin. Man's task is thus a reproduction on a small scale of the activity of Universal Reason, "providence at work within the limitations of natural necessity".<sup>83</sup> Virtue is knowledge, but knowledge transferred to the domain of action. The demands of the moral law which man recognizes within him are the imprint of the law of the universe, and human law is but its natural outward expression and reflection. The task of the individual is, in the first place, to allow reason full play in making his life harmonious, and secondly, to recognize that he is "but part of one stupendous whole", and thus it is his duty to subordinate himself to the general movement of the universe.<sup>84</sup>

Stoic physics and ethics cannot be rigidly harmonized for a monistic theory allows no opening for the operation of free will, nor for the opposition of good and evil principles, whereas a science of ethics presupposes that man has at least some share in creating his destiny. The Stoics attempt a synthesis: "*manente fato aliquid sit in hominis arbitrio*".<sup>85</sup> Man's power of assent rests with himself, and in giving it, he exercises a real causality. Probably in that capability of assenting or not, lies the interpretation of the remark, "All things take place according to destiny, but not all things according to necessity",<sup>86</sup> which on the surface contradicts dogmas attributed to them.<sup>87</sup> But no interpretation can outweigh the fundamental inconsistencies which derive from their doctrine of necessity, and the only feasible explanation is that "the Stoic fixes

<sup>77</sup> Diogenes Laertius, VII, 127; cf. also VII, 101. Perhaps the meaning which the Stoics attached to this was not quite so repellent as it may at first appear. All vice is vice, that is, being a substance it can be no more and no less than what it is. Cf. J. R. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

<sup>80</sup> Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, 1, 12. (Von Arnim, I, 537).

<sup>81</sup> Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis adversus Stoicos*, 14, 1065D.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 84. Epictetus, *Discourses*, III, 17.

<sup>83</sup> E. V. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>84</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, 10, 3-5. "On these terms you are a citizen of the universe and a part of it, not one of those

marked for service, but of those fitted for command; for you have the faculty to understand the divine governance of the universe and to reason on its sequence. What then is a calling of a citizen? To have no personal interest, never to think about anything as though he were detached, but to be like the hand or the foot, which, if they had the power of reason and understood the order of nature, would direct every impulse and every process of the will by reference to the whole."

<sup>85</sup> Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum*, II, 38, 3.

<sup>86</sup> Alexander Aphrod., *De Fato*, 8. (Von Arnim, II, 970).

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 82.

his attention on the pulsating, living, willing powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind, non-moral, unbending "necessity" of things, even whilst he admits such necessity is there."<sup>88</sup>

### III. THE PLATONIC BACKGROUND and THE PLOTINIAN VARIATION OF THE LOGOS AS PROVIDENCE

#### (i) *The Platonic Background*

The Stoics in thus deducing an intelligent cause from the orderly arrangement of the universe were quite obviously in one of the main streams of Greek tradition. One must go back to the Nous of Anaxagoras and the Logos of Heraclitus for the first philosophic approaches to such a line of thought. But the question of their dependence on Heraclitus is disputed among scholars, probably a corollary of the dispute as to just what did Heraclitus mean.<sup>1</sup> It is to Plato, therefore, that we turn for comparison and contrast in the present problem of an interpretation of the Logos as a basis for *Pronoia*.

We are told by Diogenes Laertius<sup>2</sup> that Favorinus credited Plato with being the first to employ in philosophical discussion the term 'divine providence'. The emphasis in such a remark must be placed on the notion of philosophical discussion for Greek literature is permeated with the idea of the intervention of the gods.<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact man has always believed in divine intervention in the workings of the world. The question is not so much the novelty of the claim, but whether it can be justified.

An objection frequently raised to Plato's justification is that he felt obliged to embody it in mythological form, being unable to cope with the problem on purely rational grounds. Myths, yes, but necessarily thereby so devoid of truth that they have no intellectual content to offer us? Surely not. It can hardly be supposed that Plato felt he was offering something infra-philosophic—rather his very rationalism, straining towards a further wisdom he felt rather than grasped and which, therefore, could not be set forth as a *pure* work of reason, masked itself under the cloak of the myth.

Il [Plato] a vu de même, et avec une égale profondeur, que la création de mythes scientifiques—la plus noble espèce d'êtres de raison fondés *in re*—est une conséquence nécessaire de cette méthode [la connaissance mathématique]. Les mythes du *Timée* ont pu vieillir, ce n'est pas par un aveu d'impuissance ou par une fuite dans la poésie que le *Timée* use de mythes, c'est en vertu d'une admirable intuition des conditions propres de la connaissance physico-mathématique et de ce qu'on appelle les sciences exactes, quand cessant d'être mathématiques pures elles entreprennent d'expliquer le monde de l'expérience.<sup>4</sup>

And L. Robin<sup>5</sup> says: "The *Timaeus* shows in decisive fashion that myth, that is, history is for Plato a necessary stage of knowledge, and that it is not cut

<sup>88</sup> E. V. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>1</sup> J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 142, says that the Stoics held Heraclitus in peculiar veneration and sought to interpret him as far as possible in accordance with their own system. E. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 134, says that Zeno's interest in the Heraclitean logos was the effect, not the cause of his own theory. Cf. also p. 393 ff. E. V. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 70, believes that Zeno drew from Heraclitus the two doctrines of eternal fire and the logos.

<sup>2</sup> III, 24. Cf. E. Zeller, *Plato and the Older*

*Academy*, (Eng. trans. by Alleyne and Goodwin, London, 1888), p. 498. Also, P. E. More, *The Religion of Plato*, (Princeton Univ. Press, 1921), p. 139, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1941).

<sup>4</sup> J. Maritain, *Les Degrés du Savoir*, (Paris, 1935), p. 319.

<sup>5</sup> *Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit*, (London and New York, 1928), p. 222. But compare J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, (London, 1905), Intro. pp. 51 ff.

completely off from either intermediate discursive knowledge or the pure knowing of dialectic."

It is, of course, impossible to make from the myths a neatly co-ordinated whole, but for the present purpose it suffices to recall that one principle dominates. This universe is a very beautiful work of art, quite beyond the possibility of mere chance, but manifestly the work of intelligence arranging everything in accordance with a premeditated plan (*Pronoia*).<sup>6</sup> Creation is the application of law and order but not to a substratum of matter essentially indistinct from the law. The Demiurge or Maker finds a chaotic 'matter' to work on, which bears within it such necessity that it continually offers resistance to the rule of order and reason.

For the genesis of this cosmos is a mingled birth, a concurrence of necessity and reason; and the beginning was thus: reason got control of necessity by persuading it to bring on most things to their best end as they came into existence; and so and in such a manner, by the act of necessity submitting to reasonable persuasion, the universe was composed.<sup>7</sup>

Chance and design concur, for matter (designated by a variety of names, notably necessity) being wholly devoid of reason or plan, is really chance. God, so to speak, does the best he can with the matter at hand, and beautiful in general as the results are, matter is not wholly submissive.

For Plato, then, in contrast with the Stoics, God is not immanent but transcends this universe. It was from no inner necessity of his being in the Stoic sense that creation takes places, but because God was good and without envy, and wished to share his goodness as far as possible.<sup>8</sup> Plato, it is true, does speak of a World Soul, a conception we shall have more occasion to stress in dealing with Plotinus.

He [God] found that of things by nature visible no work lacking reason would ever be fairer than one with reason, and that it is impossible for reason to accrue to anything without soul. For this consideration he composed the universe by fashioning reason in soul, and soul in body, in such a manner as to produce a work fairest and best in nature. So at least following the probable account, we must say that the cosmos was created as a creature with soul and reason, veritably by the providence of God.<sup>9</sup>

But this World Soul is not God but something fashioned by him "being compounded of the Same and the Other, and essence"<sup>10</sup> and fitted to the corporeal, that is, being in some way akin to the eternal and immutable and to the changeable and ephemeral. Nor are the individual souls fashioned of the same divine stuff as were the secondary gods and the World Soul.

In the *Timaeus* Plato clearly distinguishes between God as the efficient cause of the universe and the eternal patterns which culminate in the highest and all-embracing Idea of the Good, on which God kept his eyes for a model and which therefore may be said to be the exemplary cause. Yet commentators on Platonic thought as a whole differ as to the precise meaning of this distinction. Christian thinkers regarded the Ideal pattern as the conception of the plan *within* the mind of God. Many modern scholars contend that God is for Plato the Idea of the Good, and the personal characteristics with which it is freighted are due to the mythological and, so to say, popular terminology.

Thus for Plato and for the Stoics this universe takes its origin in a creative

<sup>6</sup> *Timaeus*, 30C. *Laws*, X, 903C ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Timaeus*, 48A. Quoted from P. E. More, *The Religion of Plato*, p. 189.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 29E.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 30B-C. Quoted from P. E. More, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-72.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 35A.



force acting according to Reason. But though both theories call for a doctrine of providence, it is manifest that the term cannot carry the same signification for both. Ultimately any metaphysical explanation of a doctrine of providence rests on a theory of creation, and the difficulties and inconsistencies of any system in this respect may, as we hope to point out, be found to have their source here. For the Stoics the Logos is providence, and its very nature is to create out of *itself* as matter, and nothing can hinder that unbroken chain of cause and effect from coming to pass, or from at length returning to its origin, in a process which is eternal. There is here no matter which lies outside its scope, no chance event, for everything must have its cause, which is none other than the Logos acting according to the necessary exigencies of its nature. But in the Platonic account there are two causes, the rational, "creative of things good and fair", and the "necessary" destitute of reason, which produces now and again an unordered work of chance.<sup>11</sup> Matter, this vague formless "receptacle of all creation", lies outside the creative act, but inasmuch as it enters into the formation of the copies of the patterns, Plato leaves a way open for chance and for an explanation of evil that does not lead back to God.

In the *Laws* Plato faces this problem which confronts any theory of providence and which was to prove a stumbling-block for the Stoics. The reality of providence seems jeopardized when one considers the apparent injustices in the fortunes of man. Is it that providence is absorbed in the task of imparting beauty and regularity to the universe as a whole and is incapable of directing all the little daily occurrences of life? That cannot be, for God, being most wise and being willing and able to attend to all, could never neglect the little things which after all are the more easily attended to.<sup>12</sup> We must not impute to providence an inability similar to ours of comprehending endless details.

Plato introduces an argument which in some form or other was to persist in every discussion of the problem, and which has already been met in the Stoic philosophy, but the interpretation of which varies according to the setting. It is the solution of the whole and the part. All things have been ordered by God for the salvation and welfare of the whole, each part contributing its share according to its ability. Of this mighty whole the individual man is but a single part which must look towards and tend to the whole, for every part of creation came into being to the end that the life and being of the whole might have happiness, "not the whole for thee, but thou for it". So our difficulty is that we fail to understand how that which happens is best for the whole and for us, so far as the common creation permits.<sup>13</sup> That is to say, the physical universe looked at as a whole exhibits law and regularity and works into one harmonious system by the subservience of the parts to its end. Even this regularity is not absolute, for there is in the physical world also an element of disorganization, of irregularity, which never wholly submits to the law of reason.<sup>14</sup>

Thus both Plato and the Stoics declare that the imperfection of the parts is necessary for the perfection of the whole, but from completely different viewpoints. For Plato the physical imperfection of the parts finds its necessity in the fact that the creating God is not omnipotent, and certain material elements escape his reasonable control. Evil is not denied but it really remains a mysterious fact inexplicably present in the world. The Stoics admit that physical imperfections necessarily exist, but inasmuch as they are necessary factors in exhibiting the good, they cannot be said to be essentially evil. Monism inevitably tends to deny evil; Plato's dualism at least recognized the validity of the problem, even if he reached no definite solution, apparently hesitating between

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 45D-E.

<sup>12</sup> *Laws*, X, 903B. Cf. also 900C.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Statesman*, 273B-D.

an explanation based on the unreasonableness or 'necessity' of matter, or a doctrine of two world souls, one good, one evil.<sup>15</sup>

If providence were to attempt to arrange all in order that each part might receive its due, whether in the line of justice or happiness, the result would only be a chaotic disruption of all the laws of nature. But providence is justified by taking a long-range view. According to the doctrine of transmigration, the soul passes through a series of lives and its reward or punishment is meted out in these successive stages. All souls come from the hands of their maker equally endowed, and it is not clear just how to account for the degrees of righteousness and unrighteousness they attain. Each has a little world of chaos in himself to subdue.

God has contrived that each member of the living world should be so placed as most easily and effectively to render virtue victorious and vice defeated. To this end he has contrived that the character developed by us should determine the character of our seat and the place occupied by us at any time; but the development of our particular character he has left to the will of each of us. As a man desires and as is the character of his soul, such and in such manner, for the most part, each of us is born.<sup>15a</sup>

In the Myth of Er Plato indicates that moral evil is the result of the soul's own choice. God is not responsible.<sup>16</sup> In a long course of metempsychosis, the soul may be trained and brought back at last to a realization of where its happiness lies. But if not, the gods are inexorable, and since providence is the working out of God's wisdom, goodness and justice, ultimately its efficacy cannot be denied.

## (ii) *The Plotinian Doctrine of Providence*

Although the theory of the Logos is incorporated into the system of Plotinus, it is not immediately evident just how it can justify its presence. For the Stoics, it was the substantial principle of all things; but in a universe which proceeds by way of the three hypostases, the One, the Intelligence and the Soul, the Logos is not identical with any of them. For Plato there is the intelligible world and the sensible world; for the Stoics the intelligible world and the sensible world are one and the same, for the Logos penetrates all in varying degrees, like a ray of light which is in its origin in the highest degree luminous, but whose force diminishes with distance from the source, until it reaches vanishing point. For Plotinus, there is again the distinction of the intelligible world and the sensible world, but the sensible world has emanated from the intelligible world, which is ultimately reducible to a unity pushed far beyond the Stoic monism. Here there is at once the endeavour to absorb the Stoic theory of the Logos while denying what the Stoics considered its synonymous term, destiny, and yet retaining providence. How is this complex achieved?

Working back from this world to a cause, Plotinus seeks to reduce the many to the One, the first cause of all things. He takes the psychological fact of the aspiration of the human soul towards a higher unity as a key for an interpretation of the universe. As in our thought we tend to reduce the manifold of sensation to a unity, yet there still remains the dualism of thinker and thought which is surmounted only at rare intervals by an ecstatic experience, so even if we remount to the Prime Mover of Aristotle, pure act, 'self-thinking thought', there is still a duality which must find its ultimate reduction in some

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Laws*, X, 896D. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on the Timaeus*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 78.

<sup>15a</sup> *Laws*, X, 904B-C. Quoted from P. E.

More, *The Religion of Plato*, p. 100. Cf. *Phaedo*, 107D.

<sup>16</sup> *Republic*, X, 617E. Cf. also *Rep.* II, 379C.

unity beyond. Plotinus' affirmation of the One is based on this metaphysical need of perfect unity. God, therefore, is above all categories of thought, of life, of act. He is super-being, super-thought, super-act, and so beyond all description.<sup>17</sup> No name that we can give is adequate; we can only say what he is not.<sup>18</sup> Yet since to speak of him we need some designation, even though any name implies an unjustifiable limitation, Plotinus calls him the One,<sup>19</sup> the Good,<sup>20</sup> or the First.<sup>21</sup>

Why should this most perfect being beget anything? If in a sublime unity he is already all, why or what shall he create? We find the answer expressed for us in an analogical mode in beings of this earth. Just as here a perfect being seeks to beget another in the image of himself, and all beings here are faint images of God, so the most perfect being must beget, because of his very goodness which is unmingled with envy.<sup>22</sup> This generation of something other than the One came not from chance but from the very necessity of its being; not even by thinking, for that would imply a duality in the One—a self-contradiction. The nearest we can approach to it is to consider it as a spontaneous overflow, an emanation or procession, without diminution of the source. Similes are at once helpful and misleading. God is like the sun which emits light without, so Plotinus thought, undergoing any loss.<sup>23</sup> Or he is like a fountain which flows out to a river inexhaustibly, but the flowing is from all eternity and the fountain remains unchanged.<sup>24</sup>

What is begotten? It is an image of the God who is above all thought and being—the Intelligence or divine mind. No longer perfect unity, but thinker and thought, since it contemplates itself as the image of the One. By the same necessity which caused the emanation from the One, there emanates from Intelligence the Soul. Since each begetting means a greater remoteness from unity, with the emanation of Soul multiplicity has so increased that the ideas which have been imaged forth in Intelligence are now distinct from each other. So that in this third realm we have both individual souls (of men and of spheres) and the World Soul which for Plotinus is limited to the earth and not, as for the Stoics, in the universe as a whole. It is in the distinction of the individual human souls from the World Soul that the Logos finds its place. The World Soul knows things not by reflective reason but by pure intellect, direct intuition.<sup>25</sup> By that same divine necessity of love as in God, there issues from it in ever increasing multiplicity and decreasing perfection, the material world of sense.

At first glance it is difficult to see how Plotinus distinguishes between the Soul and Logos. For he says:

By giving something of itself to matter, Intelligence produced everything without issuing from its rest or quietness. That which it gives is Reason, because reason is an emanation of Intelligence, an emanation that is as durable as the very existence of Intelligence. In a seminal reason all parts exist in a united condition without any of them struggling with another, without disagreement or hindrance. This Reason then causes something of itself to pass into the corporeal mass, where the parts are separated from each other and destroy each other.<sup>26</sup>

The function of the Logos is to harmonize these opposites, for the sense world was formed by the concurrence of Intelligence and necessity. Necessity drives the sense-world to evil and to what is irrational, because necessity is itself irrational; but Intelligence dominates necessity. The intelligible

<sup>17</sup> *Enneads*, V, 3, 12-14; VI, 7, 37; III, 8, 9.

<sup>18</sup> V, 5, 13; V, 5, 6.

<sup>19</sup> V, 5, 6; VI, 6, 9; VI, 9, 5.

<sup>20</sup> VI, 2, 17; VI, 7, 38; II, 9, 1.

<sup>21</sup> III, 8, 9; V, 4, 1; VI, 9, 5.

<sup>22</sup> IV, 8, 6; V, 4, 1. Cf. *Timaeus*, 29E.

<sup>23</sup> V, 1, 6.

<sup>24</sup> III, 8, 10.

<sup>25</sup> IV, 3, 18.

<sup>26</sup> III, 2, 2.

world is pure reason; none other could be such. The world which is born of it had to be inferior to it and be neither pure reason nor mere matter, for order would have been impossible in unmingled matter. The sense-world is, therefore, a mixture of matter and reason.<sup>27</sup>

The Logos is as a seminal reason containing within itself all things. "By it were things begotten."<sup>28</sup> Is it then the Soul? No, no more than it is Intelligence.

This logos is not pure absolute Intelligence. Neither is it the pure Soul but it depends thereon. It is a ray of light that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to Intelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational quiet life . . . All things that enjoy the presence of Reason and which participate therein in any manner whatsoever, immediately receive a rational disposition, that is, a form.<sup>29</sup>

The Soul is the principle of life; the Logos is the expression of the intelligible and orderly in the development of life. At this point Plotinian and Stoic theories meet, but Plotinus explicitly rejects the Stoic identification with fire.<sup>30</sup> Like the distributor of rôles in a drama, the Logos assigns to individual souls their parts in the drama of life<sup>31</sup> and the harmonizing of the parts, good and evil, and the administration of the universe in conformity with reason, leads to the doctrine of providence.

The traditional framework for an analysis of providence (from Chrysippus) embodied the three main themes of proofs for its existence drawn from the contemplation of the order in the world, its mode of action, and the solution of problems raised by such a doctrine.<sup>32</sup> Plotinus assumes its existence, treats but briefly of its nature, and devotes the greater part of his *ex professo* treatment of the subject in the Third *Ennead*, Books 2 and 3, to resolving difficulties in his theodicy.

On the one hand, providence excludes the formation of the world by chance; on the other hand, according to Plotinus, it is just as much opposed to any notion of a creation in time. The former is a self-evident absurdity, a complete denial of intelligibility, but the latter merits some discussion.

Providence may be distinguished as universal or particular. By particular providence is meant that reasoned deliberation which precedes so many of our actions. As applied to the world, such a providence would imply on the part of God a prevision and calculating reasoning similar to ours. We might thus conceive of God as considering how and under what conditions the universe should be made the best possible. But such a mode of providence has no place in a theory which maintains the existence of the world from all eternity.<sup>33</sup> Plotinus repeatedly asserts that the universe is not the result of any rational foresight.<sup>34</sup> Whence could the principles of such reasonings arise? Not from sense objects, which by hypothesis were not in existence. Nor could they have been intelligible principles, for reasoning which has intelligible principles and conclusions could not result in a conception of the sense world.<sup>35</sup> So when foresight and reasoning are attributed to God, it is only a figurative means of expressing the fact that he has so regulated and disposed things as might have been done by some wise person who had to reason about results.<sup>36</sup> Not by reflection but by necessity does the universe exist. Just as the One necessarily

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. *Timaeus*, 47E-48A, and *supra*, p. 88.

<sup>28</sup> III, 2, 15.

<sup>29</sup> III, 2, 16.

<sup>30</sup> IV, 7, 4.

<sup>31</sup> III, 2, 17. Cf. E. Bréhier, *Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, (2nd ed. Paris, 1925), p. 89, for a discussion of the same idea in Philo.

<sup>32</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, 30 ff. develops the first theme at length. Seneca, *De Providentia*, I, 1, expressly sets aside the first two in order to treat the third.

<sup>33</sup> III, 2, 1. On the eternity of the world cf. II, 9, 3; II, 1, 1.

<sup>34</sup> IV, 3, 10; V, 8, 12; IV, 4, 10-11.

<sup>35</sup> VI, 7, 1.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

and without thought generates Intelligence, so Intelligence necessarily produces a nature inferior to itself. For a being which can do but one thing, foresight and reasoning about contrary courses are useless.<sup>37</sup> So we can eliminate from the discussion any such notion of the nature of providence as entails action in time or as the result of a deliberative process.

There remains then universal providence. This consists in the conformity of the universe to Intelligence; Intelligence is anterior to the universe not in time but by nature, in that it is the cause, the archetype and model.<sup>38</sup> Universal providence consists in the fact that this world is framed in the image of the spiritual world. Intelligence produces order and harmony among things which matter tends to disunite. Necessity drives the sense world to evil and to what is irrational because necessity is itself irrational, but Intelligence dominates necessity.<sup>39</sup> It was necessary that this world should exist since a complete universe must contain every grade of being; and God can bring harmony even out of discordant elements. So the creative Logos proceeding from Intelligence contends with necessity but it is the spiritual principle which conquers—the world as a whole is good.

As a mixture of matter and reason the sense world is dominated and administered by the World Soul. Now this providence may be said to be twofold, according as one considers the universe as a whole or its individual parts. The universe is directed by the order and power of its dominating principle, that is, the World Soul. Nature as it were applies this principle to particular creatures. The first providence regulates everything in a regal manner without performing any actions or observing the details. The second adjusts its creative power to the inferior nature of creatures by getting in contact with them.<sup>40</sup> Nature is the active faculty of the World Soul and it is through its medium that the sensible world is a creation of the World Soul. Individual souls share with the Universal Soul in the administration of the world so long as they remain in the intelligible world. But when they separate themselves from the Universal Soul to unite themselves to bodies, their power is weakened and the care of their individual bodies demands all their concentrated attention.<sup>41</sup> Every soul has a lower part turned toward the body and a higher part turned toward divine Intelligence. The Universal Soul manages the universe by her lower part without any kind of trouble, for she governs her body not as we do, by reasoning, but by intelligence, and consequently in a manner entirely different from that adopted by art. The individual souls, each of whom administers a part of the universe, also have a part that rises above their body but they are distracted from thought by sensation and by a perception of a number of things that are contrary to nature and that come to trouble and afflict them.<sup>42</sup> The Universal Soul dominates exterior objects without being in any way dependent on them. It is otherwise with the human soul. Here below there are beings which perish because they cannot conform to the universal order. It is as if a tortoise happened to be caught in the midst of a choric ballet that was dancing in perfect order; if it could conform to that order it would suffer no harm, but because it cannot withdraw from the effects of the order regulating the dancers, it is trodden under foot.<sup>43</sup>

Such is the nature of the Plotinian providence; not the work of a reflecting determination, it nevertheless makes of the universe a beautiful and harmonious whole. It is the totality of mutual accord that we should first consider, not the details, for while criticism of individual parts might seem justified, that criterion is unjust because it is in the totality of relations that true harmony is dis-

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. III, 2, 2.

<sup>38</sup> III, 2, 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*: III, 2, 2. Cf. *Timaeus*, 47E-48A.

<sup>40</sup> IV, 8, 2.

<sup>41</sup> IV, 8, 4.

<sup>42</sup> IV, 8, 8.

<sup>43</sup> II, 9, 7.

covered.<sup>44</sup> Indeed this order is so perfect that no amount of reasoning on our part could devise a wiser plan than that which we discover realized in particular natures. It would be ridiculous to expect the sensible world to equal in perfection the intelligible world, or to suppose that each being should have in itself the perfection of every other being. That would be equivalent to complaining because man has not horns. Did the individual possess all the perfections of the universal, it would be no longer individual. As it is, the beauty of the parts consists in conforming to the order of the whole.<sup>45</sup> When we criticise this order, we resemble men who know little of painting and who blame the artist for putting shadows in his picture whereas he has but properly disposed the contrasts of light.<sup>46</sup>

At this point we touch on Plotinus' reconciliation of the fact of evil with a providence which is synonymous with an eternal and universal order whereby the divine power acting in accordance with its nature in all its actualizations produces beauty and justice.<sup>47</sup> Yet evils confront us on every level of life, and it is precisely on this fact that the opponents of a doctrine of providence seize as a starting point for argumentation. Mutual destruction and opposition reign among animals; fortune constantly maltreats the good and favours the wicked. It is most inconsistent, they say, to maintain that divine providence rules all when the wicked conquer the good and submit them to all kinds of degradation.

Plotinus' answers to these objections, especially on the side of physical evil, are strikingly Stoic in character. Poverty and disease are of no importance to the good, and they are useful to the wicked. All these accidents are useful for the order of the universe, in that they furnish an opportunity for virtue for the good and an occasion of manifesting the divine justice in the wicked. Not that the divinity causes such evils for that purpose, but since they exist it is characteristic of a divine power to be able to make even evil promote the fulfilment of its purposes.<sup>48</sup> Besides no harm can really come to the righteous man.<sup>49</sup>

Evil is nothing but the defect or absence of good, and in a world of matter where things are successively inferior the farther they recede from the first principle of good, it is inevitable that physical evil should exist. One element comes into existence by the destruction of another; animals mutually devour each other, and in so doing are mutually transformed and, so to say, reborn under other forms. In any case their bodies could not last forever, and is it not better that they should contribute to the variety and multiple life of the universe even if it entails a necessary internecine warfare?<sup>50</sup> Granted a universe in which the good is mingled with matter, it is impossible for evil of this kind not to be present, for matter is not capable of receiving the perfection of intelligible beings.

Plotinus' doctrine of matter is rather entangled. Side by side with expressions which denominate it as 'absence of good', 'deprivation', are passages which seem to make it the principle of evil.<sup>51</sup> Yet he points out that though matter if it could exist by itself would be evil, it is 'potentially all things',<sup>52</sup> a necessary condition of the good in so far as it is a good to progress from potentiality to actuality. At the lowest level in the great scale of beings in the emanation process is matter, mere indeterminate potency, where light as it were fades out into darkness. In its infinite distance from the One, it might be regarded as the complete absence of the Good, and hence evil, but it would seem to be

<sup>44</sup> III, 2, 3.

<sup>45</sup> III, 2, 12, 14.

<sup>46</sup> III, 2, 11.

<sup>47</sup> III, 2, 13. Cf. B. A. G. Fuller, *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus*, (Cambridge, 1912).

<sup>48</sup> III, 2, 5. Cf. L. Grandgeorge, *Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme*, (Paris,

1896), pp. 113-128.

<sup>49</sup> III, 2, 6. Cf. Seneca, *De Providentia*, II, 1.

<sup>50</sup> III, 2, 15.

<sup>51</sup> II, 4, 16; I, 8, 11; I, 8, 8.

<sup>52</sup> II, 5, 5.

utterly at variance with Plotinus' innermost thought to posit it as an evil principle in a dualistic universe. There could be no cosmos without form working on matter,<sup>53</sup> the union of a logos with potency. Matter is always the inferior element in which the higher works, and in that sense each stage in the emanatory scale may be considered matter of the next above.<sup>54</sup> Metaphysically, matter would seem to be the absence of being and good, but in moral aspects it is often regarded as a positive presence actively thwarting the power of the Good.

In discussing matter Plotinus combines the Aristotelean notion of matter as the recipient of forms with Platonic statements regarding the union of being and non-being, the same and the different. Despite the intricacies of his arguments, one thing at least is clear. Plotinus is rigidly opposed to the 'materialism' of the Stoics who admit the existence of an intelligent spirit and yet assert it is only modified matter. In such a system, Plotinus says God, the soul and all other such things are mere words; nothing but body exists.<sup>55</sup> He objects to the Stoic doctrine on the ground that it gives first place to what is potential, whereas the potential implies that actuality is necessarily anterior. If the Stoics had thought this out, instead of taking sensation for their guide, they would have been obliged to seek for some other principle, and would have found a unity which is not so merely contingently, that is, they would have arrived at the Absolute, as Plotinus did.<sup>56</sup>

The problem of moral evil in the Plotinian universe is more difficult. It would seem as impossible to claim for man freedom of action in this theory as it was in the Stoic system. Yet Plotinus distinctly states that providence must not be held responsible for the wickedness of men. Rather must the cause be sought in the voluntary determinations of the souls themselves.<sup>57</sup> In his treatise on Fate<sup>58</sup> Plotinus sets forth the Stoic position only in order to reject it. The thesis of a unique principle which by linking and interrelating all things and conferring on all their manner of being, establishes a single cause which produces all through seminal reasons has been connected with a doctrine of the soul of the universe. True, an attempt had been made (by Chrysippus<sup>59</sup>) to conciliate destiny and liberty by admitting that there are things which depend on us. But this is illusory. No less than the rest of the universe, we would be subjected to necessity, for fate includes all causes and there is nothing which can hinder or alter the occurrence of an event. If everything obeys the impulsion of a single principle, there is nothing left for us to do but to follow it also. Liberty becomes but a word; no more than children or fools have we the power of determining the directions of our appetites. We ourselves become mere automata, with no will or reasoning faculties.<sup>60</sup> Such rigid and exaggerated determinism destroys the very notion of causation and necessary sequence, for all will be but one.

To offset these difficulties, we must look for some other explanation, some cause which will at once maintain order and interdependency of things and yet not destroy our proper being. This is to be done by recognizing the soul as an independent principle, not only the Universal Soul but also individual souls. In the universal concatenation of causes and effects, the soul is a principle of no little importance, for instead of issuing from a seminal reason like other things, it is itself a primary cause. Outside the body it is mistress of itself, free and independent of the world; but once descended into a body it is no longer so independent since it then forms part of an order of beings different from itself. Sometimes it dominates circumstances; sometimes it yields to outward influences, and this depends on itself. If it is good, it resists evil tendencies

<sup>53</sup> II, 4, 4.

<sup>54</sup> IV, 7, 1; IV, 4, 2; V, 1, 3.

<sup>55</sup> IV, 7, 4; II, 4, 1.

<sup>56</sup> VI, 1, 26.

<sup>57</sup> III, 2, 7. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* X, 617E.

<sup>58</sup> III, 1.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De Fato*, 17, 39.

<sup>60</sup> III, 1, 7.

and modifies its surroundings; if it is an inferior soul, it will be adversely affected.<sup>61</sup>

If we assemble all events which result either from voluntary acts or from hazard and exterior circumstances, we may say that all are 'necessary' or determined by a cause. For how could anything lie outside of these causes? We cannot, however, reduce everything to the one cause, fate, but must insist that there are two causes: the human soul, and exterior circumstances.<sup>62</sup> We need not consider the soul free when it yields to blind impulse and carries out a decision because it is impelled thereto by external things. But on the contrary, when it follows its own guide, pure and impassible reason, its determination is really voluntary, free and independent, and the act it performs is its own, derived from its inner power and not the consequence of an exterior impulse.<sup>63</sup> Acting conformably to right reason, the soul is free; tangled up with exterior circumstances and lacking prudence, it may be said to obey fate.<sup>64</sup> It is true that once a cause is given the effects will follow if only the whole series of causes is given. But man is himself one of these causes; he, therefore, does good by his own nature and is a free cause.<sup>65</sup> Responsibility for our errors must not be thrown back upon the 'All'.

How does this fit into a doctrine of providence? In the first place, it must be said that the sphere of providence must not be extended to the point of suppressing our actions. For if providence did everything and alone existed, it would thereby be annihilated, seeing that there would be nothing but divinity and it would have nothing for which to provide. The action of providence extends over all beings but does not destroy them. It preserves in man that which constitutes humanity, that is, it makes him live in conformity with the laws of providence and fulfil the prescriptions of that law.<sup>66</sup> It is unreasonable for a wicked person to expect the Good to forget himself in order to save the evil one. So is it unreasonable to expect the gods to neglect their proper life in order to rule our particular affairs. In the arena of life the gods do not fight for the cowardly, for the law decrees that in war life is saved by valour and not by prayers, just as the fruits of the earth are obtained not by prayer but by labour. It is ridiculous to expect preservation by God if one does nothing that he has willed as means of preservation. Often the evil rule over the good because of the cowardice or inertia of the latter, and this is just.<sup>67</sup> But even so, man is never abandoned by providence which leads him back to divine things by numerous means, always permitting him to retain rationality and participate in some degree in wisdom, intelligence and justice.<sup>68</sup> Our freedom consists in obeying our true nature and the more our practical activities are dominated by the spiritual activity of Soul, the freer we become. "Necessity and freedom do not contradict each other; necessity includes freedom."<sup>69</sup>

If we examine man's intermediate place in the universe and the position of the Logos with reference to Intelligence and Soul, its relation to providence may become more clear. It has been pointed out already that Plotinus does not always assign the same place to the Logos. Sometimes he speaks of it as proceeding from Intelligence and Soul,<sup>70</sup> sometimes as from the Universal Soul which in turn proceeds from Intelligence.<sup>71</sup> But the inconsistency is more verbal than otherwise. The metaphysics of Plotinus bears an analogy to what one discovers in an analysis of consciousness. Starting from knowledge of sensible objects, we tend towards a process of unification, first in rational discursive

<sup>61</sup> III, 1, 8.

<sup>62</sup> III, 1, 10.

<sup>63</sup> III, 1, 9.

<sup>64</sup> III, 1, 10.

<sup>65</sup> III, 2, 10.

<sup>66</sup> III, 2, 9; cf. III, 3, 7.

<sup>67</sup> III, 2, 8.

<sup>68</sup> III, 2, 9.

<sup>69</sup> IV, 8, 5.

<sup>70</sup> III, 2, 16.

<sup>71</sup> III, 3, 3.



knowledge, and then rising beyond to a still more unified experience, of intuition and ultimately ecstasy. It is in thus remaining impassible while thinking intelligible things that our resemblance to the divinity consists, although the divinity's thought is not at all identical with ours. It is a primary principle from which our thought is derived and differs. As the vocal word is only an image of the interior logos of the soul,<sup>72</sup> so also is the word of the soul only an image of the superior principle. As the exterior word, when compared to the interior word of the soul, seems discrete and divided, so the reason of the soul which is no more than the interpreter of the intelligible word is discrete in comparison with the latter.<sup>73</sup> Rational knowledge may be said to be on a lower level than intelligence, or it may be said to be the act of the soul which Intelligence engenders. Therefore, the Logos does not assume equal rank with the three supreme principles, One, Intelligence and Soul. Plotinus very definitely says that the Logos which descends from Intelligence into the Soul and actualizes it does not constitute a nature distinct from the Soul and Intelligence and intermediary between them.<sup>74</sup> The Soul stands midway between the phenomenal world and the world of spirit. It is the principle of the former and has its principle in the latter. It may be considered the last logos of the spiritual world and the first of the material. It is because it can be considered under these two aspects that there are apparently conflicting statements about the position of the Logos.

Just as the Universal Soul is one but has different parts, so there are differences in the individual *logoi*, which very diversity is made to harmonize into a unity. The Universal Soul is an organism, each of whose parts acts according to its nature, and all of which falls under the one great plan of a general divine providence.<sup>75</sup> These diversities become more manifest in the sensible world as creatures enter more and more into matter. Man has been constituted with a free principle, that is, reason, but not all make use of it. Nor can man's failure in this regard be assigned wholly to the domination of matter for the 'seminal reason' of man contains within itself the very reason of our constituent matter.<sup>76</sup> Individual character may be the result of pre-existence, and Plotinus follows Plato in affirming that the justice of providence works itself out in the successive reincarnations of souls.<sup>77</sup>

One must note at this point two contrasting traditions which Plotinus incorporates regarding the proper function of the soul in its connection with the body. On the one hand, following the Stoic tradition, the soul is represented as an intermediary between the intelligible world and the sensible world, the organizing force of the body. On the other hand, following the Orphic Pythagorean tradition, the soul is thought of as a seat of destiny. Under the first aspect its connection with the body is good and necessary, the fulfilment of its normal function; under the second aspect it represents a fall, the result of its own wrong-doing. Plotinus finds this very contradiction in the "divine Plato" who, though often speaking of the descent of the soul into the body, "does not always say the same thing". Sometimes he speaks of the soul as in a prison. In the *Phaedrus*<sup>78</sup> he asserts that the cause of the fall of the soul is the loss of her wings. But in the *Timaeus*<sup>79</sup> he praises the world and says that the Demiurge gave it a soul to make it intelligent. So that the purpose of the introduction of the Universal Soul and of each of our souls was to achieve the perfection of the world.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Compare the Stoic doctrine. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VIII, 275. (Von Arnim, II, 135, 223). Cf. R. Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, p. 276, n. 2.

<sup>73</sup> I, 2, 3.

<sup>74</sup> II, 9, 1.

<sup>75</sup> III, 3, 1-2.

<sup>76</sup> III, 3, 4.

<sup>77</sup> III, 2, 8; III, 3, 4. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* X, 619B ff.

<sup>78</sup> 246C.

<sup>79</sup> 34C.

<sup>80</sup> IV, 8, 1.

Such a conflict of ideas represents on one level the fundamental difficulty in the philosophy of Plotinus which he encounters in attempting to represent the world as a rational order, yet a place where the individual soul works out her destiny. Bréhier<sup>81</sup> considers that the fundamental problem in the philosophy of Plotinus is the attempt to reconcile

“le conflit entre une représentation religieuse de l’univers, c’est-à-dire une représentation telle que notre destinée y ait un sens, et une représentation rationaliste qui semble enlever toute signification à quelque chose de tel que la destinée individuelle de l’âme.”

In summary we may say that all things form one unity and all relate to one providence. Referred to inferior things, it may be said that destiny governs them, providence reigns alone in what is on high. That is, all in the intelligible world is either reason or above reason, namely Intelligence and pure Soul. What derives therefrom is providence; reason participates therein, but in unequal degrees. All human actions which have any good in them are related to the plan of providence and in conformity with it but are not done *by* providence but by a principle within ourselves. The deed done by an intemperate man is done neither by providence nor according to providence. Nor is the deed done by the temperate man done by providence, but it conforms to providence because it conforms to reason.<sup>82</sup> But when one contemplates the occurrences in the world, one is really contemplating the causes which make them arise, the providence which presides over them and whose action extends in an orderly manner to all beings and events, which are dominated by reason and mingled with necessity. In this mixture it is impossible for a human mind, even though very wise, to distinguish providence from what conforms thereto, or what derives from the substrate of matter. Such a privilege belongs to God alone, and hence prediction and divination do not reach causes but facts which can be determined in an analogy of reciprocal influences and relations.<sup>83</sup>

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The history of philosophy is no mere record of the intellectual activity of certain individuals, but a striking testimony to the dynamic force and what might be almost called the eternal reverberations of ideas. The latent power of a theory of the universe may require centuries before it becomes completely actualized. It is the history of thought which explains to a large extent the history of events.

Our study of the Logos doctrine as a basis for providence illustrates in a certain degree this vitality of an idea, as well as its inherent possibilities of adaptation. The doctrine of the Logos, originating, as far as it is known, in philosophic thought with Heraclitus becomes a central factor in the Stoic system, is made a connecting link between Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish religion in Philo,<sup>84</sup> is incorporated into the spiritual philosophy of Plotinus, and in Christianity this well-known term of Greek philosophy was employed to express the ineffable mystery of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. This does not mean, of course, that the mutual relationships of these diverse adaptations can always be actually made manifest, or indeed very accurately determined. We shall confine our remarks to the two systems whose theory of providence has been studied.

In the first place, points of similarity may be noted. For Plotinus and for the Stoics providence is, strictly speaking, an impersonal force, really the order and mutual harmony which Intelligence (or reason) produces among things.

<sup>81</sup> *La Philosophie de Plotin*, (Paris, 1928), p. 34.

<sup>82</sup> III, 3, 5.

<sup>83</sup> III, 3, 6.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. E. Bréhier, *Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie*.

The world is a work of reason (not, however, reflective or planning reason) but necessarily proceeding from its source by virtue of the very nature of that source. Such a providence is universal, extending down to the last details, but looking rather to the harmony and order of the universe than to individuals as such. Both systems conceive of a "great chain of being", where every level in the possible scale of realizations of being is discoverable in a progressively descending gradation. There is an inherent optimism since this great scale of being owes its origin to the necessary and intrinsic goodness of the first principle. This is the best of all possible worlds, and this despite the manifest evils which prove a stumbling block for most rational explanations of the universe.

Plotinus tends to follow the Stoics in denying the existence of physical evil for the good person, since they cannot affect the spirit. Then, also like them, he proceeds to justify it. Contradictions and oppositions are necessary results of matter, and in the long run, could we see with sufficient clearness, all seeming evils concur in the good of the universe. The part is necessarily imperfect because it is a part, and its partial and therefore imperfect character does not detract from the goodness of the universe as a whole. There is in both philosophies the inconsistency of denying the reality of evil except as a mere transient appearance and affirming its necessity as a means to a greater good.

Even on the question of moral evil, although Plotinus inveighs against the determinism of the Stoics, his own solution of the problem is not so fundamentally different. True, he does not have to face the basic inconsistency which the monistic system encountered. Overlooking that fact in Stoicism, there is the same notion that a freedom which consists in acting conformably to one's nature is a sufficient basis for establishing moral responsibility. Both philosophies unite a necessity of procession of creatures from one principle with a freedom in rational creatures. Though the One must act as it does, since it is not compelled to do so by an extrinsic force, it is said to possess a freedom of self-determination. Similarly with the successive emanations, they are necessary acts but free in the sense that the *must* arises from within. The same applies to individual souls. Part of a world order over which it to a large extent can exercise no control, nevertheless the determination of its particular acts is to be found in its individual character. But Plotinus never gives a thoroughly satisfactory explanation for the first choice of a downward path on the part of the soul.

Plotinus unites in his doctrine of the descent of the soul into the body Stoic and Platonic doctrine which are difficult of reconciliation. According to a rationalist explanation of the universe, there is the necessary process of emanation by which the soul of its very nature necessarily and we may say unconsciously generates a body. On the other hand, such a descent of the soul into the body is regarded from the Platonic viewpoint as a fall, a punishment, a fault. Now if such a process is a necessary level for the perfection of the universe, where can be the fault or fall? And it might be added—where can be the freedom? But if the soul makes its own choice, how does such a choice fit into a doctrine of emanation?

Plotinus denies the legitimacy of this dilemma, by saying these positions are not exclusive but quite compatible.<sup>85</sup> The fall of the soul is at once free and determined. It is determined inasmuch as it follows the eternal law of emanation. It is free inasmuch as it finds this descent the true expression of its own nature, and while there is not indeed a choice whether or not to descend, it is a voluntary and free act as being under no outer compulsion. Just as necessity and freedom here coincide, so Plotinus seems to regard this descent as at once involving a new degree of perfection and a fall because of further separation

<sup>85</sup> IV, 8, 5; IV, 3, 13.

from God and a turning from the intelligible world to a world of sense in which it tends to become immersed. Firmly convinced of the liberty of man, Plotinus is as firmly convinced that it can enter into a rationalistic explanation of the universe. Stoicism and Neo-Platonism confront the same problem; but whereas for the Stoics man's only freedom consists in an unconditional surrender to what is eternally decreed, Plotinus attempts to disengage the soul from the causal nexus of phenomena by making it a primary cause. It finds its good in conforming itself to the divine standard. But in the last resort, it is still not outside providence<sup>86</sup> and Plotinus offers no real solution to the problem of freedom and determinism.<sup>87</sup>

The Stoic doctrine of sympathy is completely incorporated into the Neo-platonic philosophy but the sympathetic unity of the parts of the sensible world is only a feeble image of that which prevails in the intelligible world. There each being has in itself all things and sees all things in itself. Each is all. Here below each thing is fragmentary; there each is in itself a universe.<sup>88</sup> So individual souls have a common sympathy because of their participation in the undivided Soul. This is faint in comparison with the complete sympathy of the intelligible world but it does testify to their unity of nature.<sup>89</sup> In fact, a chain of sympathy runs through all nature; it accounts for the influence of the stars on human affairs; it explains magical art.<sup>90</sup>

It would be incorrect to attribute to Stoicism as such a strongly religious character, but in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* the ethical is overlaid with religious feeling, and in the Stoicism of the Third Period this tendency is accentuated. By that time the Logos was regarded not only as a rational principle but also a personal force. In Plotinus the religious problem is as intimate a part of his thought as the philosophic problem. Ethics and metaphysics are really but reverse aspects of the same process. The soul seeking for means to be restored to its primitive state mounts successively by an interior concentration of its powers up to the highest possible stage of unity, finding therein its true life and its regeneration. The way down is the descent of the soul into matter. Transferring this notion of the ascent and descent of the soul across the intelligible world to the universe as a whole, we have a series of hierarchical forms as a rational explanation of the universe. Plotinus endeavours to demonstrate the fundamental identity of these two representations of the universe, religious and philosophic. The soul achieves its destiny by rational knowledge which leads it up and beyond to unity. Plotinus may be indebted to some extent on this point to the Stoics, for they had already emphasized the fact that knowledge of the necessity of the cosmic order freed man. But in Plotinus this purifying knowledge is at once a life of the spirit and a vision of the universe. Just how much Plotinus owed his mystical elements to Oriental thought is a debatable point.<sup>91</sup>

While there are points of similarity between Stoic and Plotinian philosophy, there are even more striking differences. The Stoic monism is absolutely rejected; matter is not part of God as the Stoics held, any more than darkness is part of light. Although man is recognized as "a noble creation, as perfect as the scheme allows"<sup>92</sup> this does not lead Plotinus to the anthropocentric theodicy of the Stoics. As he says, we are surprised at seeing injustice here below chiefly because we tend to regard man as the most precious and wisest being in the universe. Yet man's place is midway between gods and animals and sometimes

<sup>86</sup> III, 3, 4.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. P. Henry, 'Le Problème de la Liberté chez Plotin', *Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie*, XXXIII, (1931), pp. 50-79; 180-215; 318-339.

<sup>88</sup> VI, 7, 2; III, 8, 8.

<sup>89</sup> IV, 9, 1.

<sup>90</sup> IV, 4, 40-42.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. E. Bréhier, *La Philosophie de Plotin*, pp. 106-133.

<sup>92</sup> III, 2, 9. Cf. Plato, *Laws*, X, 903B.

he inclines one way, sometimes the other. Man is not the best being in the universe.<sup>83</sup>

Quite possibly the theory of emanation derived from the Stoics but the materialistic tone that it assumes in their system is spiritualized and idealized in the Plotinian account of the procession of creatures from the One. Furthermore, Plotinus finds the source of the emanational process beyond the Logos which Stoic philosophers accepted as first principle. For them the *Logos Spermatikos* was the seed in which the structure and the history of the whole universe was implicit, and the world process was simply its unfolding. In this organization into a single rational whole, where the Logos is identified with the deity, pantheism prevails. The *logoi spermatikoi* are but individual manifestations of the one creative *Logos Spermatikos* of the universe.

For Plotinus individual souls are members rather than modifications of the World Soul to which they belong. They are unique beings, each of which expresses a distinct character or logos conceived in the Intelligence. For the forms which the second hypostasis, Intelligence, thinks, are what the Stoics would call *logoi spermatikoi* seminal reasons, which not only contribute to the rational and intelligible order of which they are a part, but must create in their turn a further order of being in the sensible world as nearly as possible in their own image. To the extent to which the *logoi spermatikoi* enter the sensible world is it rational and beautiful. But in this spontaneous and necessary efflux, first from the One and then from Intelligence and Soul, the source remains undiminished and in a sense exterior to that which emanates from it. If this is pantheism, it is at least of a different type from Stoic pantheism. Here God is both immanent and transcendent, whereas he is wholly immanent in Stoic philosophy. The Neoplatonic conception of the deity is best understood by a reference to the dynamic pantheism of the Stoics but it is necessary to supplement this by a still higher conception of the function of spirit.

As a basis for providence, the Logos doctrine thus offers some interesting points of a comparison and contrast in the two systems. For the Stoics the Logos is providence, is the rational organization of the universe, the ultimate principle to which all is reduced. For Plotinus providence is the conformity of the sensible universe to Intelligence where intelligible forms are the true reality, and where Logos is no longer a first principle but is further reducible to a still more ultimate source. This procession from the One is for Plotinus eternal; the Stoic theory regarded the emanation of all things from the Logos as subject to cyclic episodes. Both regard it as a necessity of nature, not a reasoned reflection. The providential Logos of the Stoics is shorn of its materialistic and monistic aspects in Plotinus, and while taking its place in a rational explanation of the universe, retains only its dynamic spiritual character. Intimately linked with the theory of the World Soul and the origin of individual souls, the Logos for Plotinus is at once the informing principle of the Stoics and the Heraclitean source of the conflict and harmony of contrary forces. In so far as Neoplatonism adopted Stoic ethics and transformed them by a spiritualizing and intellectualizing process, the Logos doctrine of the Stoics was incorporated in its doctrine of providence. But in so far as Stoic metaphysics was discounted in favour of Platonic (as interpreted by Plotinus), the Logos becomes a subsidiary element in providence, in a universe where the first principle is the Absolute—the ineffable One.

<sup>83</sup> III, 2, 8-9.

# Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin Before 1350

(CONTINUATION)

J. T. MUCKLE C.S.B.

## PART I—BEFORE 1000

(supplement)

IN THE preface to my list of Greco-Latin translations before 1000 for the use of students of philosophy (*Mediaeval Studies*, IV (1942), 33-42) I invited my readers to make suggestions for additions or emendations. My invitation has so far evoked no replies—*silent Musae inter arma*. I offer the following supplementary list of my own.

AMPHILOCHUS OF ICONIUM. Late fourth century. Anastasius Bibliothecarius translated the sermon *In Occursum Domini*. The translation has not been published. The Greek text is in PG 39, 44-60; cf. Bard. GAL III, 225.

APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTIONS. The first fifty of the 85 canons from Bk. 8, ch. 47 of the *Apostolic Constitutions* were translated by Dionysius Exiguus and are found in PL 67, 141-148.

ST. ATHANASIUS. *Liber de Trinitate et Sancto Spiritu* extant only in Latin is in PL 62, 307-334 as the twelfth book of the *De Trinitate* attributed to Vigilius of Thapsus. Stülchen (*Athanasiana*, TU 19, 1899, 4, 75-76) considers it of doubtful authenticity but thinks it is a translation of a Greek original of the fourth century. Bardenhewer (GAL III, 56-57) does not consider it a translation.

ST. BASIL. Rufinus' translation of the eight homilies of St. Basil is in PG 31, 1723-1794.

DIDYMUS THE BLIND. Cassiodorus (*Inst.* I, 5.) says that Epiphanius Scholasticus translated his *Commentary on Proverbs*. The translation is not extant; fragments of the Greek text are in PG 39, 1621-46. The codex which Cassiodorus took to be a *Commentary on the Canonical Epistles* may have been a sixth century catena; cf. Bard, GAL III, 110; TU 28 (1905), 2c.

ST. EPIPHANIUS. Fourth century. St. Jerome translated a letter of Epiphanius to John of Jerusalem. The translation is in PL 22, 517-527; CSEL 54, I, 1, 395-412 as number 51 among the letters of St. Jerome.

EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA. Eusebius of Vercelli translated with emendations his *Commentary on the Psalms*; cf. St. Jerome, *De Viris Ill.* 96; *Epp.* 61,2; 122,20. The translation is not extant; parts of the Greek text are found in various editions; cf. Bard. GAL III, 253-254; 486-487.

EUSEBIUS OF EMESA. (d. 360) Some sermons *Ad Monachos* in PL 50, 833 ff. are attributed in some Mss to Eusebius; cf. F. M. Powicke, *The Mediaeval Books of Merton College* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 121. Still others may be his; cf. Bard. GAL III, 264.

ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA. Scotus Erigena also translated his *De Hominis Opificio*; unpublished.

ST. IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH. The translation of the mixed recension of his *Letters* has been attributed by some to Robert Grosseteste; cf. S. Harrison Thomson (*The Writings of Robert Grosseteste*, Cambridge, 1940, pp. 58-60) who thinks it improbable.

- ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM. The old Latin version of his *De Sacerdotio* was published shortly after the invention of printing: cf. J. Arbuthnot Nairn, *De Sacerdotio* (Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1906), p. LV.
- ST. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR. *Scholia in S. Gregorium Theologum* was translated by Anastasius Bibliothecarius. The translation is extant in Mss; cf. S. Harrison Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 53, n.2.
- ORIGEN. St. Jerome (*Ep.* 112,20) says that Eusebius of Vercelli translated Origen, *On the Psalms*.
- ST. NILUS. Fifth century. There is an old Latin version of his *Tractatus de octo Spiritibus Malitiae* and also of *De Magistris et Discipulis* attributed to St. Nilus; cf. Bard. GAL IV, 169, 174. There is also an old Latin version of the *Narrationes*; the authenticity of this treatise has been questioned: cf. Bard. GAL IV, 163. I know of no edition of these translations. The Greek text of the first is in PG 79, 1145-1164, and of the last *ibid.* 589-693.
- PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA. *Quaestiones in Genesim* was translated by the translator of part of *De Vita Contemplativa*; unpublished. Cf. Fred C. Conybeare, *Philo, About the Contemplative Life* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 143.
- PRISCIAN OF LYDIA. Sixth century. A Latin version of his *Solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Chrosroës Persarum Rex* found in Mss from the ninth century is attributed to Scotus Erigena. It has been edited by Bywater, *Supplementum Aristotelicum* I, part 2, (Berlin, 1886).
- THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA. (d. ca. 428). There is extant in Mss a fifth century abridged translation of his *Commentary on the Psalms*. cf. Bard. GAL III, 316.
- THEODORET OF CYRUS. (d. 458). A collection entitled: *Fragmenta Theodoretii ex libris quinque adversus beatum Cyrillum sanctumque Concilium Ephesinum* is found among the works of Mercator in PL 48, 1067-1084.
- THEOPHANES. Anastasius Bibliothecarius (ninth century) composed *Chronographia Tripartita* in which he reproduced parts of the chronicles of Georgius Syncellus (d. ca. 810), Nicephorus (d. 829) and Theophanes (d. ca. 817). The extant part translated from Nicephorus is in PL 129, 511-554; those from Syncellus and Theophanes are in PG 108, 1191-1428.
- VERBA SENIORUM (PL 73, 851-1062) is a translation made by Paschasius of Dumio in conjunction with St. Martin of Bracara; cf. Bard. GAL V, 316.

## PART II—FROM 1000 TO 1350

It might be well to repeat and expand what was said in the general foreword. This list of Greco-Latin translations has been compiled primarily for the use of students of philosophy. It does not contain translations in fields quite foreign to philosophy such as those of Holy Scripture, liturgy, canon law, hagiography, mathematics, the applied sciences, etc. No translations of medical treatises are listed except several commonly mentioned of Hippocrates and Galen. It should be borne in mind that no translations from Arabic even of philosophical works are noted. Mediaeval authors, such as St. Thomas, often make short quotations from a Greek work for which I have found no reliable proof of a translation. No doubt many of these excerpts are second-hand but I am of the opinion that more works of the Greek Fathers were translated than is yet known; there is much research in libraries yet to be done before we can feel sure on the subject.

For brief and concise biographical notices on almost all mediaeval translators, see the several chapters *On Translators* in George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* II (two parts), Carnegie Institute (1931). For the symbols used by me to denote collections of texts, periodicals, histories of literature etc.,

see the general preface (*Mediaeval Studies* IV (1942), 33). AL stands for *Aristoteles Latinus* I as noted below under Aristotle.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS. His *Commentary on the Meteors* of Aristotle was translated by William of Moerbeke (1260). His *Commentary on the De Sensu et Sensato* of Aristotle was translated into Latin; some think from the Greek by William of Moerbeke: cf. AL p. 97. But G. Théry, 'Alexander d'Aphrodise', *Bibliothèque Thomiste* VII, (Saulchoir, 1926) pp. 86-92, thinks the Latin version was made by Gerard of Cremona from the Arabic. Peter of Abano (Padua) in the first part of the fourteenth century translated the *Liber Problematum*; cf. Thorndike and Kibre, *Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin*, the Mediaeval Academy of America, (Cambridge, 1937), col. 533, and Thorndike, *History of Magic and Experimental Science* II (Columbia University Press, 1929), p. 878. Praechter (*Die Philosophie des Altertums* Berlin, 1926, p. 564) says: *Die Probleme . . . sind unecht*.

AMMONIUS. Fifth-sixth centuries. In *Perihermenias*. This commentary was translated in 1268, it is assumed, by William of Moerbeke. The text of Aristotle in it differs from that of the Boethian version. Cf. AL p. 97.

ANDRONICUS, PSEUDO-. A Latin translation of the first half of *De Passionibus* is found in two thirteenth century Mss. The translator may be Robert Grosseteste or, more probably, one of his circle. The Greek text is in A. Mullachius, *Fragmenta Phil. Graecorum* III, (1881), pp. 570-574.

ARISTOTLE. In compiling this list of translations of Aristotle, copious use has been made of the following works as reliable statements of facts so far discovered: Ezio Franceschini, 'Aristotele nel Medioevo Latino', *Atti del IX Congresso Nazionale Ital. di Filosofia* (Padua, 1935); George Lacombe (and others), *Aristoteles Latinus* (Union Académique Internationale: *Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi*) *Pars Prior*, (Rome, La Libreria dello Stato, 1939); G. Harrison Thomson, *The writings of Robert Grosseteste* (Cambridge, University Press, 1940). In this list AL stands for *Aristoteles Latinus* and GR for Professor Thomson's work. The common ascription of works to Aristotle has been followed except for works which everyone knows are spurious.

## THE ORGANON

*Praedicamenta (Catagoriae)*: (a) There is extant in eleventh century Mss an anonymous recension of the translation of Boethius from the chapter *De facere et pati* (PL 64, 261). (b) *Versio Contaminata*, found in Mss from the twelfth century, appears to be a contamination between the Boethian and the anonymous versions; AL p. 45.

*De Interpretatione*. The text of the Boethian version is found separated from the commentary in a tenth century Ms; AL p. 45.

*Topica, Sophistici Elenchi, Analytica*. In the editions of the *Chronicle* of Robert de Monte for the year 1128 we read (MGH SS VI, p. 489 note a, which is the edition of Bethmann, 1844; reproduced in PL 160, 443D, note 555): *Iacobus clericus de Venecia transtulit de Greco in Latinum quosdam libros Aristotelis et commentatus est scilicet Topica, Analyticos Priores et Posteriores et Elenchos, quamvis antiquior translatio super eosdem libros haberetur*. These words are in a footnote in both editions with the prefatory words: *Hic alia manus, eadem quae ad a. 1151, non Roberti, addit*, and at the end of the above quotation is the statement: *Desunt 2, 7b, 8d*, referring to three thirteenth century Mss. From the description of the Mss of the *Chronicle* (MGH op. cit. pp. 293-7, and PL 160, 49-54) we gather that these entries mean that in Ms E, which



up to 1156 is a copy of a lost autograph but contains marginal additions in Robert's hand and from 1156 to 1182 is the autograph of Robert, the reference to James of Venice is not by Robert.

Further, we are told that in Mss 2 which goes to 1156 and in 7b and 8d which go to 1182, the same text is missing altogether. But Lacombe in AL p. 45, note 5, says: *Roberti de Monte Chronica in compluribus recensionibus exstat quarum secunda tantum et tertia (ann. 1169 et 1182 factae) de Iacobo mentionem faciunt; tertiam manu ipsius Roberti transcriptam possidemus*, (sic). Professor Haskins (*Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1924, p. 227) says: "This entry is not found in the earliest redaction of the *Chronicle* completed in 1156-57, but appears in the redactions of 1169 and 1182, for the latter of which we have the authors own copy, and there can be no doubt that it emanated from Robert himself . . .". The Prologue to the translation of the *Posterior Analytics* in Codex Toletanus (XIII. s.) mentions the translation of James of Venice; AL p. 46; cf. Haskins, *op. cit.*, p. 229. Boethius says he translated the *Topics* (PL 64, 1173C, 1216D), the *Prior* and *Post. Analytics* (1051B, 1184D), and wrote a commentary on the *Topics* (1216D). If Boethius did translate the New Logic, what became of his translation for six centuries? What became of the *Commentary on the Topics* which he says he composed and when was the text separated from the *Commentary*? If he translated the *Analytics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*, it was likely with the intention of composing commentaries upon them; but we find no reference to or trace of such commentaries. If we are to take the entry in the *Chronicle* of Robert as its face value, what became of the commentaries of James of Venice? How is it that with one exception the name of James is found in no Ms and that no Ms known at present claims to reproduce his translation, that no catalogue, no scholastic philosopher mentions him as Minges admits (*Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 29, 1916, 250)? Which is the older translation mentioned by Robert? Scholars have not yet given a satisfactory answer to all these questions taken together. Is it not possible that Boethius made these translations along with commentaries upon the texts, but that owing to his premature death they were not published and that the translations embodied in commentaries were lost or destroyed along with many Mss he must have possessed. If his translations had had been published, why does he emphasize in several places that he has made them?

Neither are we sure of the identity of the author of the Latin text we have in PL 64 for these works. Grabmann (*Geschichte der schol. Methode* I, 1909, p. 150) says that they are the work of James of Venice; and in the second volume of the same work, p. 72, he says their author is the humanist, Johannes Argyropulos (d. 1486). Haskins (*op. cit.* p. 241, note 79) says that the humanistic retouching of the Migne text is obvious, but that we must await a critical restitution of the mediaeval text for further study. Parth. Minges who has studied the question, ('Zur Textgeschichte der sogenannten Logica Nova der Scholastiker', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 29 (1916), 250-263), comes to the conclusion, p. 263: "Der Mignesche Text, speziell von den beiden Analytiken, dürfte mit dem scholastischen bzw. mit dem des Jacob von Venedig engere Beziehungen haben".

*Topica*. Besides the common or 'Boethian' version, there are found marginal variant reading in Mss of the twelfth century from another version. AL p. 47.

*Sophistici Elenchi*. Various readings from a version other than the

## MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

common one were found by Franceschini in Ms Assisinat. Bibl. Com. 658, XIII century. AL p. 47.

*Analytica Priora*. Geyer (*Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie*, Berlin, 1928, p. 146) says that Abelard did not use the common version. *Analytica Posteriora*. There is in Cod. Toletanus 17. 14, XIII (init.) a version of the *Posterior Analytics* made between 1128-1159. AL p. 48.

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*Physica, Versio Vetustissima*. A version of the first two books exists in Ms Vat. Reg. 1855, XII (medio) discovered by Haskins.

*Physica, Vetus Translatio*. Likely made before 1170. Mansion thinks there is a still older translation in Avranches Ms 232; AL p. 52, note 1. *Physica, Nova Translatio*. A revision of previous versions by William of Moerbeke.

*De Celo et Mundo*. Thomson (GR p. 66) says that there is no doubt that Grosseteste made a translation of most if not all of the *De Celo et Mundo*. William of Moerbeke likely is the author of a translation (1271) of all four books but his translation of the first two books is probably a revision of that of Grosseteste. AL p. 54.

*De Generatione. Vetus Translatio* by Henricus Aristippus (d. 1162) corrected and divided into chapters by Alfredus Anglicus cf. *Beiträge, z. Geschichte d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, Supplementband III*, 1935, pp. 463-471. *Nova Translatio*, a revision of the former likely by William of Moerbeke. AL p. 55.

*Meteora*. Aristippus translated the fourth book; William of Moerbeke translated Books I-III and revised Aristippus' translation of Book IV. AL pp. 56, 57. Cf. F. H. Fobes 'Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle's Meteorology', *Classical Philology*, X (1915), 312-14, for traces of another translation.

*De Anima. Vetus Translatio* was made a little after 1150. *Nova Translatio* is a revision of the former likely by William of Moerbeke. AL p. 58.

## PARVA NATURALIA

*De Sensu, De Memoria, De Sompno, De Longitudine, De Iuventute, De Respiratione, De Morte*, all are found in a Latin version appearing about the end of the twelfth century. A revision of this translation was made in the thirteenth century doubtless by William of Moerbeke. AL p. 60.

## LIBRI METAPHYSICALES

*Metaphysica Vetustissima*, a translation of the twelfth century of Bks. I-III and of Bk. IV as far as Bekker 1007a 32. Lacombe (AL p. 61) thinks this may be the translation referred to more than once early in the thirteenth century: cf. Haskins, *Med. Science*, p. 367.

*Media Translatio* was made before 1230; it covers Bks. I-XIV except Bk. XI; Bks. XIII and XIV may have been translated a little later than the rest.

*Metaphysica Vetus* was made likely before 1230; it is a contamination of the *Vetustissima* and the *Media* and ends like the former at Bk. IV, 1007a 32.

*Nova Translatio* is a revision of the *Media* by William of Moerbeke who translated and inserted Bk. XI: scholars have not dated this translation.

*Fragmentum Vaticanum* contains 90 lines likely from the Greek of the

beginning of Bk. I, (Bekker 980a 21-981b 12). It is found in a thirteenth century Ms (Vat. Ottob. 2048) and is in much more elegant Latin than any of the former.

## LIBRI MORALES

*Ethica*. The *Ethica Vetus* is a translation of Bks. II-III of the *Nicomachean Ethics* found in thirteenth century Mss.

*Ethica Nova* is a translation of Bk. I of the same work made a little later than the former, as it is called *Nova* in the Mss.

*Ethica Borghesiana* is a fragmentary translation contained in Ms Vat. Borghes. 108; it contains parts from Bks. I-III, VII, VIII. Cf. A Pelzer, 'Les versions latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote, en usage au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie*, XXIII (1921), 329-335.

*Liber Ethicorum* is a translation of the whole ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Robert Grosseteste between 1240-49; AL pp. 68-71. Thomson, GR p. 65, says: "The whole (work) must be before 1244 and may be before 1242". This translation was published separately from the text of the commentaries in 1516 and has been several times published with the commentaries of St. Thomas, St. Albertus Magnus and others. The *Incipit* is: *Omnis ars et omnis doctrina similiter autem et actus et electio*; the *Explicit*: *legibus et consuetudinibus utens, dicamus igitur incipientes*. GR p. 65; AL pp. 69-71.

*Magna Moralia* was translated by Bartholomew of Messina between 1258 and 1266. There was a revision at least of the translation of Bk. II, Chapter 8, in the text of *De bona Fortuna*. AL p. 72.

*De bona Fortuna* is a work composed in the Middle Ages made up of the eighth chapter of the second book of *Magna Moralia* and the fourteenth chapter of the seventh (al. eighth) book (1246b 37-1248b 11) of the *Eudemian Ethics*. Besides the common translation noted above, there is another version in at least two Mss. The two translations are related but it has not yet been determined which depends on the other. AL p. 73. *Ethica Eudemia*. Apart from Bks. IV-VI which is Bks. V-VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, chapter fourteen of Bk. VII (al. VIII) in the *De bona Fortuna* and chapter XV of the same book found in three Mss, no mediaeval version of the *Eudemian Ethics* is known. AL p. 73.

*De laudabilibus Bonis* (*De Virtute, De Virtutibus et Vitiis*) belongs to a certain peripatetic philosopher of the first century A.D. The translation is ascribed to Grosseteste in the Ms and Thomson thinks it was made in 1245; GR p. 68.

*Politica*. There is an old version of Bks. I-II found in at least two Mss and according to Pelster (*Philos. Jahrbuch* 47, 1934, 58-64), it was used by St. Albertus Magnus. William of Moerbeke translated the whole work but his translation of Bks. I-II is a revision of the former. AL pp. 74-5. This translation has been published by F. Susemihl, *Arist. Politicorum libri octo cum Transl. Guilelmi de Moerbeke* (Leipzig, 1872).

*Economica*. *Translatio Vetus* is a version of the two books published by F. Susemihl, *Aristotelis quae feruntur Oeconomica*, (Leipzig, 1887). The *Recensio Durandi* is a revision of the former according to Lacombe (AL p. 76) although Susemihl thought Durandus' translation came first. It is dated in the colophon in many Mss as of 1295 and attributed to an

archbishop and a bishop in Greece and Durandus of Alvernia at the time in the Papal Court at Anagni. Who these translators were is not yet agreed by scholars. AL pp. 76-77.

### RHETORICA

*Rhetorica. Vetus Translatio* is a versio attributed to Bartholomew of Messina. William of Moerbeke translated it independently of the former version about 1270; a critical edition of William's translation has been published by L. Spengel, *Aristotelis Rhetorica. Accedit vetusta translatio latina* I (Leipzig, 1867), pp. 178-342.

*Epistola ad Alexandrum*. The translation of this pseudo-Aristotelian work is attributed to William of Moerbeke.

*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Translatio Vaticana* has been edited by M. Grabmann, 'Eine lateinische Uebersetzung der pseudo-arist. Rhet. ad Alex. aus dem 13 Jahr.', *Sitzungsber. d. Bayer. Akad. der Wissensch. Philos.-histor. Abteil.* (1931-2) Heft 4, pp. 1-81. Scholars are not agreed on the identity of the translator. The *Translatio Americana* is contained in a Ms at the University of Illinois.

*Poetica*. There is a version in Ms. Eton 128, fol. 194<sup>v</sup>-206<sup>v</sup> and another in a fourteenth century Ms which states that this version was made in 1248.

### LIBRI DE ANIMALIBUS

Many (27) of the Mss for the Greco-Latin translations of this work divide it into five parts comprising twenty-one books. *De Historia Animalium*, 10 books; *De Progressu An.*, 1 book; *De Motu An.*, 1 book; *De Partibus An.*, 4 books; *De Generatione An.*, 5 books. *De Progressu* and *De Motu* are lacking in some Greco-Latin Mss as they are in the versions of Michael Scot from the Arabic. *De Historiis* (books I-IX), *De Progressu*, *De Motu*, *De Generatione* are extant in a mediaeval translation likely by William of Moerbeke; book X of *De Historia Animalium* seems to have been added later as it is either in the margins or after the whole work in the Mss; it was not considered authentic by the Greeks. There are two versions of the *De Partibus*, one anonymous, the other, scholars agree, is by William of Moerbeke; these two are related but which is anterior has not been determined. AL pp. 80-85. The translation by Moerbeke of the first book of *Historia Animalium* is found in G. Rudberts, *Textstudien zur Tiergeschichte des Aristoteles* (Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift, 1908).

### PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE

*Problemata. Vetustissima* covering part of the Greek text has been edited by V. Rose, *Aris. Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863): *Vulgata* a translation by Bartholomew of Messina between 1258 and 1264 the first book of which has been edited by R. Seligsohn, *Die Uebersetzung der ps. Aristotelischen Problemata durch Bartholomaeus von Messina* (Berlin, 1934).

*Physionomia* translated by Bartholomew has been edited by R. Förster, *Scriptores Physiognomici graeci et latini* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1893), Vol. I, pp. 4-91. AL p. 87.

*De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus* was also translated by Bartholomew. *De Principiis* was translated by the same.

*De Signis Aquarum*, in some Mss *Aristotelis Astrologia Navalis*, was translated by Bartholomew.

*De Lineis indivisibilibus* was translated likely by Robert Grosseteste; some Mss speak of a *nova translatio*; if this is the *nova*, there must have been an earlier translation of which nothing further is known. AL p. 88. GR p. 67.

*De Mundo*. A translation was made by Nicholas of Sicily probably an associate of Bartholomew. There is a second and probably earlier anonymous translation. The mediaeval Latin versions of *De Mundo* have been published as an appendix to *De Mundo*, *St. Andrew's University Publications* (Oxford, 1924).

*De Coloribus*. *Translatio vetus* ends after Chapter 3 of the Greek text; *translatio vulgata* is a recension.

*De Inundatione Nili*. A Latin version referred to as *nova* in Mss has been edited by V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863), pp. 631-43. AL p. 90. There is nothing further known of an earlier translation.

*Vita Aristotelis*. A Latin translation was in use from 1267. It has been edited by V. Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886), pp. 442-450.

*De Intelligentia Aristotelis*. A Latin version of this prologue to the *Physics* by a neo-platonist was made before 1200. AL p. 93.

For translations of commentaries on works of Aristotle, see under Alexander Aphrodisius, Ammonius, Eustratius, Johannes Grammaticus, Simplicius and Themistius.

ST. ATHANASIUS. Burgundio of Pisa perhaps translated *De Fide et Spiritu Sancto* cf. Bandini, *Catalogus Codicum Mss Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae* IV, p. 455; in the Ms *Plut. XIV, Dext. Cod. VII* and *item XXI*, 262b it is marked *anonymo interprete*.

ST. BASIL. Burgundio of Pisa in his prologue to the translation of the *Homilies on the Gospel of St. John* by St. John Chrysostom says that he translated a commentary of St. Basil on Isaiah. This prologue is quoted in part by Haskins, *Med. Science*, p. 151. Was it the *Commentary on Isaia*s, chapters one to sixteen, by some attributed to Basil? Some scholars ascribe to him the translation of St. Basil's *Hexameron*; cf. de Ghellinck, 'Johannes Damascenus in der Chronik des Salimbene', *Theol. Quartalschrift*, (1937), 2, 175-179; P. Hugo Dausend, 'Zur Uebersetzungsweise Burgundios von Pisa', *Wiener Studien*, 85 (1913), 355. I see no basis for such an opinion; of course Eustathius had translated it centuries before.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Louise Ropes Loomis (*Mediaeval Hellenism*, Lancaster, Pa., 1906, p. 82) says: 'Vincent of Beauvais was able to make out impressive lists of the books of famous Eastern churchmen which he had seen in Latin, seven miscellaneous treatises by Clement of Alexandria . . . ten compositions in prose and verse by Gregory of Nazianzen . . . ' and in a footnote she mentions works of each listed by Vincent, among which are the *Stromata* and *Adversus Gentiles* of Clement and an *Hexameron on Marriage and Virginity*, and *De Spiritu Sancto* for St. Gregory. Vincent does not say these works are in Latin. In his *Speculum Historiale*, X (not XI as Miss Loomis says), 126, he repeats for Clement, word for word, except for the *Hypotyposes*, what St. Jerome writes in *De Viris Illustribus* 38, PL 23, 687, critical edition by E. C. Richardson, TU 14 (1896) I, pp. 26, 27. For St. Gregory, Vincent, *op. cit.* XIV (not XV as Miss Loomis gives it), 90, not only repeats St. Jerome, *op. cit.* 117, but names that work as his source. Miss Loomis lists for St. Gregory an *Hexameron on Marriage and Virginity*, an

utterly impossible title; St. Jerome lists *Liber, hexametro versu, Virginitatis et Nuptiarum*; the Venice edition (1494) of the *Speculum Historiale*, p. 182r, col. 2 has *hexameron* for *hexametro* but the Douai edition (1624), p. 574, reads *hexametro*.

DEMETRIUS. *De Elocutione*, attributed in the M.A. to Aristotle, was translated into Latin; this mediaeval translation has been edited by B. V. Wall, (Cath. Univ. of America, 1937).

*Dialogus inter Judaeum et Christianum* attributed to Anastasius Sinaiticus was translated by Paschal the Roman in 1158 or 1163; cf. George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* II, 1, (Carnegie Institute, 1931) p. 347.

DIOGENES LAERTIUS. Aristippus in the Prologue to his translation of Plato's *Meno* (Plato Latinus I, London, 1940, pp. 6, 12 ff.) says that upon the request of Maius and Hugo *librum Diogenis de vita et conversatione dogmateque philosophorum in italicas transvertere sillabas me parabam. Quibus ad tempus postpositis* etc. to translate the *Meno*. V. Rose, ('Die Lücke in Diogenes Laërtius und der alte Uebersetzer', *Hermes* I, Berlin, 1866, pp. 367-397) argues that Walter of Burley in the first half of the fourteenth century used a Latin translation of Laërtius *de Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* made from the Greek in the twelfth or thirteenth century; that a certain Hieremias de Montagnone (op. cit. p. 372, n. 1.) in his *Compendium Moraliū notabiliū*, 1285, and other writers made use of the same translation. There is no trace so far as I know of an extant mediaeval version of Diogenes. Did Henricus Aristippus return to his purpose and translate him in whole or in part?

DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, THE PSEUDO-. John Sarrazin, a contemporary of John of Salisbury, and also Robert Grosseteste translated the four works: *On The Celestial Hierarchy*, *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, *On The Divine Names*, *On Mystical Theology*. Thomas Gallus, abbot of Verceil, made a paraphrase of the same four works about the middle of the thirteenth century. The translations of John Sarrazin have been published in *Doctoris Ecstatici D. Dionysii Cartusiani Opera Omnia*, (Tournai, 1902) vols. 15 and 16: *The Celestial Hierarchy* in 15, 285-310, *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* in 15, 597-628, *The Divine Names* in 16, 351-394, *The Mystical Theology* in 16, 471-475. *The Divine Names* and *Mystical Theology* have also been published in *Dionysiaca* I (Paris, 1937); in this work the translations of Hilduin, Erigena, John Sarrazin, Grosseteste and several later ones are printed line by line concurrently along with the Greek text. The translations of *The Divine Names* are on pages 5-561, of *The Mystical Theology* on pages 565-669. Grosseteste's translation of *The Divine Names* and *The Mystical Theology* are in the same place; his translation of the other two treatises is unpublished. The paraphrase by Gallus of these four treatises is in the works of Dionysius Cartusianus, 15 and 16, chapter by chapter after the commentary of Denis the Carthusian on the corresponding texts of Erigena's translation; his paraphrase of *The Divine Names* and of *The Mystical Theology* are also printed in *Dionysiaca* I, pp. 675-712.

The translations of the four *Epistles to Gaius*, of the fifth to *Dorotheus* and of the ninth to *Titus*, by Hilduin, Erigena, John the Sarrazin and others are found in *Dionysiaca* I, pp. 605-669; John Sarrazin's translation of the first eight is found in the works of Denis the Carthusian, 16, p. 501 *et passim*. Denis used his translation of *Epistles* 1-8 as the basis for his own commentary. We find the translations of *Epistles* 9 and 10 op. cit. pp. 595-599. The paraphrase of Gallus of *Epistle* 9 is found on pp. 578-583 and also *Dionysiaca* I, pp. 713-717.

William, a monk of St. Denis, translated about 1170, the *Eulogy* of Michael Syncellus. See his letter to Ivo, abbot of Saint Denis in *Journal des Savants* (1900), 727. The Greek text is in PG 4, 617-668.

**EUSTRATIUS** (fl. 1100) In *Ethicam*. The translations of the commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*: that of Eustratius of Nicea, Bks. I and VI; that of Aspasius, Bk. VIII and perhaps the anonymous commentary on Bks. II-IV; and that of Michael of Ephesus, Bks. V, IX, X, are on evidence from Mss ascribed to Robert Grosseteste. The Latin translations were printed at Venice, 1536. GR. pp. 68-69.

**GALEN** (d. 199). According to Haskins (*op. cit.* p. 208), Burgundio of Pisa translated the following ten works: *De Sectis Medicorum*, *De Temperamentis*, *De Virtutibus Naturalibus*, *De Sanitate tuenda*, *De Differentiis Febrium*, *De Locis affectis*, *De Compendiositate Pulsus*, *De Differentiis Pulsuum*, *De Crisibus*, *Therapeutica*. He gives manuscript authority for the ascription of each of these to Burgundio. P. Hugo Dausend, ('Zur Uebersetzungsweise Burgundio von Pisa', *Wiener Studien*, 85, 1913, 355) lists Burgundio's translations of Galen as follows: *De Differentiis Febrium Libri duo*, *De Regimine Sanitatis*, *De Diagnosi*, *De Introductione pulsus et Causis ipsius*, *De Compendiositate Pulsuum*, *De Alimentis*, *Ars Medica*, *De Sectis Medicorum*, *De Sanativis*, *De Sanitate*, *De Differentiis Pulsuum*; he gives as a reference only Haenel, *Catalogi* 659. Diels, ('Die Handschriften der antiken Aerzte. I Teil Hippocrates und Galenos', *Abhandlungen der K. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1905, 58-150) lists the Latin translations of Galen but does not distinguish the Greco-Latin from the Arabic-Latin. Thorndike and Kibre (*Incipits of mediaeval scientific Writings in Latin*, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge, 1937) lists Mss for the following Latin translations of Galen by Burgundio: *De Crisi*, *De Differentia Pulsus*, *De Febribus*, *De Ingenio Sanitatis*, *De Iuvamentis membrorum (De Usu Partium)*, *Megapulsus*, *De Regimine Sanitatis*, *Appendix ad Tegni*, *De Vindemiis*. Sarton gives the same list of works of Galen translated by Burgundio as Haskins; *op. cit.* II, 1, p. 348. Haskins (*op. cit.* p. 208, n. 93) says that evidently some of Burgundio's work was revised in the fourteenth century by Nicholas of Reggio and Peter of Abano. Thorndike and Kibre (*op. cit.* Index, col. 884, s.v. Nicholas of Reggio) give a long list of Galen's works translated by Nicholas for which they have found Mss. Burgundio in his preface to his translation of Chrysostom's *Homilies on St. John's Gospel* (quoted in part by Haskins, *op. cit.* p. 151) lists the *Tegni (Ars medica)* of Galen as already existing in a Greco-Latin translation. Diels (*op. cit.* p. 63) lists an eighth century Ms (London, B.M. MV (Add. 17,156) which contains part of the *Tegni*. William of Moerbeke translated the *De Alimentis*, not Burgundio. Cf. Diels and Thorndike and Kibre s.v. *De Alimentis*. Nicholas of Reggio translated *De Historia philosopha (Peri filosofou Historias)*; the Greek text is in Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, pp. 595-648; this and the Latin translations of numerous other works of Galen are found in *Editio Iuntina* of Galen, (1528): cf. Diels, *op. cit. passim*. The prognostication of disease by astrology, *Liber de Prognosticationibus Egritudinum secundum motum lunae* was translated by William of Moerbeke and also by Peter of Abano; this treatise was falsely attributed to Hippocrates or Galen in the Middle Ages.

**ST. GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS**. Dausend (*op. cit.* 355) says a translation of the *Apologia de Fuga* is ascribed to Burgundio of Pisa by some, but he gives no reference. Rufinus had already translated it. Aristippus in his preface to his translation of the *Meno* printed in *Hermes* I (1866), 386-7,

and in *Plato Latius* I, (London, 1940) pp. 5-6 ff. says: *iussu Siculorum regis Willelmi Gregori Nazianzi opuscula translaturus eram. Quibus sepositis etc.* which means only, *I was going, or getting ready to translate*, not as Haskins (*Med. Science*, pp. 142, 143, 166) implies; *had begun to translate*. Whether Burgundio returned to the work we do not know. Webb is mistaken in thinking that there was a mediaeval version of Gregory's *Apologeticus* from the fact that John of Salisubury paraphrased a passage from it in *Policraticus* 7, 19 (680bc). I am of the opinion that the passage is simply a paraphrase of an extract from Rufinus' translation edited in CSEL XXXXVI, 1, pp. 7-83. See also above under Clement of Alexandria.

HERO OF ALEXANDRIA. His *Pneumatica* was translated in the time of Aristippus. It may be the unedited version in Ms Paris, B.N. Lat. 7226B, fols. 1-43; a second version was made by William of Moerbeke who also translated the *Catoptrics* of Hero which he ascribed to Ptolemy. Cf. Haskins, *op. cit.* pp. 182-3; Sarton, *op. cit.* p. 830.

HIPPOCRATES. Fifth-fourth centuries B.C. His *Aphorisms* were translated by Burgundio of Pisa.

ST. IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH. The two spurious Epistles of St. Ignatius to St. John and one to the Blessed Virgin Mary and one of the Blessed Virgin to St. Ignatius were likely composed in Greek and translated by Grosse-teste. Cf. GR pp. 60-62. There have been several editions of this translation, a recent one by A. Hilgenfeld, *Ignatii Antiocheni et Polycarpi Smyrnaei Epistulae et Martyria* (Berlin, 1902) pp. 71-105.

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM. Robert of Torigni in his *Chronicle* (MGH SS. VI, 531) says for the year 1180 that Burgundio had translated a large part of Chrysostom on Genesis. Burgundio also translated the ninety *Homilies on Matthew* (1151). In his *Prologue* to his translation of the *Homilies on St. John*, Burgundio says: *Johannis Chrysostomi commentationem super Evangelium Matthaeae . . . integre translata tradideram*; and at the end of the *Prologue* to his translation of the *Homilies on Matthew* we read: *Burgundius . . . transtulit hunc librum . . . per nonaginta Homilias*; cf. Martène and Durand, *Veterum Scriptorum et Monumentorum . . . amplissima Collectio* (Paris, 1724), I, pp. 828, 819. At the end of Codex Laur. PL XIV d. IV there is this notice: *Expletum est hoc opus . . . consummatum anno MCLI . . .*, Bandini, *Catalogus Codicum Mss Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae*, IV, 450. There is evidence that this translation is the one found in some Mss but further work has to be done on them to make sure. Professor Haskins (*op. cit.* p. 207, note 89) refers to a translation of Burgundio of the *Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles*, and gives as a reference: R. Sabbadini, *Le scoperte dei codici; nuove ricerche* (Florence, 1914), p. 264. I have not been able to gain access to a copy of this work. I have found no reference to such a translation in Sabbadini, *Le scoperte dei codici Latini e Greci nel secolo XIV e XV*, (Florence, 1905). Cassiodorus (*Inst.* I, 9) says the fifty-five homilies on the Acts were translated by his friends. Burgundio also translated the *Homilies on St. John's Gospel* (1173). Anianus had already centuries before translated the *Seven Homilies* (panegyrics) *on St. Paul*. P. Hugo Dausend, 'Iohannes Damascenus in der Chronik des Salimbene', *Theol. Quartalschrift* (1937) 2, 175 says that Burgundio translated the *Homilies on St. Paul*, but he gives no reference. C. Baur, *Iohannes Chrysostomus und seine Zeit II* (Munich, 1930), p. 175 says that a Latin translation of 'die Säulenhomilien' was in existence by the seventh century, but he too gives no reference. Baur (*S. Jean Chrysostome*. Paris 1907, p. 62, n. 2) says it



was revised and corrected in the fifteenth century by Francis Aretinus and thus revised has been published several times. Bartholomew of Pisa in his *Opus de Conformitate Vitae b. Francisci ad Vitam D.N.J.C.* says that Angelus de Cingulo (fl. c. 1280) translated *Johannem Climacum, dialogum b. Marcarii pulcherrimum et quendam librum devotissimum b. J. Christomi*; cf. Fr. Ehrle, 'Die Spiritualen Archiv für Literatur- u. Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters I (Berlin, 1885) p. 518. What work of Chrysostom is referred to I do not know.'

ST. JOHN CLIMACUS. Sixth century. His *Scala Paradisi* was translated about 1280; cf. the note just above and Bard. GAL V, 81.

ST. JOHN DAMASCENE. Eighth century. His *De Fide Orthodoxa* was translated by Burgundio of Pisa about 1148, (cf. Bard. GAL V, 57), and also by Robert Grosseteste (cf. GR p. 48). There is an anonymous translation of Bk. III, chapters 1-8, under the title of *De Incarnatione Verbi* which de Ghellinck (Le Mouvement Théologique du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, pp. 262-267) puts anterior to 1150: de Ghellinck in his article, 'L'entrée de Jean de Damas dans le monde litt. occidental,' *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 21, 1912, 457, had by implication ascribed this translation to Cerbanus, a monk in Hungary. I know of no edition of any of these translations. *De Dialectica (De Logica)*, *De Heresibus, Elementarium Dogmatum*, including *De duabus Voluntatibus . . . et una Hypostasi* (PG 95, 128-185), and *De Hymno Trisagion*, all of which with the *De Fide Orthodoxa* make up the *Fons Scientiae* were translated in mediaeval times. The translation of these works has been ascribed by some to Burgundio of Pisa; cf. Le Quien, PG 94, 67; *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1937, 170; *Wiener Studien*, 35 (1913), 355. Thomson (GR pp. 45 ff.) ascribes them to Robert Grosseteste and thinks he translated them between 1235 and 1242. In the translation of the *De Logica* the first three chapters are missing and it ends with chapter 66. PG 94, 669. I know of no edition of these translations. The Greek text is in PG 94.

JOHN THE GRAMMARIAN (Philoponus). First part of the seventh century. His commentary on the chapters *De Intellectu* of the third book of Aristotle's *De Anima* was translated by William of Moerbeke in 1268. The translation is published by M. de Corte, *Le Commentaire de Jean Philopon sur le Troisième Livre du Traité de l'Ame d'Aristote* (Liège, 1934).

ST. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR. Seventh century. Thomson (GR, p. 52) considers that the incomplete translation of his *Prologus* to the works of Pseudo-Dionysius is most probably by Grosseteste. The translation has not been published. *Scholia Maximi Confessoris in Opera Pseudo-Dionysii*: Franceschini in *Journal of Theological Studies*, 34 (1933), 355-363 argues that the translation of this work is by Grosseteste. Thomson (GR pp. 53-4) thinks that Grosseteste "had before him a Latin translation of these scholia other than that of Anastasius". He also is of the opinion that Grosseteste "translated afresh many of the scholia or emended the translation of whatever scholia he had available in Latin". The translation has not been edited.

*Hekatonades*. Cerbanus translated this collection before 1150. Cf. de Ghellinck, 'L'entrée de Jean de Damas dans le monde litt. occidental', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 21 (1912), 457.

MOSES OF BERGAMO in the twelfth century translated from the Greek a work on the *Trinity* based on Scripture: cf. Haskins, *op. cit.*, pp. 201 ff.

NEMESIUS OF EMESA. First part of the fifth century. *On the Nature of Man* was translated by Burgundio of Pisa c. 1155; there is also an earlier translation apparently by Alphanus I, bishop of Salerno, who died in 1085. These translations have been edited by C. Burkhard, the former,

- Vienna, 1891; the latter, Leipzig, 1917. The treatise *De Anima* PG 45, 188-221 attributed to St. Gregory of Nyssa in the Middle Ages consists of chapters 2 and 3 of this work of Nemesius, pages 3 to 27 of Burkhard's edition of Burgundio's translation.
- PLATO. The *Meno* and *Phaedo* were translated by Henricus Aristippus c. 1156. The translation of the *Meno* has been edited by V. Kordeuter, *Plato Latinus I* (London, Warburg Institute, 1940). Part of the text (126a-142a) of the *Parmenides* is included in the translation of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides* by William of Moerbeke.
- PROCLUS. His *Commentary on the Timaeus* and his *Commentary on the Parmenides* were translated by William of Moerbeke. The versions of the former and of the latter in part are to be published in the *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi*. The *De decem Dubitationibus*, *De Providentia* and *De Malorum Subsistentia* in a version by William of Moerbeke (1280) are found in Victor Cousin, *Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera I* (Paris, 1864). The *Elementatio Theologica* was also translated by William (1268); the version is unpublished. There is extant in Mss part of a translation of the *De Motu* which Haskins thinks was probably the work of William: cf. Haskins, *op. cit.*, pp. 143, 179 ff.
- PTOLEMY. The *Almagest* was translated in Sicily in 1160. Haskins (*op. cit.* p. 109) says there is evidence of a second version from the Greek for a Dresden Ms gives quite a different rendering of the first four books.
- SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. (fl. 200) His *Pyrrhonian Sketches* was translated in the twelfth century; unpublished. Cf. Geyer, *Die Patristische und Scholastische Zeit*, pp. 149, 688.
- SIMPLICIUS. First part of the sixth century. *In De Caelo* was translated by William of Moerbeke (1271). AL p. 98.
- SUIDAS. Tenth century. Seventy-one articles of his *Lexicon* including the second on *Jesus* or *De Probatione Virginitatis Beatae Mariae* were translated by Grosseteste; unpublished. Cf. GR pp. 63-65.
- TESTAMENTA XII PATRIARCHARUM was translated by Robert Grosseteste. There have been many editions of the Latin version; one in PG 2, 1025-1150. This is probably the same version which Matthew Paris *Chron. Maj.* 5, 285 attributed to Nicholas of St. Albans, a contemporary of and assistant to Grosseteste in the work of translation.
- THEMISTIUS, (fl. end of the fourth century), *In De Anima* of Aristotle was translated likely by William of Moerbeke in 1268. It is to be published in the proposed *Aristoteles Latinus*.
- VITA SECUNDI. This philosophical text of the second century was translated by William the Physician in the second half of the twelfth century. This version has been critically edited by A. Hilka, 88, *Jahresbericht der schlesischen Gesellschaft für vaterländische Cultur* (Breslau, 1910), IV, Abt. c. 1. Cf. Haskins, *op. cit.* p. 147.

# The Conception of Substance in the Philosophy of the Ikhwan as-Safa' (*Brethren of Purity*).

EMIL L. FACKENHEIM

THE philosophical encyclopedia of the *Brethren of Purity*, completed before 983 A.D.<sup>1</sup>, contains apart from the prevailing Neoplatonic and Aristotelian various other elements, Muslim, Neopythagorean, Gnostic, Hermetic, Manichaic<sup>2</sup>. That is has outspoken Shi'ite, in particular Isma'ilite leanings has definitely been established". The idea of an "intrinsic" access to the Deity current in these sects is combined with the forces behind the Platonic dictum that knowledge be an "assimilation to God as far as possible,"<sup>3</sup> and therefrom the intellectual energy behind the *Encyclopedia* derives its vital and unifying force. The exclusive character of this "Geheimreligion der Gebildeten"<sup>4</sup> which expects salvation from a "combination of Greek philosophy" with "Arabian religion"<sup>5</sup> goes yet hand in hand with a popularization of the received heritage, for this heritage is accepted *in toto* as "Greek", "scientific", we would say "enlightening", and it does not primarily grow into definite philosophical problem-situations.

In philosophical endeavors of this kind we hardly expect to find doctrines spelling creativity, especially not concerning as definite problems as that of substance. And yet the conception of substance to be found in the treatises of the *Brethren of Purity* is of considerable importance, both in the novelty of some of its elements and in the influence it exercised on some of the most eminent of mediaeval philosophers. The very acceptance *in toto* of the whole of Greek learning as a unity of truth leads to truly novel mergings of ideas and attempts at unification. It so happens that these attempts affect fundamentally the conception of substance. The following analysis will endeavor to exhibit this as a fact. The links connecting the *Brethren of Purity* with subsequent philosophers, especially Ibn Gabirol our analysis will enable us to guess. The precise establishment of these links, however, is a task beyond the scope of this article.

## *The concepts of substance and accident*

"Substance is that which subsists in itself and receives contrary accidents."

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ibn al-Qifti *Ta-rih al-Hukama'*, ed. 1923), p. 371.

J. Lippert (Leipzig 1903), p. 82 and Husain F. al-Hamdani, 'Rasa'il Ikhwan as-Safa' in the Literature of the Isma'ili Taiyibu Da'wat', *Der Islam*, vol. XX p. 282 ff. on the passage in Ibn al-Qifti. Cf. further on the date of the *Encyclopedia*: *Der Islam* vol. IV, p. 324, *JRAS* (1934) pp. 553-556, *EI* vol. II, pp. 459-460.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. H. H. Schaefer, 'Manichaeer und Mustime', *ZDMG*, vol. 82, p. LXXIX.

<sup>3</sup> For the Shi'ite element in general and the Isma'ilite element in particular cf. Hamdani, *op. cit.*, especially p. 285 ff., also P. Casanova, 'Notice sur un Manuscrit de la secte des assassins', *Journal Asiatique* (1898), pp. 151 ff., and R. A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, (London

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus* 176 B. Frequently repeated by all Neoplatonists; for the Br.P. cf. *Die Anthropologie der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*, translated by F. Dieterici (Leipzig 1871) (henceforth quoted as *Br. P. Anthropol.*), p. 117, and *Die Naturanschauung und Naturphilosophie der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*, translated by F. Dieterici (Leipzig 1876) (henceforth quoted as *Br.P.Natur.*), p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Thus Schaefer, *op. cit.*, p. LXXIX.

<sup>6</sup> In these words Ibn al-Qifti (*op. cit.*, p. 83) characterizes the philosophical efforts of the Br.P.

<sup>7</sup> *Die Abhandlungen der Ichwan es-Safa' in Auswahl*, ed. F. Dieterici (Leipzig 1886) (henceforth quoted as *Br.P. text*, pp. 358,

This is, as it is frequently emphasized<sup>8</sup>, not a definition (*hadd*), but merely a description (*rasm*)<sup>9</sup>, since of substance as a highest genus no definition is possible<sup>10</sup>. This "description" is used so frequently and in precisely the same words that it must be considered as almost official. The dependence even in the formulation on Aristotle is at once evident<sup>11</sup>. And although the positive phrase "subsisting in itself," invariably substituted for the Aristotelian negative one "neither predicable of nor present in a subject"<sup>12</sup>, might carry a meaning not quite identical with that expressed by the latter phrase, this is, at least at this point of our analysis, not more than an indication that the authors of the *Encyclopedia* do not follow Aristotle's precise terminology very closely. At least in a first rough survey it seems sufficiently clear that Aristotelian substances are the object of the "description" at hand. The additional characterization of substance as "receiving contrary accidents"<sup>13</sup> makes clear that its "self-subsistence" is non-inherence in a subject, in contrast with the "accident" which is determined as "quod est in aliquo non sicut pars eius et destruitur absque destructione illius."<sup>14</sup> The fact that the attempt is made to determine substance *qua* substance within a *metaphysica generalis* bears witness of a considerable Aristotelian influence. The Neoplatonic tendency, expressed in Plotinus' doctrine of the heteronomy of the categories<sup>15</sup>, is invariably to neglect or even ignore the substance-accident-relationship and to consider "substance" or rather "substances" exclusively within a *metaphysica specialis*, to be determined as this or that particular kind of entity at some definite level in the cosmic hierarchy. But although the Neoplatonic hierarchy rules the whole philosophy of the *Brethren of Purity* and especially the influence of the *Theology of Aristotle*<sup>16</sup> is felt everywhere, a *general* determination of substance *qua* substance seems not to be made impossible thereby. How general it really is and what systematic reasons bring it about will become clear only later on. So far at least, there seems to be a simple realistic acceptance of the world in an Aristotelian sense, of a world primarily conceived in terms of substance and accident, rather than in terms of an aprioric emanation-structure. Every being must be either substance or accident or composed of both<sup>17</sup>. More precisely, every being must be conceived in one of the ten Aristotelian categories which are again subdivided into the one category of substance on the one hand,—which comprises those beings which are "self-subsisting"—, the nine categories of accidents on the other<sup>18</sup>. The Aristotelianism at the basis of the primacy of

379, 390, 578; translated: *Die Logik und Psychologie der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*, translated by F. Dieterici, (Leipzig 1868) (henceforth quoted as *Br.P.Log.*), pp. 36, 63, 77, *Die Lehre von der Weltseele bei den Arabern im zehnten Jahrhundert*, translated by F. Dieterici (Leipzig 1872) (henceforth quoted as *Br.P.Welts*), p. 176.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. *Br.P.text*, pp. 359, 379.

<sup>9</sup> For the history of these terms see I. Madkour, *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, (Paris 1934), p. 119 ff., Avicenna, *Le livre des théorèmes et des avertissements*, ed. J. Forget (Leyden 1892), p. 17 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Br.P.text*, pp. 358, 379, *Br.P.Log.*, pp. 36, 63. For this traditional doctrine cf. *Porphyrus Isagoge* . . . ed. A. Busse, (Berlin 1887), p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 2 a 11 ff., 4 a 10 ff., 4 b 16 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *Categories* 2 a 11 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 4 a 10 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Nagy (ed.), 'Liber introductionis in artem logicae demonstrationis', *Beitraege z.Gesch.d.Phil.d.MA*, vol. II 5 (Munich 1897) (a Latin translation of *Br.P.text* p.

376 ff., henceforth quoted as *Br.P.Lib.*), p. 58, *Br.P.text* p. 390, *Br.P.Log.* p. 77. For this formula cf. especially Aristotle, *Categories* 1 a 23 ff., 3 a 32 and Porphyry, *op. cit.*, p. 12: "an accident is something which becomes and ceases to be without the subject being destroyed."

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* VI 1, 1 ff.; in Arabic philosophy cf. *Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift . . . Liber de Causis*, ed. O. Bardenhewer (Freiburg 1882), p. 109. In later Greek Neoplatonism the *general* term substance had become almost meaningless requiring in every case a *special* significant attribute, cf. *Proclus' Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1933), propositions 171, 176, 186, 190.

<sup>16</sup> *Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles*, ed. F. Dieterici (Leipzig 1882), an Arabic excerpt from Plotinus' *Enneads*, cf. V. Rose, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1883, pp. 843-846.

<sup>17</sup> *Br.P.text*, pp. 213, 354, 390, 455; *Br.P.Welts*, p. 39. *Br.P.Log.* pp. 30, 77, *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 42.

<sup>18</sup> *Br.P.text* pp. 354, 359, *Br.P.Log.* pp. 30, 37.

the substance-accident-distinction is strongly reinforced by *Kalam*, where the substance-accident-distinction is of equal prominence. The influence of *Kalam* is especially obvious in the thesis of the *Brethren of Purity* that "*omne quod est excepto Deo est substantia vel accidens*"<sup>19</sup>, a statement which might be found literally in the literature of *Kalam*.<sup>20</sup> Thereby the *metaphysica generalis* and with it the generality of the conception of substance is, in contrast with Aristotle, limited from the outset. But his limitation is not carried out with thorough consistency, and especially whether being is to be conceived to be *qua being* in a relation of emanation-dependence to God is nowhere clearly decided. "Intellect", the first entity emanated from the One, is repeatedly characterized as the "*first being*"<sup>21</sup>, God being "*beyond being*"<sup>22</sup>. Further, the ten categories are declared to contain *all being*, yet not God<sup>23</sup>. *Every being* is spiritual or bodily, but God is neither<sup>24</sup>. God is unqualifiedly the cause of *all being*<sup>25</sup>. But in contrast with these statements some passages suggest that being is primarily divided into (a) God (b) all created being<sup>26</sup>. Nor do attempts at a general description of being *qua being*<sup>27</sup> give any further clarification of this point.

However this question may have to be decided, *created being* is primarily divided into substance and accident, and the *Brethren of Purity* are in this point at least as much in concord with *Kalam* as with Aristotle.<sup>28</sup> True, *Kalam* is severely criticized from the Neoplatonic point of view, especially those *Mutakallimun* who implicitly deny the existence of spiritual being in the created world by holding that reality be divided into God on the one hand, bodies plus their accidents on the other<sup>29</sup>. But this affects the division of being only secondarily, and it is now as follows: There is (1) God the creator and (2) created being which is either (a) substance (i) corporeal (composite) or (ii) spiritual (simple) or (b) accident (i) corporeal or (ii) spiritual<sup>30</sup>. The theory or spiritual accidents, i.e. states in spiritual substances<sup>31</sup> greatly strengthens the generality of the concept of substance and the claim of the substance-accident-division of created being to primacy, although, as will be seen shortly, such accidents can be ascribed only to a limited number of spiritual beings.

This is the point to which the first general analysis of the conception of substance *qua* substance takes us. The next and much more far-reaching analysis will deal with the position of substance within the cosmology, the *metaphysica specialis* of the *Brethren of Purity*, attempting to explain the conditions of the possibility of a general conception of substance within a Neoplatonic hierarchy<sup>32</sup>.

### *The position of the constituents of substance in the cosmic hierarchy*

If there is a similarity between the *Brethren of Purity* and *Kalam* in the primacy of the substance-accident-division, there the similarity ends. Even in the analysis of the constituents of substance their ways part in a manner which shows that even the criteria for the substance-accident-division are quite different. For in the case of the *Brethren of Purity* this analysis does not lead to the atom, but in the usual Aristotelian-Neoplatonic fashion to form and matter.

<sup>19</sup> *Br.P.Lib.* pp. 57f., *Br.P.text* p. 390, *Br.P.Log.* p. 77.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, (Cambridge 1932), pp. 190, 209 f. We intend to give special attention to this point elsewhere.

<sup>21</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 239, *Br.P.Log.* p. 101; cf. also *Br.P.text* pp. 3, 213, *Br.P.Welts.* pp. 13, 39.

<sup>22</sup> Thus the current Neoplatonic doctrine.

<sup>23</sup> *Br.P.text* pp. 354, 359; *Br.P.Log.* pp. 30, 37.

<sup>24</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 216, *Br.P.Welts.* p. 43.

<sup>25</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 578, *Br.P.Welts.* p. 177.

<sup>26</sup> *Br.P.text* pp. 217 ff., *Br.P. Welts.* p. 44; cf. also *Br.P.text* p. 390, *Br.P.Log.* p. 77.

<sup>27</sup> E.g. *Br.P.text* p. 578, *Br.P.Welts.* p. 176.

<sup>28</sup> However, this concord has serious limitations (cf. below).

<sup>29</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 217, *Br.P.Welts.* p. 44.

<sup>30</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 455, *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 42; cf. also *Br.P.text* pp. 1 ff., 357, 390, *Br.P.Welts.* p. 11, *Br.P.Log.* pp. 35, 77, *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 163.

<sup>31</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 244, *Br.P.Log.* p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> In the *Theology of Aristotle* and the *Liber de Causis*,—works with which the *Encyclopedia* has a close resemblance as far as its cosmology is concerned—, there is no trace of a general determination of the concept of substance.

What is unusual in the case of the *Brethren of Purity* is a particularly strong intellectual effort to merge this *general* metaphysical analysis of substance into form and matter with an elaborate Neoplatonic cosmic hierarchy and to allot in the *metaphysica specialis* definite cosmic positions not only to matter and form, but also to the various stages of their composition. While in their cosmology in general the *Brethren of Purity* accept the common Neoplatonic doctrine, it is from this specific effort on their part that most of those doctrines derive which deserve special attention.

There is to be found a general description of substance and accident alternative to the one analysed above: "There are two kinds of form (a) constituting (*muqawwim*) and (b) completing (*mutammim*). The scholars have called the constituting forms substances, the completing forms accidents".<sup>33</sup> Historically this distinction is to be related to Plotinus' distinction between substantial qualities or rather activities and mere incidental qualifications<sup>34</sup>. Of even greater significance are, as will be seen more clearly shortly, those ideas finding expression in Porphyry's statement that the *differentia* be "*constitutive*" of the substance<sup>35</sup>, in distinction from the accident<sup>36</sup>. However, the formula quoted is so central and occurs so frequently in the *Encyclopedia* that vague historical references are no adequate explanation. This can be given only by a systematic analysis.

Logically, there are two assertions implied in this description of substance and accident: (a) a form constitutes a thing as some one definite thing, but (b) not all formal characters to be found in the thing are thus constitutive,—which would make a change within the same thing impossible. The solution of three problems is now set as a task by the prominent position this formula occupies in the *Encyclopedia*: (i) what is the criterion distinguishing "constituting" from "completing" form? (ii) what is the reason for the virtual absence of matter in this formula? That the *Brethren of Purity* should in a prominent formula for substance ignore matter,—a flagrant inconsistency with their actual doctrine—, requires an adequate *systematic* explanation. (iii) This problem is closely connected with the third: is this formula connected or at least compatible with the "description" of substance preliminarily analysed above?

The key to the solution, or at least an attempt at a solution of all these problems is the concept of *degrees of formation*, basic to the whole *metaphysica specialis* of the *Brethren of Purity*. First of all, there are two kinds of substances, simple and composite, spiritual and corporeal<sup>37</sup>. Composite substances are composed of simple *and therefore spiritual* substances, *viz.* matter and form. The full implications of this doctrine will be seen shortly. Secondly, the formation of composite substances is a *matter of degree*. By degrees a relatively undetermined matter is distinguished from a determining form, and we arrive by abstraction at four kinds of matter: (a) "*working matter*", as e.g. wood and iron, (b) "*natural matter*", i.e. the four elements, (c) "*general matter*" which is "*absolute body*" and (d) "*prime matter*".<sup>38</sup> Only (c) and (d) require comment: freed from the differentiation into four elements matter is still determined by extension. Extension<sup>39</sup> constitutes corporeality and is thus "*corporeal form*".<sup>40</sup> Thus "*second matter*" is "*first*" or "*absolute body*".<sup>41</sup> After

<sup>33</sup> Br.P.text pp. 354, 356, Br.P.Log. pp. 30, 33; cf. also Br.P.text pp. 379, 98, 197, 456, 215; Br.P.Natur. p. 25, Br.P.Anthrop. pp. 21, 42, Br.P.Welts. p. 41.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* VI 2, 17; especially II 6, 3; cf. Br.P.Lib. p. 58: "accidens non habet actionem".

<sup>35</sup> Porphyry, *op. cit.* p. 10.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* p. 12.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. Br.P.text pp. 1 ff., 357, 390, Br.P.Welts. p. 11, Br.P.Log. pp. 35, 77.

<sup>38</sup> Br.P.text pp. 2, 25, Br.P.Welts. p. 12, Br.P.Natur. p. 2 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Or "*quantity*" (e.g. Br.P.text p. 25); cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), p. 580.

<sup>40</sup> On the history of "corporeal form" cf. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, pp. 577-591. Wolfson traces the origins of "corporeal form" back to Simplicius (p. 581) and Plotinus (p. 582). Cf. also J. Guttman, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, (Munich 1933), p. 379.

the abstraction of corporeal form prime matter remains, both completely undetermined and incorporeal.—But we have not yet reached the basic point in our analysis. Even Plotinus had considered prime matter as incorporeal because absolutely indefinite; but yet it had been to him the principle of sensuality<sup>42</sup>. As has already been noted by some scholars<sup>43</sup> the *Brethren of Purity* go a fundamental step further by asserting that matter be a *positive spiritual principle*. This step affects basically the whole situation, especially with respect to the conception of substance. Before its implications can find consideration, this step must itself be explained in the light of the systematic metaphysical efforts of the *Brethren of Purity*.

The *Brethren of Purity* take immense pains to work out as detailed and continuous a system of levels as possible, using the Neoplatonic principle of gradually increasing multiplicity emanating from the One. Using numbers and mathematics in a fashion which in its detailed character appears almost absurd they relate increasing multiplicity<sup>44</sup> and decreasing perfection<sup>45</sup> to the distance from God. The *Brethren of Purity* now make the resolute attempt to *pursue the continuity of emanation as far down as possible, viz. to individual things, Aristotelian first substances*. It is a current Isma'ite doctrine that matter be higher in the emanation scale and simpler than those entities which bestow on it quantity and divisibility.<sup>46</sup> In conformity with this general doctrine the *Brethren of Purity* place their conception of gradual formation of matter right into the scheme of increasing multiplicity; and gradual formation of matter becomes of necessity primarily multiplication of the simpler and is only secondarily determination of the more indeterminate. Throughout their writings the *Brethren of Purity* make use of the analogy of the matter-form-relation to that between genus and species, an analogy already emphasized and made use of by Aristotle<sup>47</sup>, Plotinus<sup>48</sup> and Porphyry.<sup>49</sup> But while they stress the constitutive character of the more specific not less than e.g. Porphyry<sup>50</sup>, of matter (genus) they stress, in contrast with the Aristotelian outlook shared by Porphyry, *not the indeterminateness, potentiality, but its bearing, underlying character*. For what is simpler, i.e. nearer to the One, is according to Neoplatonic principles independent of what is more differentiated and more distant from the One, and there is a strictly unilateral relation of dependence not only logically, but also ontologically<sup>51</sup>. Thus the *Brethren of Purity* state explicitly that in the chain God, intellect, soul, prime matter, first body, four elements and definite material thing any prior link is ontologically independent from the posterior and would continue to exist if the posterior ceased to be<sup>52</sup>. This is why prime matter receives its positive character and why it can now be described as "*simple substance* (i.e. actual, not merely potential) *receiving form*"<sup>53</sup>. It is a spiritual being next in the metaphysical order to soul and both simpler than and prior to body.

Aside from the considerable historical influence it exerted this attempt at a systematic cosmic continuity is of great intrinsic significance, especially in

<sup>41</sup> Br.P.text pp. 2, 5, 13, 447, 196 ff., Br.P.Welts. pp. 12 ff., 15, 25, 28, Br.P.Anthrop. p. 21.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Guttman, op. cit. p. 379, Plotinus, *Enneads*, II 4, 8-9.

<sup>43</sup> Guttman, op. cit. p. 379, M. Wittmann, *Zur Stellung Avencebrols (Ibn Gabirols) im Entwicklungsgang der arabischen Philosophie*, (Muenster 1905), p. 63.

<sup>44</sup> Br.P.text p. 217, Br.P.Welts. p. 43.

<sup>45</sup> Br.P.text p. 3, Br.P.Welts. p. 13 ff.

<sup>46</sup> From God successively emanate: Reason, Soul, Prime Matter, Space, Time. cf. E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. I (London 1925), p. 439, vol. II (Cambridge

1928) pp. 197 ff.

<sup>47</sup> *Metaphysics* 1043 a 19 ff., 1045 a 33 ff.

<sup>48</sup> *Enneads* II 4, 1-5.

<sup>49</sup> Op. cit. p. 11.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. note 35.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* VI 8, 15: "Isolate anything else and the being is inadequate; but the Supreme in isolation is still what He is."

<sup>52</sup> Br.P.text pp. 215 ff., Br.P.Welts. pp. 41 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Br.P.text pp. 98, 577, Br.P.Natur. p. 251, Br.P.Welts. p. 176; cf. also Br.P.text p. 447, Br.P.Welts. p. 28.

its implications for the conception of substance, as the next chapter will show. But it is not free from grave difficulties with which later Ibn Gabirol struggles more successfully<sup>54</sup>. For the *Brethren of Purity* do not succeed in establishing continuity between the levels above and beneath prime matter. By making a radical distinction between simple and composite substances<sup>55</sup> they implicitly admit that, although on the one hand God, intellect, soul and prime matter differ in degree of simplicity<sup>56</sup>, on the other hand the different kinds of matter in degree of formation, these two processes do not form one homogeneous process from simplicity to multiplicity. Production of differentiated levels differs in kind from formation of matter, and while e.g. soul continues to exist if matter disappears, not body, but merely the form of body must disappear if matter is to continue to exist without that form<sup>57</sup>. Thus the *principle of composition*, different in kind from multiplication concerning the variation of essences, remains ultimately undeduced and, entailed thereby, corporeality which is to result from the composition of a spiritual matter and a spiritual form<sup>58</sup>. True, the *Brethren of Purity* use sporadically the conception of a spiritual matter within soul subject to formation<sup>59</sup>, but only Ibn Gabirol introduces it systematically for the intelligible part of the cosmos, precisely in order to overcome the difficulties of the *Brethren of Purity*.

### *The general concept of substance and the cosmic hierarchy*

In their exposition of the cosmos of substances the *Brethren of Purity* do not much more than repeat traditional Neoplatonic doctrines: God is not a substance,—this confirmed by both *Mutakallim* and Neoplatonic teaching; but the “divine things” are “immaterial eternal substances”<sup>60</sup>; for intellect is a “simple substance”<sup>61</sup>, soul a “spiritual substance”<sup>62</sup>; soul is therefore independent from body<sup>63</sup> governing it<sup>64</sup>, and man is composed of two substances<sup>65</sup>. “High” and “low” substances are distinguished in the usual Neoplatonic manner.<sup>66</sup> The whole world of substances is unified by its contingency on God, the “first cause”<sup>67</sup>.

However, while e.g. the *Theology of Aristotle* and the *Liber de Causis*<sup>68</sup> with which works the *Brethren of Purity* share this general Neoplatonic frame make no attempt at a general definition of substance following in their contempt for things material by implication Plotinus’ doctrine of the heteronomy of the categories<sup>69</sup>, the matter is quite different in the case of the *Brethren of Purity*. Aside possibly from other extraneous influences it is due to their systematic efforts analysed in the last chapter that matter and the material world are given a much greater prominence than in Neoplatonism in general, although they are appraised from Neoplatonic principles. And in their,—at least in their own intention,—smoothly continuous cosmos the question of substance *qua* substance can be raised without fear of committing a sacrilege by classifying spiritual and corporeal entities together.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Guttman, *op. cit.* pp. 105 ff., cf. also A. Heschel, ‘Das Wesen der Dinge nach der Lehre Gabirols’, *HUCA* vol. XIV pp. 359-385, especially pp. 366 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. note 37.

<sup>56</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 14, *Br.P.Welts.* p. 26: intellect is an “even simpler” substance than soul.

<sup>57</sup> *Br.P.text* pp. 215 ff., *Br.P.Welts.* pp. 41 ff.

<sup>58</sup> This latter fact has already been stressed by Guttman, *op. cit.* p. 379. As late a thinker as Isaac Abravanel (d.1509) still struggles with this problem (cf. a passage quoted by Wolfson, *op. cit.* pp. 580 ff.).

<sup>59</sup> *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 103.

<sup>60</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 39, *Br.P.Natur.* p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 352, *Br.P.Log.* p. 26.

<sup>62</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 237, *Br.P.Log.* p. 100, cf. *Br.P.text* pp. 187, 233, *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 124, *Br.P.Log.* p. 94.

<sup>63</sup> *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 100.

<sup>64</sup> *Br.P.Anthrop.* p. 124.

<sup>65</sup> *Br.P.Anthrop.* pp. 118, 120.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Theology of Aristotle*, pp. 15, 80, 91, 108.

<sup>67</sup> *Br.P.text* pp. 215 ff., 536, 545, *Br.P.Welts.* pp. 41 ff., 130 ff., 141.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. notes 15 and 16.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. notes 15 and 32.



What, then, is substance? True, an Aristotelian "first substance" is a substance, but its underlying matter is likewise an *actual* substance, as it is simpler, nearer to the first cause and thus independent of its form. And thus the closer we come to the first cause, we always encounter substances, except in the case of the first cause itself, whose substantiality is denied for traditional reasons. This leads of necessity to a *relative distinction* of what the formula quoted above calls *constituting* and *completing forms*, depending entirely on the kind of substance defined: for the substance of a shirt sewing is constitutive, for the substance of the cloth it is merely completing<sup>70</sup>. Already Aristotle had stated that not only substance, but also an entity *in potentia* had a capacity for contraries<sup>71</sup>, though in his opinion the two cases were essentially different. But as the *Brethren of Purity* assert the ontological independence of matter (genus), the reception of contrary forms (*differentiae*) can no longer be essentially distinguished from the reception of contrary accidents.<sup>72</sup> The attempt at a general characterization of substance as "receiving contraries" is thus sufficiently explained; all substances below and including prime matter possess this property, for even prime matter may receive corporeal form or no form at all. However, in the spiritual world only some substances receive contraries. "Reception of contraries" is not a property of all substances, because formation, specialization is not the universal principle of multiplication. But also the stress on form in the second formula for substance is sufficiently explained, for it is the degree of formation which determines the relative distinction between substantial and accidental. For the virtual absence of matter from that formula (problem (ii)) one further fact must be stressed: species,—though not the *differentia*—, implies the genus; in the same manner any form presupposes and implicitly contains all the more general forms including corporeal form<sup>73</sup>. True, logically it does at any rate not contain prime matter, but (a) the analogy of the matter-form-relation to that between genus and species and the imposition on it of the heterogeneous Neoplatonic simplicity-multiplicity-relation obscure this fact. According to the former matter is like a highest genus implied in all specific forms; the latter makes in the material world all things presuppose the simplest entity basic to them, *viz.* matter. Furthermore (b), matter itself is spiritual, possessing, as it were, no specifically "material" character, and corporeality remains undeduced.

Substance is *qua* substance "self-subsisting." The meaning of this term,—which is quite specific to the *Brethren of Purity* especially compared with its use among their Muslim predecessors—, can now finally be determined. In terms of the analogy it can be said that from the highest genus down to the Aristotelian first substance every entity is self-subsisting, containing in itself the *genus proximum* as well as its own specific character and requiring logically no reference to anything outside itself. But none of the *differentiae* is self-subsisting, although they may become integral part of a self-subsisting entity. Only because specification does not go down to individuals are there accidents *absolutely*; relatively all *differentiae* are accidents, because the more generic does not require the more specific for actual constitution. Thus prime matter is like a highest genus described as substance *as such*, while body is a substance, but not *qua* substance body,<sup>74</sup> rather is it defined as a substance (prime

<sup>70</sup> Br.P.text p. 215, Br.P.Welts. p. 41.

<sup>71</sup> E.g. *Metaphysics* 1051 a 5 ff.

<sup>72</sup> The later Arabic philosophers take great pains to re-establish the distinction firmly, even in terminology, cf. Wolfson, *op. cit.* p. 577; Avicenna, *an-Najaf* (Cairo 1331 A.H.), p. 325.

<sup>73</sup> Br.P.Welts. p. 12.

<sup>74</sup> In the *Theology of Aristotle* this term

indicates God's "aseity" (cf. p. 136), in the *Liber de Causis* "self-subsisting", i.e. "being the cause of its own formation and completion" (p. 105) is a term applicable only to intelligible substances, in *Kalam* the term is not used systematically, or if so, within an entirely different metaphysical background.

<sup>75</sup> Br.P.text pp. 196 ff., Br.P.Anthrop. p. 21.

matter, highest genus) possessing dimensions (first form, *differentia*)<sup>76</sup>. Abandoning the terms of the analogy: in the system of successive formation every formed entity at each level is self-subsisting, in contrast with differentiating characters *in abstracto* which are, even if integral, constituting part,—but in any case only part—, of a substance at one level, yet accidental in relation to that substance which is the matter of the latter.

Even if we do not speak in terms of the analogy, this doctrine implies that prime matter be substance *per se*<sup>77</sup>. The *Brethren of Purity* try to overcome the embarrassment entailed in this doctrine by putting prime matter together with all the other spiritual substances (except God) into one category of entities which are substances *per se*. But this only shows again that the *Brethren of Purity* are unable to extend their structural concepts regarding the material world beyond the level of prime matter. For there is no harmonious transition from the production of levels harboring multiplicity to the formation of matter.

<sup>76</sup> *Br.P.text* p. 379, *Br.P.Lib.* p. 44. For the history of this "definition" in later Arabic and Jewish philosophy cf. Wolfson, *op. cit.*

p. 590.

<sup>77</sup> *Br.P.text* pp. 196 ff., *Br.P.Welts.* p. 21.

# A Thomistic Glossary on the Principle of the Preeminence of a Common Good

I. Th. ESCHMANN O.P.

IN the present article the endeavour has been made to assemble, from the complete works of St. Thomas, the texts which contain or directly deal with the principle: *bonum commune praefertur bono privato*.

As yet we have no reliable lexicon for St. Thomas' doctrine. The following collection, therefore, originating from a careful reading of the sources, may be of use to the ever-increasing number of scholars who are interested in the problem of the common good in St. Thomas. The Thomistic doctrine on this point is found in widely-scattered texts and is expressed in a multiplicity of variations of the principle as also in an extraordinarily rich application of the fundamental idea. This doctrine is, therefore, rightly designated as one difficult to survey and hard to grasp<sup>1</sup>. But with a collection of texts such as the following we hope to provide a basis which will render a survey and a grasp of the doctrine less arduous. Anyone acquainted with St. Thomas will indeed find in our collection many texts already well-known. Here and there, however, he may discover a passage that has hitherto escaped notice.

I call this collection a Thomistic glossary on the principle of the preeminence of a common good. This name emphasizes a fact which strikes the eye of the reader at once and which calls for most careful attention. The fact is that St. Thomas never wrote a *Tractatus de bono communi*. The first specific treatise of this kind seems to have appeared not earlier than near the turn of the thirteenth century and was written by a pupil of St. Thomas, Fra Remigio de' Girolami O.P. of Florence, teacher of Dante<sup>2</sup>. Aquinas himself did no more than gloss a so-called *authenticum* which came to him through a rich tradition. Moreover, these glosses were composed only when concrete problems presented the occasion, problems in which tradition had already used the principle and thus established its specific context. This is a primary characteristic of St. Thomas' doctrine and one of which we must never lose sight. Likewise, to mention a similar fact, St. Thomas has left us no synthesis of social philosophy. He wrote not even a *quaestio* on the Church as a community, not to speak of a treatise on the state. These facts, as such, are a definite feature of the Thomistic system, and are therefore of more importance to the exegete of this doctrine than any effort to supply the lacuna by the construction of such a synthesis. Our glossary, then, intends to present exactly the *status questionis* in St. Thomas, that is to say, how and where he used the principle, what were the problems to which he related it, and what meaning he saw in it.—By insisting on the textual documentation being as complete as possible we hope also to escape a danger which is perhaps not always sufficiently guarded against, namely the danger of reading our own problems into the Thomistic texts instead of seeing the problems presented by the texts.

<sup>1</sup> Dom Odo Lottin in *Bulletin de théol. anc. et méd.* II, p. 229\*.

<sup>2</sup> M. Grabmann, *Die italienische Thomistenschule des XIII. und beginnenden XIV. Jahrh.* in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*,

Munich, 1926, pp. 361 ff.—R. Egenter, 'Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz'. Die soziale Leitidee im "Tractatus de bono communi" des Fr. Remigius von Florenz, in *Scholastik* IX, (1934), pp. 79-92.

The glossary forms the matter of the second part of this article.

The first part is a historical introduction the purpose of which is a study of the tradition on which St. Thomas draws.

A continuation of this study, consisting of conclusions based upon the material here presented, is in preparation.

## PART I—HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

I. In every case the statement of our principle in St. Thomas is in the form of a quotation whether or not the author presents it expressly as such. It is noteworthy, however, that whenever St. Thomas refers to the author of the explicit expression of the principle, it is, with only two exceptions (texts 39, 185 *infra*), the authority of Aristotle which he invokes. This might lead us to believe that we are faced here with an Aristotelico-Thomistic doctrine. Nothing is further from the truth and nothing could be more misleading for a right understanding of St. Thomas' teaching, since from the outset it would prevent our viewing the problem in its correct historical perspective. Historically speaking the principle of the superiority of a common good and related doctrines are a legacy to Scholasticism from a Roman and patristic heritage. Not the philosophical idealism of the Greek Platonic *polis*, but the conscience and pride of the builders of empire and civilization find expression in it. The real meaning of the former did not bother mediaeval thinkers, but the Roman Empire finding in some way its successor in the Church was a very living thing for them<sup>3</sup>. The fundamental ideas which the scholastics intended to convey by citing this axiom are due to Roman and especially patristic tradition. The authority of Aristotle is only, if at all, in a very limited sense a source for the scholastic axiom. It would be a mistake, however, to consider meaningless the emphatic appeal to Aristotle made by St. Thomas in support of the principle. On the contrary, it has a very precise import in the Thomistic doctrine. Generally speaking the Aristotelian authority is an addition to a pre-established doctrine whose main lines and significations had been fixed quite apart from Aristotelian philosophy. This latter reinforces the Roman-patristic ideas and plays a decorative rather than a constructive rôle.

In this historical introduction, therefore, it will be our task to outline the Roman-patristic thought. I do not mean to insinuate that the Greeks had no part in the formation of the ideas underlying the principle. On the contrary Greek influence, especially Platonic and Stoic, is clearly visible, as for example in Cicero. And so, if we were attempting a complete history of the principle for its own sake, then probably we would begin with Plato. But if we approach the problem from the point of view of the mediaeval scholastics and ask ourselves how it appeared to them, then certainly it is the Roman-patristic tradition which appears in the foreground. For from it the mediaeval schoolmen learned the principle as well as its specific problems, and only after Aristotle became known did they begin to compare the patristic and Aristotelian thought, dealing with the principle in question.

### *The Roman principle*

II. The simplest and most current statement of the principle of the preeminence of the common good found in Roman writers and others inspired by their works, is as follows: *Bonum commune praeferendum est bono privato*. St. Thomas along with other scholastics made abundant use of this formula (texts 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18, 21-24, 27-36, 38-40, 42, 200), although almost never did they take

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Glossa ordinaria in Decretum*, C. 23, Q. 4, c. 3 (Ed. Paris, 1501; fol. CCXCVIIIva): *Proprie dicitur res romane civitatis res publica; sed res aliarum civitatum abusive.*

pains to indicate its source in Roman literature or Roman law. However, this should not prove surprising. The mediaeval *scholares* were well aware of the origin of the formula. Consequently, there was scarcely any need for the professors to quote the source of so current a dictum. Besides being in the code of Canon Law, it was tirelessly repeated in such widely read authors as Cicero and Seneca, in their endeavour to inspire their readers with the virtue of the civic-mind, *pietas*, the true source of Roman greatness. Likewise, had Saint Augustine seen in the Roman disdain of private welfare when the common weal was in question, the historical mission and greatness of Rome. Moreover, any contemporary of St. Thomas, wishing to know the legal sources, could easily find them without resorting to any profound research, as they were available in the *Glossa ordinaria* of Accursius compiled in the middle of the thirteenth century. Here were gathered the references to the Pandects, the Codex and the Novellae of Justinian.

The first obvious characteristic of the Roman formula is to be found in the term *praeferre*, and in the synonyms by which the precedence of the common good is expressed. The principle is presented not speculatively, but rather from a practical point of view, that is as a rule governing our conduct. This corresponds to the practical outlook of the Romans who did not trouble themselves to investigate the intrinsic relations of the common and private good, but rather out of their natural civic-mindedness established a guide for their behaviour. In the word *praeferre* or in synonymous expressions the Roman character of the formulation of our principle is certainly recognizable.

The following texts are selected particularly in regard to the formulation of the principle. Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum* III, 19, 64: *Mundum autem censent (Stoici) regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. Ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum salutem anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. Nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. Ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod decet cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos.*

Cicero, *De officiis* I, 7, 22: . . . in hoc naturam debemus sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre.

Cicero, *De officiis* I, 19, 62: *Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est.*—The words “in vitio est” are still remembered by St. Bonaventure, see below §XIV.

Tacitus, *Annales* 6, 16: (criticism of Roman morals): *Privato usui bonum publicum postponitur.*

Seneca, *De beneficiis* VII, 16, 2: *In omni quaestione propositum sit nobis bonum publicum.*

The word and notion of “*bonum commune*” are Roman and found repeatedly in Roman literature, e.g. in Vergil, *Aeneid* 11, 435 (*bona communia*); Seneca, *Dialog.* VIII (*De otio*), 1, 4 (*Non desinemus communi bono operam dare*); *Id.*, *De clementia* I, 3, 2; II, 5, 3, etc. More texts of the same kind are to be found in *Thesaurus linguae latinae*, vol. II (Leipzig 1900/06) p. 2099; vol. III (Leipzig 1906/12) pp. 1970/72, 1977.

In Accursius’ *Glossa ordinaria* (Ed. Lyons 1549) vol. I, p. 906 the following texts of Roman law are mentioned:

Paulus, *Digest* XVII, 2, 65, 5 (Ed. Mommsen-Krueger, p. 230): *Semper enim non id, quod privatim interest unius ex sociis, servari solet, sed quod*

societati expedit. The word "semper" is recorded by St. Thomas, texts 5, 6, 72, 93.

Justinian, *Codex* VI, 51 (Ed. Krueger, p. 282): quod communiter omnibus prodest, hoc rei privatae nostrae utilitati praeferendum esse censemus, nostrum esse proprium subiectionum commodum imperialiter existimantes.

Justinian, *Novellae* VII, 9 (Ed. Schoell-Kroll, p. 60): Oportet enim ea, quae communiter et generaliter et in omnium utilitatem sanciantur, potius valere quam ea, quae circa aliquos studentur ad corruptionem communium agi legum (texts 62, 105, 108, 131).

Justinian, *Novellae* XXXIX, 1 (Ed. cit. p. 256): Ea enim, quae communiter omnibus prosunt, his, quae specialiter quibusdam utilia sunt, praeponimus.

For the sources of this Roman formula and doctrine see Cicero, *De officiis* I, 45,160 (Posidonius); *ibid.* III, 23, 90 (Hecato). This angle of the problem does not come within the scope of my approach to the question.

III. What is the significance of this rule? With this weapon especially, the Romans fought against political corruption wherein a man of political might and influence appropriated to himself common property, and by subjecting the members of the community to the service of his own interests made them in a certain sense his slaves. In public life our principle had an absolute and, theoretically at least, an unquestionable validity. There can be no doubt, as Cicero states, that anyone aspiring to headship in the community or to exercise a public office, must always keep in mind the prescriptions of Plato that he must direct his whole activity to the protection of the common good of the citizens, even to the point of being unmindful of his own interests. *Tutor et procurator rei publicae* such is the glory and the responsibility of the incumbent of public office. On a great number of Roman inscriptions we read *Bono Publico Natus*, abbreviated as B P N, as an official title of the emperor. The same basic principle dominates the Roman philosophy of law. Law is a general prescription, which means especially that it deals directly with the common good and not that of the individual, always preferring the former to the latter. This notion is of course not originally a Roman invention. However the Romans have the merit of so firmly implanting it in Western thought that it has never disappeared therefrom.

Cicero, *De Officiis* I, 25, 85: Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant (*Rep.* 342 E, 420 B): unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est.

Cicero, *De re publica* II, 29, 51: . . . quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae; sic enim appelletur quicumque erit rector et gubernator civitatis.

On the title B P N see *Corpus inscriptionum latinarum* (Th. Mommsen etc.); of the numerous examples a few are quoted in *Thesaurus linguae lat.*, vol. II, pp. 2100, 62 ff.

Cicero, *De legibus* III, 44: In privatos homines leges ferri noluerunt, id est enim privilegium; quo quid est iniustius? The scholastics quote this doctrine in the form which Isidore of Seville has given it, *Etym.* 5, 21 (PL 82, 203; Gratian D. 4, c. 2): lex . . . nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium conscripta (II-II<sup>4</sup>, 90, 2 s.c.)

<sup>4</sup>The Roman numbers I, I-II, II-II, III indicate the respective parts of St. Thomas' *Summa theologiae*.

IV. Political corruption is rooted in morals, it is in fact, nothing else than moral corruption, that is covetousness and avarice. To fight against these vices, Roman moralists and preachers had resort to the principle of the preeminence of the common good. That a man, says Cicero, seek only his own interests without any thought at all for common utility, and in case of conflict to prefer the former, is monstrous, and foreign to every human feeling. Consequently, the principle became a general ethical norm giving expression and relief to what the Romans called *humanitas*. *Humanitas* consists in the mutual friendship between men, benevolence and socialibility apart from its relation to intellectual culture. Humanity requires that limits be placed on one's own will, based on a thoughtfulness for others. It is inhuman to pursue one's own interests or rights so heartlessly as to be unwilling to depart from them one jot or tittle in deference to fellow men. The social nature of man is interpreted and explained in terms of the common good. He is *bono publico natus*. Common good, then, means not the good of the social whole as such, but the good of others, that of one's fellow man. In other words, the concept has here no fixed term of relation in the community as such, viz. the political community. Rather it assumes a characteristic turn to generalization, concerns the general social relations among men. It is true, however, that there again comes to the fore, especially in Seneca, a more or less fixed term of relation, namely the Stoic suprapolitical world of men and gods in which humanity finds its true home.

Cicero, *De officiis* I, 19, 62 (continuation of the above quoted text): non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis.

Cicero, *De officiis* III, 5, 24: Multo magis est secundum naturam excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi est.

Seneca, *De clementia* I, 3, 2: Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus homini magis convenire (the question is about the virtue of *clementia*), cum sit nulla humanior, constet necesse est non solum inter nos (i.e. the Stoics), qui hominem sociale animal communi bono genitum videri volumus etc.

Seneca, *Ibid.* II, 6, 3: Ergo non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret, sed proderit, in commune auxilium natus ac bonum publicum, ex quo dabit cuique partem.

Seneca, *Ibid.* II, 5, 3: . . . nulla secta benignior leniorque est, nulla amantior hominum et communi bono adtentior, ut propositum sit usui esse, ut auxilio nec sibi tantum, sed universis singulisque consulere. (Seneca is talking about the Stoics).

Here then the *bonum publicum* no longer has a definitely political meaning, but rather a general social one. The Aristotelian *political animal* becomes in Stoic language a *social animal* (Cf. J. v. Arnim, *Stoicorum vet. fragm.* III, 346). Cicero is quite conscious of this distinction; *De officiis* II, 21, 72: Sed quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est, quae ad singulos spectant, deinceps de is, quae ad universos quaeque ad rem publicam pertinent, disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum partim eius modi sunt, ut ad universos cives pertineant, partim singulos, ut attingant, quae sunt etiam gratiora. (The discussions of St. Thomas in *Contra gent.* 3, 80, Ed. Leon. man. p. 319a, are very similar to this text). Cicero, however, fails to make use of this distinction; Romans were too ready to confuse the state and mankind.

Concerning the *civitas hominum et deorum* (Cicero, *De fin.* III, 19, 64) see Seneca, *De clementia* I, 23, 2: In qua civitate . . . consensus fit innocentiae et indulgetur velut bono publico. *Id. De beneficiis* VII, 1, 7: (sapiens) si sociale animal et in commune genitus mundum ut unam omnium domum

spectat et conscientiam suam dis aperuit semperque tamquam in publico vivit se magis veritus quam alios: subductus ille tempestatibus in solido ac sereno stetit consummavitque scientiam utilem ac necessariam.—Cicero (*Tuscul. Disp.* IV, 23,51) gives the Stoic opinion: numquam privatum esse sapientem.

V. Selfishness and avarice are not only inhuman but also unnatural. The great universal nature, as is clear from a fragment of Zeno, quoted by Cicero, looks chiefly to the whole, deliberates for the whole and makes provision for its good and its utility. The principle of the priority of the common good falls under the tutelage of the whole of nature. Nature is endowed with the same qualities as the emperor, *bono publico nata*. Its first concern is that the universe may be adequately equipped so as to ensure permanence, and may likewise be endowed with the perfection of beauty and fullness of adornment. What can be more expedient or more fitting than to imitate nature? Through this Stoic notion, Seneca is confirmed in his pessimistic outlook on the world of sense and the state. For individual things and individual goods are naturally contraries and as such are naturally in conflict. It will be the function of universal nature above all to reconcile these contraries. In universal nature alone does the principle of the priority of the common good find its full realization.

Cicero, *De natura deorum* II, 22, 57 f.; Arnim, *St. v. fr.* I, 171 f.: (Zeno teaches) . . . hac quidem ratione omnis natura artificiosa est, quod habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur. Ipsius vero mundi, qui omnia complexu suo coeret et continet, natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium. . . . Talis igitur mens mundi . . . haec potissimum providet et in is maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxime autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.

*Id.* *De officiis* III, 6, 30 f.: . . . communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum conservat et continet. . . .

*Id.* *De natura deor.* III, 9, 21: Nihil est mundo melius in rerum natura. Cicero adds a characteristic remark to this statement of Zeno: ne in terris quidem urbe nostra.

Seneca, *Dialog.* II (*De constantia sapientis*), 8, 2: Non potest . . . quisquam aut nocere sapienti aut prodesse, quoniam divina nec iuvare desiderant nec laedi possunt, sapiens autem vicinus proximusque dis consistit, excepta mortalitate similis Deo. Ad illa nitens pergensque excelsa, ordinata, intrepida, aequali et concordi cursu fluentia, secura, benigna, bono publico nata, et sibi et aliis salutaria nihil humile concupiscet, nihil flebit.—This doctrine, enriched with Neoplatonic elements, will become a factor of the first importance in the discussion of our principle in St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.

VI. As to special problems, Cicero used the principle of the superiority of the common good for the resolution of a question to which we must call particular attention because of its historical importance. It is the celebrated question whether the speculative and philosophical life is to be preferred to the practical and political, and, whether, in fine, the philosopher really has a place at all in political life. By positing this problem, as is well known, all the great thinkers of antiquity made men conscious of the fact that there is something better than the state, public activity and the common weal. Cicero resolves upon a pragmatic solution: the duties prescribed by justice must be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties imposed by it; for the former concern the welfare of our fellow man and nothing ought to be more sacred in men's eyes than that.



Cicero, *De officiis* I, 43, 155: . . . intellegitur studiis officiisque scientiae praeposenda esse officia institutae, quae pertinent ad hominum utilitatem, qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius. (Transl. W. Miller, *Loeb Class. Libr.*)

The following text *De officiis* I, 21, 70 is of particular importance for the scholastic discussion of the problem: . . . neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et facilius et tutius et minus aliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum generi et ad claritatem emplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem publicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt.—Cf. *infra* text 23.

VII. On two points especially, Cicero has attempted to investigate more profoundly the meaning of our principle. From his Stoic sources he saw in the principle not an absolute and ultimate ethical rule, but rather a norm governed by the general law of virtue and human honour. Consequently nothing dishonorable can be done to save one's country. The common good is a moral good just as is also the individual good. Consequently the common good can in no way be served by immoral action. The *res publica* consists essentially of honest and virtuous men. Hence, as in all else, to subject their civic-mindedness to the moral law no more limits this virtue than a thing is limited by its definition. Likewise for Cicero the preservation and protection of private property belong to the essence and consequently to the intrinsic limits of the common good. It is the great merit of Cicero to have given far reaching and clearly audible voice to one of the basic principles of European civilization, namely that society and state consist of owners. By virtue of their institution *res publica* and *civitas* have as their main end the guarantee of the untrammelled possession and fruition of the individual's properties and rights. The very idea of *bonum publicum* includes therefore, according to Cicero, private property just as this idea also includes morality and is regulated by it. Hence Cicero asserts: *De bonis privatis publice deminutio non fiat*, a basic principle adopted in large measure by Roman legal practice. Indeed the citizens must make a sacrifice of their private goods on behalf of the whole; nevertheless Cicero appears to have left it entirely to the initiative of the individual to carry this out. Normally, then, the levying of an income tax would appear almost an unjustifiable intervention of the state into the rights of the individual. Cicero is willing to allow such intervention only in case of extreme emergency. This point of view has been reproached as a blind respect for the inviolability of private property, and a failure to recognize the duties of owners to the community<sup>5</sup>. However, that is hardly the question here. Rather the question is whether Cicero was not too optimistic in supposing that men generally would be unselfish enough, out of community spirit, to safeguard the state without legal coercion. He did not lose sight of the duty of preferring the common good to that of the individual. But the critical point of Cicero's discussion seems to be the following: the citizens of the Ciceronian state, whose final aim is the protection of private property, give preference to the common good only as a means of ensuring the security of private property. Hence the ultimate term towards which everything gravitates and finally reverts appears to be the individual good. If the common good is both identified with and ordained to the individual good, then is there not the danger that the common good will completely disappear as a specific entity, so that there will be nothing common to which the individual good can be preferred? It seems very characteristic that the Roman discussion of the problem, if discussion it may be called, should resolve itself into a mere juxtaposition of two goods, thus rendering impossible any decision as to which is ultimately more important.

<sup>5</sup>F. Cauer, *Ciceros politisches Denken*, Berlin 1903, pp. 68-70.

Cicero, *De officiis* I, 45, 159: . . . quaerendum . . . num haec communitas (i.e. the community of the common good), quae maxime est apta naturae, ea sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper anteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta . . . Haec igitur non suscipiet rei publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed haec commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.

*Ibid.* III, 6, 26: . . . unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum.—See *De Rep.* III, 18, 28.

*Ibid.* III, 6, 31: . . . (sapiens) si occiderit (if he should perish) multum de communi utilitate detraxerit (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, 64, 6; p. 1761b 25).

*Ibid.* II, 21, 73: In primis autem videndum erit, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat . . . Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce naturae congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant. Danda etiam opera est, ne, quod apud maiores nostros saepe fiebat propter aerarii tenuitatem assiduitatemque bellorum, tributum sit conferendum, idque ne eveniat multo ante erit providendum. Sin quae necessitas huius muneris alicui rei publicae obvenerit . . . danda erit opera, ut omnes intellegant, si salvi esse velint, necessitati esse parendum. Cf. *ibid.* 22, 78.

On the notion of ownership in Roman Law see the very suggestive remarks of F. Schulz, *Principles of Roman Law*, Eng. tr. Oxford, 1936, pp. 151 ff. Interesting is Frontinus, *de aquaeductu*, 128 (cit. by Schulz, p. 162, n. 1): cum maiores nostri . . . ne ea quidem eriperint privatis quae ad commodum publicum pertinebant, sed cum aquas perducerent, si difficilior possessor in parte vendunda fuerat, pro toto agro pecuniam intulerint et post determinata necessaria loca rursus eum agrum vendiderint, ut in suis finibus proprium ius tam res publica quam privata haberent.—It is not the Roman conception of ownership which is individualistic, but the Roman law relating to ownership (*ibid.* p. 152). Regarding the juxtaposition there is the characteristic text from Cicero's *De officiis* II, 21, 72: Danda opera est omnino, si possit, utrisque (i.e. bono publico et privato), nec minus, ut etiam singulis consulatur, sed ita, ut ea res aut prosit aut certe non obsit rei publicae.

To sum up we can say that the Romans gave to the principle of the priority of the common good a clear and concise formulation, so often repeated as to become stereotyped in their literature. Moreover they have shown both its meaning and value in a whole series of definite problems. But the Romans lacked a forthright theory of the relation between the common and private good, that is, a theory built up for its own sake and in which the principle finds its proper alignment and its own unequivocal meaning. It is at this point that the lack of a social philosophy and a political theory makes itself felt.

### *The principle in Patristic literature, especially in St. Augustine*

VIII. The Latin Fathers, who were nurtured in Roman ways and grew up under a Roman sky, show how deeply the Roman principle, in its stereotyped form, penetrated and fixed itself in Western thought. They frequently repeat this formula and do their share to implant it in men's minds and transmit it to posterity. The principle is mainly applied to the Church and ecclesiastical life.

We shall cite here only a few passages.

As regards the *De officiis* of St. Ambrose, we can, from the nature of

the treatise, anticipate the fact that it will reproduce the doctrine of Cicero on the common good and relate it to the Sacred Scriptures. Cf. e.g. I, 28, 135 (PL 16, 67): *Ergo secundum Dei voluntatem vel naturae copulam invicem nobis esse auxilio debemus, velut in medio omnes utilitates ponere et, ut verbis Scripturae utar, adiumentum ferre alter alteri* (Cf. Cicero, *De off.* I, 6, 22).

*Ibid.* I, 24, 115, col. 62: . . . (iustitia) quae suum cuique tribuit, alienum non vindicat, utilitatem propriam negligit, ut communem aequitatem custodiat.—In this context Ambrose along with Cicero grants a place of pre-eminence among the other virtues to justice. So too does fortitude enjoy an outstanding place in the system of virtues in so far as its object is the security of the common good.

The highest praise which St. Augustine could bestow on the Romans, was: . . . *isti privatas res suas pro re communi, id est re publica, et pro eius aerario contempserunt* (*De civ. Dei* 5, 15). For their common-mindedness the Romans received the reward due to them in justice, namely, the grandeur and glory of the Empire (*gloriae humanae immanissimus fastus, ibid.* 5, 17). Along with this common-mindedness, which the Romans betimes carried to an heroic degree (*ibid.* 19), there is nonetheless the contrasting Roman selfishness and avarice which finally brought about from within the downfall of the Roman Empire (*ibid.* 1, 31 ff.)

As to the use of the principle the following texts, relevant to Scholasticism, might be noted. Ambrosiaster, *In Epist. I ad Cor.* 14, 1 (PL 17, 267): *Post caritatem prophetandi studium magis habendum hortatur, quia quamvis magni sint spiritales gradus, quos enumerat (Apostolus), hic tamen melior, qui ad utilitatem Ecclesiae proficit ut discant omnes divinae legis rationem.*—See II-II, 172, 4.

In his doctrine of the angels St. Gregory (XL Homil. in Evang. 2, 34, 8; PL 76, 1250; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* II, 9, 2) states that archangels are distinguished from the angels in as much as the former concern themselves with the lofty affairs of God, the latter only with the less great, that is individual human affairs: *Archangeli, qui maiora nuntiant; Angeli, qui minora.* Scholastics took it for granted that Gregory based this hierarchy on the principle of the common good and its preeminence; *infra*, texts 1, 20.

IX. The doctrine of charity in Augustine raises our principle to an entirely new plane. The law of charity in Augustine is expressed in the language of the political and ethical Roman principle: *communia propriis non propria communibus antepondere*. This text is taken from the letter to the nuns which was later to become the so-called Rule of St. Augustine. The question here is only that of religious poverty. In the context of course St. Augustine takes a quite different and less stringent position with regard to private property than did Cicero. Here he can quite unrestrainedly emphasize the preeminence of common possessions. Nonetheless it would be false to believe that the notion of St. Augustine was limited to the case at hand; he goes much further. In religious poverty the universality of charity expresses itself in a very special way, namely the preferring of a permanent good to the passing exigencies of this life. With the Romans preference for the common good bespoke *magnitudo animi*, i.e. the constancy and liberty of the spirit in opposition to the changeability and necessity of the body. *Caritas*, replacing the ancient *humanitas* and *magnitudo animi*, carries the same essential traits rearranged under a new principle. And so the preference of a common good, far from being a limited rule for a special perfection, is rather a general rule of Christian perfection as such. This is what the Apostle means by saying (I Cor. XIII, 5) that charity *seeketh not her own*. What is one's own stands in opposition to what is common, and this opposition is reducible to the (Platonic) opposition between the intelligible ideas and

sensible reality, between intelligible immutability and sensible mutability.—In still another way did St. Augustine perceive and define this opposition: Charity prefers the universal good to a particular good, the good of the whole to that of a part. This is expressed in a passage of the XII<sup>th</sup> book of *De Trinitate*,—a text crammed, if not overloaded with profound ideas. The text approaches the problem from the point of view of sin: "The soul loving its own power, slips onwards from the whole which is common, to a part, which belongs privately to itself. And that apostatizing pride, which is called *the beginning of sin*, whereas it might have been most excellently governed by the laws of God, if it had followed Him as its ruler in the universal creature, by preferring something to the whole, and struggling to govern this by a law of its own, is thrust on, since nothing is more than the whole, into caring for a part; and thus by lusting after something more, is made less; whence also covetousness is called *the root of all evil*."—To cite still another example, St. Augustine also has recourse to this same notion when he makes the famous opposition between the earthly and heavenly city, the former of which is founded on love of self even to the contempt of God, the latter on love of God even to the contempt of self. Here again there appears the word *contemnere* which belongs to the terminology of our principle.

Augustinus, *Epist.* 211, 12 (CSEL 57, 366): *Caritas enim, de qua scriptum est, quod non quaerit quae sua sunt, sic intellegitur, quia communia propriis, non propria communibus antepoint* (St. Thomas, text 30)

*Ibid.*: Et ideo, quanto amplius rem communem quam propriam curaveritis, tanto amplius profecisse noveritis, ut in omnibus, quibus utitur transitura necessitas, superemineat, quae permanet caritas.

Augustinus, *Epist.* 140, 24, 61f (CSEL 44, 207): *Initium autem omnis peccati superbia* (Eccli. 15), qua diabolus irrevocabiliter in exteriora progressus est hominemque invidendo et ei simile aliquid suadendo deiecit. Cui homini in quadam scriptura dicitur: *Quid superbit terra et cinis, quoniam in vita sua proiecit intima sua* (Eccli. 9-10). *In vita sua dictum est* tamquam in propria sua et quasi privata, qua delectatur omnis superbia. Unde caritas in commune magis quam in privatum consulens dicitur non quaerere quae sua sunt.

Augustinus, *De Trinitate* 12, 9, 14, PL 42, 1005f (Transl. M. Dods, Edinburgh, 1873, p. 295, slightly altered): Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima a comuni universo ad privatam partem prolabitur; et apostatica illa superbia, quod *initium peccati dicitur*, cum in universitate creaturae Deum rectorem secuta legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid universo appetens atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius universitate, in curam partilem truditur, et sic aliquid amplius concupiscendo minuitur; unde et avaritia dicitur *radix omnium malorum* (1 Tim. VI, 10).

*Ibid.* 12, 11, 16 (col. 1006): Tanto magis itaque inhaeretur Deo, quanto minus diligitur proprium.

Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* 14, 28: Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scil. amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui.

God is called *bonum commune* in *Ep.* 137, 5, 17 (*Ed. cit.* 122). Cf. *infra* §XI.

X. As the text of the *De Trinitate* already shows, Augustinian cosmology also contains our principle, though differently formulated. With Greek, especially Stoic Philosophy St. Augustine agrees in looking upon the whole of the universe as being "better" than its parts. The same idea might also be stated in an absolute way by saying that the whole is the best and the greatest thing in

the universe. The whole, integrating and unifying the parts, towers above the parts taken singly and in themselves. St. Augustine is clearly aware not only of the importance but also of the dangers of this ancient conception which generally leads to the divinization of the cosmos. It is therefore with a certain emphasis that he draws upon the biblical account of creation in order to substantiate, to limit and to correct the ancient idea. In the first days of creation the parts of the whole are, bit by bit, assembled. They are said to be good. Only on the seventh day, when the whole is completed, Scripture increases its praise and, significantly, states that the universe, taken collectively, is *very good* (Gen. 1, 31). The Greeks are therefore right in evaluating the whole more than the parts, but they are wrong in forgetting the Creator who is still superior to the whole universe.—In St. Augustine's struggle against the Manicheans the preeminence of the whole with regard to the parts is one of the dominant features of the discussion. The error of Manichean metaphysics consists in this that only the parts and their relative harmfulness and ugliness are considered, whilst the order and beauty of the whole within which those parts have their proper place and usefulness, is not taken into consideration. This part of St. Augustine's thought and its historical connections is so well known that we need not enlarge upon it. As far as I can see, the Roman principle of the duty of preferring the common good has never, in St. Augustine, been actually connected with the idea of the preeminence of the whole. The two ideas are, however, so closely interrelated that it would take little time or effort to bring out this relation, especially since the Romans have already pointed out that to prefer the common good is a natural duty imitating universal nature and its order.—Again the Stoic dogma of the superiority of the universe is referred to in a passage of the *Tractates on the Gospel according to St. John*, a passage whose importance for our question cannot be overstressed and has clearly been set forth in mediaeval Scholasticism. Two works are compared, the justification of the sinner and the creation of the universe. Which one is greater? Let us notice that, as St. Augustine explicitly points out, justification is Christ's work which he is certainly working in the sinner, but not without him. In a certain way, therefore, man's personal effort with regard to his eternal salvation and the effect of it, eternal beatitude, is compared to the work of creation and the created universe. I do not hesitate, St. Augustine answers, to call justification greater than the heavens and the earth and all contained therein which is within the compass of our vision. For both *heaven and earth shall pass away*, but the salvation and predestination of those predestined thereto shall remain forever. In the former there is only the working of God, but in the latter there is also his image. Who, indeed, would hesitate to answer that question except the ancient Philosopher believing in the eternity and incorruptibility of the heavens? Ancient philosophers bowed their knees before the starry heavens and justified this adoration by their metaphysics of the whole and its parts. In the face of the Christian theology of our eternal beatitude this ancient philosophy breaks down. But if it is no longer a question of the corporeal universe, what place does man occupy in the spiritual universe? Is he not subordinated, as a part to the whole, to the totality of this spiritual universe? This problem is not stated by St. Augustine in the above text.

Augustinus, *Confessiones* 13, 28, 43: Septiens numeravi scriptum esse te vidisse, quia bonum est quod fecisti: et hoc octavum est, quia vidisti omnia quae fecisti, et ecce non solum bona, sed etiam *valde bona* (Gen. I, 31) tamquam simul omnia. Nam singula tantum bona erant, simul autem omnia et *bona et valde*. Hoc dicunt etiam quaeque corpora, quia longe multo pulchrius est corpus, quod ex membris pulchris omnibus constat, quam ipsa membra singula, quorum ordinatissimo conventu completur universum. quamvis et illa etiam singillatim pulchra sint.—See also *ibid.*

7, 12, 18; *De Gen. contra Manich.* I, 21, 32; *Enchir.* 10, and elsewhere. Cf. *infra* texts 10, 17.

Augustinus, *De ordine* 2, 19, 51: In hoc enim sensibili mundo vehementer considerandum est, quid sit tempus et locus, ut quod delectat in parte sive loci sive temporis, intellegatur tamen multo esse melius totum, cuius illa pars est; et rursus, quod offendit in parte, perspicuum sit homini docto, non ob aliud offendere, nisi quia non videtur totum, cui pars illa mirabiliter congruit; in illo vero mundo intelligibili quamlibet partem tamquam totum pulchram esse et perfectam.—Might not Plato himself well have expressed the antinomy between the common good and the particular good, and its solution, in words like these? See Seneca, *Dial.* II, 8, 2, quoted above.

*De genesi contra Manich.* 1, 21, 32: Omnis enim pulchritudo, quae partibus constat, multo est laudabilior in toto quam in parte.

*De natura boni* 3: Ordo is included under the *generalia bona* which are spoken of as *maxime . . . a Domino Deo* (*ibid.* 13).

*De civitate Dei* 11, 22: (Manicheans take offence at the evils of nature, such as fire, frost, wild beasts and so forth; but they do not consider) quam vel in suis locis naturisque vigeant pulchroque ordine disponantur, quantumque universitati rerum pro sui portione decoris tamquam in communem rem publicam conferant vel nobis ipsis, si eis congruenter atque scienter utamur, commoditatis adtribuant . . . Unde nos admonet divina providentia non res insipienter vituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere . . . A terrenis usque ad caelestia et a visibilibus usque ad invisibilia sunt alii alia bona meliora, ad hoc inaequalia, ut essent omnia.

When St. Thomas comes to speak of the present problem, he gives the same weight of authority to the Pseudo-Areopagite as he does to St. Augustine. Dionysius' statements on the question stem from much the same historical background as that of Augustine and are solved with the same source material. Mere mention of the Greek monk must suffice here.

Augustinus, *In Ioannis Ev.*, Tract. 72, 3 (PL 35, 1823): *Et maiora horum faciet. Quorum, obsecro? Numquidnam omnium operum Christi maiora facit, qui cum timore et tremore suam ipsius salutem operatur* (Phil. II, 12)? Quod utique in illo, sed non sine illo Christus operatur. Prorsus maius hoc esse dixerim quam est caelum et terra et quaecumque cernuntur in caelo et terra. *Et caelum enim et terra transibit* (Matth. XXIV, 35); praedestinatorum autem, id est eorum, quos praescit, salus et justificatio permanebit. In illis tantum opera Dei, in his autem etiam est imago Dei.—The text continues: Sed in caelis Sedes, Dominationes, Principatus, Potestates, Archangeli, Angeli opera sunt Christi. Numquid etiam his operibus maiora facit, qui operante in se Christo cooperatur aeternam salutem ac justificationem suam? Non hic audeo praecipitare sententiam. Intelligat, qui potest, iudicet, qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos creare quam impios iustificare.—Manifestly St. Augustine does not go into the question which we today might want him to treat.—Cf. *infra*, texts 16, 178.

Regarding the Stoic divinization of the cosmos let it suffice here to point out one of the outstanding texts, Marc. Aurel., *Medit.* 4, 23.

XI. St. Augustine's doctrine of the state and of society is mainly a continuation of his theology of charity and of his cosmology. St. Augustine's only interest in the state is to point out its place in the theological and universal order of things. The state represents the best in the human order. In these words St. Augustine restates clearly and distinctly the Greek concept of the priority of the common good. His eminently metaphysical mind goes much further still in that he defines this priority according to its intrinsic metaphysical structure. It is a teleological priority, in that the state is wholly composed of individual families as of parts,

in which the metaphysical principle of the whole and the parts is realized, in as much as the parts are ordained to the whole. Hence Augustine travels a considerable distance along the way of the Greeks, especially that of the Aristotelian metaphysics of the state. In this connection his acute criticism of the Ciceronian concept of the state, at least one side of it, is indeed quite remarkable. No theological considerations ever brought the just mind of the Bishop of Hippo to throw out, so to speak, the wheat with the chaff, and to consider the state in the realm of human affairs as subjected to the family and to the individual. Augustine is surely conscious of the danger of this Greek metaphysics of state. For him the danger was not in the fact that the relationship of the individual and state was defined in the forementioned way; there was no need at all, in order to obviate this difficulty, to reverse the teleological relationship and to say that the political common good and the state are to be ordained to the individual and to his advantage. Rather the danger lies in this that the good of the state is divinized and becomes an absolute. Here again we are faced with the Hellenistic divinization of the cosmos, which provides the motive for and at the same time entails as a consequence the deification of the state, or more exactly, of the head of the state.<sup>6</sup> Hence when St. Augustine says that the state and the common good are the better and the best in the realm of human affairs, *in suo humano genere*, the statement is pregnant with meaning. Above human affairs stands the better, namely what is divine; above earthly peace, which is the political common weal, is the heavenly peace; above the *civitas terrena* stands the *civitas aeterna*; above *felicitas terrena* stands the *sempiterna salus*. Hence for him it was not a case of overturning the teleological priority of the whole, but rather to show forth the teleological preeminence of the one totality, namely the *civitas aeterna* over the other totality, the *civitas terrena*. In this basic idea the Augustinian doctrine of the state readily finds its center of gravity. Augustine never tired of pointing out that only when the common good is subordinated in this way can the state fulfill its mission, and only then is the commonweal truly achieved. We shall quote here only the most important text: What discourses or writings of philosophers, what laws of any commonwealth in any land or age, are worthy for a moment to be compared with the two commandments on which Christ says all the law and the prophets depend: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself* (Matth. XXII, 37-39)? All philosophy is here, physics, ethics logic . . . Here also is security for the welfare and renown of a commonwealth; for the perfect and true state cannot otherwise be established nor preserved than on the foundation and by the bond of faith and of firm concord; this will obtain when the highest and truest common good, namely God, is loved by all, and men love each other in Him without dissimulation, because then they love one another for His sake from whom they cannot disguise even their hidden intentions.—This text clearly shows how the Augustinian doctrine of the state flows out of the theology of charity and finally goes back to it again. If the ancient Roman heroes showed what community spirit, *pietas* and *humanitas*, meant for the grandeur of the state, so must Christians show that through the introduction of charity a still more noble kingdom can be established on earth.<sup>7</sup>

*De civitate Dei* XV, 4: *Terrena civitas . . . hic habet bonum suum, cuius societate laetatur, qualis esse de talibus laetitia rebus potest . . . Non . . . recte dicitur ea bona non esse, quae concupiscit haec civitas, quando est et ipsa in suo humano genere melior. Concupiscit enim terrenam quandam*

<sup>6</sup> On the divinization of the emperors see Julius Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, vol. II, 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1926, pp. 376 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, vol. I, Freiburg i. B. 1929, pp. 342-344.

pro rebus infimis pacem . . . Haec bona sunt et sine dubio Dei dona sunt. Sed si neglectis melioribus, quae ad supernam pertinent civitatem, ubi erit victoria in aeterna et summa pace secunda, bona ista sic concupiscuntur, ut vel sola esse credantur vel his, quae meliora creduntur, amplius diliguntur: necesse est miseria consequatur et quae inerat augeatur. Cf. Cicero, *De nat. deorum* III, 9, 21, quoted above §V.

Sermo 62, 5, 8; PL 38, 418: Discute nunc maiores tuos. Primi tibi sunt pater et mater . . . Maior sit patria et ipsis parentibus tuis, ut quidquid iusserint parentes contra patriam, non audiantur. Et quidquid iusserit patria contra Deum, non audiat.

*De civitate Dei* XIX, 16: Quia igitur hominis domus initium sive particula debet esse civitatis, omne autem initium ad aliquem sui generis finem et omnis pars ad universi, cuius pars est, integritatem refertur, satis apparet esse consequens, ut ad pacem civicam pax domestica referatur, id est, ut ordinata imperandi obediendique concordia cohabitantium referatur ad ordinatam imperandi obediendique concordiam civium. Ita fit, ut ex lege civitatis praecepta sumere patrem familias oporteat, quibus domum suam sic regat, ut sit paci adcommoda civitatis.

*De civitate Dei* II, 20 (The following conception is criticized): Reges non curent, quam bonis, sed quam subditis regnent . . . Quid alienae vineae potius quam quid suae vitae quisque noceat, legibus advertatur. Nullus ducatur ad iudicem, nisi qui alienae rei domui saluti vel cuiquam invito fuerit importunus aut noxius; ceterum de suis vel cum suis vel cum quibusque volentibus faciat quisque quod libet.—Some essential features of Roman Law are here very aptly criticized.

The notion *temporalis felicitas* occurs in *Epist.* 138, 4, 18; on *sempiterna salus* which in St. Augustine is also often a somewhat social thing, see *Epist.* 138, 3, 17: . . . propter adipiscendam sempiternam salutem et sempiterni cuiusdam populi caelestem divinamque rem publicam.

*Epist.* 137, 5, 17: Quae disputationes, quae litterae quorumlibet philosophorum, quae leges quarumlibet civitatum duobus praeceptis, ex quibus Christus dicit totam legem prophetasque pendere, ullo modo sunt comparandae? *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum* etc. Hic physica . . . hic ethica . . . hic logica . . . Hic etiam laudabilis rei publicae salus; neque enim conditur et custoditur optima civitas nisi fundamento et vinculo fidei firmaeque concordiae, cum bonum commune diligitur, quod summum ac verissimum Deus est, atque in illo invicem sincerissime se homines diligunt, cum propter illum se diligunt, cui, quo animo diligant, occultare non possunt.

*Epist.* 138, 2, 10: . . . accusatur religio tamquam inimica rei publicae. Quae si, ut dignum est, audiretur, longe melius Romulo, Numa, Bruto ceterisque illis Romanae gentis praeclaris viris constitueret, firmaret, augetetque rem publicam. Quid enim est res publica nisi res populi? Res ergo communis, res utique civitatis etc.

### *The principle in Canon Law*

XII. In the *Corpus Juris Canonici* the Roman principle appears expressly as a basic notion, which characterizes the spirit of Church legislation as a whole. Likewise, it is instrumental in the solution of a whole series of juridical problems and cases. The nature of these problems will be evident in the following texts.—Opposite this positive and constructive use of the principle, Canon Law contains a criticism of it which culminates in the propositions: *Dignior est lex privata quam publica*, and *Lex privata publicae legi praeiudicat*. This means that the Christian's inner life of obedience to the Holy Spirit is his own affair and holds preeminence over the public or the common good. The words of Holy Scripture (Acts V, 29): *We ought to obey God rather than men*, become



the basis of a surprisingly definite juridical formula despite the notion and evaluation of privilege in Roman Law, a formula which might seem to imply a reversal of our principle, though only with regard to a special case. Christian liberty is proclaimed in a determinate and well-defined sense as will be clear from the following texts.

C. 7, Q. 1, c. 35 (Ed. Lipsiensis II, Friedberg, col. 579 f.): *Causa necessitatis mutationes episcoporum fieri possunt.* The canon itself is taken from Pope Pelagius II: *Scias, frater dilectissime, aliud esse causam necessitatis et utilitatis, aliud praesumptionis ac propriae voluntatis. Non ergo mutat sedem qui non mutat mentem, id est qui non avariciae causa, aut dominationis, aut propriae voluntatis vel dilectionis suae migrat de civitate ad civitatem, sed causa necessitatis et utilitatis mutatur. Nam et plurimorum utilitas unius utilitati vel voluntati praeferenda est . . . Unde non isti mutant civitatem, sed mutantur, quia non sponte, sed coacte hoc agunt. Non ergo bene intelligunt ecclesiasticas regulas, qui hoc negant causa utilitatis vel necessitatis fieri posse, quociens communis necessitas aut utilitas persuaserit.*

C. 8, Q. 1, c. 9 (col. 592 f.): *Locus regiminis sicut desiderantibus est negandus, ita fugientibus est offerendus.* The canon itself is an extract from one of the letters of St. Gregory the Great. We quote it almost entirely because of its very considerable importance in the present matter: In scriptis vestris (he is writing to Cyriacus, bishop of Constantinople) vos magnopere requiem quesisse narratis, sed per hoc ad pastorem sollicitudinem vos congrue venisse ostenditis, quia sicut locus regiminis desiderantibus negandus est, ita fugientibus offerendus . . . Si is, qui valet, omnipotentis Dei oves pascere rennuat, ostendit se pastorem summum minime amare. Si enim unigenitus Patris pro explenda utilitate omnium de secreto Patris ad publicum nostrum egressus est, nos quid dicturi sumus, si secretum nostrum preponimus utilitati proximorum? Quies itaque nobis et ex corde appetenda est, et tamen pro multorum lucro aliquando postponenda. Nam, sicut toto desiderio debemus occupationem fugere, ita si desit qui predicet, occupationis onus libenti necesse est humero subire . . . St. Gregory then goes on to develop this into a theory of contemplative and active life and their respective values; the matter is illustrated by the examples of Jeremias and Isaías: Duo quippe sunt praecepta karitatis, amor Dei et proximi. Per activam igitur vitam prodesse proximis cupiens Ysaías offitium predicationis appetit. Per contemplativam vero Ieremias amoris conditoris sedule inherere desiderans, ne mitti ad predicandum debeat, contradicit. Quod laudabiliter ergo unus appetiit, hoc laudabiliter alter expavit; iste, ne tacitae contemplationis lucra loquendo perderet, ille, ne dampna studiosi operis tacendo sentiret. Sed hoc in utrisque est subtiliter intuendum, quia et is, qui recusavit, plene non restitit, et is, qui mitti voluit, ante se per altaris calculum purgatum vidit.

There is reference to the same problem in canons 10 and 11 (otium sanctum querit karitas veritatis, negotium iustum suscipit necessitas karitatis, St. Augustine), in C. 16, Q. 1, c. 30; col. 769 (nec vestrum ocium ecclesiae necessitatibus preponatis, St. Augustine), and in C. 19, Q. 2, c. 2; col. 839. This latter canon deserves a more detailed study. The *dictum* of Gratian is: Qui monachorum propositum appetit, etiam invito episcopo recipiendus est. The canon of Pope Urban II explains: *Duae sunt . . . leges, una publica, altera privata. Publica lex est . . . canonum, quae quidem propter transgressionem est tradita . . . Lex vero privata est, quae instinctu S. Spiritus in corde scribitur . . . Si quis . . . afflatus Spiritu sancto in aliquo monasterio . . . salvare se voluerit, quia lege privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit, ut a publica lege constringatur. Dignior est enim lex privata quam publica. Spiritus quidem Dei lex est, et qui Spiritu Dei aguntur lege Dei*

ducuntur; et quis est, qui possit Sancto Spiritui digne resistere? Quisquis igitur hoc Spiritu ducitur, etiam episcopo suo contradicente, eat liber nostra auctoritate. *Iusto enim lex non est posita, sed ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi libertas, et si Spiritu Dei ducimur, non estis sub lege.* Clearly, the "private" law of the Holy Ghost puts definite limits on the public law and the public good. The superiority of the private good with respect to the public good, and the formal reversal at least of our principle have never been more emphatically expressed in Christian language. See *infra*, text 26.

To the same group also belongs a document of Canon Law, used by St. Thomas in text 39. In a letter of Innocent III of April 29, 1206 (Potthast, *Reg. Rom. Pontificum* 2763), found in the Decretals of Gregory IX (X, 3, 31, 18; Ed. Friedberg 576), there is a text regarding a person who wished to transfer from a less strict religious order to one of stricter observance; it reads: *Talis, postquam a praelato suo transeundi licentiam postulaverit, ex lege privata, quae publicae legi praeiudicat, absolutus, libere potest sanctioris vitae propositum adimplere . . .* But the case is quite different for a bishop: . . . *nullus (episcopus) absque licentia Romani Pontificis praesumat occasione quacunque deserere praesulatum, quoniam, sicut maius bonum minori bono praeponitur, ita communis utilitas speciali utilitati praeferitur. Et in hoc casu (!) recte praeponitur doctrina silentio, sollicitudo contemplationi, et labor quieti.*

Other problems actually or at least virtually connected with our principle are the following:

The problem of the justification of capital punishment and the right to kill in a just war, that is one declared by the public authority on behalf of the commonwealth: C. 23, Q. 5, c. 7-9 (932 ff.), c. 28 (938), c. 42 (942), c. 48 (945). C. 24, Q. 3, especially c. 16 (955), c. 34 (999).

The problem of fraternal correction and related problems, e.g. the tolerance of sinners: C. 23, Q. 4, c. 1-4 (899); C. 2, Q. 1, c. 18 (446).

The problem of the objective foundation of the power of dispensation. See Brys, *De dispensatione in Iure Canonico*, Bruges 1925, pp. 29, 76, 84, 116 ff., 187 ff., 209-221.

XIII. Mediaeval jurisprudence has already made quite an interesting attempt to synthesize the traditional doctrine of the principle of the common good, using especially the documents of Canon Law. We refer here to a passage of the *Glossa ordinaria* to Gratian's *Decretum*. This *Glossa* was completed about the middle of the thirteenth century. Whoever, therefore, the author of this passage and whatever the exact date of its composition, we seem safe in taking it as a representative expression of the state of the question among the jurists contemporary with St. Thomas. The principle is treated in a sober way and the glossator seems to feel that it is too general to be easily applied in practice. But in his treatment he demonstrates great ability and a good grasp of the essentials of the problem. The incumbent of an ecclesiastical office, e.g. a bishop, must in no case whatsoever prefer his private interests to the common interests of the Church entrusted to his care. As was emphasized in Roman Law, which the jurist follows very closely, the principle is above all a rule for public life and for anyone in public office. The same idea can also be expressed as follows: When the private utility is contained in the public, the principle is always valid. This is the case of the bishop, for as such he is not a private individual but a public person. When and in so far as the public and private interests are separable and are separated, it is allowed to give preference to the private interests in the sense that they need suffer no loss, because ordered love begins at home. This statement at first glance may appear surprising and somewhat shocking. But it need not be, since it is injury of the soul and not injury of the body that is in question, and this not only in the ancient sense as explained by

Cicero, but also in the new Christian sense explained in the decrees of Urban II and Innocent III: the contemplative life which hearkens to the Holy Ghost is in itself preferable to the active life; *lex privata praejudicat legi publicae*.—This simple and unpretentious gloss of a jurist is a real masterpiece of juridical composition, which gives the lie to all those mediaeval theologians who accused the jurists of incompetence in the *reductio ad artem*.

The gloss to C. 7, Q. 1, c. 35, is taken from the edition of the *Glossa ordinaria* Paris 1501, f. CXC v.a.: *Preferenda est. Nam cum quis vocatur ad prelaturam, non preponet privatum commodum communi, ut hic et VIII, q. I in scripturis* (C. 8, Q. 1, c. 9; col. 592) et XVI, q. I. *vos autem* (C. 16, Q. 1, c. 30, col. 769). Et hoc intelligas, cum per publicum non impeditur privatum; alias enim suam utilitatem potest preferre: *ff. de iudiciis, si longius* (Dig. 5, 1, 18; p. 104a), *ff. de arbi., licet autem* (Dig. 4, 8, 15; p. 97b), *ff. ad leg. Aquil., si quis fumo* (Dig. 9, 2, 49; p. 162a), *ff. de prescriptis verb. 1. qui servandarum* (Dig. 19, 5, 14; p. 293a). Aliud tamen videtur in prelato, ut ille semper teneatur preponere utilitatem ecclesie sue proprie utilitati, ut XII, q. IV, *quicumque* (C. 12, Q. 4, c. 2; col. 714). Cum ergo detrimentum quis patitur pro publica utilitate, potest suam preponere utilitatem, XIX, q. II, *due* (C. 19, Q. 2, c. 2; col. 839), XIV dist., *quod ait* (D. 14, c. 2; col. 33), quia ordinata caritas a se incipit, XXIII, q. V, *si non licet* (C. 23, Q. 5, c. 9; col. 933), *de penitentia*, dist. II, *qui vult* (D. 6, c. 1, *De paenit.*; col. 1242). Vel dic quod, quando privata utilitas includitur in communi, tunc preponitur communis, ut est in prelatura, ut arguitur *ff. pro socio, l. actione, §Labeo* (Dig. 17, 2, 65; p. 260b). Vel distingue: an utilitas in acquirendo consistit aut in damno vitando; tunc secus, vel econverso.

On the theologians' opinion of jurists see Albert 4 *Sent.* 27, 2 (Ed. Borgnet 30, 131); *ibid.* 21 (180b), and especially *ibid.* 15 (159a): De hac reductione ad artem non curant iurisperiti, quia intendunt grossis pro vulgaribus, circa quae sunt casus et particularia.

### *St. Albert and St. Bonaventure*

XIV. For this paper I have made no special research into the pre-Thomistic scholastics. Suffice it, then, here to quote a certain number of passages from Book IV of St. Albert's Commentary on the Sentences, and from St. Bonaventure. *Salvo meliori iudicio* I would designate St. Albert as the first mediaeval thinker to join to the idea, contained in the Roman principle, the authority of the Stagirite and to substitute for the Roman expression that of Aristotle's Ethics I, 1094b 7. Every reader of the German scholastic knows how eager he was to make use of Aristotle's writings whenever he could and sometimes also however he could. The text of Aristotle's Ethics was, even before the translation of Robert Grosseteste, already known through the so-called *Ethica Nova*. It is only in Book IV of St. Albert's Commentary on the Sentences that the complete translation of Grosseteste enters into the theological system, and it seems to be there also that our text begins for the first time to play its rôle. In St. Bonaventure I can find no trace of any expression of the Roman principle in Aristotelian terms. Whereas St. Bonaventure neglects, whenever he can, the *mundana sapientia* of the Stagirite, St. Albert is diligent, and in his turn St. Thomas too, to set forth and display, whenever he could, how this same wisdom could be brought into the service of traditional truth.

Albert, 4 *Sent.* 26, 10 (Ed. Borgnet, p. 112): *Ponderatio personalis boni non est condigna continentis animae* (with reference to Eccli. 26, 20: *Omnis autem ponderatio non est digna continentis animae*: the scholastic problem is that of the dispensation from the vow of continence *propter melius bonum*, as was established in Canon Law). Sed tamen ponderatio boni communis praeponderat quantumcumque bono personali, praecipue tale bonum, quale

est salus speciei. Et hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles (!), quod si bonum est bonum hominis, melius erit quod civitatis, et maximum bonum gentis.—In the same way St. Albert says *ibid.* 38, 15, p. 415a: Licet enim bonum melius sit castitas, tamen minus bonum in genere, quando fit commune Ecclesiae, praeiudicat (cf. the texts of Canon Law, above §XII) meliori bono privato. For, as Albert states *ibid.* 16, p. 416b: Bonum commune Ecclesiae multo melius (est) quam bonum personale; or generally speaking, *ibid.* p. 417b: Commune minus (bonum) . . . sua communitate recompensat personale (maius) bonum; and 38, 18, p. 419b: Bonum commune melius est quam aliquod bonum particulare. The common good is in Albert either that of the *species* (26, 10, p. 111a: Dignior est species quam individuum et magis necessaria; *item ibid.* 31, 21, p. 254b: Dignior et melior est species individuo), or of *Ecclesia*, as the above quoted texts prove. A tacit reference to Aristotle's *Ethics* is still to be found in 49, 6, p. 674b: Si autem accipiatur secundum maximum posse ista (scil. ultima) felicitas, tunc erit in maximo bono hominis operatio prudentiae non impedita; hoc autem bonum est bonum gentis, non tantum hominis vel civitatis, amotis impedimentis etc.

Without pretence of giving a complete collection, I add one text to the passages given in the *Tabula generalis* of St. Bonaventure's works, Ed. Quaracchi X, p. 38, s.v. *bonum commune*. I *Sent.* 10, 1, 1; vol. I, 195b: Omne bonum in commune deductum pulchrius elucescit (St. Augustine!).—*Ibid.* 46, 3; p. 825a: Bonum commune praefertur bono privato.—3 *Sent.* 27, 2, 2; vol. III, 607a: A certain "modus dicendi (bonum) proprium" "sonat in vitium" (Cicero, *De officiis* I, 19, 62, see above §II). *Ibid.* 29, 3; p. 644a: Salus centum animorum magis facit ad honorem Dei et magis est appretianda quam salus unius animae.—*Ibid.* 39, 3, 3; p. 879b: . . . (ut communiter dicitur . . . ) bono privato praeferenda est utilitas communis.—4 *Sent.* 38, 2, 3; vol. IV, p. 823a: Communis utilitas praeferenda est bono privato.—It is beyond any doubt that St. Bonaventure's formulations are of the Roman-patristic stamp. On his general reserve as to the *mundana sapientia* of Aristotle see 4 *Sent.* 30, dub. 2; vol. IV, p. 712a. The Editors of Quaracchi are certainly mistaken, when in vol. IV, p. 823a, n. 3 they conjure the Philosopher in this connection.—See St. Thomas, *In I Cor.* 1, lect. 3; Ed. Vivès 20,614a: Per Graecos autem (Apostolus) omnes gentiles dat intelligere, qui a Graecis mundanam sapientiam acceperunt.

The translation of the *Ethica Nova* of the passage *Eth.* I, 1094b 7 in Marchesi, *L'Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione latina medievale*, Messina 1904, Appendix p. XXVIII.—On St. Albert and the *Ethics* see O. Lottin, *Saint Albert le Grand et l'Ethique à Nicomaque*, in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* I, *Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Phil. u. Theol. d. MA*, Suppl. III, Münster i. W. 1935, p. 622.

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Surveying what has been said we may briefly summarize the main doctrinal lines of our principle in Roman-patristic tradition.

The principle is the concise and pregnant expression of civic-mindedness, that is of the Roman *pietas*. The individual is conscious that he is part of a social whole. He prefers the good of this whole because his own good and its security are contained and safeguarded in it. In the proposition that the part is ordained to the whole the relation between particular and common good is given a determination that lends itself to a vast philosophical development. The wholes in question are the human social units: the state (*civitas*), the Empire, and, with the Fathers, the Church. In this connection the principle is a funda-

mental proposition as regards public order, a proposition solving a long series of theoretical and practical problems with regard to this order.

The *pietas*, however, is viewed from an ethical point of view. *Pietas* is a manifestation of unselfishness and magnanimity. When thinkers insist upon this aspect, they are inclined to lose sight of the relation to the concrete social whole which the principle originally implies. For the Romans, then, the principle becomes an expression of *humanitas*. For St. Augustine it expresses the essence of *caritas*. It becomes a criterion for determining on the one hand the order of ethical goods and the system of virtues, and on the other the order of charity.

Hence tradition employs the notion of common good in a double way not always clearly differentiated. On the one hand it is the good of the social whole as such, i.e., its unity, order, stability etc.; on the other hand it is the good of an individual man made common by unselfish communication.

Already in Roman Stoic philosophy the universal order of nature appears as an outstanding and even as the only true common good. Philosophical speculation on the preeminence of the common good manifests a special regard for this universal common good. The principle becomes a fundamental axiom of cosmology and this cosmology in turn, with its profound import in a host of problems, penetrates the discussion about the common good. The relation between common and singular good is viewed analogically as the relation between universal and particular, between intelligible idea and sensible reality. These connections are indicated by Seneca. St. Augustine saw them and used them especially in his controversy with the Manicheans, while at the same time protesting against the ancient divinization of the cosmos, which had always been one of the main points of controversy between Hellenism and Christianity.

We may note that this controversy will enter a new phase in medieval times when the Arabians reopen it and set into relief its larger theological and philosophical implications. This circumstance accounts for the fact that the medieval discussion of the common good will be freighted with the problems of creator and creation, the knowledge and providence of God, the nature of matter etc.

The sharpest, and historically the most important, Christian criticism of our principle is found in the precedence given to the *lex privata Spiritus Sancti*. In the history of ideas this proposition is clearly connected with the old Platonic controversy over the relative value of the philosopher and statesman, the theoretical and political life. The same theme will occupy a decidedly large place in the discussions about the common good by the Scholastics.

## PART II—THE THOMISTIC GLOSSARY

XV. Coming now to St. Thomas, let me first make a few observations as to the arrangement of the following glossary. All the texts which contain the principle, whether explicitly or implicitly have been collected. Care has been taken to quote the texts in sufficient length to show what particular problems St. Thomas wished to discuss in conjunction with it. Whenever St. Thomas uses the principle in a dialectical way, that is within a so-called objection, this is indicated by an asterisk. The pertinent *Responsiones* are collected under a separate heading (§XXI) along with other critical observations of St. Thomas.

It seemed that the glossary should consist of all those propositions in which a comparison is made between the particular and common good or thing and in which the superiority of the latter is in any way affirmed. This superiority is expressed in different ways as the headings under which we group the formulae will show (§XVI-XX).

It was not always easy to determine to which group a particular text should be assigned. This was the case with texts in which St. Thomas combined the

elements of distinct currents of tradition. An effort was made, however, to group the texts as accurately as possible.

The texts are ordered according to the general chronology of St. Thomas' works. Special problems of chronology, however, are outside the scope of this study.

*Citations and use of the principle*

XVI. Texts in which the expression of the principle is derived from Roman-patristic tradition.

1. 2 *Sent.* 11, I, 2 s.c.: Minima sunt, quae ad singulas personas pertinent.<sup>8</sup>—St. Gregory, *supra* §VIII.
2. 3 *Sent.* 9, II, 3 ad 3: (Praelatus) est persona publica et honoratur in ipso bonitas Ecclesiae vel reipublicae, quae est maior quam merita unius singularis personae.
3. 3 *Sent.* 30, I, 1 ad 4: Quia caritas ordinem habet, et plus debet diligere quisque se quam alium, et propinquos quam extraneos, et amicos quam inimicos, et bonum commune multorum quam bonum privatum unius, potest aliquis salva caritate optare malum temporale alicui et gaudere, si contingit, non inquantum est malum illius, sed inquantum est impedimentum malorum alterius, quem plus tenetur diligere, vel communitatis vel Ecclesiae.
4. \*4 *Sent.* 15, III, 2, q. 1 in 3: Quaelibet singularis persona est inferior quam Ecclesia.
5. 4 *Sent.* 19, II, 3 sol. 1 ad 2 (de ordine correctionis fraternae): Si (peccatum) non cedat in damnum alterius nec sit infectivum peccatum, tunc potest denuntiatio differri, quousque videatur admonitionis effectus, praecipue si (peccator) emendationem promittit. Si autem est infectivum aliorum, debet denuntiari praelato, ut gregi suo caveat. Sicut enim dicit Hieronymus<sup>9</sup> (Gratian, D. 45, c. 17; col. 166): Quae misericordia est parcere uni et multos in discrimen adducere? Polluitur populus ex uno peccatore, sicut ex una ove morbida universus grex.—Semper enim bonum multorum debet praeferrī bono unius (cf. Paulus, *supra* §II). Unde etiam fama unius negligi debet, ut innocentia vel fama multitudinis conservetur.
6. *Ibid.* ad 3: . . . (collegium) cuius bonum semper praeponendum est bono unius. Unde et aliquando, etiam si peccantis emendatio non expectatur, potest aliquis coram multitudine accusari, si profectus multitudinis credatur.
7. \*4 *Sent.* 49, I, 1 q. 3 in 2: Beatitudo est ultima perfectio hominis. Sed maior est perfectio alicuius rei secundum quod est causa aliorum quam secundum quod in se perfecta existit: unde dicit Dionysius in 3. cap. *De caelesti Hierarchia* (2; PG 165B), quod omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri in reductione aliorum.—Per intellectum autem speculativum homo habet perfectionem in seipso; intellectus autem practicus est causa aliorum. Ergo beatitudo magis consistit in intellectu practico quam in speculativo.—Text 172.
8. *Contra impugn. Dei cult. et rel.* 2 (Ed. Mandonnet, p. 12): Minora bona pro maioribus intermitteri possunt, ut dicit *Glossa* super illud Luc. IX, 60: *Tu autem vade et annuntia regnum Dei*. Sed bonum commune praefertur bono privato. Cum ergo monachus in claustro ordinem suum servans privato

<sup>8</sup> Minima non dicuntur ibi simpliciter parva, sed simpliciter magna, respective parva. Respectu enim eorum, quae nuntiant Archangeli, quae supernaturalia sunt, minima dicuntur, quae pertinent ad aequitatem providentiae communis et dispensationem uniuscuiusque ad iustam sui meriti retributionem; quamvis in se contemplari causas et rationes

talium in Verbo maximum sit. St. Albert, *Summa theol.* II, 10, 39; I, 3; Ed. Borgnet 32, 478.

<sup>9</sup> The edition Vivès, vol. 10, p. 561 reads *Origenes* instead of *Hieronymus*. Since, however, St. Thomas is manifestly quoting from the *Decretum*, the only correct reading is *Hieronymus*.

bono insistas, scil. tantum suae salutis (Gratian, C. 19, Q. 2, c. 30; *supra* §XII), doctrinae autem officium, quo plurimi erudiuntur, in commune bonum totius Ecclesiae redundet, non est inconveniens, si monachus extra claustrum vivat ad doctrinae officium assumptus de licentia eius, ad quem spectat.

9. *Quodlib.* 11, 12: Oportet ordinem fraternae correctionis sumere secundum ordinem caritatis. Ordo autem caritatis est, ut quis bono proximi praeferat commune bonum.
10. *Contra gent.* 3, 64 (Ed. Leonina manual p. 297a): Id . . . quod est maxime bonum in rebus causatis, est bonum universi, quod est maxime perfectum, ut Philosophus dicit (*Metaph. Lambda*, 1075a 11); cui etiam consonat Scriptura divina, Genesi I, 31, cum dicitur: *Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona*, cum de singulis operibus dixisset simpliciter, quod erant bona (Augustinus, *supra* §X). Bonum igitur ordinis rerum causatarum a Deo est id, quod est praecipue volitum et causatum a Deo . . . Id igitur, quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi.<sup>10</sup>
11. *Contra gent.* 3, 125; p. 378b: Non . . . propter bonum unius debet praetermitti<sup>11</sup> bonum multorum.—Cf. text 72.
12. *Contra gent.* 3, 135, p. 391a: . . . illi, qui praetermissa propriorum cura utilitati communi deserviunt . . . Qui . . . voluntariam paupertatem assumunt, ut Christum sequantur, ad hoc utique omnia dimittunt, ut communi utilitati deserviant.
13. *De verit.* 5, 4 ad 4: Quodlibet . . . particulare bonum est parvum respectu boni alicuius naturae universalis.—Cf. text 1.
14. *In I Cor.* lect. 2 (Ed. Vivès 20, 607b): Est . . . divisionis causa, dum unusquisque naturale bonum quaerit, praetermisso perfecto bono, quod est bonum totius.
15. *In II Cor.* 1, 2 (Ed. Vivès 21, 61a): In donis divinis est ordo. Ad hoc enim Deus dat aliquibus specialia dona, ut ipsi effundant illa in utilitatem aliorum. Non enim dat lumen soli, ut sibi soli luceat, sed ut toti mundo. Unde vult, quod de omnibus bonis nostris, sive sint divitiae, sive potentia, sive scientia, sive sapientia, accrescat aliqua utilitas aliis; I Petr. 4, 10: *Unusquisque gratiam, quam accepit, in alterutrum illam administrantes*. Hoc est ergo, quod Apostolus dicit: *Consolatur nos in omni tribulatione*. Sed quare? Non ut solum nobis hoc sit ad bonum, sed ut etiam aliis prosit.
16. *\*De potentia* 5, 5 in 5: (Quaeritur, utrum motus caeli quandoque deficiat. Et videtur, quod non . . . Terra (enim) in aeternum stat, ut dicitur Eccle. I, 4). Sed dicebatur, quod motus caeli non est propter hunc finem, sed ad complendum numerum electorum, quo completo motus caeli quiescit. Sed contra: Nihil est propter vilius se, eo quod finis est nobilior his, quae sunt ad finem (*Topica* III, 116b 22), cum finis sit causa bonitatis in his, quae sunt ad finem. Sed caelum, cum sit incorruptibile, est nobilius quam generabilia et corruptibilia. Ergo non potest dici, quod motus caeli sit propter aliquam generationem in istis inferioribus, per quam tamen numerus electorum posset compleri.—Cf. Augustinus, *supra* §X; text 178.
17. *\*De potentia* 6, 1 in 21: Inconveniens est, ut maius bonum dimittatur pro minori bono. Sed bonum universi est maius quam aliquod bonum particulare cuiuscumque. Unde Augustinus dicit, quod Deus fecit bona etiam singula, simul autem omnia valde bona (text 10). Ergo inconveniens est, quod propter salutem alicuius hominis vel alicuius gentis Deus mutet cursum naturae.—Text 179.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *supra* §X and texts 14 and 19. Moreover *Contra gent.* 2, 44 and 45 (p. 137b, 139a); I, 25, 6 in 3 and elsewhere.

<sup>11</sup> For the word *praetermittere* (*intermittere*, text 8) see Cicero, *De officiis* I, 10, 32 and St. Thomas 3 *Sent.* 33, II, 5 in 4.

18. *De carit.* 9 ad 15: Secundum ea, quae pertinent proprie ad propriam personam alicuius, (aliquis) plus debet exhibere dilectionis effectum parentibus quam extraneis, nisi forte inquantum in bono alicuius extranei penderet bonum commune, quod etiam sibi ipsi imponere quisque debet.—Cf. text 31.
19. \*I, 93, 2 and 3.<sup>12</sup> Quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, quia etsi *bona* sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur *valde bona*, Gen. I, 31. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei et non solum homo.<sup>13</sup>—Text 183.
20. I, 113, 3: Hoc videtur esse minimum in officiis angelorum procurare ea, quae ad unius hominis salutem pertinent.—Text 1.
21. *De perfectione vitae spiritualis* 13 (Ed. Mandonnet, p. 224): Bonum commune secundum rectam rationem est bono proprio praeferendum: unde unaquaeque pars naturali quodam instinctu ordinatur ad bonum totius.
22. \**Quodlib.* 3, 12 in 5: Communis utilitas praefenda est bono privato. Sed per hoc, quod aliqui religionem intrant, derogatur communi utilitati: si enim omnes religionem intrarent, non essent, qui plebium curam agerent.—Text 184.
23. \**Quodlib.* 3, 17 in 4: Bonum publicum praeferendum est bono privato, et vita activa est magis fructuosa quam contemplativa (Cicero, *supra* §VI) . . . Sed archidiaconi et plebani intendunt utilitati communi multitudinis . . . Ergo praefendi sunt religiosi, qui saluti propriae student in vita contemplativa Deo servientes.—Text 185.
24. *Quodlib.* 4, 12: Si . . . peccatum fratris non sit adeo occultum, quin per aliquas suspiciones in multitudinis notitiam veniat, unde multorum scandalum oriatur, iam peccatum non solum nocet illi, sed multis (Gratian, C. 2, Q. 2, Q. 1, c. 19). Et quia bonum multitudinis praefertur bono unius, ideo praelatus debet disquirere veritatem de facto, ut scandalum multitudinis vel cesset per poenam peccantis vel per eius excusationem. (Gregory IX, in X, 5, 34, 16).
25. \*I-II, 3, 5 in 1: Videtur, quod beatitudo consistat in operatione intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam per intellectum speculativum, cuius scientia accipitur a rebus. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus practici quam speculativi.—Cf. texts 7, 187.
26. \*I-II, 96, 5 in 2: Urbanus Papa dicit, et habetur in *Decretis* (*supra* §XII): Qui lege privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit, ut publica constringatur. Lege autem privata Spiritus Sancti ducuntur omnes viri spirituales, qui sunt filii Dei, secundum illud Rom. VIII, 14: *Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt*. Ergo non omnes homines legi humanae subduntur.<sup>14</sup>—Text 189.
27. \*I-II, 97, 4 in 1: Commune bonum non debet intermitteri pro privato commodo alicuius personae.—Texts 89, 190.
28. \*I-II, 105, 4 in 5: Bonum commune secundum virtutem est bono privato praeferendum ab unoquoque. Sed in bello, quod committitur contra hostes, quaeritur bonum commune (Gratian, C. 23, Q. 7, c. 7; Q. 3, c. 5 *et passim*). Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XX, 5, quod imminente praelio aliqui domum remittantur . . .
29. II-II, 25, 6 ad 2: Peccantes, de quibus magis praesumitur nocumentum aliorum quam eorum emendatio, secundum legem divinam et humanam praeciuntur occidi (Gratian, C. 23, Q. 4, cc. 33, 45 *et passim*). Et tamen hoc

<sup>12</sup> See above, note 4.

<sup>13</sup> See texts 110, 111, 117 and note 30.

<sup>14</sup> The canon of Urban II is also quoted in

*Contra pestif. doct. retrah. homin. a relig. ingressu* 11 (Ed. Mandonnet, p. 299) and *Quodlib.* III, 17 s.c.



- facit iudex non ex odio eorum, sed ex amore caritatis, quo bonum publicum praeferret vitae singularis personae.
30. II-II, 26, 4 ad 3: Sicut Augustinus dicit in *Regula*, cum dicitur: *Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt*, sic intelligitur, quod communia propriis anteponit.—Cf. text 93.
31. II-II, 31, 3 ad 3: Parentes in recompensandis beneficiis sunt omnibus aliis praeferendi, nisi necessitas ex alia parte praeponderat vel aliqua conditio, puta communis utilitas Ecclesiae vel reipublicae (Augustinus, *supra* §XI).
32. II-II, 32, 6: . . . pro talis personae (per quam Ecclesia vel respublica sustentaretur) liberatione (aliquis) seipsum et suos laudabiliter periculo mortis exponeret, cum bonum commune sit proprio praeferendum . . . Quando occurreret . . . aliqua magna necessitas reipublicae . . . , laudabiliter praetermitteret aliquis id, quod ad decentiam sui status pertinere videtur, ut maiori necessitati subveniret.
33. II-II, 40, 4: Multo magis est observanda salus reipublicae, per quam impediuntur occisiones plurimorum et innumera mala et temporalia et spiritualia, quam salus corporalis unius hominis.
34. II-II, 58, 11 s.c.: Ambrosius dicit in I *De off.* (24; PL 16, 62): Iustitia est, quae . . . utilitatem propriam negligit, ut communem aequitatem custodiat.
35. II-II, 68, 1 ad 3: Revelare secreta in malum personae est contra fidelitatem; non autem, si revelentur propter bonum commune, quod semper praeferendum est bono privato. Et ideo contra bonum commune nullum secretum licet recipere.—Cf. text 24.
36. \*II-II, 102, 3 in 2: Illi, qui sunt in dignitate constituti, curam gerunt boni communis. Consanguinei autem pertinent ad bonum privatum, quod est propter bonum commune contemnendum; unde laudabiliter aliqui pro bono communi periculis mortis seipsos exponunt. Ergo observantia per quam exhibetur cultus his, qui in dignitate sunt constituti, est potior virtus quam pietas, quae cultum exhibet personis sanguine iunctis.
37. \*II-II, 185, 2 in 1 (cf. Gratian, C. 8, Q. 1, c. 9; *supra* §XII): Videtur, quod liceat episcopatum iniunctum recusare. Ut enim Gregorius dicit in *Pastoralibus* (Gratian, l. c.): per activam vitam prodesse proximis cupiens Isaias officium praedicationis appetiit; per contemplativam vero Ieremias amoris Conditoris sedulo inhaerere desiderans, ne mitti ad praedicationem debeat, contradicit.—Nullus autem peccat, si meliora nolit deserere, ut minus bonis inhaereat. Cum ergo amor Dei praeemineat dilectioni proximi, et vita contemplativa praeferatur vitae activae . . . , videtur, quod non peccat ille, qui omnino episcopatum recusat.—Text 200.
38. II-II, 185, 2 s.c.: Augustinus dicit ad Eudoxium (Gratian, C. 16, Q. 1, c. 30) . . . neque otium vestrum necessitatibus Ecclesiae praeponatis.
39. \*II-II, 188, 6 in 1: Dicitur . . . (X, 3, 31, 18; *supra* §XII): sicut maius bonum minori bono praeponitur, ita communis utilitas speciali utilitati praeferitur; et in hoc casu recte praeponitur doctrina silentio, sollicitudo contemplationi et labor quieti.—Sed religio est melior, quae ad maius bonum ordinatur. Ergo videtur, quod religiones, quae ordinantur ad vitam activam, sint potiores . . . Text 201.
40. II-II, 188, 7: Sollicitudo, quae circa proprias divitias adhibetur, pertinet ad amorem privatum, quo quis se temporaliter amat. Sed sollicitudo, quae adhibetur circa res communes, pertinet ad amorem caritatis, quae *non quaerit quae sua sunt*, sed communibus intendit.
41. \*II-II, 188, 8 in 4: (Videtur, quod perfectior sit religio in societate viventium quam agentium solitariam vitam. Nam) Dominus dicit Luc. XI, 33: *Nemo accendit lucernam et in abscondito ponit, neque sub modio*. Sed illi, qui solitariam vitam agunt, videntur esse in abscondito positi, nihil utilitatis

hominibus afferentes. Ergo videtur, quod eorum religio non sit perfectior.—Text 202.

42. III, 42, 2: Salus multitudinis est praeferenda paci quorum-cumque singularium hominum.

XVII. Texts in which the expression of the principle is based on Aristotle's *Ethics* I, 1094b 7.

43. 2 *Sent.* 9, I, 3: (Archangeli) dicuntur maiora nuntiare, quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, secundum Philosophum in I *Eth.*—Cf. text 1.
44. 2 *Sent.* 11, I, 2 s.c.: Minima sunt, quae ad singulares personas pertinent, quia quanto bonum est communius, tanto est divinius, secundum Philosophum in I *Eth.*—Text 1.
45. 2 *Sent.* 23, I, 2: (utrum Deus debuerit permittere hominem tentari vel peccare.) Ad providentiam divinam pertinet, ut unumquodque in sua natura relinquatur, quia, ut Dionysius dicit (*De div. nom.* 4, 33, PG 3, 733), providentia non est corruptiva naturae, sed salvativa. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum universi excedit bonum particulare cuiusque naturae creatae, sicut etiam bonum gentis excedit bonum unius hominis, ut in I *Eth.* dicitur. Si autem aliqua natura a suo gradu translata in altiore per providentiam mutetur, quamvis aliquod bonum illi naturae excresceret, tamen bonitati universi aliquid detraheretur . . . Dico ergo quod, si peccatum omnino impidiretur, per hoc multi gradus bonitatis tollerentur.—Cf. August. *De continentia* 6, 15; PL 40, 359.
46. 2 *Sent.* 29, I, 3 ad 4: Deus ex malo semper maius bonum elicit (cf. Augustine 1. c. in text 45); non tamen illi de necessitate, in quo malum esse permittit, sed in comparatione ad universum, cuius pulchritudo consistit (? consurgit, cf. *Contra gent.* 3, 71) ex hoc, quod mala esse sinuntur. Bonum autem universi praeponderat bono particularis rei, sicut bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum hominis, ut in I *Eth.* Philosophus dicit.<sup>15</sup>
47. 2 *Sent.* 32, II, 2: Sicut bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis, ut in I *Eth.* dicitur, ita etiam bonum universi praepollet bono particularis rei et specialis naturae. Unde etiam defectus in universum redundans deterior est. Si autem humani generis naturalis multiplicatio tolleretur, in defectum totius universi redundaret . . . Et ideo non debuit intermitteri humanae generationis processus naturalis, ut infectio originalis vitaretur.
48. 3 *Sent.* 1, I, 2 ad 6: (Mortale peccatum actuale est maius quam originale, quia habet plus de voluntario. Ergo, cum homo possit pro mortali satisfacere, potest multo fortius pro originali satisfacere.—Against this objection St. Thomas states:) Bonum, quod per peccatum actuale corrumpitur, est bonum huius personae, cui praeponderat bonum totius naturae, quod per originale corrumpitur, quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, ut dicitur in I *Eth.* Unde et originale peius erit quam actuale.
49. \*3 *Sent.* 32, 5, q. 4 in 2: Bonum commune est divinius quam bonum unius. Sed bonum humani generis est bonum commune, bonum autem Christi est bonum unius singularis personae. Ergo (Deus) plus diligit humanum genus quam Christum.—Text 166.
50. 3 *Sent.* 35, I, 3 sol. 1: Activa vita consistit in omnibus agibilibus, sive sint ad seipsum, sive ad alium: sed principaliter consistit in his, quae ad alium sunt, quia bonum multorum, secundum Philosophum, est divinius quam bonum unius. Unde et iustitia, quae ad alterum est, a Philosopho in V *Eth.* (1129b 27) dicitur esse pulcherrima virtutum.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. I, 22, 2 ad 2; 48, 2 ad 3; 92, 1 ad 3.

51. 3 *Sent.* 35, I, 3 sol. 1 ad 1: Per ea, quae ad seipsum sunt, homo disponit se tantum ad (vitam) contemplativam, sed per ea, quae ad alium comparantur, homo et se et alios disponit, quod divinius est.
52. 3 *Sent.* 35, I, 3 sol. 1 ad 2: (The objection is: Homo magis debet seipsum diligere quam alios . . . Ergo et vita activa magis consistit in hoc, quod homo seipsum ordinet quam aliis intendat. The answer:) In hoc ipso, quod homo aliorum salutem et regimini studet, se plus diligit et sibi meliorem partem reservat, quia divinius est et sibi et aliis causam bonae operationis esse quam sibi tantum, sicut dicit Philosophus in IX *Eth.*—Cf. text 133. The word *divinius*, however, points to *Eth.* I.
53. \*3 *Sent.* 35, I, 4 q. 1 in 2: Bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius. Sed vita contemplativa consistit in bono unius hominis; vita activa in bono multorum. Ergo vita activa est nobilior quam contemplativa.—Text 167.
54. \*4 *Sent.* 2, I, 3 q. 1 in 3: Bonum commune est divinius quam bonum personae, ut dicitur in I *Eth.* Sed matrimonium et ordo ordinantur in remedium commune, alia autem (sacramenta) in remedium unius personae . . . Ergo illa duo sacramenta ante alia poni debebant.—Text 168.
55. 4 *Sent.* 15, II, 4 sol. 1: Illud quo subtracto non potest servari decencia status aliquo modo sui vel suorum, non debet aliquis in eleemosynas expendere . . . nisi necessitas alia praeponderet . . . Ecclesiae vel reipublicae, quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius.—Text 32.
56. 4 *Sent.* 24, III, 2 sol. 3: Ubicumque sunt multa ordinata in unum, oportet esse aliquod universale regimen supra particularia regimina . . . Bonum autem commune divinius est quam bonum speciale. Et ideo super potestatem regitivam, quae coniectat bonum speciale, oportet esse potestatem regitivam universalem respectu boni communis: alias non posset esse colligatio in unum. Et ideo, cum tota Ecclesia sit unum corpus, oportet, si ista unitas debet conservari, quod sit aliqua potestas regitiva respectu totius Ecclesiae supra potestatem episcopalem, qua unaquaeque specialis Ecclesia regitur.<sup>16</sup>
57. \*4 *Sent.* 26, I, 2 in 3: Bonum speciei melius est quam individui, quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, ut dicitur in I *Eth.* Sed praeceptum primo homini datum ad conservationem individui per actum nutritivae adhuc obligat. Ergo multo magis praeceptum de matrimonio, quod pertinet ad conservationem speciei.—Text 169.
58. \*4 *Sent.* 31, I, 1 in 1: Videtur, quod matrimonium non debeat habere aliqua bona, quibus excusetur. Sicut enim conservatio individui . . . est de intentione naturae, ita conservatio speciei, quae fit per matrimonium; et multo magis, quanto melius et divinius est bonum speciei quam bonum individui. Sed ad actum nutritivae excusandum non indiget aliquibus. Ergo nec etiam ad excusandum matrimonium.
59. 4 *Sent.* 38, I, 4, sol. 1 ad 3: Bonum commune est multo<sup>17</sup> melius quam bonum privatum, propter quod etiam homo interdum ab otio sanctae contemplationis removetur, quae *optima pars* est iudicio Domini, Luc. X, 42, ut communi utilitati proximorum vacet. Et ideo alii dicunt probabilius: si communis utilitas totius Ecclesiae aut unius regni vel provinciae exposceret, posset convenire et in voto continentiae et in voto religionis dispensari, quantumcumque esset solemnizatum.<sup>18</sup>—Cf. texts 59, 195.
60. \*4 *Sent.* 49, I, 1 q. 1 in 3: (utrum beatitudo in bonis corporis consistat). Quanto aliquod bonum est communius, tanto divinius, ut patet in I *Eth.* Sed bonum corporale communius est quam spirituale etc.—Text 170.
61. \*4 *Sent.* 49, I, 1 q. 3 in 1: Videtur quod beatitudo magis consistat in actu

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *De regimine princ.* 1, 1; I, 103, 3 and *passim*.

<sup>17</sup> The word *multo* might go back to Eustratius, *In Eth. Nic.* I (Ed. Heylbut, Berlin,

1892, p. 18, line 2).

<sup>18</sup> The *anonymi* are identified in Ed. *Summ. theol.* Ottawa, p. 1886b35.

intellectus practici quam speculativi. Quanto enim aliquod bonum est communius, tanto est divinius, ut patet in I Eth. Sed bonum intellectus speculativi est singulariter eius, qui speculatur. Bonum autem intellectus practici potest esse commune multorum.—Text 171.

62. \*4 *Sent.* 49, V 3, q. 2 in 11: Bonum commune est potius bono particulari. Sed si aliquis pro conservatione reipublicae moriatur in bello iusto, non debetur ei aureola. Ergo etiam si occidatur pro conservatione fidei in seipso. Et sic martyrio aureola non debetur.—Text 173.
63. *Contra gent.* 1, 41, p. 38a: Bonum universale praeeminet cuilibet bono particulari, sicut bonum gentis est melius quam bonum unius. Bonitas enim totius et perfectio praeeminet bonitati et perfectioni partis. Sed divina bonitas comparatur ad omnia alia sicut universale bonum ad particulare, cum sit omnis boni bonum . . . Est igitur ipse summum bonum.
64. *Contra gent.* 2, 42, p. 133a: Optimum . . . in omnibus entibus causatis est ordo universi, in quo bonum universi consistit, sicut et in rebus humanis bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius. Oportet igitur ordinem universi sicut in causam propriam reducere in Deum.
65. *Contra gent.* 2, 44; p. 136a: Quanto aliquid est melius in effectibus, tanto est prius in intentione agentis. Optimum autem in rebus creatis est perfectio universi, quae consistit in ordine distinctarum rerum. In omnibus enim perfectio totius praeeminet perfectioni singularium partium.
66. *Contra gent.* 2, 44; p. 137b: Cum bonum totius sit melius quam bonum partium singularium, non est optimi factoris<sup>10</sup> diminuere bonum totius, ut aliquarum partium augeat bonitatem.
67. *Contra gent.* 2, 45; p. 138b: Operi a summo bono artifice facto non debuit deesse summa perfectio. Sed bonum ordinis diversorum est melius quolibet illorum ordinatorum per se sumpto: est enim formale respectu singularium, sicut perfectio totius respectu partium. Non debuit ergo bonum ordinis operi Dei deesse.
68. *Contra gent.* 3, 17; p. 241b: Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem: esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum commune, cum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat. Bonum autem, quo quaelibet res bona est, est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum, quae ab ipso dependent. Omnes igitur res ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum, quod est Deus.
69. *Contra gent.* 3, 69; p. 303b: Melius est, quod bonum alicui collatum sit multorum commune quam quod sit proprium, quia bonum commune semper invenitur esse divinius quam bonum unius tantum. Sed bonum unius fit multis commune, si ab uno in alia derivatur; quod non potest esse, nisi inquantum diffundit ipsum in alia per propriam actionem. Si vero potestatem non habet illud in alia transfundendi, manet sibiipsi proprium. Sic igitur Deus rebus creatis suam bonitatem communicavit, ut una res, quod accepit, possit in aliam transfundere. Detrahare ergo actiones proprias rebus, est divinae bonitati derogare.
70. *Contra gent.* 3, 69; p. 304a: Subtrahere ordinem rebus creatis est eis subtrahere id, quod optimum habent: nam singula in seipsis sunt bona, simul autem omnia optima propter ordinem universi: semper enim totum est melius partibus et finis earum.
71. *Contra gent.* 3, 71; p. 307b: Bonum totius praeeminet bono partis. Ad providum igitur gubernatorem pertinet negligere aliquem defectum bonitatis in parte, ut fiat augmentum bonitatis in toto . . . Non igitur per divinam providentiam debuit malum a rebus excludi.

<sup>10</sup>Plato, *Timaeus Chalcidius interpret.* §9 (Ed. Mullach, Paris 1867, p. 157).

72. *Contra gent.* 3, 125; p. 378b: (Marriage between blood-relations is generally not permitted. There are, however, possible exceptions. It is true that) non propter bonum unius debet praetermitti bonum multorum, cum bonum multitudinis semper sit divinius quam bonum unius. Ne tamen defectus, qui in aliquo uno posset accidere, omnino absque medela remaneat, residet apud legislatores et eis similes auctoritas dispensandi in eo, quod communiter est statutum.
73. \**Contra gent.* 3, 136; p. 393a: Viri . . . et mulieris coniunctio ad bonum speciei ordinatur. Divinius autem est bonum speciei quam bonum individui. Magis ergo peccat, qui omnino abstinet ab actu, quo conservatur species, quam peccaret, qui abstinere ab actu, quo conservatur individuum.—Cf. text 169.
74. *Contra gent.* 3, 146; p. 404b: Bonum commune melius est quam bonum particulare unius. Subtrahendum est igitur bonum particulare, ut conservetur bonum commune. Vita autem quorundam pestiferorum impedit commune bonum, quod est concordia societatis humanae (Gratian, C. 23, Q. 5, c. 1). Subtrahendi igitur sunt huiusmodi homines per mortem ab hominum societate.—Cf. text 29.
75. *De verit.* 5, 3: Providentia Dei, qua res gubernat, est similis . . . providentiae, qua paterfamilias gubernat domum et rex civitatem aut regnum. In quibus gubernationibus hoc est commune, quod bonum commune est eminentius quam bonum civitatis vel familiae vel personae, ut habetur in principio Ethicorum. Unde quilibet provisor plus attendit, quid communitati conveniat, si sapienter gubernat, quam quid uni tantum.
76. *De verit.* 5, 3 ad 3: Bonum naturae, quod est communicabile, praeeminet bono individui, quod est singulare.
77. *De potentia* 5, 5: Potest . . . contingere, quod vilior sit terminus operationis rei nobilioris; non autem, ut sit finis intentionis: sicut securitas rustici est terminus quidam, ad quem operatio regis gubernantis terminatur, non tamen regimen regis est ordinatum ad huius rustici securitatem sicut in finem, sed in aliquid melius, scil. in bonum commune.<sup>20</sup>
78. *In Eth.* 1, 2 (Ed. Pirotta, n. 30): Ostendit (Aristoteles) quod politica (scientia) sit principalissima ex ipse ratione proprii finis. Manifestum est enim, quod unaquaeque causa tanto prior est et potior, quanto ad plura se extendit. Unde et bonum, quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est, quanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo, si idem bonum est uni homini et toti civitati, multo videtur "maius" et "perfectius" "suscipere" i.e. procurare et "salvare" illud quod est bonum totius civitatis, quam id, quod est bonum unius hominis. Pertinet quidem ad amorem, qui debet esse inter homines, quod homo conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini. Sed multo "melius" et "divinius" est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti "genti et civitatibus". Vel: aliquando "amabile" quidem est, quod hoc exhibeatur uni soli civitati, sed multo "divinius" est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti "genti", in qua multae civitates continentur.<sup>21</sup> Dicitur autem hoc esse "divinius", eo quod magis pertinet ad Dei similitudinem, qui est ultima causa omnium bonorum . . . (31) Sciendum est autem, quod politicam dicit esse principalissimam non simpliciter, sed in genere activarum scientiarum, quae sunt circa res humanas, quarum ultimum finem politica considerat. Nam ultimum finem totius universi considerat scientia divina quae est respectu omnium principalissima.
79. *In Eth.* 3, 4, 537, 538: Fortitudo est . . . circa mortem, quam quis sustinet pro optimis rebus, sicut contingit, cum aliquis moritur in bello propter

<sup>20</sup> Cf. 2 *Sent.* 1, II, 3 ad 3 and Moses Maimonides, *The Guide for the Perplexed* III,

13; Engl. tr. London 1936, p. 276.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Eustratius, *op. cit.* p. 3, line 3.

- patriae defensionem . . . Mors, quae est in bello, . . . est in periculo optimo, quia homo pericula sustinet hic propter bonum commune, quod est optimum, ut in principio dictum est.
80. *In Eth.* 10, 11, 2099: Felicitati, quae est ultimus finis, maxime competit vacatio. Quae quidem non invenitur in operationibus virtutum practicarum, quarum praecipuae sunt illae, quae consistunt in rebus politicis, utpote ordinantes bonum commune, quod est divinissimum, vel in rebus bellicis, quibus ipsum bonum commune defenditur contra hostes. Et tamen his operibus non competit vacatio.
  81. *In Eth.* 10, 11, 2102: Inter omnes actiones virtutum moralium excellunt politicae et bellicae tam pulchritudine, quia sunt maxime honorabiles, quam etiam magnitudine, quia sunt circa maximum bonum, quod est bonum commune.
  82. *In Polit.* 1, 1: (Communitas politica) est . . . coniectatrix principalissimi boni inter omnia bona humana; intendit enim bonum commune, quod est melius et divinius quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in principio Ethicorum.
  83. *De regimine principum* 1, 9: Si virtutis est, ut per eam opus hominis bonum reddatur, maioris virtutis esse videtur, quod maius bonum per eam aliquis operatur. Maius autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam bonum unius . . . Pertinet autem ad regis officium, ut bonum multitudinis studiose procuret. Maius igitur praemium debetur regi pro bono regimine, quam subdito pro bona actione.
  84. *\*De correctione fraterna* 2 in 11: Agens naturale unumquodque facit quanto melius potest, et similiter agens artificiale. Ergo etiam corripiens fratrem ex caritate, debet hoc facere quanto melius potest. Sed melius est, quod hoc faciat publice; sic enim magis prodest multitudini: bonum autem multorum est melius quam bonum unius.—Text 181.
  85. *De spe* 1 ad 9: Diligere Deum super omnia potest intelligi . . . uno modo secundum quod bonum divinum est principium et finis totius esse naturalis. Et sic amant Deum super omnia non solum rationalia, sed et bruta animalia et inanimata inquantum amare possunt, quia unicuique parti amabilius est bonum totius quam proprium bonum. Unde naturaliter manus se exponit ictui pro salute totius corporis.
  86. *I.* 50, 4 ad 3: Bonum speciei praeponderat bono individui. Unde multo melius est, quod multiplicentur species in angelis, quam quod multiplicentur individua in una specie.
  87. *I.* 108, 6: (Principatus) sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et praecipuum in divinis ministeriis: nam bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis.
  88. *De perfectione vitae spiritualis* 14: Sunt . . . alii, qui spiritualia bona et divina supra naturam et rationem existentia aliis largiuntur, scil. doctrinam divinorum, manuductionem ad Deum et spirituale sacramentorum communicationem . . . Huiusmodi autem bonorum collatio ad singularem quandam perfectionem pertinet fraternae dilectionis, quia per haec bona homo ultimo fini coniungitur . . . Additur autem ad hanc perfectionem, si huiusmodi bona non uni tantum vel duobus, sed toti multitudini exhibeantur, quia etiam secundum Philosophum bonum gentis perfectius est et divinius quam bonum unius. Unde et Apostolus dicit, Eph. IV, 11: *Alios autem pastores et doctores ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi*, scil. totius Ecclesiae.
  89. *\*I-II*, 97, 4 in 1: Lex statuta est pro communi utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit (D. 4, c. 2). Sed commune bonum non debet intermitteri pro privato commodo alicuius personae, quia, ut dicit Philosophus in *I Eth.*, bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis. Ergo videtur, quod non debeat

dispensari cum aliquo, ut contra legem communem agat.—Text 190.

89. \*I-II, 97, 4 in 1: Lex statuta est pro communi utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit gratum faciens. Bonum enim gentis est melius quam bonum unius, ut Philosophus dicit in I Eth. Sed gratia gratum faciens ordinatur solum ad bonum unius hominis, gratia autem gratis data ordinatur ad bonum commune totius Ecclesiae.—Text 191.
91. \*I-II, 113, 9 in 2: Iustificatio impii ordinatur ad bonum particulare unius hominis. Sed bonum universi est maius quam bonum unius hominis, ut patet in I Eth. Ergo maius opus est creatio caeli et terrae quam iustificatio impii.<sup>22</sup>—Cf. St. Augustine, *supra* §X.—Text 192.
92. II-II, 26, 3: Unaquaeque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium. Quod manifestatur ex opere: quaelibet enim pars habet inclinationem principalem ad actionem communem utilitati totius. Apparet etiam hoc in politicis virtutibus . . .
93. II-II, 26, 4 ad 3: Semper . . . commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium bonum: sicut etiam ipsi parti est magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale.—Continuation of text 30.
94. II-II, 31, 3 ad 2: Bonum multorum commune divinius est quam bonum unius. Unde pro bono communi reipublicae vel spiritualis vel temporalis virtuosum est etiam, quod aliquis propriam vitam exponat periculo. Et ideo, cum communicatio in bellicis actibus ordinetur ad conservationem reipublicae, in hoc miles impendens commilitoni auxilium, non impendit ei tamquam privatae personae, sed sicut totam rempublicam iuvans. Et ideo non est mirum, si in hoc praefertur extraneus coniuncto secundum carnem.—Cf. text 31.
95. \*II-II, 39, 2 in 2: Bonum multitudinis est maius et divinius quam bonum unius, ut patet per Philosophum in I Eth. Sed schisma est contra bonum multitudinis, i.e. contra ecclesiasticam unitatem; infidelitas autem est contra bonum particulare unius, quod est fides unius hominis singularis. Ergo videtur, quod schisma sit gravius peccatum quam infidelitas.—Text 193.
96. II-II, 42, 2: Seditio opponitur et iustitiae et communi bono. Et ideo ex suo genere est peccatum mortale, et tanto gravius quanto bonum commune, quod impugnatur per seditionem, est maius quam bonum privatum, quod impugnatur per rixam.
97. II-II, 47, 10: Quidam (*Eth.* VI, 1142a 1) posuerunt, quod prudentia non se extendit ad bonum commune, sed solum ad bonum proprium. Et hoc ideo, quia existimabant, quod non oportet hominem quaerere nisi bonum proprium. Sed haec aestimatio repugnat caritati, quae non quaerit quae sua sunt . . . Repugnat etiam rationi rectae, quae hoc iudicat, quod bonum commune sit melius quam bonum unius.
98. \*II-II, 58, 6 in 3: Ad iustitiam legalem pertinet quod actus omnium virtutum ordinentur ad altiorem finem, i.e. bonum commune multitudinis, quod praeeminet bono unius singularis personae. Ergo videtur, quod iustitia legalis essentialiter sit omnis virtus.
99. II-II, 58, 12: Si loquamur de iustitia legali, manifestum est, quod ipsa est praeclior inter omnes virtutes morales (texts 50, 131), inquantum bonum commune praeeminet bono singulari unius personae.
100. \*II-II, 88, 11 in 1: Videtur quod in voto solemni continentiae possit fieri dispensatio. Una enim ratio dispensandi in voto est, si sit impedimentum melioris boni . . . Sed votum continentiae, etiamsi sit solemne, potest esse impeditivum melioris boni: nam bonum commune est divinius quam bonum unius. Potest autem per continentiam unius impediri bonum totius multitu-

<sup>22</sup> Cf. 4 *Sent.* 17, I, 5 q. 1 in 1; *ibid.* 46, II, 1 q. 3 in 2; *In Ioan.* 14, 3, 5; III, 43, 4 ad 2.

- dinis, puta quando per contractum matrimonii aliquarum personarum, quae continentiam voverunt, posset pax patriae procurari.—Texts 59, 195.
101. II-II, 117, 6: Omnibus (virtutibus) praeferuntur virtutes, quae ordinant in bonum divinum; nam bonum divinum praeeminet cuilibet bono humano. Et in bonis humanis bonum publicum praeeminet bono privato.—Cf. text 82.
102. \*II-II, 124, 3 in 3: Melius esse videtur aliis prodesse quam seipsum in bono conservare, quia bonum gentis melius est quam bonum unius hominis, secundum Philosophum in I Eth. Sed ille qui martyrium sustinet, sibi soli prodest; ille autem, qui docet, proficit multis. Ergo actus docendi et gubernandi subditos est perfectior quam actus martyrii.—Text 197.
103. \*II-II, 124, 5 in 3: Inter alias virtutes opera illa videntur esse potiora, quae ordinantur ad bonum commune, quia bonum gentis melius est quam bonum unius hominis, secundum Philosophum in I Eth. Si ergo aliquid aliud esset causa martyrii, maxime videtur, quod illi essent martyres, qui pro defensione reipublicae moriuntur. Quod Ecclesiae observatio non habet. Non enim militum, qui in bello iusto moriuntur, martyria celebrantur. Ergo sola fides videtur esse martyrii causa.—Text 198.
104. II-II, 141, 8: Sicut Philosophus dicit in I Eth: bonum commune multitudinis divinius est quam bonum unius. Et ideo quanto aliqua virtus magis pertinet ad bonum multitudinis, tanto melior est. Iustitia autem et fortitudo magis pertinent ad bonum multitudinis quam temperantia.
105. \*II-II, 152, 4 in 3: Bonum commune potius est bono privato, ut patet per Philosophum in I Eth. Sed coniugium ordinatur ad bonum commune . . . Virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum speciale, ut scil. vitent tribulationem carnis, quam sustinent coniugati . . . Ergo virginitas non est potior continentia coniugali.—Text 199.
106. *De praeceptis caritatis*, cap. De dilectione proximi (Ed. Mand. p. 425): Non est peccatum suspendere iuste malos. Ministri enim Dei sunt tales secundum Apostolum, Rom. XIII, 4. Et servant isti dilectionem, quia poena fit aliquando propter castigationem, aliquando propter bonum melius et divinius. Est enim maius bonum unius civitatis quam vita unius hominis.
107. III, 1, 4: Hoc modo (scil. extensive, non intensive) peccatum originale, per quod totum genus humanum inficitur, est maius quolibet peccato actuali, quod est proprium singularis personae. Et quantum ad hoc Christus principalis venit ad tollendum originale peccatum, inquantum bonum gentis divinius et eminentius est quam unius, ut dicitur in I Eth.
108. \*III, 65, 3 in 1. Videtur, quod sacramentum Eucharistiae non sit potissimum inter sacramenta. Bonum enim commune potius est quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in I Eth. Sed matrimonium ordinatur ad bonum commune speciei humanae per viam generationis; sacramentum autem Eucharistiae ordinatur ad bonum proprium summentis.—Text 204.
109. *Compendium theologiae* 124: Bonum multorum melius est quam bonum unius tantum, et per consequens est magis divinae bonitatis repraesentativum, quae est bonum totius universi. Si autem creatura superior, quae abundantiore bonitate a Deo participat, non cooperaretur ad bonum inferiorum creaturarum, illa abundantia bonitatis esset unius tantum. Per hoc autem fit communis multorum, quod ad bonum multorum cooperatur. Pertinet igitur hoc ad divinam bonitatem, ut Deus per superiores creaturas inferiores regat.
- XVIII. Texts in which the expression of the principle is based on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Lambda, 1075a.
110. \*2 Sent. 16, I, 2 in 3: Ubi est expressior similitudo, ibi magis salvatur ratio imaginis (Dei). Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis expressius repraesentatur in toto universo quam in aliqua parte eius. Ergo totum universum magis debet dici ad imaginem Dei quam aliqua creatura rationalis.—Text 164.



111. \*3 *Sent.* 2, I, 1 q. 3 in 1: Videtur quod totum universum sit magis assumptibile (i.e. by the second divine Person) quam humana natura. Effectus enim universalis maxime causae universali assimilatur. Sed universum est effectus universalis Dei, qui universalis causa est. Ergo universum Deo magis assimilatur quam humana natura, quae est quidam particularis effectus. Et ita est magis assumptibile.—Text 135.
112. *Contra gent.* 1, 70; p. 66b: Bonum ordinis universi nobiliter est qualibet parte universi, cum partes singulae ordinentur ad bonum ordinis, qui est in toto, sicut ad finem, ut patet per Philosophum in XII Metaph.
113. *Contra gent.* 1, 71; p. 68a: Si Deus cognoscit aliquid aliud a se, maxime cognoscet quod est optimum. Hoc autem est ordo universi, ad quem sicut ad finem omnia particularia bona ordinantur.
114. *Contra gent.* 1, 85; p. 78b: Deus principaliter vult bonum universitatis suorum effectuum, quam aliquod bonum particulare, quanto in illo completior invenitur suae bonitatis similitudo.
115. *Contra gent.* 2, 39; p. 129b: Id quod est bonum et optimum in effectu est finis productionis. Sed bonum et optimum universi consistit in ordine partium eius ad invicem, qui sine distinctione esse non potest. Per hunc enim ordinem universum in sua totalitate constituitur, quae est optimum ipsius.
116. *Contra gent.* 3, 76; p. 313a: Inconveniens videtur, quod (Deus) singularia cognoscens eorum ordinem non velit, in quo bonum praecipuum eorum constat, cum voluntas sua sit totius bonitatis principium. Oportet ergo, quod, sicut immediate singularia cognoscit, ita immediate eorum ordinem statuatur.
117. \**Contra gent.* 4, 53; p. 510b: Cum Deus sit universalis omnium causa, ad utilitatem totius universitatis rerum eum praecipue intendere oportet. Sed assumptio humanae naturae (per Verbum) solum ad utilitatem hominis pertinet. Non igitur fuit conveniens quod, si alienam naturam assumere debuit, quod solum naturam humanam assumpserit.—Text 175.
118. *De substantiis separatis* 8 (Ed. Mandonnet, p. 104): Bonum universi potius esse quam bonum cuiusque particularis naturae invenitur . . . (Ideo) inconveniens est, ut bonum universi non proveniat ex intentione universalis agentis, sed quadam necessitate ordinis rerum. Si autem bonum universi, quod in distinctione et ordine consistit partium, ex intentione primi et universalis agentis procedit, necesse est, quod ipsa distinctio et ordo partium universi etiam in intellectu primi principii praexistat.
119. *De substantiis separatis* 10; p. 113: Inconveniens est, id, quod est optimum in universo, attribuere casui; nam id, quod est optimum, maximam habet rationem finis intenti. Optimum autem in rerum universitate est bonum ordinis: hoc enim est bonum commune, cetera vero sunt singularia bona.
120. \**De caritate* 7 in 5: Deus ex caritate diligitur. Ergo oportet magis ex caritate diligi, quod ab Eo maxime diligitur. Sed inter omnia creata maxime diligitur a Deo bonum universi, in quo omnia comprehenduntur. Ergo omnia sunt ex caritate diligenda.<sup>22</sup>—Text 180.
121. I, 15, 2: In quolibet effectu illud, quod est ultimus finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente: sicut ordo exercitus a duce. Illud autem, quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per Philosophum in XII Metaph. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium.
122. I, 22, 2 ad 2: Ad providentiam (divinam) pertinet, ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne impediatur bonum universi perfectum.

<sup>22</sup>i.e. not alone nor in a special way rational natures, as is the thesis of the corp. art.

123. \*I-II, 2, 8 in 2: Ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo opere perfecto: unde pars est propter totum sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui in VIII Physicorum (252b 24) dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate creaturarum.—Text 186.
  124. \*III, 4, 1 in 4: Cum Deo competat summa perfectio, tanto magis est Deo aliquid simile, quanto est magis perfectum. Sed totum universum est magis perfectum quam partes eius, inter quas est humana natura. Ergo totum universum est magis assumptibile quam humana natura.—Text 203.
- XIX. Texts in which the expression of the principle is based on other Aristotelian sources.
125. 3 *Sent.* 9, II, 3 ad 3: Dignius est alterius virtutis causam existere inquantum huiusmodi, quam virtuosum esse, ut dicit Philosophus in IX *Eth.* (1169a 33-34).—Text 133.
  126. 3 *Sent.* 33, II, 5 ad 4: (De iustitia legali) dicit Philosophus, quod est lucidior aliis virtutibus, sicut lucifer aliis stellis. Hoc autem non dicitur per comparisonem virtutis ad virtutem, sed per comparisonem privati boni, quod attendit virtus simpliciter, ad commune bonum.—Cf. texts 131, 732.
  127. *Contra gent.* 2, 32; p. 121b: Cum . . . omnia Dei bonitatem participant, inquantum habent esse: secundum quod diuturniora sunt, magis Dei bonitatem participant. Unde et esse perpetuum speciei dicitur divinum esse<sup>21</sup> (*De anima* II, 415a 24; *Oecon.* I, 1343b 23).
  128. *Contra gent.* 2, 45; p. 138b: Bonitas speciei excedit bonitatem individui, sicut formale id quod est materiale. Magis igitur addit ad bonitatem universi multitudo specierum quam multitudo individuum in una specie.
  129. *Contra gent.* 2, 93; p. 216b: Id, quod est speciei in unoquoque, dignius est eo, quod est individuationis principium praeter rationem speciei existens. Multiplicatio igitur specierum plus addit nobilitatis universo quam multiplicatio individuum in una specie.
  130. *In Eth.* 4, 7; 719, 720: (Aristoteles) dicit ergo primo, quod magnificus facit sumptus circa ea, quae sunt maxime honorabilia. Horum autem sunt duo genera. Primum est eorum, quae pertinent ad res divinas . . . Secundum autem genus honorabilium sumptuum sunt ea, quae magnifice fiunt per respectum ad bonum publicum (*Eth.* IV, 1122b 19-23, 33-35).—Cf. text 101.
  131. *In Eth.* 5, 2; 906 (cf. 908, 909): (Aristoteles) dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa iustitia est quaedam virtus perfecta non simpliciter, sed in comparatione ad alterum (1129b 26). Et quia esse perfectum non solum in se, sed in comparatione ad alterum, potius est, propter hoc multoties dicitur, quod haec iustitia sit praeclarissima inter omnes virtutes.
  132. *In Eth.* 5, 2; 910: Concludit ergo (Philosophus) quod, sicut pessimus est ille, qui utitur malitia non solum ad seipsum, sed etiam ad amicos, ita optimus dicitur ille, qui utitur virtute non solum ad seipsum, sed etiam in comparatione ad alterum. Hoc enim maxime est difficile (*Eth.* V, 1129b 31-1130a 8).
  133. *In Eth.* 9, 9; 1883: Melius est . . . et magis virtuosum, quod ipse (virtuosus) sit causa amico suo talia (virtuosa) faciendi, quam etiam si ipse faceret (1169a 33); praesertim, cum sibi remaneat opportunitas alias talia vel maiora faciendi. Sic ergo patet, quod virtuosus plus sibi tribuit de bono quantum ad omnia laudabilia: et sic maxime amat seipsum.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. texts 86, 128, 129; likewise 2 *Sent.* 20, I, 1 ad 3; I, 23, 7; I, 98, 1; *In Iob* 7, 4 (Ed. Vivès, vol. 18, p. 51) and *passim*.

134. In *Metaph.* 1, 2 (Ed. Cathala 50): Praedicta scientia (i.e. Metaphysics) maxime considerat causam finalem omnium rerum. Quod ex hoc patet, quia hoc, cuius causa agenda sunt singula, est "bonum uniuscuiusque", i.e. particulare bonum. Finis autem bonum est in unoquoque genere. Id vero, quod est finis omnium, i.e. ipsi universo, est hoc, quod est "optimum in tota natura". Et hoc pertinet ad considerationem praedictae scientiae (*Metaph. Alpha*, 982b 6).
135. II-II, 58, 12: Aliae virtutes laudantur solum secundum bonum ipsius virtuosus. Iustitia autem laudatur secundum quod virtuosus bene ad alium se habet, ut dicitur in V *Eth.* (texts 131, 132). Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit in I *Rhet.*: Necesse est maximas virtutes esse eas, quae sunt aliis honestissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia benefactiva. Propter hoc et fortes et iustos maxime honorant, quoniam fortitudo est utilis in bello, iustitia autem in bello et in pace.<sup>28</sup>—(*Rhet.* I, 1366b 3).
136. II-II, 134, 1 ad 3: Quod autem pertinet ad personam uniuscuiusque, est aliquid parvum (text 1) in comparatione ad id, quod convenit rebus divinis vel communibus. Et ideo magnificus non principaliter intendit sumptus facere in his, quae pertinent ad personam propriam, non quia bonum suum non quaerat, sed quia non est magnum.—Text 130.
137. \*II-II, 188, 8 in 5: Id, quod est contra naturam hominis, non videtur ad perfectionem virtutis pertinere. Sed homo est naturaliter animal sociale, ut Philosophus dicit in I *Pol.* (1253a 2; *Eth.* I, 1097b 11, et *passim*). Ergo videtur, quod agere solitariam vitam non sit perfectius quam agere vitam sociale.—Text 202.
138. In *De caelo et mundo* 1, 1 n. 11: Dicit (Aristoteles, 268b 8), quod totum, i.e. universum, cuius partes sunt particularia corpora, necesse est quod sit perfectum omnibus modis. Et sicut ipsum nomen universi significat, "omniquaque", i.e. omnibus modis perfectum, et non secundum unum modum, ita quod non secundum alium. Cf. *ibid.* 1, 19, n. 14.
- XX. Texts in which the expression of the principle is teleological in form (cf. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIX, 16; Aristotle's *Physics*).
139. 3 *Sent.* 29, 3: Bonum . . . illud unusquisque maxime vult salvari, quod est sibi magis placens, quia hoc est appetitui informato per amorem magis conforme. Hoc autem est suum bonum. Unde secundum quod bonum alicuius rei est vel aestimatur magis bonum ipsius amantis, hoc amans magis salvari vult in ipsa re amata. Bonum autem ipsius amantis magis invenitur, ubi perfectius est. Et ideo, quia pars quaelibet imperfecta est in seipsa, perfectionem autem habet in suo toto, ideo etiam naturali amore pars plus tendit ad conservationem sui totius quam sui ipsius. Unde etiam naturaliter animal opponit brachium ad defensionem capitis, ex quo pendet salus totius. Et inde est etiam, quod particulares homines seipsum morti exponunt pro conservatione communitatis, cuius sunt pars. Quia ergo bonum nostrum in Deo perfectum est sicut in causa universali prima et perfecta bonorum, ideo bonum in ipso esse magis naturaliter complacet quam in nobis ipsis. Et ideo etiam amore amicitiae naturaliter Deus ab homine plus seipso diligitur. Et quia caritas naturam perficit, ideo etiam secundum caritatem Deum supra seipsum homo diligit et super omnia alia particularia bona.
140. 4 *Sent.* 19, II, 1 ad 6: In hoc, quod aliquis peccat, laeditur iustitia, et laeditur peccans. Et secundum hoc ille, qui peccantem arguit, ad duo potest attendere, scil. ad laesionem iustitiae: sed hoc proprie est eius, cui commissum est custodia iustitiae, quae est commune bonum, scil. praelati, qui est

<sup>28</sup> See also II-II, 123, 12 s.c. and ad 5.

- persona publica; et iterum ad laesionem peccantis: et hoc est proprie eius, cui competit defectibus eius subvenire. Et quia hoc est proprium amicitiae, . . . ideo directe pertinet ad caritatem. Unde quamvis correctio sit actus iustitiae, tamen correptio est actus caritatis sive misericordiae. Quia tamen bonum privatum debet ad bonum publicum ordinari sicut ad finem, ideo etiam corripit ex caritate ad laesionem iustitiae aliquo modo respicit.
141. *Contra gent.* 1, 86; p. 79 a: Bonum particulare ordinatur ad bonum totius sicut ad finem, ut imperfectum ad perfectum. Sic autem cadunt aliqua sub divina voluntate, secundum quod se habent in ordine boni. Relinquitur igitur, quod bonum universi sit ratio, quare Deus vult unumquodque particulare bonum in universo.
  142. *Contra gent.* 3, 64; p. 297a: Unumquodque intendens aliquem finem, magis curat de eo, quod est propinquius fini ultimo, quia hoc etiam est finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi, cum ad ipsum ordinetur sicut ad finem omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id, quod est perfectius. Unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. Id igitur, quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi.
  143. *Contra gent.* 3, 112; p. 364a: Manifestum est partes omnes ordinari ad perfectionem totius: non enim est totum propter partes, sed partes propter totum sunt.—Continuation of this text *infra*, text 174.
  144. *De regimine principum* 1, 15: Sicut . . . ad vitam, quam in caelo speramus beatam, ordinatur sicut ad finem vita, qua hic homines bene vivunt, ita ad bonum multitudinis ordinantur sicut ad finem quaecumque particularia bona, quae per hominem procurantur: sive divitiae sive lucra, sive sanitas, sive facundia vel eruditio. Si igitur . . . , qui de ultimo fine curam habet, praeesse debet his, qui curam habent de ordinatis ad finem et eos dirigere suo imperio, manifestum . . . fit, quod rex, sicut dominio et regimini, quod administratur per sacerdotis officium, subdi debet, ita praeesse debet omnibus humanis officiis et ea imperio sui regiminis ordinare.
  145. I, 65, 2: Omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut materia propter formam: partes enim sunt quasi materia totius.
  146. I-II, 19, 10: Non est recta voluntas alicuius hominis volentis aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum commune sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius.
  147. I-II, 21, 2 ad 2: Finis particularis ordinatur ad finem communem.
  148. I-II, 90, 2: Cum omnis pars ordinetur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum—unus autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae—necesse est, quod lex proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem. Unde et Philosophus in (?) praemisa definitione legalium mentionem facit de felicitate et communione politica . . . (*Eth.* V, 1129b 17): perfecta enim communitas civitas est, ut dicitur in I Pol. (1252b 28).
  149. I-II, 90, 3 ad 3: Civitas . . . est communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in I Pol. (text 148). Et ideo, sicut bonum unius hominis non est ultimus finis, sed ad commune bonum ordinatur, ita etiam et bonum unius domus ordinatur ad bonum unius civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta.
  150. I-II, 92, 1 ad 3: Bonitas cuiuslibet partis consideratur in proportionem ad suum totum; unde et Augustinus dicit in III *Conf.* 8, quod turpis est omnis pars, quae suo toti non congruit. Cum igitur quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est, quod aliquis homo sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi.
  151. I-II, 96, 4: Cum . . . unus homo sit pars multitudinis, quilibet homo hoc ipsum quod est et quod habet, est multitudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id, quod est, est totius.

152. I-II, 109, 3: Sic agit unumquodque, prout aptum natum est esse, ut dicitur in II Phys. (199a 10). Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius. Unde naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus.
153. I-II, 111, 5 ad 3: Id, quod est proprium, ordinatur ad id, quod est commune, sicut ad finem.
154. II-II, 26, 3 ad 2: Bonum totius diligit quidem pars secundum quod est sibi conveniens, non autem ita, quod bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita, quod seipsam refert in bonum totius.
155. II-II, 47, 10 ad 2: Ille, qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis, ex consequenti etiam quaerit bonum suum propter duo. Primo quidem, quia bonum proprium non potest esse sine bono communi vel familiae vel civitatis aut regni. Unde Maximus Valerius dicit de antiquis Romanis, quod malebant esse pauperes in divite imperio quam divites in paupere imperio (*Factor. dict. mem.* 4, 4). Secundo quia, cum homo sit pars domus vel civitatis, oportet, quod homo consideret, quid sit sibi bonum, ex hoc, quod est prudens circa bonum multitudinis: bona enim dispositio partis accipitur secundum habitudinem ad totum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro Confess. (text 150), turpis est omnis pars suo toti non conveniens vel congruens.
156. \*II-II, 47, 11 in 3: Bonum proprium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam simpliciter dictam, ordinatur ad bonum commune, quod pertinet ad politicam.—Text 126.
157. II-II, 58, 5: Manifestum . . . est, quod omnes, qui sub communitate aliqua continentur, comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad totum. Pars autem id, quod est, totius est. Unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. Secundum hoc ergo bonum cuiuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum, sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinatur iustitia. Et secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad iustitiam pertinere, secundum quod ordinat hominem ad bonum commune.<sup>28</sup>
158. II-II, 58, 9 ad 3: Bonum commune est finis singularum personarum in communitate existentium, sicut bonum totius est finis cuiuslibet partium.
159. II-II, 64, 2: Omnis pars ordinatur ad totum, ut imperfectum ad perfectum. Et ideo omnis pars naturaliter est propter totum . . . Quaelibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad totam communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Et ideo, si aliquis homo sit periculosus communitati et corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod peccatum<sup>29</sup>, laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut bonum commune conservetur.—Cf. text 29.
160. II-II, 64, 5: Quaelibet pars id, quod est, est totius. Quilibet autem homo est pars communitatis; et ita id, quod est, est communitatis. Unde in hoc, quod seipsum interficit, iniuriam communitati facit, ut patet per Philosophum in V Eth. (1138 a 11).—Cf. Gratian, C. 23, Q. 5, c. 9 et *passim*.
161. II-II, 65, 1: Quia ipse totus homo ordinatur ut ad finem ad totam communitatem, cuius est pars . . . potest contingere, quod abscissio membri, etsi vergat in detrimentum totius corporis, ordinatur tamen ad bonum communitatis, inquantum alicui inferur ad cohibitionem peccatorum. Et ideo, sicut per publicam potestatem aliquis licite privatur totaliter vita propter aliquas maiores culpas, ita etiam privatur membro propter aliquas culpas minores.
162. In Iob 7, 4; p. 51: Omnia particularia bona, quae sunt in universo, ordinari (videntur) ab bonum commune universi, sicut pars ad totum et imperfectum ad perfectum.
163. In Ep. Ad Rom. 8, 6 (Ed. Vivès, p. 499a): Bonum universi est a Deo volitum secundum se, et ad ipsum ordinantur omnes partes universi.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. I-II, 96, 3.<sup>29</sup> Cf. I-II, 21, 3.

*Special criticism of the principle*

XXI.

164. 2 *Sent.* 16, I, 2 ad 3 (text 110): Similitudo divinae bonitatis quantum ad nobilissimas participationes ipsius non resultat in universo nisi ratione nobilissimarum partium eius, quae sunt intellectuales naturae; nec per se de toto potest dici et primo, quod non convenit sibi ratione omnium partium, ut in VI *Physicorum* dicitur frequenter (text 165). Et ideo universum non potest dici imago Dei, sed intellectualis natura.
165. 3 *Sent.* 2, I, 1 sol. 3 c. et ad 1 (text 111): Alicui toti potest convenire aliquid dupliciter: vel ratione partis, sicut homo dicitur canus propter capillos; vel ratione sui, quod scil. ipsi toti primo convenit: et hoc est, ut in VI *Phys.* probatur (cf. St. Thomas' Commentary 6, 12, 3; 2, 5, 8; 4, 4, 3), quod convenit toti et omnibus partibus eius. Universum ergo potest assumi dupliciter: vel ratione partis: et sic assumptibile fuit et assumptum est humana natura assumpta; vel ratione sui: et sic assumi non potuit, quia non omnes partes eius assumptibiles erant . . . Circa hoc obiectum (text 111). Dicendum quod, quamvis Deus sit causa universalis, est tamen maxime simplex. Et ideo cum eo magis convenit effectus universalis unitus, scil. humana natura, in qua omnes naturae quodammodo congregantur, quam effectus universalis non simpliciter unitus, sicut est universum, ex cuius partibus non efficitur unum simpliciter, cum remaneant distinctae in actu.—*Ibid.* q. 3, s.c.: Non potest dici, quod totum universum sit ad imaginem Dei, nisi forte poneretur universum animatum anima rationali, ut Platonici posuerunt.
166. 3 *Sent.* 32, 5 sol. 4 c. et ad 2 (text 49): Deus Christum diligit non solum plus quam homines, sed etiam plus quam totam creaturam, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam, sed etiam quantum ad humanam, inquantum eum praedestinavit ad maius bonum, scil. ad unionem divinae personae . . . Ad secundum. Dicendum, quod quamvis sit singularis persona Christi, tamen est universalis causa salutis humani generis: et causa praestantior est causato.
167. 3 *Sent.* 35, I, 4 sol. 1 c. et ad 2 et 3 (text 53): Duplex est ratio boni. Aliquid enim dicitur bonum, quod propter seipsum est desiderandum. Et sic vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa, inquantum magis assimilatur illi vitae, ad quam per activam et contemplativam nitimur pervenire. Unde et contemplativa est finis activae et fini ultimo vicinior. Aliquid vero dicitur bonum quasi propter aliud eligendum: et in hac via vita activa praeeminet contemplativae. Vita enim contemplativa non ordinatur ad aliquid aliud in ipso, in quo est; quia vita aeterna non est, nisi quaedam consummatio contemplativae vitae, quae per contemplativam in praesenti quodammodo praelibatur. Unde non restat, quod ordinetur ad aliud, nisi secundum quod bonum unius hominis ordinatur ad bonum multorum, ad quod propinquius se habet vita activa quam contemplativa. Unde activa quantum ad hanc partem, quae salutem proximorum studet, est utilior quam contemplativa. Sed contemplativa est dignior, quia dignitas significat bonitatem alicuius propter seipsum, utilitas vero propter aliud. Sed vita activa, quae non ad aliud, sed ad seipsum tantum ordinatur, neque dignior neque utilior est quam contemplativa, immo comparatur ad contemplativam sicut utile ad id, ad quod est utile.—Ad secundum (text 53). Dicendum, quod, sicut bonum unius consistit in actione et contemplatione, ita et bonum multitudinis, secundum quod contingit multitudinem contemplationi vacare. Sed ad bonum multitudinis pervenitur per regimen activae vitae: unde ex hoc non probatur, quod activa sit dignior, sed utilior.—Politica, ut dicit Philosophus in VI *Eth.* (1145a 8–11), non praecipit sapientiae et aliis, quae

ad vitam contemplativam pertinent, sed imperat quaedam propter ipsa, sicut etiam imperat quaedam propter Deum, cui praecipit sic vel sic cultum exhiberi.

168. 4 *Sent.* 2, I, 3 sol. 1 ad 3 (text 54): Quamvis bonum commune sit divinius, tamen bonum singulare est prius in via generationis. Et ideo etiam Philosophus monasticam politicae praemisit, ut patet in X (?) *Eth.* (see *Eth.* VI, 1141b 23 ff., 29 ff.; Commentary 7, 1195-1201).
169. 4 *Sent.* 26, I, 2 (text 57): Natura inclinatur ad aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ad id, quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius: et talis inclinatio quemlibet obligat . . . Alio modo inclinatur ad aliquid, quod est necessarium ad perfectionem multitudinis: et cum multa sint huiusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud, ex tali inclinatione non obligatur quilibet homo per modum praecepti, . . . sed inclinationi naturae satisficit, cum per diversos diversa complentur . . . Cum ergo ad perfectionem humanae multitudinis sit necessarium aliquos contemplativae vitae inservire, quae maxime per matrimonium impeditur, inclinatio naturae ad matrimonium non obligat per modum praecepti, etiam secundum philosophos.<sup>28</sup>
170. 4 *Sent.* 49, I, 1 sol. 1 ad 3 (text 60): Dupliciter aliquid dicitur esse commune. Uno modo per praedicationem. Huiusmodi autem commune non est idem numero in diversis repertum; et hoc modo habet bonum corporis communitatem. Alio modo est aliquid commune secundum participationem unius et eiusdem rei secundum numerum: et haec communitas potest maxime in his, quae ad animam pertinent, inveniri, quia per ipsam attingitur ad id, quod est commune bonum omnibus, scil. Deum. Et ideo ratio non procedit.
171. 4 *Sent.* 49, I, 1 sol. 3 ad 1 (text 61): Bonum, cui intellectus speculativus coniungitur per cognitionem, est communius bono, cui coniungitur intellectus practicus, inquantum intellectus speculativus magis separatur a particulari quam intellectus practicus, cuius cognitio in operatione perficitur, quae in singularibus consistit. Sed hoc est verum, quod assecutio finis, quem intellectus practicus intendit, potest esse propria et communis, inquantum per intellectum practicum aliquis se et alios dirigit in finem, ut patet in rectore multitudinis; sed aliquis ex hoc, quod speculatur, ipse singulariter dirigitur in speculationis finem. Ipse autem finis intellectus speculativi tantum praeeminet bono intellectus practici, quantum singularis assecutio eius excedit communem assecutionem boni intellectus practici. Et ideo perfectissima beatitudo in intellectu speculativo consistit.
172. 4 *Sent.* 49, I, 1 sol. 3 ad 2 (text 7): Perfectius est habere aliquam perfectionem et transfundere ipsam in alterum, quam solum habere eam in seipso. Non enim alio modo intelligi potest comparatio dictarum perfectionum, eo quod perfectio alicuius, ut est causa, non potest esse, nisi simul sit perfectio eius in seipso. Contingit autem maiorem esse perfectionem alicuius, prout in se perfectum est, quam secundum quod est causa alterius, quando non eandem perfectionem communicat vel non tantam, sicut habet; sicut maior est perfectio, quae consideratur in Deo, secundum quod in se consistit, quam secundum quod alia causat. Et sic maior est perfectio speculatoris, inquantum in se in speculando perfectus est, quam fabri, inquantum facit cultellum. Perfectior autem esset ille, qui speculando alios speculatores aequaliter sibi constitueret, quam ille qui ipse solus posset speculari.
173. 4 *Sent.* 49, V, 3 sol. 2 ad 11 (text 62): Etiam bonum increatum excedit omne bonum creatum. Unde quicumque finis creatus, sive sit bonum commune sive bonum privatum, non potest actui tantam bonitatem praestare quantam finis increatus, cum scil. aliquid propter Deum agitur. Et ideo,

<sup>28</sup> Theophrastus, according to St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 47; PL 23, 288.

cum quis propter bonum commune non relatum ad Christum mortem sustinet, aureolam non meretur. Sed si hoc referat ad Christum, aureolam merebitur et martyr erit: utpote si rempublicam defendat ab hostium impugnatione, qui fidem Christi corrumpere moliuntur et in tali defensione mortem sustineat.—Cf. Gratian, C. 23, Q. 5, c. 46 (col. 944); *ibid.* Q. 8, c. 9 (955).

174. *Contra gent.* 3, 112; p. 364 (Continuation of text 143): Naturae autem intellectuales maiorem habent affinitatem ad totum quam aliae naturae (cf. *Metaph. Lambda* 1075a 18–25; St. Thomas' Commentary 12, 12; 2633–2637). Nam unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodammoda omnia (*De anima* III, 431c 21), inquantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu. Quaelibet autem alia substantia particularem solam entis participationem habet. Convenienter igitur alia propter substantias intellectuales providentur a Deo . . . Ergo substantiae intellectuales gubernantur quasi propter se, alia vero propter ipsas . . . Per hoc autem, quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus, quod ipsa ulterius non referatur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et alia propter ipsa, quia bona, quae per divinam providentiam sortiuntur, non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem. Quae vero aliis dantur, in eorum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt.
175. *Contra gent.* 4, 54, 55 (text 117): Quidam . . . considerantes quarundam creaturarum excellentiam super homines quantum ad aliqua, eorum cultui se adstrinxerunt colentes mundum et partes eius propter magnitudinem quantitatis et temporis diuturnitatem, vel spirituales substantias, angelos et daemones, propter hoc quod hominem excedere inveniuntur tam in immortalitate quam in acumine intellectus, aestimantes in his, utpote supra se existentibus, hominis beatitudinem esse quaerendam. Quamvis autem quantum ad aliquas conditiones homo aliquibus creaturis existat inferior, ac etiam infimis creaturis in quibusdam assimiletur, tamen secundum ordinem finis nihil homine existit altius nisi solus Deus, in quo solo perfecta hominis beatitudo consistit. Hanc igitur hominis dignitatem, quod scilicet immediata Dei visione beatificandus sit, convenientissime Deus ostendit per hoc, quod ipse immediate naturam humanam assumpsit . . . (Unde) ad . . . rationem patet responsio. Homo enim, cum sit constitutus ex spirituali et corporali natura quasi quoddam confinium tenens utriusque naturae (*Lib. De causis* 2, 8), ad totam creaturam pertinere videtur, quod fit pro hominis salute. Nam inferiores creaturae corporales in usum hominis cedere videntur et ei quodammodo esse subiectae. Superior autem creatura spiritualis, scilicet angelica, commune habet cum homine ultimi finis consecutionem . . . Et sic conveniens videtur, ut universalis omnium causa illam creaturam in unitatem personae assumeret, in qua magis communicat cum omnibus creaturis.
176. *In Metaph.* 12, 12; 2627–2631: Bonum . . . , secundum quod est finis alicuius, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo, quod est ad finem: sicut si dicimus locum esse finem eius, quod movetur ad locum. Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma (est) finis generationis et alterationis, et forma iam adepta est quoddam bonum intrinsecum eius, cuius est forma. Forma autem alicuius totius, quod est unum per ordinationem quandam partium, est ordo ipsius. Unde relinquitur, quod sit bonum eius . . . Et sic universum habet et bonum separatum et bonum ordinis. Sicut videmus in exercitu. Nam bonum exercitus est et in ipso ordine exercitus et in duce, qui exercitui praesidet. Sed magis est bonum exercitus in duce quam in ordine, quia finis potior est in bonitate his, quae sunt ad finem (cf. *Topica* III, 116b 22): ordo autem exercitus est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet.



- ducis voluntatem in victoriae consecutionem; non autem e converso: bonum ducis est propter bonum ordinis. Et quia ratio eorum, quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine, ideo necesse est, quod non solum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem, sed etiam, quod a duce sit ordo exercitus, cum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem. Ita etiam bonum separatum, quod est Primum Movens, est melius bono ordinis, quod est in universo. Totus enim ordo universi est propter Primum Moventem, ut scil. explicetur in universo ordinato id, quod est in intellectu et voluntate Primi Moventis. Et sic oportet, quod a Primo Movente sit tota ordinatio universi.
177. *In Eth.* 10, 11; 2101: Manifestum est in actionibus politicis, quod non est in eis vacatio, sed praeter ipsam conversationem civilem vult homo acquirere aliquid aliud, puta potentatus et honores. Vel: quia in eis non est ultimus finis . . . , magis est decens, quod per civilem conversationem aliquis velit acquirere felicitatem sibi ipsi et cuilibet, ita quod huiusmodi felicitas, quam intendit aliquis acquirere per politicam vitam, sit altera ab ipsa vita politica. Sic enim per vitam politicam quaerimus eam quasi alteram existentem ab ipsa. Haec est enim felicitas speculativa, ad quam tota vita politica videtur ordinata: dum per pacem, quae per ordinationem vitae politicae statuitur et conservatur, datur hominibus facultas contemplandi veritatem.
178. *De potentia* 5, 5 ad 5 (text 76): Licet generabilia et corruptibilia sint viliora caelo, tamen animae rationales sunt corpore caeli nobiliores. Quae tamen producuntur ad esse in materia disposita per motum caeli.
179. *De potentia* 6, 1 ad 21 (text 17): Quando Deus agit aliquid contra cursum naturae, non tollitur totus ordo universi, sed cursus, qui est ex ordine unius particularis rei ad aliam. Unde non est inconveniens, si aliquando contra cursum naturae aliquid fiat ad salutem hominis, quae consistit in in ordinatione ipsius ad ultimum finem universi.
180. *De caritate* 7 ad 5 (text 120): In bono universi sicut principium continetur rationalis natura, quae est capax beatitudinis, ad quam omnes aliae creaturae ordinantur. Et secundum hoc competit et Deo et nobis bonum universi maxime ex caritate diligere.
181. *De correctione fraterna* 2 ad 11 (text 84): Multo melius est et quantum ad fratrem, cuius emendationi intenditur, et quantum ad multitudinem, si fieri potest, ut (frater) secretius emendetur (Augustinus, *Epist.* 211, 11) . . . Et ideo ille, qui corrigit secundum caritatem, isto modo debet procedere.
182. I, 22 4: Post bonitatem . . . divinam, quae est finis a rebus separatus (text 176), principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens, est perfectio universi.<sup>29</sup>
183. I, 93, 2 ad 3 (text 19): Universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura: extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective<sup>30</sup> similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax beatitudinis. Vel dicendum, quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem (cf. Arist. *Physics* IV, 210 a 14 ff., 218a 7; *Metaph.* Delta, 1023a 17). Unde, cum dicitur, quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur, quin universum secundum aliquam sui partem sit ad imaginem Dei. Sed excluduntur aliae partes universi.
184. *Quodlib.* 3, 12 ad 5 (text 22): Illa fuit ratio Vigilantii haeretici, ut patet per Hieronymum . . . in libro *Contra Vigilantium* (15; PL 23, 366) . . . Stultus est . . . huiusmodi timor, cum religionis bonum sit tam difficile et arduum, ut pauci religionem intrent in comparatione multitudinis in saeculo remanentis. Sicut si quis timeret haurire aquam, ne flumen deficeret!

<sup>29</sup> See I, 65, 2 and *passim*.

<sup>30</sup> See St. Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* 2, I, 1 (Ed. Quaracchi III, 38b): Assimilari dicitur dupliciter: intensive vel extensive. Et extensive verum est, quod magis assimilatur mundo archetypo sive Deo maior mundus

quam minor, sive universitas tota quam rationalis creatura. Qualitative sive intensive est e converso propter magnam distantiam aliquarum partium eius, in quibus relucet divina bonitas de longinquo sicut in vestigio.

185. *Quodlib.* 3, 17 ad 4 (text 23): Auctoritas illa non pertinet ad perfectionem vitae, sed ad differentiam dignitatis. Sic enim "privatus distat a rege" (Ioh. Chrysostom., *De sacerdotio* 6, 5; PG 48, 682), sicut non habens praelationem ab habente. Hoc autem non in quaestione vertitur, an sit maior dignitate praelationis quicumque habens curam animarum religioso curam animarum non habente.
186. I-II, 2, 8 ad 2 (text 186): Si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum totum, sed aliquid aliud (text 176). Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non est ultimus finis hominis, sed Deus.
187. I-II, 3, 5 ad 1 (text 25): Similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum est secundum proportionalitatem, quia scil. habet se ad suum cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus speculativi ad Deum est secundum unionem vel informationem. Quae est multo maior assimilatio.
188. I-II, 21, 4 ad 3: Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua. Et ideo non oportet, quod quilibet actus eius sit meritorius vel demeritorius per ordinem ad communitatem politicam. Sed totum, quod homo est et quod habet, ordinandum est ad Deum. Et ideo omnis actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est ex ipsa ratione actus.<sup>31</sup>
189. I-II, 96, 5 ad 2 (text 26): Lex Spiritus Sancti est superior omni lege humanitus posita. Et ideo viri spirituales secundum hoc, quod lege Spiritus Sancti ducuntur, non subduntur legi, quantum ad ea, quae repugnant ductioni Spiritus Sancti. Sed tamen hoc ipsum est de ductu Spiritus Sancti, quod homines spirituales legibus humanis subdantur, secundum illud I Petri 2, 13: *Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum.*
190. I-II, 97, 4 ad 1 (texts 27, 89): Quando cum aliquo dispensatur, ut legem communem non servet, non debet fieri in praeiudicium boni communis, sed ea intentione, ut bonum commune proficiat.—Cf. text 72.
191. I-II, 111, 5 c. et ad 1 (text 90): Unaquaeque virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper autem finis potior est his quae sunt ad finem (*Topica* III, 116b 22). Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi finis. Gratiae autem gratis datae ordinant hominem ad quaedam praeparatoria finis ultimi, sicut per prophetiam et miracula et alia huiusmodi homines inducuntur ad hoc, quod ultimo fini coniungantur. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est multo excellentior quam gratia gratis data.—Cf. text 177, 185.
192. I-II, 113, 9 c. et ad 2 (text 91): Opus aliquod potest dici magnum dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte modi agendi: et sic maximum est opus creationis, in quo ex nihilo fit aliquid. Alio modo potest dici opus magnum propter magnitudinem eius, quod fit: et secundum hoc maius opus est iustificatio impii, quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis, quam creatio caeli et terrae, quae terminatur ad bonum naturae mutabilis. Et ideo Augustinus (§X), cum dixisset, quod maius est, quod ex impio fiat iustus quam creare caelum et terram, subiungit: *Caelum enim et terra transibunt, praedestinatorum autem salus et iustificatio permanebit.*<sup>32</sup>—Ad (rationem). Dicendum, quod bonum universi est maius quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiat utrumque in eodem genere (Cf. St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* 15, 4; *supra* §XI). Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. II-II, 104, 5; *ibid.* 59, 3 ad 2 et *passim*.      <sup>32</sup> See note 22.

193. II-II, 39, 2 c. et ad 2 (text 95): Manifestum est, quod infidelitas est peccatum contra (maius bonum, i.e.) ipsum Deum, secundum quod in se est veritas prima, cui fides innititur. Schisma autem est contra ecclesiasticam unitatem, quae est quoddam bonum participatum et minus quam sit ipse Deus. Unde manifestum est, quod peccatum infidelitatis ex suo genere est gravius quam peccatum schismatis, licet possit contingere, quod aliquis schismaticus gravius peccet quam quidam infidelis: vel propter maiorem contemptum, vel propter maius periculum, quod inducit, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi . . . Ad (rationem). Dicendum quod, sicut bonum multitudinis est maius quam bonum unius, qui est de multitudine, ita est minus quam bonum extrinsecum, ad quod multitudo ordinatur, sicut bonum ordinis exercitus est minus quam bonum ducis (text 176). Et similiter bonum ecclesiasticae unitatis, cui opponitur schisma, est minus quam bonum veritatis divinae, cui opponitur infidelitas.
194. II-II, 64, 2 ad 3: Homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit. Et ideo decedit a dignitate humana, prout scil. homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens, et incidit quodammodo in servitutem bestiarum, ut scil. de ipso ordinetur secundum quod est utile aliis, secundum illud Ps. 48, 21: *Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis*; et Prov. 11, 29: *Qui stultus est, serviet sapienti*. Et ideo, quamvis hominem in sua dignitate manentem occidere sit secundum se malum, tamen hominem peccatorem occidere potest esse bonum sicut occidere bestiam: peior enim est malus homo quam bestia, et plus nocet, ut Philosophus dicit in I Pol. (1253a 31).
195. II-II, 88, 11 ad 1 (text 100): Periculis rerum humanarum est obviandum per res humanas, non autem per hoc, quod res divinae convertuntur in usum humanum. Professi autem religionem mortui sunt mundo et vivunt Deo. Unde non sunt revocandi ad vitam humanam occasione cuicumque eventus.
196. II-II, 88, 12 ad 2 (texts 59, 100): Cum potestas praelati spiritualis, qui non est dominus, sed dispensator, in *aedificationem* sit *data*, et *non in destructionem*, ut patet II Cor. X, 8: sicut praelatus non potest imperare ea, quae secundum se Deo displicent, scil. peccata, ita non potest prohibere ea, quae secundum se Deo placent, scil. virtutis opera.—Cf. 4 Sent. 38, I, 4 sol. 1: Quaedam sunt, in quibus est homo ita liber sui, quod etiam contra praeceptum Papae potest illa facere, sicut continere et alia consilia divina.
197. II-II, 124, 3 ad 3 (text 102): Ratio illa procedit de martyrio secundum propriam speciem actus, ex qua non habet excellentiam inter omnes actus virtutum, sicut nec fortitudo est excellentior inter omnes virtutes. (cf. corp. art.)
198. II-II, 124, 5 ad 5 (text 103): Bonum reipublicae est praecipuum inter bona humana (August. *De civitate Dei* 15, 4 supra §XI). Sed bonum divinum, quod est propria causa martyrii, est potius quam humanum. Tamen, quia bonum humanum potest effici divinum, ut si referatur in Deum, ideo potest esse quodcumque bonum humanum martyrii causa secundum quod in Deum refertur.
199. II-II, 152, 4 c. et ad 3 (text 105): Sicut patet in libro Hieronymi *Contra Iovin.* (I, 3; PL 23, 233), hic error fuit Ioviniani, qui posuit virginitatem non esse matrimonio praefereendam. Qui quidem error praecipue destruitur et exemplo Christi, qui et matrem virginem elegit et ipse virginitatem servavit, et ex doctrina Apostoli . . . ; et etiam ratione: tum, quia bonum divinum est potius bono humano; tum quia bonum animae praefertur bono corporis; tum quia bonum contemplativae vitae praefertur bono activae . . . Ad (rationem). Dicendum, quod bonum commune potius est bono privato, si sit eiusdem generis. Sed potest esse, quod bonum privatum sit melius

secundum suum genus. Et hoc modo virginitas Deo dicata praefertur fecunditati carnali. Unde Augustinus dicit in libro *De Virginitate* (9; PL 40, 400), quod fecunditas carnis, etiam illarum, quae in hoc tempore nihil aliud in coniugio quam prolem requirunt, quam mancipient Christo, pro amissa virginitate compensari non posse credenda est.

200. II-II, 185, 2 ad 1 (text 37): Quamvis simpliciter et absolute loquendo vita contemplativa potior sit quam vita activa, et amor Dei quam dilectio proximi, tamen ex alia parte bonum multitudinis praefendum est bono unius. Unde Augustinus dicit in verbis praemissis (text 38): neque otium vestrum necessitatibus Ecclesiae praeponatis. Praesertim, quia hoc ipsum ad dilectionem Dei pertinet, quod aliquis ovibus Christi curam pastorem impendat . . . Similiter etiam praelati non sic transferuntur ad vitam activam, ut contemplativam deserant. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX *De civ. Dei* 19, quod, si imponatur sarcina pastoralis officii, nec sic deserenda est delectatio veritatis, quae scilicet in contemplatione habetur.
201. II-II, 188, 6 c. et ad 1 (text 39): Opus vitae activae est duplex. Unum quidem, quod ex plenitudine contemplationis derivatur, sicut doctrina et praedicatio . . . Et hoc praefertur simplici contemplationi. Sicut enim maius est illuminare quam lucere solum, ita maius est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum contemplari. Aliud autem opus est activae vitae, quod totaliter consistit in occupatione exteriori, sicut eleemosynas dare, hospites recipere, et alia huiusmodi. Quae sunt minora operibus contemplationis, nisi forte in casu necessitatis . . . Sic ergo summum gradum in religionibus tenent, quae ordinantur ad docendum et praedicandum . . . Secundum autem gradum tenent illae, quae ordinantur ad contemplationem. Tertius est earum, quae occupantur circa exteriores actiones . . . Ad (rationem) ergo. Dicendum, quod Decretalis illa loquitur de vita activa, prout ordinatur ad salutem animarum.
202. II-II, 188, 8 c. et ad 4 et 5 (texts 41, 137): Id, quod est solitarium, debet esse sibi per se sufficiens (cf. *Eth.* X; 1177b 1). Hoc autem est, cui nihil deest, quod pertinet ad rationem perfecti. Et ideo solitudo competit contemplanti qui iam ad perfectum pervenit. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: uno modo ex solo divino munere . . . ; alio modo per exercitium virtuosi actus . . . Ad exercitium autem huiusmodi iuvatur homo ex aliorum societate . . . Et ideo vita socialis necessaria est ad exercitium perfectionis, solitudo autem competit iam perfectis . . . Sicut ergo id, quod iam perfectum est, praeceminet ei, quod ad perfectionem exercetur, ita vita solitariorum, si debite assumatur, praeceminet vitae sociali. Si autem absque praecedenti exercitio talis vita assumatur, est periculosissima, nisi per divinam gratiam suppleatur, quod in aliis per exercitium acquiritur, sicut patet de beatis Antonio et Benedicto . . . Ad (rationem; text 47). Dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIX *De civitate Dei*, 19: a studio cognoscendae veritatis nemo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium.—Quod autem aliquis super candelabrum ponatur, non pertinet ad ipsum, sed ad eius superiores. Quae sarcina, si non imponatur, ut Augustinus *ibidem* subdit, contemplandae veritati vacandum est, ad quam plurimum valet solitudo. Et tamen illi, qui solitariam vitam agunt, multum utiles sunt generi humano . . . Ad (aliam rationem; text 137). Dicendum, quod homo potest solitarius vivere dupliciter. Uno modo quasi societatem humanam non ferens propter animi saevitiam: et hoc est bestiale. Alio modo per hoc, quod totaliter divinis rebus inhaeret: et hoc est supra hominem. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in I Pol. (1253a 27), quod ille, qui aliis non communicat, est bestia aut deus, i.e. divinus vir.
203. III, 4, 1 c. et ad 4 (text 124): Aliquid assumptibile dicitur . . . secundum congruentiam ad unionem (cum divina persona). Quae quidem congruentia

attenditur secundum duo in humana natura, scil. secundum eius dignitatem, et necessitatem. Secundum dignitatem quidem, quia humana natura, inquantum est rationalis et intellectualis, nata est attingere aliquo modo ipsum Verbum per suam operationem, cognoscendo scil. et amando Ipsum; secundum necessitatem autem, quia indigebat reparatione, cum subiaceret originali peccato. Haec autem duo soli humanae naturae conveniunt . . . Unde relinquitur, quod sola natura humana sit assumptibilis.—Ad (rationem). Dicendum, quod perfectio universi non est perfectio unius personae vel suppositi, sed eius, quod est unum sub positione vel ordine, cuius plurimae partes non sunt assumptibiles . . . Unde relinquitur, quod solum natura humana sit assumptibilis.

204. III, 65, 3 ad 1 (text 108): Matrimonium ordinatur ad commune bonum corporaliter. Sed bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur substantialiter in ipso Eucharistiae sacramento.

# MAISTRE NICOLE ORESME

## LE LIVRE DU CIEL

## ET

## DU MONDE<sup>1</sup>

### TEXT AND COMMENTARY

ALBERT D. MENUT and ALEXANDER J. DENOMY C.S.B.

(CONTINUED)

Ci commence le tiers livre du ciel et du monde ouquel il determine des corps qui sont meüz de mouvement [droit après ce que il a dit devant des corps meüz de mouvement]<sup>2</sup> circulaire. Et tracte les opinions anciens.  
 157c Et ou quart il // determine la verité. Et contient ce tiers livre .xiii chapitres.

<sup>1</sup>Continued from *MEDIAEVAL STUDIES*, III, (1941), pp. 185-280, and IV, (1942), pp. 159-297. For the reader's convenience we repeat some of the explanation of the editorial apparatus.

The hitherto unpublished text of *Du Ciel et du monde* is preserved in the following six manuscript copies:

- A Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 1082, ff. 1a-209c.
- B Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 565, ff. 23a-171d.
- C Bern. Bibl. Bongarsiana, *Ms.* 310, ff. 28a-152d.
- D Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 1083, ff. 1a-125b.
- E Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 24278, ff. 1a-146a.
- F Bibl. de la Sorbonne, *Ms.* 571, ff. 1a-234d.

The first printed edition reproduces the text of A with the following exceptions:

1. The geometrical figures appearing in the text have been assembled and printed conveniently throughout each Book with suitable references in foot-notes in the order of their appearance; arabic numerals have been inserted at the beginning of chapter headings; proper names have been uniformly capitalized throughout; all abbreviations have been solved and words run together in the text have been separated in accordance with modern usage; punctuation has been supplied, without strict adherence to any rigid system; the original of A is retained save in cases where a scribal error is clearly indicated and all textual emendations are indicated by [ ] with the original reading in a foot-note; unless otherwise indicated, emendations are derived from C; unhistorical final 's' is enclosed in ( ) ;

in so far as practical, the rules for the use of diacritical marks recommended by the Committee of the Société des Anciens Textes Français have been followed (Cf. *Romania*, LII (1926), pp. 243-246).

2. Variant readings are included only when a change of meaning is definitely involved and in Latin quotations; graphic variants are noted only when philological significance warrants. Therefore are omitted minute additions and omissions, minor repetitions, orthographical errors of minor importance, all inversions, variants of no contextual importance.
3. The translator's commentary is set off from the translated text by indenting the latter; in the original, text and commentary are distinguished only by the words 'Tieste' and 'Glose' or by suitable abbreviations.
4. References are to folios of A. All foot-note references to works in the Aristotelian corpus are from *Aristotelis Opera ex recensione I. Bekkeri*, 10 vols., Oxford, 1837.
5. In the foot-notes, Guthrie refers to *Aristotle on the Heavens*, Greek text with English translation by W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge, Mass., and London: the Loeb Classical Library, 1938); *Juntas* to the *Quantum Volumen Aristotelis De Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, Meteorologicorum, De Plantis, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis*, Venetiis apud Juntas, MDLXXIII.

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'droit après . . . de mouvement.'

[SOMMAIRE DES CHAPITRES DU TIERS LIVRE]

- 1.—Ou premier chapitre il fait mencion d'aucunes choses devant dites et met son intencion.
- 2.—Ou secont il recite .iiii. opinions et improuve la desreniere par .ii. raysons mathematiques.
- 3.—Ou tiers il reprouve l'opinion de Plato par une autre rayson naturele.
- 4.—Ou quart il reprouve encore l'opinion de Plato par .iiii. autres raysons natureles.
- 5.—Ou quint il monstre que les corps naturelz ont mouvemens naturelz et reprouve aucuns anciens opinions.
- 6.—Ou sixte il prouve que les corps naturelz qui sont meüs de mouvement droit sont pesans ou ligiers.
- 7.—Ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> il reprouve aucuns opinions et monstre que il convient que aucun element soit.
- 8.—En le .viii.<sup>e</sup> il monstre que les elemens ne sont pas infiniz en multitude.
- 9.—Ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> il monstre que il n'est pas tant seulement un element. /
- 157d 10.—Ou .x.<sup>e</sup> il monstre que les elemens sont corruptibles selon leurs parties.
- 11.—En le .xi.<sup>e</sup> il reprouve aucuns opinions de la maniere comment les elemens sont faiz un de l'autre.
- 12.—Ou .xii.<sup>e</sup> il monstre par .v. raysons generales que les elemens ne sont pas determinés par figures.
- 13.—Ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup> il prouve encore par .ix. raysons plus especiales que les elemens ne sont pas determinéz par figures.

[LIVRE III]

1.—Ou premier chapitre il fait mencion d'aucunes choses devant dites et met son intencion.

Nous avons dit devant du premier ciel et de ses parties et des estoilles meües qui sont en ce ciel, et quelles choses ce sont selon nature, et que telz corps ne furent onques ne engendrés ne fais et sont incorruptibles.

158a Glose. Tout ce a Aristote determiné ou secont livre.<sup>3</sup> Et par le premier ciel il entent ici toute la masse des // corps du ciel et de toutes les esperes celestielz et le nomme premier a la difference des esperes<sup>4</sup> de l'aer et du feu qui sont vulgalment appelléz ciel: *volucres celi*,<sup>5</sup> etc. Après il met l'intencion de toute philosophie naturele.

Tiexte. Et toutes choses natureles sont les unes substances et les autres sont operations et passions de ces substances. Et les substances, ce sont les corps simples, si comme le feu, la terre et les autres elemens et les corps qui sont faiz de cez yci, et aussi tout le ciel et les parties de lui et derechief les bestes et hommes, les plantes<sup>6</sup> et les parties de ces choses. Et les passions et oeuvres sont les mouvemens localz de chascun de ces corps, et maïsme[me]nt<sup>7</sup> des elemens et de touz autres corps desquelz mouvemens les elemens sont cause selon leur vertu.

Glose. Car chascun corps mixte est meü selon la vertu de l'element qui a seignourie en lui, si comme il appert ou quart chapitre du premier.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The principal argument relating to this matter is found in Book I, ch. 25-36; in Book II the topic is treated *passim*, ch. 16-20.

<sup>4</sup> DE estoilles.

<sup>5</sup> Psalm viii, 9.

<sup>6</sup> EF planetes.

<sup>7</sup> A maisment.

<sup>8</sup> 9d.

- 158b Tiexte. Item encore, les oeuvres et passions des substances naturelles [sont]<sup>9</sup> les alteracions et les transmutacions que / elles ont ensamble et une a l'autre. Or convient il donques que presque toute l'istoire ou science naturele soit des corps pour ce que toutes substances naturelles sont corps ou engendrees aveques corps<sup>10</sup> et aveques magnitudes et quantités.
- Glose. Il dist *presque toute science naturele etc.*, pour ce que en aucune partie est faite mencion de Dieu, des intelligences et de l'ame intellectuelle.
- Tiexte. Et tout ce que dit est appert par ce que est déterminé ou livre de *Phisique* et par considerer les livres de philosophie naturele chascun par soy.
- Glose. Il appert ou secont de *Phisique*<sup>11</sup> que nature est principe<sup>12</sup> de mouvement et de repos, et pour ce que, selon Aristote, rien n'est meü fors corps, il s'ensuit que toute chose naturele appartienne a corps. Après il met son intencion quant a ce que s'ensuit.
- Tiexte. Or est dit devant du premier element, c'est a dire du ciel, quel il est selon nature et que il est incorruptible et sanz commencement. Or reste dire des autres .ii.
- 158c Glose. Les autres sont .iiii., mais il di(s)t .ii. pour ce que il en veult ici determiner // selon ce que appartient a leurs mouvemens localz naturelz lesquelz sont faiz par .ii. vertus ou qualitez, c'est a savoir pesanteur et legiereté;—et donques des autres .ii., c'est a savoir du legier et du pesant.
- Tiexte. Et en disant de ces elemens, il convendra aveques ce enquerir de la generacion et corrupcion de eulz, car ou generacion n'est rien ou elle est en ces elemens et es choses qui sont faites de ces elemens. Et, par aventure, convient il donques premierement considerer a savoir mon se generacion est ou non.
- Glose. Il traicte ici de [la]<sup>13</sup> generacion des elemens selon leur nature et selon ce que il appartient pour leur mouvement, mais il en traicte ou livre de *Generacion et corrupcion*<sup>14</sup> [plus]<sup>15</sup> ou resgart des choses qui sont de eulz mixtes et compostes.

2.—Ou secont chapitre il recite .iiii. opinions anciens et reprouve<sup>1</sup> la desreniere par deux raisons mathematiques.

- 158d Les philosophes qui ont ou temps passé enquis de verité speculative et ausquelz nous adreçons nos paroles ont eü opinions divers les uns des / autres. Car aucuns d'eulz ostoient<sup>2</sup> toute generacion et toute corrupcion et disoient que rien ne est fait de nouvel ne rien corrompu mais seulement selon apparence; et le nous est avis, si comme disoient ceulz qui ensuoient Mellissus et Parmenides lesquelz, combien que il dient bien de autres choses comme sont les choses perpetueles, toutevoies l'en ne doit pas ce cuider des choses naturelles, car parler des choses qui sont perpetueles et immobiles c'est autre consideracion que naturele et premiere par dignité,—ce est methaphisique. Et la cause de leur erreur fu pour ce que il ne cuidoiert que il fust autre substance quelcunque que celles qui sont sensibles,—et ainsi

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'sont.'

<sup>10</sup> A corps et aveques corps et aveques magnitude.

<sup>11</sup> *Physicorum*, II, 1, 192b, 13-16; cf. also VIII, 3, 253b, 6-9.

<sup>12</sup> DE commencement.

<sup>13</sup> A omits 'la.'

<sup>14</sup> *De Generatione et Corruptione*, I, 2, *passim*, and II, 1, 328b32-329a2.

<sup>15</sup> A omits 'plus.'

<sup>1</sup> B recite.

<sup>2</sup> BCDEF estoient.



entendoient les premiers philosophes,—et que toutes natures estoient teles. Et pour ce que nous avons cognoissance et science qui ne peut estre de choses corruptibles, il s'ensuit que les substances corporeles sont incorruptibles. Et ainsi faisoient ces philosophes leurs raysons.

- 159a Glose. Les Pythagoriens furent de ceste opinion qui metoient // que ame est corps invisible et est perpetuele et d'une nature en hommes et en bestes; et aussi metoient il les autres corps sensibles estre incorruptibles fors selon apparence. Et ceste opinion en partie recite Ovide ou .xv.<sup>o</sup> de son grant livre.<sup>3</sup> Après Aristote met ou recite une autre opinion.

Tiexte. Et autres furent qui metoient leur estude a dire le contraire, desquelz les uns dient que toute chose ot commencement et que rien ne fu perpetuellement, mais aucunes choses orent commencement et sont incorruptibles et les autres furent faites et seront corrompues.<sup>4</sup> Et ce fu l'opinion de Hesiodus.

Glose. Ce fu un thelogien des poiens qui bailla sa science en poëtrie et mettoit que toutes choses furent faites d'une matiere confuse appellee *chaos*, et de ce fait mencion Ovide ou commencement de son grant livre.<sup>5</sup> Après vient la tierce opinion.<sup>6</sup>

- 159b Tiexte. Item, aucuns des autres premiers philosophes dient que toutes autres choses, fors une seule, sont continuellement / autres et autres et fluent aussi comme le temps ou un son. Et n'est rien permanent ne fichié fors celle seule chose de laquelle toutes les autres sont faites par transformacion. Et ceste opinion tiennent plusieurs et Eraclitus<sup>7</sup> qui fu de Ephese.

[Glose.]<sup>8</sup> Mais les<sup>9</sup> uns disoient que celle chose qui est la matiere dont toutes sont faites est eue, si comme Tales; et Anaximenes disoit que ce est aer et Heraclitus<sup>10</sup> que ce est feu. Après s'ensuit la quarte opinion qui fu de Plato.

Tiexte. Et aucuns sont qui dient que tout corps est generable et dient que les corps sont engendrés et fais de superficies et resoluz ou corrompuz arriere en superficies.

Glose. Si comme il fu dit ou premier chapitre du premier,<sup>11</sup> superficie est une quantité ymaginee longue et laee sanz quelcunque profondeur ou espaisseur, mais est indivisible selon profondeur et divisible selon lonc et selon lé. Après il reprouve ceste opinion par .ii. raisons mathematiques.

Tiexte. Et des autres opinions sera parlé autre fois.

- 159c Glose. Si comme après en ce livre et ou livre de *Generacion*.<sup>12</sup> Et // aussi l'opinion Plato estoit plus commune ou, par aventure, Aristote avoit trop le cuer contre lui, si comme di(s)t Eustrace ou premier d'*Ethiques*.<sup>13</sup>

Tiexte. Mais de ceulz qui mettent que les corps sont constitués et composés de superficies, l'en peu(s)t veoir promptement que il dient moult de choses autres qui sont contraires aus disciplines mathematiques. Et n'est pas juste chose de destruire les principes et les conclusions de teles sciences qui n'a raysons plus creables au contraire que teles legieres suspicions.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Metamorphoses*, XV, 156-462.

<sup>4</sup> BCDEF corruptibles.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5-7.

<sup>6</sup> B omits 'Après vient . . . opinion.'

<sup>7</sup> BCDF Eraclius.

<sup>8</sup> A Tiexte.

<sup>9</sup> A repeats 'les.'

<sup>10</sup> BDEF Eraclius; C Heraclius.

<sup>11</sup> 5c et seq.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Juntas*. t.c. 4, 175K, J. L. Stocks notes in his English translation of *De Caelo*, The

*Works of Aristotle*, translated into English under the Editorship of W. D. Ross, II (Oxford 1930), 298b, 34, note 4, that the promised discussion is not found in either *De Caelo* or *De Generatione*.

<sup>13</sup> *Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria*, ed. G. Heylbut (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, XX, Berlin, 1892), I, vi, pp. 65-72.

<sup>14</sup> A legiertes suspicions.

Glose. Tous mathematiens supposent que tout corps et toute quantité continue est divisible sanz fin et que nulle tele quantité n'est composee de choses indivisibles, si comme il fu dit ou premier chapitre du premier<sup>15</sup> et appert ou sixte de *Phisique*.<sup>16</sup> Après il met la seconde rayson.

Tiexte. Item, se les corps sont composts de superficies, par samblable rayson les superficies sont compostes de lignes et les lignes de poins. Et ainsi seroit possible que une ligne fust dont la partie ne seroit pas ligne.

159d Glose. Si comme celle / qui seroit composee de .ii. poinz.

Tiexte. Mais de ce fu consideré devant ou livre de *Phisique* et monsté que longitude ou ligne ne peu(s)t estre indivisible.

Glose. Ce est ou sixte de *Phisique*<sup>17</sup> comme dit est.

3.—Ou tiers chapitre il repreve l'opinion de Plato par une autre raison naturele.

Or voulons nous maintenant un petit considerer quelz impossibles des corps naturelz il convient ensuir a l'opinion de ceulz qui dient que lignes sont faites de poins indivisibles.<sup>1</sup>

Glose. Après il met .iii. supposicions.

Tiexte. Premièrement, de metre que quantités continues sont composees de indivisibles, touz les impossibles qui s'en ensuient en sciences mathematiques s'en ensuient en sciences naturelez, et ceulz qui s'en ensuient en sciences natureles ne s'en ensuient pas touz es mathematiques pour ce que les choses mathe[m]a-tiques<sup>2</sup> sont dites et entendues par abstraction et les natureles par apposition ou conjunction aveques matiere.

160a Glose. Si comme, pour cause d'exemple, quant le // mathematiens parle de cercle, il ne cure et ne considere pas se il est d'or ou d'argent ou d'autre matiere, mais le naturien considere la matiere sensible et le subject et ainsi des autres figures et des nombres.

Tiexte. Item, moult de choses sont lesquelles ne pourroient estre en<sup>3</sup> choses indivisibles et lesquelles par neccessité sont es choses natureles, car se une chose est indivisible, ce est impossible que chose divisible soit en elle. Item, toutes passions ou accidens corporelz<sup>4</sup> sont divisibles en .ii. manieres, i.e., selon espece ou selon accident: selon espe[c]e,<sup>5</sup> si comme couleur dont les especes sont blanc et noir; et selon accident se le subject ouquel est tele passion ou accident est divisible. Et pour ce, toutes passions corporelles sont divisibles en ceste maniere et pour ce convient considerer le impossible qui s'ensuit se les corps naturels estoient<sup>6</sup> composts de indivisible[s].<sup>7</sup>

Glose. Après il forme sa rayson.

Tiexte. Or est ce impossible que une chose soit pesante qui est composte de .ii. choses desquelles ne une ne l'autre ont pesanteur.

160b Et touz corps sensibles ont pesanteur / selon Democritus ou, au moins, la terre et l'eau, si comme Plato meisme diroit.<sup>8</sup> Et chose

<sup>15</sup> 5c.

<sup>16</sup> *Physicorum*, VI, 1, 231a, 25-34; 2, 232b, 21-25; 233a, 10-21; 233b, 16-19; 4, *passim*, 234b, 10-235a, 37.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 230a, 30-232a, 20; 2, 233b, 16-19.

<sup>1</sup> *DE* poins divisibles.

<sup>2</sup> *A* matheantiques.

<sup>3</sup> *BCDEF* estre et choses.

<sup>4</sup> *AB* corporeles.

<sup>5</sup> *A* espere.

<sup>6</sup> *DE* naturelz n'estoient.

<sup>7</sup> *A* indivisible.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Timaeus*, 49, 53, 60-61. The *vetus translatio* used by Oresme merely indicates at this point, 'ut et ipsi dixerint.' Cf. *Juntas*, 178E. Averrois in his Commentary makes no

indivisible, si comme est point, n'a quelcunque pesanteur; et donques la ligne qui seroit composee de poinz ne seroit pas pesante.<sup>9</sup> Et se les lignes ne sont pesantes, les superficies ne sont pas pesantes. Et donques nul corps n'est pesant.

Glose. Après il prouve par .iii. raisons que point ne peu(s)t estre pesant et ce avoit il supposé.

Tiexte. Et que ce ne soit pas possible que point ait pesanteur il appert, car toute chose pesante e[s]t<sup>10</sup> plus pesante que aucune autre et toute legiere plus legiere d'aucune autre. Mais, par aventure, il n'est pas neccessité que toute chose qui est plus pesante d'autre soit pesante, et aussi de chose plus legiere.

Glose.<sup>11</sup> Et se aucun opposoit en disant que le comparatif presuppose le positif et donques tout ce que est plus pesant est pesant, je respon que par *pesant* il entent ce que est simplement pesant et absolument. Et l'eau n'est pas tele, et toutevoies elle est plus pesante que n'est l'aer et est pesante aucunement et non pas simplment ou absolument. Et de ce //

160c

met il après exemple.

Tiexte. Et est aussi comme toute chose grande<sup>12</sup> est plus grande, mes de toute qui est plus grande il ne convient pas que elle soit grande, car moult de choses simplement petites sont plus grandes d'aucunes autres.

Glose. Un homme est dit simplement grant quant il attaint ou passe quantité deüie; et quant il n'i attaint il est dit petit et di(s)t l'en que il n'est pas grant, et toutevoies il est plus grant que n'est un espervier et que moult de choses.

Tiexte. Et donques se toute chose pesante est plus pesante, il convient que elle soit plus grande en pesanteur. Et ainsi toute chose pesante est divisible. Et l'en suppose que point est indivisible.

Glose. Se un point de terre est plus pesant que un point d'eau, donques la pesanteur contient en vertu tant et plus que la pesanteur du point de eau. Et donques est elle divisible. Et ce est impossible que accident divisible soit en subject indivisible. Mais l'en pourroit dire que ceste pesanteur est divisible selon intencion et selon degrés, mais non pas selon extension et quantité. / Et pour ce, par aventure, les raisons que Aristote fait a ce propos ne sont pas toutes demonstratives, combien que la conclusion soit neccessaire. Après il met a ce la seconde rayson.

160d

Tiexte. Item, chose pesante est espesse et la legiere est claire, et une chose est dite espesse pour ce que en equale quantité a plus de matiere en elle et par ce elle differe de chose clere. Et toute tele chose est divisible. Et donques se point est pesant, il est espés et se il est legier, il est cler et, par consequent, il est divisible et partible, car il a en equale quantité plus ou moins de parties de matiere.

Glose. Après il met a ce la tierce rayson.

Tiexte. Item, toute chose pesante est molle ou dure, et ce que est mole cede en ses parties quant il est touchié. Et donques est chose molle divisible.

Glose. Et, par consequent, point ne peut estre mol et donques il ne peu(s)t estre dur, car il [est]<sup>13</sup> dont les parties ne cedent pas au touchement. Et, par consequent, point n'est pesant ne legier. Et ainsi est ceci prouvê par

reference to Plato or to Democritus: Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 8, 178L.

<sup>9</sup> DE seroit point pesante.

<sup>10</sup> ABCDEF et.

<sup>11</sup> BCDEF legiere chose. Et se aucun.

<sup>12</sup> DE omit 'grande.'

<sup>13</sup> A car il dont; B car dur est dont; CDF car est dont; E car il est dont.

- 161a .iii. raysons prises de .iii. differences qui sont pesant // et legier, cler et espés, mol et dur. Après il prouve une autre chose que il avoit supposee et par .ii. raysons.

Tiexte.<sup>14</sup> Mais encore ne peu(s)t l'en dire que chose pesante soit composee de parties integrales qui ne sont pesantes, car il conven-droit que ceulz qui ce dient, se il ne vouloient faire fiction, determinassent quans poins font pesanteur et quans non.

Glose. Car il disoient que .ii. poins ou .iii. mis ensamble ne poisent rien, mais quant il sont en grant multitude, il font pesanteur. Or convenist il donques dire quans il y fault.

Tiexte. Item, toute pesanteur est plus grande d'aucune pesanteur, si comme il est dit devant.<sup>15</sup> Et donques il convendrait que point indivisible fust pesant. Car poson que .iiii. poins facent pesanteur et .iii. ne la facent pas, donques qui adjousterà le quint, tout ensemble sera plus pesant et, par consequent, le quint point est pesant.

- Glose. Mais je prouve que ces raysons ne concluent pas, car aucunes choses sont si petites que elles sont insensibles et ne peuvent estre veües, et peuvent estre de / tele quantité que .ii. ou .iii. ou .iiii. peuvent bien estre veües conjointes en une et non en mendre nombre. Et se .iii. ensamble sont invisibles<sup>16</sup> et les .iiii. sont visibles, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que la quarte separee soit visible. Et ainsi la quinte adjoustee fait tout plus visible et si est par soy invisible. Et tout ce appert en perspective et en plusieurs lieux de philosophie. Et semblablement droit l'en des poins indivisibles quant a pesanteur. Item, les petites poudretes que l'en voit en l'aer ou ray du soleil sont de nature de terre et se plusieurs, si comme .xii., estoient mises en un, ce peseroit; et qui adjousteroit la .xiii.\* tout seroit plus pesant. Et toutevoies, chascune par soy ne poise rien. Et ausi droit l'en des poins indivisibles. Au premier je respon que ce n'est pas semblable, car il n'est partie de chose visible, tant soit petite, qui ne soit visible quant est de soy et se vertu estoit qui fust assés puissante pour la veoir; mais point indivisible ne peu(s)t estre pesant quant est de soy.
- 161c Au secont semblablement, l'en droit que chascune de ces pou- // dretes est pesante quant est de soy, mais sa pesanteur seule n'est pas si grande que elle peüst diviser le aer qui resiste ou le vent. Et une telle adjoustee a chose plus pesante la fait plus pesante. Et est aussi comme se .xi. hommes povoient traire une nef et, le .xii.\* adjouste, il la traitoient et, adjouste le .xiii.\*, il la traitoient plus isnelement. Et comme dit est, par aventure, ne sont pas toutes les raysons d'Aristote a ce propos demonstratives.

4.—Ou quart chapitre il reprouve encore l'opinion de Plato par .iiii. autres resons natureles.

- Encore est autre raison contre cest opinion, car il dient que corps est fait de superficies. Or est il ainsi que l'en peu(s)t ymaginer .ii. lignes estre adjoustees ensemble [ou une sus l'autre]<sup>1</sup> ou une ou bout de l'autre et semblablement de .ii. superficies ou de plusieurs. Et se .ii. superficies sont mises une decoste l'autre, elles ne peuvent faire corps mais font plus grande superficie.<sup>2</sup> Et se elles sont mises une sus l'autre, le corps que elles feroient ne seroit pas element ne, par consequent, corps compo- / sé de elemens.
- 161d

<sup>14</sup> DE omit 'Tiexte.'

<sup>15</sup> 160c.

<sup>16</sup> B visibles.

<sup>1</sup> A omits 'ou une sus l'autre.'

<sup>2</sup> A plus grandes superficies.

Glose. Car il disoient que les elemens sont de figures [speriques]<sup>3</sup> regulieres qui ont plusieurs faces, et que l'element du feu qui a le moins de faces ou de superficies est de figure appelee pyramide laquelle a .iiii. faces, si comme il appert ou .xiii.<sup>o</sup> de Euclide.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Item, les uns corps sont plus pesans que les autres et aucuns sont plus [legiers, et donques se il dient que les corps sont plus]<sup>5</sup> pesans qui sont de plusieurs superficies, si comme il est determiné in *Thimeo*,<sup>6</sup> il s'ensuit que les superficies sont pesantes et que ligne et point ont pesanteur, car point se a ou resgart de ligne comme ligne ou resgart de superficie et superficie a corps proporcionnellement, si comme nous avons dit devant. Et se il disoient autrement et que la terre n'est pas plus pesante pour ce que elle soit de plusieurs superficies, mais pour ce que elle est de superficies pesantes et le feu de ligieres, donques par samblable rayson les lignes et les poins seront pesans et legiers; et ce est reprouvé devant.

Glose. Ou chapitre precedent.<sup>7</sup>

162a

Tiexte. Item, se ainsi estoit, il s'ensuiroit que l'en peüst faire que il ne seroit quelcunque magnitude ou quantité, // car il disoient que corps peu(s)t estre resolut en superficies et par semblable rayson superficie peu(s)t estre resolute en lignes et ligne en poins, et ainsi il ne sera fors poi[n]z<sup>8</sup> et nul corps. Item, par semblable il convendroit que le temps, qui est chose continue, fust composé de instanz ou de momens indivisibles. Et se ainsi estoit, il pourroit estre resolut en telz momens, et donques il seroit osté et ne seroit pas temps.

Glose. Après il applique ces raysons contre une autre opinion.

Tiexte. Et telz inconveniens<sup>9</sup> s'ensuiuent a ceulz qui mettent que le ciel est constitué et composé de nombres; car aucuns, aussi comme sont les Pythagoriens, mettent que toute nature est faite de nombres. Et nous voions que les corps naturelz ont pesanteur et legiereté. Et unités dont les nombres sont composés ne peuvent faire corps, combien que elles soient posees ensemble, et ne peuvent avoir pesanteur.

162b

Glose. Car, selon les Pythagoriens, elles sont indivisibles, et chose indivisible ne peu(s)t estre partie de corps ne de chose pesante / ou legiere, si comme il appert par les raysons devant mises.

Les raysons d'Aristote prouvent que les corps ne sont pas composts de indivisibles finiz en multitude, mais ne prouvent pas que eulz ne soient composts de indivisibles infiniz. Et de ce ay je autrefois dit plus a plain ou sixte de *Phisique*<sup>10</sup> ou ceste matiere est principalement tractie, et me souffist a present mettre ici un argüement jousté l'imaginacion que fait Aristote ou .xxviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du secont.<sup>11</sup> Je pose donques que la terre toute fust hors et loing du centre du monde, si comme disoient les Pythagoriens; et pose que une petite espere de feu fust ou centre du monde tellement que le centre de ceste espere fust le centre du monde et que ce feu fust du tout uniforme, semblable et d'une maniere en toutes ses parties, et que ce fust tres pur element tant rare ou tant

<sup>3</sup> A figures corporeles regulieres.

<sup>4</sup> B omits 'Euclide;' CDEF E. Cf. *Euclidis Elementa*, XIII, 13, ed. I. Heiberg IV (Lipsiae, 1885), p. 291.

<sup>5</sup> A omits 'legiers et donques . . . sont plus.'

<sup>6</sup> 56B.

<sup>7</sup> 160c.

<sup>8</sup> A poiz.

<sup>9</sup> F mouvemens.

<sup>10</sup> Oresme refers to his commentary on the *Physics* now lost. Cf. *Physicorum*, VI, 2, 232b, 21-25; 233a, 10-21; 233b, 16-18; 4, *passim*, 234b, 10-235a, 37.

<sup>11</sup> 147d et seq.

- cler que nature ne le peüst faire plus rare ou plus cler; et pose que toute chose dehors qui le pourroit empeeschier d'estre meü a son // lieu fust ostee, lequel lieu naturel a ce feu est la superficie concave du ciel, si comme souvent dit est. Je di que, ce posé, ce feu seroit divisé en choses indivisibles infinies, premierement car tout empeeschement forain est osté et il est en lieu qui li est de[s]naturel<sup>12</sup> et ou il ne pourroit reposer perpetuellement. Et donques seroit il meü vers le ciel. Item, il ne seroit pas meü tout ensemble plus vers une partie du ciel que vers les autres pour ce que il les resgarde toutes samblablement et equalment. Item, il ne pourroit estre plus estendu ne estre plus rare ne plus cler. Item, il est de sa nature de legier divisible. Item, il ne seroit divisé plus en un lieu ou partie que es autres et ne resteroit une partie quelcunque plus entiere ou plus a estre divise[e]<sup>13</sup> que l'autre ou que les autres, car elles sont toutes du tout et partout semblables et ne pourroit l'en signer lieu ou la division ne fust aussi comme en quelcunque autre. Et donques il ne en demoureroit rien indivisé, mais seroit ce feu divisé<sup>14</sup>
- 162d en touz les signes / ou il est divisible et donques seroit il divisé en indivisibles et non pas finiz, car ce est impossible par les raysons de Aristote maisme[me]nt<sup>15</sup> ou sixte de *Phisique*.<sup>16</sup> Et, par consequent, ce feu seroit divisé en indivisibles infiniz. Et maintenant le feu n'est pas compost d'autres choses que il seroit en ce cas. Mais je ay pensé que aucun pourroit dire que combien que ce feu soit semblable [par]<sup>17</sup> toutes ses parties, toutevoies le ciel est dessemblable en ses parties et par ce, il atraira plus une partie de ce feu que l'autre et sera divisé plus en un lieu que en autre. Je respon que ce n'est que une fuite, car il ne fault fors muer un pou le cas et mettre que selon la dissimi[li]tude<sup>18</sup> des parties [du ciel, les parties]<sup>19</sup> de ce feu en recompensant soient telement dessemblables que equalité quant a propos et quant a mouvement soit de toutes pars. Et d'autre partie, selon Aristote, le feu n'est pas meü en haut ne la terre en bas parce que le ciel atraie l'un et boute l'autre en rien, mais sont meüz
- 163a de leur nature par legiereté et par pesanteur. // Item, encore pourroit aucun dire que les parties de ce feu ne pourroient demourer semblables fors par un seul moment<sup>20</sup> indivisible pour ce que le ciel par son mouvement est continuellement en autre et autre et nouvele disposicion, et par ce et par l'influence du ciel ce feu seroit alteré diversement en ses parties et divisé, etc.; et ce est impossible que le ciel repose. Je respon et di que, par aventure, ne est [ce]<sup>21</sup> pas impossible par nature que par une espace de temps le ciel meü ne altere pas autrement une partie de ce feu que l'autre et que il demeure un temps en equalité en ses parties quant a legie[re]té.<sup>22</sup> Et posé que nature ne peüst ce faire, toutevoies n'est ce pas impossible a ymaginacion ne qui encloe contradiction; et, selon Averroïz ou .xxx.<sup>e</sup> chapitre,<sup>23</sup> Aristote use souvent de telle doctrine en supposant comme possible ce que nature ne peu(s)t faire, si comme il appert ou chapitre desus dit ou il pose que la terre eüst esté engendree hors du milieu. Et de tel possible et impossible fu dit / ou .xxx.<sup>e</sup> chapitre du premier livre.<sup>24</sup> Item, le cas desus mis ne enclot pas contradiction et est possible de la puissance de Dieu, et donques de ce ne se doit ensuir chose simplement impossible. Mais encore ay je pensé autre difficulté: et semble que si face, car se ceste espere de feu est divisee en indivisibles infiniz
- 163b

<sup>12</sup> A de naturel.<sup>13</sup> ABCD divisé.<sup>14</sup> BCDEF omit 'mais seroit ce feu divisé.'<sup>15</sup> A maisment.<sup>16</sup> A que.<sup>17</sup> A dissimilitude.<sup>18</sup> A omits 'du ciel les parties.' Omission

indicated, but not filled in.

<sup>19</sup> DE mouvement.<sup>20</sup> A omits 'ce.'<sup>21</sup> A legiere.<sup>22</sup> Juntas, t.c. 17, 183G.<sup>23</sup> 48b et seq.

comme dit est, ceste division sera aussi tost en un lieu comme en autre et soudainement. Et se tel point indivisible n'est rien, si comme je ay autre-foys monstré,<sup>24</sup> il s'ensuit que par ceste voie ce feu sera adnichilé soudainement et, par consequent, le lieu demourera vieu ou l'aer, qui est environ, le reemplira et sera meü soudainement. Et tele soudaine mutacion local semble estre simplement impossible. Et se telz poins indivisibles sont aucunes choses, ou eulz sont legiers ou non; se non, il s'ensuit .ii. inconveniens: un est que il ne seront pas meüz en haut; l'autre est que ce feu qui en est composé ne sera pas legier. Et se il sont legiers, vezci .ii. autres inconveniens: car ce feu qui est compo- // sé de telz poins infiniz

163c

avra legiereté infinie; l'autre est car l'aer ne resistera en rien a leur mouvement pour ce que il ne le diviseront pas. Et donques seront il meüz de bas en haut soudainement; et ce semble impossible meïsment supposé que Dieu delessast ce feu faire ce que s'ensuiroit selon le cours de nature, car ce point seroit de tout bas, tout haut, sans passer par le moien<sup>25</sup> ou il seroit en un moment par tout le moien et feroit une ligne de poins infinis.

5.—*Ou quint chapitre il monstre que les corps naturelz ont mouvemens naturelz et reprouve aucuns opinions anciens.*

Et<sup>1</sup> que touz corps simples aient mouvemens naturelz il appert par ce que s'ensuit.

Glose. Après il le prouve par .ii. raisons.

Tiexte. Car nous voions que telz corps sont meüs. Et donques se ce est autrement que selon nature, ce est hors nature et par violence. Et se ainsi est, il convient que aucun autre mouvement leur soit naturel et que il soit un, / car pluseurs peuent estre hors nature ou contre nature.

163d

Glose. Si comme se maladie est desnaturele a corps humain, il convient que son contraire, ce est santé, lui soit naturel. Et aussi comme santé est en une maniere et les maladies sont diverses, semblablement mouvement naturel est un et mouvement desnaturel ou hors nature peut estre en moult de manieres. Et pour ce, la chose pesante descent naturellement droit en bas et peu(s)t estre meüe hors nature droit en haut ou en travers, a destre et a senestre, etc., en moult de manieres.

Tiexte. Item, que les corps simples aient mouvement naturel il appert par leur repos, car la ou il reposent ou ce est par violence ou selon nature. Et la ou un corps repose par violence, a ce lieu est il meü par violence et la ou il repose selon nature, a ce lieu est il meü selon nature. Or voions nous et savons que aucune chose repose ou milieu; et se ce est selon nature, il convient que a ce lieu soit meü selon nature; et se tel corps repose ou milieu par violence, don- // ques convient il que aucune chose l'empeesche que il n'est meü. Et se ceste chose qui l'empeesche repose, l'en peu(s)t demander comme devant se ce est naturellement ou par violence. Et ainsi, en procedant, il convient par neccessité devenir a une chose qui repose par nature ou il convendroit que tel procès fust infini, et ce est impossible. Et qui droit, si comme Empedocles, que la terre n'est pas soustenue par une autre chose qui ainsi l'empeesche de mouvement et repose

164a

<sup>24</sup> 161b.

<sup>25</sup> B milieu.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. ii.

souz<sup>2</sup> elle, mais pour la giracion et isneleté du mouvement du ciel qui la fait reposer ou milieu, donques convendroît il, se ceste giracion estoit ostee par ymaginacion, que la terre fust meüe au lieu ou elle est encline;<sup>3</sup> et est impossible que elle fust meü[e]<sup>4</sup> touzjours sans fin, car ce est impossible de passer espace infinie. Et donques convient il dire que elle se arresteroit ou que ce fust, et que yleuques se reposast non par violence, mais selon nature. Et se ce repos est selon nature, il convient que le mouvement qui est a ce lieu soit se- / lon nature.

164b

Glose. Après il reprouve autres opinions.

Tiexte. Et a Dem[o]critus<sup>5</sup> et a Leucippus qui mettoient que les premiers corps sont meüz en une espace wide et infinie, quel estoit leur mouvement selon nature?

Glose. Mais il responnoient que ces premiers<sup>6</sup> corps sont petis athomes et sont elemens et moeuent un l'autre. Et contre ce il di(s)t après.

Tiexte. Mais de ces elemens, se un est meü de l'autre par violence, il convient devenir a un qui sera meü selon nature, car se il y a un qui soit premier et il est meü par violence, il convient que ce soit par un autre ou d'un autre qui est devant et donques n'estoit pas premier. Et se il n'i a nul premier, donques un est meü par l'autre et l'autre par autre et ainsi sans fin; et tel procés est impossible.

Glose. Après il reprouve semblablement l'opinion de Plato et d'aucuns autres par .v. raisons.

164c

Tiexte. Et tel inconvenient s'ensuit a ce que est escript ou livre de Plato appellé *Tymeus*<sup>7</sup> ou il est dit que le monde fu fait, et que au devant de // ce les elemens estoient meüz desordenement et estoit tout broullié un parmi l'autre. Car ou les elemens estoient ainsi meüz sans ordenance par violence, et donques s'ensuit l'inconvenient desus dit; et se il estoient ainsi meüz par nature, donques estoit le monde qui veult bien considerer, car il convient que le premier mouvant<sup>8</sup> fust meü par nature, et les corps ne sont pas meüz a leur propre[s] lieu[s]<sup>9</sup> par violence es quelz il reposent par nature. Et donques dire que les corps pesans estoient meüz au milieu et les legiers en haut, ce est l'ordre et la disposicion du monde. Et donques estoit le monde avant que il fust fait. Item, aucun pourroit demander: quant les elemens estoient ainsi meüz sans ordre, estoit ce possible que il se peüssent tellement estre meslés par leurs mouvemens que il feüssent corps mixtes comme sont char et os et teles choses? si comme Empedocles disoit que par amisté qui mouvoit les elemens estoient faites et engendrees moult de testes sans couls.<sup>10</sup>

164d

Glose. Car qui diroit que ce es- / toit possible, donques estoit le monde ou pouvoit estre, estant ceste desordenance; et qui diroit que ce estoit impossible, donques n'estoi[en]t<sup>11</sup> pas meüz les elemens sanz aucune ordenance par quoy estoit empeeschie tele mixcion.<sup>12</sup>

Tiexte. Item, Democritus et Leucippus mettoient que devant le monde les athomes et elemens estoient infiniz et meüz sans ordre en une espace infinie. Et donques convient il que ce fust par une

<sup>2</sup> BCDEF repose sans elle.

<sup>3</sup> A enclinee.

<sup>4</sup> A meü.

<sup>5</sup> AF Demecritus.

<sup>6</sup> DE omit 'premiers.'

<sup>7</sup> 30A.

<sup>8</sup> BEF mouvement.

<sup>9</sup> A propre lieu.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, 245, 20.

<sup>11</sup> A estoit.

<sup>12</sup> B omits 'par quoy . . . mixcion.'



- 165a vertu motive ou par plusieurs finies<sup>13</sup> ou par infinies. Et selon la multitude de teles vertus motivez, comme seroient pesanteur et legiereté, en espeece est la multitude<sup>14</sup> des mouvemens selon espeece. Et se il estoient meüz par une vertu ou par plusieurs finies, donques n'estoient il pas sanz ordenance; et se par infinies et par mouvemens infiniz en espeece, ce est impossible, si comme il fu dit ou premier livre.<sup>15</sup> Et ne peu(s)t l'en pas dire se il n'estoient meüz tous a un lieu que pour ce fust desordenance, car maintenant que le monde est ordené, touz ne sont pas meüz a un lieu mais seule- // ment ceulz qui sont d'un gerre ou d'une espeece. Item, estre meü desordeneement ou sans ordre, ce n'est autre chose fors estre meü hors nature ou contre nature, car des corps sensibles, leur ordre ce est leur propre nature. Et ce est inconvenient et impossible que mouvement desordené et hors nature dure par temps infini, car la chose est naturele aus choses qu'i compete et que ont plusieurs teles et par plus grant temps;<sup>16</sup> et il convient que ces philosophes desus diz dient le contraire, car celle desordenance, qui avroit duré par temps infini avant la constitution du monde, seroit naturele et l'ordre et le monde seroient hors nature ou contre nature; et ce est inconvenient. Item, il semble que Anaxagoras ne disoit pas si mal qui mett[o]it<sup>17</sup> que le monde avoit eü commencement et fu fait de choses qui estoient par devant sans mouvement. Et les autres dient que le monde fu fait par assembler les elemens; les autres disoient que ce n'est pas raysonnable dire que il fust fait de choses distantes et meües, et pour / ce, Empedocles ne vouloit pas que amisté eüst fait le monde, car elle est cause de assembler. Et pour ce, le monde fu fait, selon lui, de une chose et d'une masse assemblee.
- 165b Glose. Nous ne povons clerement savoir ne declairer leurs opinions et aussi il ne est de ce mestier.
- Tiexte. Et donques appert par ce que dit est que chascun corps a mouvement naturel duquel il est meü non pas par violence ne hors ou contre nature.

6.—Ou sixte chapitre il prouve que les corps qui sont meüs naturellement de mouvement droit sont pesans ou legiers.

- 165c Nous voulons monstrier que les corps qui sont meüz de mouvemens drois ont inclinacion de pesanteur et legiereté, car nous avons dit devant que telz corps sont meüz. Et se corps ainsi meü ne a par nature inclinacion a estre meü en bas ou en haut, nous voulons monstrier que ce est impossible que il soit ainsi meü. Car posé que .a. soit un corps<sup>18</sup> qui ne soit pesant ne legier, et que .b. soit un corps pesant qui descende en un // temps et passe la ligne .ge., et en ce meisme temps .a. descende [par la ligne]<sup>19</sup> .gd. Or soit prinse une partie de .b.,-et soit .c.,-de tele quantité que .b. a .c. ait tele<sup>20</sup> porcion en pesanteur comme a .ge. a .gd. Et donques il s'ensuit que .a. qui n'est pas pesant, et .c. qui est

<sup>13</sup> A plusieurs et finies.

<sup>14</sup> BCF omit 'la multitude,' DE la desordenance.

<sup>15</sup> Ch. 9-16.

<sup>16</sup> B omits 'et par plus grant temps.'

<sup>17</sup> A metteit, corrected from metten; BC mettent.

<sup>18</sup> Figure 1, p. 195.

<sup>19</sup> A omits 'par la ligne.'

<sup>20</sup> B que a ait tele.

pesant, seroient meüz de isneleté equale; et ce est impossible.

Et par ceste rayson meïsme l'en peu(s)t argüer de legiereté.

Glose. Si comme se le corps pesant en un minut d'une heure<sup>21</sup> descent .ii. estades et le non-pesant une estade, la moitié du pesant ou une autre partie en ce minut de heure descendroit une estade ou moins, car ceste rayson de Aristote et celle qui ensuit et autres semblables ont mestier de correction, tele comme elle fu mise ou .xii.\* chapitre du premier.<sup>22</sup> Après ceste raison qui est de mouvement naturel, il met la seconde qui regarde mouvement violent.

165d

Tiexte. Item, se aucun corps est meü qui n'est pesant ne legier, il convient que il soit meü par violence, car il ne pourroit estre meü naturellement par la rayson devant dite. Et se il / estoit meü par violence, il convendroit que il fust meü de isneleté infinie; et ce est impossible. Car se il estoit meü de isneleté finie, il pourroit estre que corps pesant et resistant et corps non-pesant et non-resistant fussent meüz violement d'une meïsme isneleté; car se le non-pesant est meü en un minut de heure par .xii. piés et le pesa[n]t<sup>23</sup> par un pié, l'en pourra prendre si petite partie du pesant que en ce minut elle sera meüe par .xii. piés. Et ce est impossible que pesant et non-pesant soient meüz d'une isneleté.

Glose. Ce est la rayson d'Aristote en sentence, mais il la met en termes aussi comme la precedente.

Tiexte. Et donques comme ainsi soit que quelcunque corps pesant donné, l'en peu(s)t prendre a ymaginacion un qui seroit meü plus isnelement de mouvement violent et qui avroit moins de resistance. Et donques celui qui n'a quelcunque resistance ne pesanteur seroit meü de isneleté infinie; et ce est impossible.

166a Glose. Ce est a entendre se n'estoit la // resistance du moien ou d'autre chose dehors.

Tiexte. Or appert donques que de neccessité tout corps déterminé a mouvement a en soy pesanteur ou legiereté.

Glose. Après il compare mouvement naturel et violent et met une difference.

Tiexte. Et le mouvement duquel le principe est ou corps meü est de nature ou naturel, mais celui dont la vertu motive est dehors, en tant comme tel, est violent.

Glose. Le mouvement est naturel quant le corps meü a inclinacion a tel mouvement, posé que la vertu motive soit en tel corps ou dehors; et celui est violent qui est contre l'inclinacion du corps meü. Après il met comme aucun mouvement est aussi comme mixte de naturel et de violent.

Tiexte. Et tout mouvement naturel, tel comme quant une chose est meüe en bas, est fait plus isnel par la vertu qui meu(s)t le corps en bas par violence.

166b Glose. Qui gecteroit fort une pierre droit [en bas],<sup>24</sup> elle descendroit plus isnelement que se l'en la lessoit cheoir par elle. Mais pour ce ne seroit pas tel mouve- / ment violent ne mixte, car il seroit selon l'inclinacion du corps meü. Mais qui la gecteroit non pas tout droit en bas mais en traversant, ce mouvement seroit aucunemen[t]<sup>25</sup> mixte de violent en tant comme elle ne descent pas tout droit. Après il met comment aer est requis en un mouvement et en l'autre.

<sup>21</sup> CF en un d'une heure; DE en un d'une honne.

<sup>22</sup> 21a et seq. Oresme's measure of an *estade* equals 625 feet; cf. 152d, note 24.

<sup>23</sup> A pesait.

<sup>24</sup> A omits 'en bas.'

<sup>25</sup> A aucunemen.

Tiexte. Et la puissance motive en chascun de ces .ii. mouvemens use de aer aussi comme de un instrument, ce est a savoir en mouvement violent qui est ou en haut ou en bas, car le aer est nay a estre legier et pesant. Et donques quant une chose pesante est gectee en haut, l'aer, en tant comme il est legier, fait ce mouvement après le commencement de tel mouvement qui est fait par la vertu qui fait la violence. Et aussi se la chose pesante est gectee en bas, l'aer la meu(s)t en tant<sup>26</sup> comme il est pesant après ce que elle est separee de la vertu qui fait la violence, laquelle vertu imprime et baille puissance a l'un et a l'autre, ce est a entendre a l'aer et a la chose gectee. Et // pour ce, quant elle est separee de ce qui la gecte, elle est meüe parmi l'aer. Et se l'aer ou tel corps moien n'estoit, il ne seroit quelcunque mouvement violent. Et ainsi le aer ou tel moien promeut et fait aide en chascun mouvement naturel de chose pesante ou legiere.

166c

Glose. Il est certain que aer ou eaue ou autre moien est neccessaire a mouvement droit selon Aristote ou quart de *Phisique*,<sup>27</sup> car tel mouvement ne pourroit naturellement estre fait par vieu<sup>28</sup> ou par espace simplement wide. Mais je tien que tel moien ne est [en]<sup>29</sup> rien cause efficiente de tel mouvement, soit naturel, soit violent,<sup>30</sup> et ceulz qui tiennent le contraire ne pourroient par ce salver plusieurs experiences; si comme d'une secte qui seroit tracte fort parmi une fieble pel, elle seroit meüe bien oultre non-obstant que la pel eüst arresté le aer qui la suivoit; item, d'une pelote de plon qui est aucune fois gectee moult plus haut que ne seroit une bien legiere pelote de equale quantité; item, d'une chose ronde / et plate, comme est un bacin, qui est meüe circulairement par soy quant elle est esmeüe ou escuillie, et moult de teles experiences ou l'en ne pourroit soustenir raysonnablement que le aer face tel mouvement, si comme je ay autrefois declairié sus le .vii.<sup>[6]</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>31</sup> Mais de quelcunque tel mouvement violent, ce qui le fait est une qualité ou vertu motive qui est causee et imprimee ou corps ainsi meü par le premier motif, selon ce que je declaray ou .xiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du secont.<sup>32</sup>

166d

Tiexte. Et ainsi appert par ce que dit est que tout corps de cibas est pesant ou legier et comment telz corps ont mouvemens hors nature.

7.—Ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre il reprouve aucuns opinions et monstre que il convient que aucun element soit.

Par ce que dit est peu(s)t apparoir que tous corps n'oient pas commencement et que aussi n'est pas vray que nul corps ne eu(s)t commencement ou est engendré.<sup>1</sup>

167a Glose. Aucuns disoient que le monde fu fait et tout corps; // les autres disoient que tout est perpetuel et que rien n'est fait de nouvel fors selonc apparence.

Tiexte. Car ce est impossible que tout corps eüst esté fait de nouvel, se ainsi n'estoit que il fust possible que aucune espace

<sup>26</sup> D bas lieu la noeut en tant; E bas lieu lancent en tant.

<sup>27</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 7, 214a, 26-32; 8, 215b, 25-216b, 21.

<sup>28</sup> DE lieu.

<sup>29</sup> A omits 'en.'

<sup>30</sup> ACDEF violente.

<sup>31</sup> ABCD vii. Again Oresme refers to his lost commentary on the *Physics*, stating briefly the objections of the 'impetus impressus' theory of motion to the Aristotelian theory, expounded in *Physicorum*, IV, 8 and VIII, 10.

<sup>32</sup> 106b et seq.

<sup>1</sup> A engendree.

wide fust et separee de tout corps. Car quant le premier corps fu fait, il convenoit par necessité que l'espace fust du tout wide puisque yleuques n'estoit corps au devant, car un corps peu(s)t bien estre fait d'un autre corps, si comme feu est fait de aer, mais ce est du tout impossible de faire corps de non-corps et que quelcunquantité ne<sup>2</sup> precede. Et meismement, combien que un corps soit fait de ce que estoit en puissance et pavoit estre tel corps, toutevoies se ce n'estoit aucun autre corps qui fust devant ou lieu, il convendroient que le lieu fust vieu et separé de tout corps.

167b Glose. Et ce est impossible, si comme dit est et si comme il appert ou quart de *Physique*,<sup>3</sup> que naturellement quelcunquanté lieu soit vieu. Mais posé que corps ne puisse estre fait fors d'autre corps prèexistant ou precedent par generacion natu- / rele, toutevoies ce peu(s)t estre<sup>4</sup> par creacion et par puissance supernaturele. Et qui demanderoit se le lieu, ou le monde fust fait quant il fu créé, estoit vieu par devant, je respon que ce estoit tellement comme maintenant est hors ce monde, posé que il ne y eüst quelcunquanté corps. Et Aristote dit ou .xxiiii.<sup>5</sup> chapitre du premier<sup>6</sup> que hors le ciel ne est lieu ne plain ne vieu, et semblablement l'en lui respon-droit que audevant de la creacion du monde ne estoit lieu ne plain ne vieu. Et de ce fu dit plus a plain ou .xxiiii.<sup>5</sup> chapitre desus dit.<sup>6</sup> Après il enquier de quelz corps est generacion.

Tiexte.<sup>7</sup> Or convient dire après de quelz corps est generacion et pourquoy. Et en toutes choses, la cognoissance est faite par les principes ou premieres parties de elles.

Glose. Si comme la cognoissance des dicions depent de la cognoissance des lettres qui sont premieres parties des dicions.

167c Tiexte. Et les principes ou premieres parties des corps qui sont, ce sont les elemens. Et donques convient il considerer qui sont les elemens des corps et pour- // quoy il sont, et après quans il sont et quelz il sont. Et ce pourra estre fait en supposant quelle chose est la nature de element. Or disons donques que element de corps est ce en quoy l'autre corps de quoy il est element est divisé ou resolut, et est en tel corps en propre forme ou en vertu, car encore est il doute en laquelle de ces .ii. manieres element est en corps compost. Et element est indivisible en autres corps differenz en espece. Et tele chose est tout element et touz le veulent ainsi dire.

167d Glose. Ceste diffinicion de element s'acorde a celle que il met de element ou quint de *Methaphisique*.<sup>8</sup> Et pour la miex entendre, l'en doit savoir que, quant a propos, une chose est composee de parties dites integrales, si comme sont les membres d'un homme et si comme une pierre ou une busche ou quelcunquanté chose est composee des pieces<sup>9</sup> en quoy l'en la peu(s)t diviser; et teles parties ne sont pas dites elemens de ceste chose. Mais une chose est composee ou mixte d'autres qui different en espece et dont chascune est par / tout tel corps; et se elle n'est pas composee telement, ce est vray et premier element de ce corps. Et presque par tele maniere les sillabes sont composees des lettres qui sont voiez et non pas des escriptes et, pour ce, sont elles appelees elemens des dicions et ceste similitude met Aristote ou quint de *Methaphisique*.<sup>10</sup> Item, chascun

<sup>2</sup> B omits 'ne.'

<sup>3</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 8, 214b, 17-28; 216b, 20-21; 9, 217b, 21-27.

<sup>4</sup> CDE ce ne peut estre.

<sup>5</sup> 34b. BC ou .xxviii. ch.

<sup>6</sup> 35c et seq.

<sup>7</sup> Guthrie, ch. .iii.

<sup>8</sup> *Metaphysicorum*, V, 3, 1014a, 26-1014b, 15.

<sup>9</sup> DE d'especes.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1014a, 27-30.

- des .iiii. elemens est composé de forme et de matiere et pour ce, forme et matiere sont les premiers elemens simplement. Mais les autres, ce est a savoir feu et aer, etc., sont les premiers qui peuvent ester par soy, car matiere ne peut ester ne estre par soy ne forme materiele aussi. Item, aussi comme les lettres consonantes ne peuvent avoir son par soy, si comme dit Prescian,<sup>11</sup> et se elles ne sont conjointes aus vocales, semblablement ne peu(s)t estre matiere sans forme substancial. Et aussi comme les vocales ont son sans les consonantes, semblablement forme peu(s)t bien estre sans matiere, si comme sont les angels et les ames separees. Mais en ce est dessamblable, que // forme materiele ne peu(s)t estre sans matiere ne separee de matiere. Et donques les letres sont elemens des sillebes et des dicions, et les sillebes ne sont pas elemens des dicions mais en sont parties integrales. Item, une autre similitude est, car une chose corporele, si comme une quantité de cire, peu(s)t estre muee en moult de figures, mais ce est impossible que elle soit sans figure et aussi est ce impossible que figure soit sans aucun subject. Et semblablement, la premiere matiere substanciele ne peu(s)t estre sans forme ne forme materiele substanciele ne peu(s)t estre sans matiere et sans subject. Mais en tant est dessamblable, car en la cire figuree la matiere ou le subject, ce est a savoir la cire, est la substance ou essence de la chose et non pas [de]<sup>12</sup> la figure. Mais, au contraire, la matiere premiere n'est pas la substance de la chose composee tant comme est la forme. Item, qui feroit une mixcion de .ii. ou de plusieurs liqueurs, si comme de vin et de cerise et de sydre, ces liqueurs seroient les premiers elemens de chose mixte / par voie de resolucion, et feu et aer et eaue et terre seroient les secons, et matiere premiere et forme seroient le tiers. Mais par voie de composicion, matiere et forme sont les premiers et sont elemens<sup>13</sup> de chascune des autres choses; et feu, aer, et *cetera* les secons et sont elemens de chascune des liqueurs et de la chose mixte; et ces liqueurs sont les tiers elemens. Item, de ce que Aristote di(s)t que encore est doute se les elemens sont en la chose mixte en leur propre forme ou autrement, je ay autrefois tractié ceste matiere ou livre de *generacione*.<sup>14</sup> Et briefment, il me semble que il n'i sont pas en leur propre forme, car il n'i sont pas comme parties integrales par petis athomes aussi comme l'en feroit une mixcion de farine et de sablon; mais convient que chascune partiete, tant soit petite, du corps compost soit mixte des .iiii. elemens, car autrement tel corps ne seroit pas proprement un. Et se les elemens estoient en tel corps en propre forme, il s'ensuiroit que en tel corps // partout seroit .iiii. formes et la siene propre; et ainsi une meisme matiere avroit plusieurs formes substancieles et materieles, laquelle chose selon philosophie est aussi impossible comme dire que un corps eüst ensamble plusieurs figures, si comme que une cire fust sperique et cubique ou ronde et quarree. Après il monstre par .ii. raysons que il convient que aucun element soit.
- 168a
- 168b
- 168c

Tiexte. Et se element est ce que nous avons dit, il convient par necessité que de aucuns corps soient telz elemens, car en char, en fust et en quelcunque tele chose est feu et terre en puissance ou en vertu. Et ce appert clerement, car terre et feu sont fais de telz corps par segregacion ou par resolucion.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Priscianus, *Institutionum grammaticarum libri XVIII*, ex recensione W. Hertzii (A. Keil, *Grammatici latini*, II), I, 8, 17-18 (I Leipzig, 1855), pp. 8, 13.

<sup>12</sup> A omits 'de.'

<sup>13</sup> F omits 'et sont elemens.'

<sup>14</sup> Oresme refers to his commentary on *De*

*Generacione* recently discovered by D. B. Durand in Florence. Bibl. Nazionale. Ms. *Conventi soppressi*, H IX 1628, fols. 1-76\* and still unpublished. Cf. *Le Livre de Ethiques*, ed. Menut, p. 33, note 61.

<sup>15</sup> CDE ou revolution.

Glose. Nous voions que les corps mixtes sont resoluz en poudre et terre et en vapeurs et en teles choses qui sont de la nature des .iiii. elemens, et donques il sont aucunement en telz corps..

168d

Tiexte. Mais en feu n'est pas char ou fust ne en puissance ne en propre forme ou en fait, car de feu ne sont pas faites teles choses par reso- / lucion; et semblablement, posé que il ne fust fors .i. seul element, ne<sup>16</sup> char ne os ne seroient en lui ne quelcunque tele chose. Mais il est a considerer quelle maniere de generacion est des choses mixtes et de ces elemens.

Glose. Ce sera ou livre de *Generacione et corruptione*.<sup>17</sup> Après il recite opinions.<sup>18</sup>

Tiexte. Mais Anaxagoras di(s)t des elemens le contraire de ce que dit Empedocles, car cestui di(s)t que feu et terre et les elemens moiens sont elemens des corps et que tous autres corps en sont composts. Et Anaxagoras di(s)t le contraire et di(s)t que les corps qui sont de parties samblables sont elemens, si comme char et os et chascune tele chose. Et dit que le aer et le feu sont mistures de teles choses et de toutes autres semences des corps, et que le aer et le feu sont composés et mixtionés de corps invisibles de parties semblables et sont de tous telz corps assembléz ensemble et, pour ce, tous autres corps sont fais de aer et de feu; et le feu il appelloit ciel.

169a

Glose. Il disoit que char est faite de aer et de feu pour ce que en aer sont infinis // athomes invisibles de char et ou feu aussi, et athomes de os et de fust, etc. Après il met la seconde rayson a monstrier que aucuns elemens sont.

Tiexte. Item, de tout corps naturel est aucun propre mouvement; et des mouvemens les uns sont simples, les autres sont mixtes. Et les mixtes sont des corps mixtes et les simples des simples.

Glose. Tout ce fu declairié ou tiers chapitre du premier livre.<sup>19</sup>

Tiexte. Et pour ce il appert que aucuns corps simples sont, car aucuns mouvemens simples sont. Et donques appert que elemens sont et pourquoi il sont.

# 8.—Ou le .viii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il monstre que les elemens ne sont pas infinis.

169b

Aprés<sup>1</sup> ce, est a considerer a savoir mon se les elemens sont infiniz et, se il sont finiz, quans il sont en nombre. Et premiere-ment est a regarder se il sont infiniz en la maniere que aucuns disoient, si comme Anaxagoras qui disoit que touz les elemens estoient chascun / de parties semblables.

Glose. Après il reprouve ceste opinion par .iii. raysons.

Tiexte. Car nul de ceulz qui tiennent ceste opinion ne prent ce nom element si comme il le doit prendre, car nous voions moult de corps qui sont divisés en parties semblables en espece lesquelz sont mixtes, si comme char, os, fust, pierre.

Glose. Car telz corps par corrupcion ou alteration sont resoluz en poudre, en aer,<sup>2</sup> en vapeur et donques sont eulz mixtes ou composts.

Tiexte. Et nul corps compost ne est element et n'est pas element

<sup>16</sup> DE fors un seulement ne.

<sup>17</sup> De *Generacione*, II, 7, 334b, 8-30.

<sup>18</sup> B omits 'Aprés il recite opinions.'

<sup>19</sup> 7d et seq.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. iv.

<sup>2</sup> A eacr.

tout corps de parties semblables, mais qui<sup>3</sup> est indivisible en autres corps differenz en espece, comme dit est.

Glose. Ou chapitre precedent;<sup>4</sup> et il entent par corps de parties semblables quant les parties sont de tele espece comme est le tout, aussi comme chascune partie de char est char et de pierre est pierre, mais chascune partie de honne n'est pas honne.

169c Tiexte. Item, encore n'est il pas neccessité que ceulz qui prennent ainsi element metent que les elemens soient infiniz, car ceulz qui dient que il sont finis, si comme .ii. // ou .iii. ou en autre nombre, rendent aussi bien cause des operacions natureles comme ceulz qui mettent que il sont infiniz, si comme Empedocles i<sup>5</sup> met grant poiene. Et aussi comme il ne povoit rendre rayson de tout, semblablement ces ici ne peuvent dire que tous corps soient fais de corps qui sont de parties semblables, car une face ou visage n'est pas fait de faces ou de visages ne une autre chose qui est selon nature de certaine figure. Et donques appert que miex est mettre les elemens et les principes finis que infiniz et en mendre nombre que en plus grant, en la maniere que l'en fait en sciences mathematiques ou l'en prent touzjours les principes finis ou en espece ou en quantité.

Glose. En espece quant aus figures qui sont resolutes en triangles et en pyramides, etc., si<sup>6</sup> comme il appert en geometrie, et en quantité quant aus nombres qui sont resoluz en unités, etc.

169d Tiexte. Item, les corps naturelz different les uns des autres selon leurs propres differences et / ces differences sont qualitéz sensibles lesquelles sont finiez, si comme il sera monsté après.<sup>7</sup> Et donques par neccessité, les elemens qui sont les premiers corps sont finiz.

Glose. Car il sont differenz selon les premieres qualitéz sensibles qui sont finiez et .iiii., si comme il sera monsté ou secont livre de *Generacione*.<sup>8</sup> Après il met l'opinion de Democritus et de Leucippus.

170a Tiexte. Et aucuns autres, si comme Leucippus et Democritus, excludoient moult de accidens ou de choses raisonnables, car il dient que les premieres magnitudes ou quantitéz sont infinies en multitude<sup>9</sup> et indivisibles selon quantité. Et dient que d'un corps ne sont pas faiz plusieurs par corrupcion ne de plusieurs un par generacion, mais tous corps sont faiz par la complicacion et circumposicion ou applicacion de ces indivisibles. Et mettent aucune-ment que toutes choses sont nombres et de nombres; et se il ne le dient plainement, toutevoies il le veulent // dire. Et encore dient il que les premiers corps different par figures, et pour ce que les figures sont infinies, il dient que les simples corps ou elemens sont infinis.

Glose. Car aussi comme es nombres est procés infini, semblablement une figure est de .iii. angles, autre de .iiii., autre de .v. et ainsi sans fin.

Tiexte. Mais ces ici ne determinent pas quelle figure ont les corps que nous appellons elemens fors seulement que<sup>10</sup> au feu il assignent figure de pyramide, ce est a dire pointue. Et disoient que le aer et l'eau et les autres different selon grandeur et

<sup>3</sup> F omits 'corps de parties semblables, mais que.'

<sup>4</sup> 167c.

<sup>5</sup> A il.

<sup>6</sup> A etc. et si.

<sup>7</sup> De Sensu, 445, 20ff; also Physicorum, I, cf. Juntas, t.c. 36, 203H.

<sup>8</sup> De Generatione, II, 7, 335a, 10-17.

<sup>9</sup> F en magnitude.

<sup>10</sup> A seulement et que.

petitece et que leur nature est *pansperme*,<sup>11</sup> ce est a dire toute semence de touz les elemens.

Glose. Après il reprouve ceste opinion par .vii. raisons.

170b

Tiexte. Et donques le premier pechié ou inconvenient de ceste opinion est de ce que il ne mettent pas les elemens finis, car aussi bien et miex salvassent il par ce toutes apparences. Item, se les differences des elemens ne sont infinies, les elemens / ne sont pas infiniz. Item, ceulz qui mettent [corps]<sup>12</sup> indivisibles destruisent les sciences mathematiques et moult de principes et d'apparences ou de choses qui apparent sensiblement dont nous avons dit ou livre de *Phisique*.

Glose. Ou sixte ou est dit que toute chose continue est divisible<sup>13</sup> sans fin.<sup>14</sup>

170c

Tiexte. Item, il convient que ces ici se contredient, car il mettent que le aer est de plus grans athomes que l'eaue et l'eaue que la terre; et ce est impossible que un indivisible soit plus grant que l'autre. Item, un ne pourroit estre fait de l'autre si comme aer de eaue, car il convendrait que ces indivisibles creüssent et ce est impossible; et toutevoies, il disoient que aer et eaue et terre sont faiz un de l'autre. Item, encore selon leur posicion ne s'ensuit il pas que les elemens soient infiniz, car il dient que les corps different par figures. Et toutes figures, posé que elles soient infinies, sont composees de pyramides, car les figures corporeles rectilignes ou angulaires sont composees // de pyramides rectilignes et espere est composee de .viii. parties comme pyramides. Et donques sont aucuns principes de figures finis selonc espee, ou un<sup>15</sup> ou .ii. ou plusieurs. Et donques selon la posicion<sup>16</sup> de ces ici, les corps simples, qui sont elemens, seront<sup>17</sup> en tel nombre et non pas infinis.

Glose. Il appert par geometrie comment toutes figures superficeles et rectilignes sont resolutes en triangles et composees de triangles. Et toutes corporeles figures de droites superfices ne sont pas resolutes en pyramides, etc., si comme il disoient. Et espere est en .viii. pyramides semblables, si comme il appert par les .viii. pieces d'une pelote ou d'un esteuf.

Tiexte. Item, chascun simple corps a simple mouvement et les simples mouvemens ne sont pas infinis ne les lieux infinis,<sup>18</sup> et ne est de telz corps fors .ii. mouvemens drois. Et donques les simples corps ou elemens ne sont pas infiniz.

Glose. Ceste rayson fu mise en la fin du chapitre precedent.<sup>19</sup>

170d 9.—Ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il monstre que il n'est pas tant seulement / un element.

Et' pour ce que par neccessité il convient que les elemens soient en certain nombre fini, il reste a considerer se il sont plusieurs ou non, car aucuns mettent que un seul element est. Et les uns dient que ce est eaue; les autres dient que ce est aer; les autres

<sup>11</sup> CDEF pansperene.

<sup>12</sup> A indivisibles corps, with 'corps' expunctuated.

<sup>13</sup> DE indivisible.

<sup>14</sup> Physicorum, VI, 1-2, 231a, 18ff.

<sup>15</sup> BCDEF finis se l'en oste un. Cf. Juntas, t.c. 39, 206E: 'necesse est ergo ut figure habeant principia propria, sive fuerit una

figura, aut duo, aut plures.'

<sup>16</sup> D donques ce la pos.; E donques se est la pos.

<sup>17</sup> A elemens et seront.

<sup>18</sup> B omits 'ne les lieux infinis.'

<sup>19</sup> 169a.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. v.



que ce est feu; les autres que ce est une chose plus subtile que eaue et plus espesse que aer et dient que elle est infinie et contient tous les cielx.

Glose. Après il les improuve et premierement ceulz qui dient que ce est aer, si comme Anaximenes et Dyogenes,<sup>2</sup> ou que ce est eaue, si comme Thales et Yppon, ou une chose moienne, si comme Anaximandrus; et les improuve par .ii. raisons.

171a

Tiexte.<sup>3</sup> Et donques ceulz qui dient que ce est aer ou eaue ou une chose plus subtile que eaue et plus espesse que aer, et qui mettent que les choses sont faites de tel element par le engroissier ou espessier et par le subtilier, il ne scevent que il dient et convient que il mettent aucune chose premiere que ce que il dient // estre premier element,<sup>4</sup> car il dient que quant une chose est faite des elemens, ce est composicion; et quant les elemens sont fais d'une chose, ce est resolucion et ce en quoy est faite resolucion est de plus subtiles parties. Et donques convient il que il soit premier par nature. Or dient il que le feu est le tres plus subtil de tous les corps qui sont, et donques est le feu le premier corps par nature et element. Et se il disoient que un autre corps est plus subtil que ne est feu, ce ne fait difference, car donques ce corps est element et non pas autre qui soit moien et moins subtil. Item, selon ce que il veulent, subtil et rare sont une chose et aussi espés et gros sont une chose, et encore dient il que subtil est petit ou de petites parties, et que gros est de grans parties;<sup>5</sup> et donques element est déterminé par estre petit et autre corps par estre grant. Et petit et grant ne sont pas choses absolutes, mais sont dites ou resgart d'autre, car ce que est petit est grant ou resgart de ce que est mendre. Et donques se les elemens sont ainsi déterminéz, / rien ne sera feu<sup>6</sup> simplement et absolument, ne aer ne eaue, mais un sera feu ou resgart d'une chose et sera aer ou resgart de l'autre.

171b

Glose. Après il applique ceste rayson contre ceulz qui mettent plusieurs elemens en disant que il different seulement en ce que l'aer est de plus petiz athomes que l'eaue et l'eaue que la terre, etc.

Tiexte. Et ce meïsme inconvenient s'ensuit a ceulz qui dient que les elemens sont plusieurs et differens en grandeur et en petitesse, car se un element, aussi comme est l'aer, a certaine porporcion en grandeur ou en petitesse a l'eaue et l'eaue a tele porporcion a la terre, donques est l'eaue aer ou resgart de la terre et ainsi des autres.

Glose. Après il met l'opinion de ceulz qui mettent que seulement le feu est element et leurs raysons.

Tiexte. Et ceulz qui supposent que le feu est element ne sont pas d'un acort et a leur opinion s'ensuient autres inconveniens, car les uns appliquent ou attribuent au feu figure pyramide.

171c

Glose.<sup>7</sup> Ce est une figure corporele contenue en .iiii. triangles et a .iiii. pointes, aussi comme // ce que l'en appelle caquetrepe.

Tiexte. Et de ces ici les uns qui parloient plus simplement disoient que ce est pour ce que pyramide est la plus acue de toutes les figures, et le feu est le plus acu de tous les corps; et les autres plus apparenment amenoient ceste raison: car tous corps sont composés comme de leur element de ce que est de plus subtiles

<sup>2</sup> BCDEF omit 'et Dyogenes.'

<sup>3</sup> DE omit 'Tiexte.'

<sup>4</sup> F omits 'estre premier element.'

<sup>5</sup> B omits 'et que gros est de grans parties.'

<sup>6</sup> DE sceu.

<sup>7</sup> BCDEF omit 'Glose.'

parties, et toutes figures<sup>8</sup> corporeles ou solides sont composees de pyramides. Et donques puisque de touz corps feu est le plus subtil et de toutes figures pyramide est la plus subtile et la premiere, et la premiere figure est deüe au premier corps, il s'ensuit que feu est de figure pyramide. Et les autres ne faisoient mencion de la figure, mes disoient que le feu est de tous corps le plus subtil et qui est composé de plus subtiles parties et de lui sont fais les autres corps par compression, aussi comme l'en comprime une chose enflee et espartie<sup>9</sup> en la comprimant et espessant.

Glose. Après il les improuve par .vi. raysons.

171d Tiexte. Mais il s'en- / suient difficultés et inconveniens aus uns et aus autres, car se il mettent, comme si font, que le premier corps ou element est de parties indivisibles, les raisons qui ont esté devant mises sont contre eulz.

Glose. Ou tiers chapitre et en le .viii.<sup>10</sup>

Tiexte. Item, a parler naturellement, l'en ne peu(s)t dire que tel element soit composé de parties indivisibles, car tout corps peu(s)t estre comparé a autre selon quantité. Et donques tele proporcion ou comparoison<sup>11</sup> a toute l'eau a toute la terre, tele le a l'element de l'un a l'element de l'autre, ce est a dire un indivisible<sup>12</sup> a l'autre des indivisibles dont l'eau et la terre sont composees, et ainsi des autres choses. Or est<sup>13</sup> l'eau plus grande et plus rare que la terre et le aer que l'eau, et donques un element indivisible est mendre que un autre indivisible, et le mendre est contenu ou plus grant ou equal au mendre. Et donques tel element de eau ou de aer est divisible.

172a Glose. Il disoient que l'element du feu, par compression et condemp- // sacion, est fait aer ou eau. Et donques ses parties sont faites menses et, par consequent, elles ne sont pas indivisibles.

Tiexte. Et se il dient que elles sont divisibles, il convient que ceulz qui mettent que elles sont figurees octrient que chascune partie de feu n'est pas feu pour ce que pyramide n'est pas composé de pyramides, mais a parties qui ne sont pas pyramides. Item, il s'ensuiroit que tout corps ne fust pas element ou compost de element, car une partie du feu qui est de figure pyramide n'est pas feu puisque elle n'est pyramide et si n'est pas autre element ne chose mixte. Item, se il dient que le feu n'est pas déterminé par figure mais par quantité, il s'ensuit que de element est element, et ainsi sans fin pour ce que tout corps est divisible en parties divisibles.

Glose. Car il disoient que les corps sont composés de leur element comme de parties integrales.

172b Tiexte. Item, encore s'ensuit il que une meisme chose est feu ou resgart d'une autre / [et]<sup>14</sup> aer ou terre ou resgart de l'autre.

Glose. Car elle est grande ou resgart de l'un et petite ou resgart de l'autre.

Tiexte. Item, une rayson est commune contre tous ceulz qui mettent un seul element, car il s'ensuit que de tous corps soit un mouvement naturel seulement, car tout corps a en soy principe de mouvement naturel. Et donques se tous corps sont d'une

<sup>8</sup> BCDEF omit 'et le feu est le plus acu . . . et toutes figures.'

<sup>9</sup> BCF enflee et est autre en la comp.; DE enflee et est autre en la comp.

<sup>10</sup> 159d, 169a.

<sup>11</sup> A comparaoison; B composicion.

<sup>12</sup> BCDEF divisible.

<sup>13</sup> BCDEF Ou est.

<sup>14</sup> A omits 'et.'

nature, tous ont un mouvement et tant plus avront en soy de celle nature et de cel element, tant seront plus isnelement meüz; si comme feu, tant est plus grant, tant monte en haut plus isnelement. Or est il ainsi que pluseurs corps sont meüz en bas; et donques pour ce que pluseurs mouvemens naturelz sont, si comme nous avons determiné devant, il appert que ce est impossible que un seul element soit.

Glose. Il fu dit ou secont chapitre du premier<sup>15</sup> comment pluseurs mouvemens naturelz sont.

10.—Ou .x.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il monstre que les elemens ne sont pas perpetuelz mes corruptibles selon leurs parties. //

- 172c Et pour ce que les elemens ne sont pas infinis ne un seul, il convient que il soient pluseurs et finiz. Or est a considerer premierement se il sont perpetuelz ou se il sont engendrés ou genera[b]les,<sup>1</sup> car, ce monstre, l'en pourra savoir quans il sont et quelz il sont. Et c'est impossible que les elemens soient perpetuelz, car nous voions que feu et eaue et chascun des corps simples est resolut et comme mué. Et donques convient il que ceste resolucion procede sans fin ou que elle se arreste. Et se elle procede et a procedé sans fin, il convient que le temps de ceste resolucion soit infini et aussi du temps de sa composicion, car chascune chose tele a .i. temps de sa composicion et un autre de sa dissolucion. Et donques s'ensuit que hors un temps infini de toutes pars sera .i. autre temps semblablement infini, car le temps de la composicion de tele chose seroit infini et encore premier et devant le temps de sa dissolucion. Et donques seroit un temps infini hors un autre temps simplement infini, laquelle chose est im- / possible. Et qui diroit que ceste dissolucion ne procede pas sans fin mais se arreste en aucun temps et ne peu(s)t passer outre, nous demandons a savoir mon se chascun des corps ou ceste dissolucion se arreste est indivisible ou se il est divisible sans ce que il soit onques divisé, si comme vouloit Empedocles, ce semble. Se l'en di(s)t que il est indivisible, ce ne peu(s)t estre par les raisons devant dites.

Glose. Ou sixte de *Phisique* et en ce tiers en pluseurs lieux.<sup>2</sup>

Tiexte. Et se ce corps est divisible<sup>3</sup> et que il ne sera onques dissolut ne divisé ou corrompu, ce est inconvenient, car le plus petit corps est plus de legier corruptible que ne est le plus grant et, selon ceste opinion, le plus grant est corrompu seulement parce que il est dissolut et divisé en plus petiz. Et est raysonnable que le plus petit soit le plus tost corrompu, car nous voions que le feu est corrompu en .ii. manieres: une est quant il est destaint par son contraire, et autre est quant il se amarsist et de- // faut en soy meïsme. Et de tant [comme il est mendre, de tant]<sup>4</sup> est il plus tost corrompu.

Glose.<sup>5</sup> Le feu n'est onques corrompu fors par son contraire fors selon apparence quant il estaint par defaute de matiere, car lors la fredeur ou

<sup>15</sup> *7a et seq.*

<sup>1</sup> *A generales. Guthrie, ch. vi.*

<sup>2</sup> *Physicorum*, VI, 2, 232b, 21-25; 233a, 10-21; 233b, 16-19; 4, *passim*, 234b, 10-235a, 37.

In *Du Ciel*, 159d, 162b et seq.

<sup>3</sup> D corps divisible; E corps indivisible.

<sup>4</sup> A omits 'comme il est mendre, de tant.'

<sup>5</sup> E omits 'Glose.'

moisteur de l'aer circunstant le corrupt, mais il ne appert pas telement comme quant l'en gecte de l'eau desus.

Tiexte. Et donques est neccessaire que les elemens soient corruptibles et genera[b]les.<sup>6</sup>

Glose. Après il prouve que il sont engendrés et faiz un de l'autre.

Tiexte. Et puisque les elemens sont genera[b]les,<sup>6</sup> ou ceste generacion est faite de corps precedent ou de non-corps; et se elle est faite de corps, ou ce corps est autre que element ou mixte ou non. Or ne peu(s)t l'en dire que ceste generacion soit faite de non-corps, car celui qui est engendré et fait il convient que ce soit en aucun lieu; et se en ce lieu estoit et est autre corps dont cestui ne soit<sup>7</sup> fait, il s'ensuit que .ii. corps seront ensemble par tout un lieu, ce est a savoir celui qui est fait de nouvel et le préexistent ou precedent. Et se ce lieu / estoit du tout sans corps, donques estoit ce lieu vieu et separé de tout corps; et nous avons monsté devant que c'est impossible.

173b

Glose. Ou quart de *Phisique*<sup>8</sup> et aussi que .ii. corps ne peuvent estre en un lieu propre a chascun de eulz.

Tiexte. Mais encore ne peu(s)t l'en dire que les elemens soient faiz d'autre corps qui ne soit des elemens ou mixte des elemens, car il convendrait que tel corps fust premier que les elemens. Et ce corps, ou il avra pesanteur ou legiereté; et se ainsi est, ce est un des elemens. Et se il n'a quelcunque inclinacion a mouvement, il sera immobile et mathematique, ce est a savoir sans qualité sensible. Et donques tel corps ne sera pas en lieu, car au lieu ou il repose il est possible que il soit meü. Et se il y repose par violence, il est meü contre nature; et se il y repose sans violence, il y est meü selon nature. Et donques se tel corps est en aucun lieu, ce est aucun des elemens; et se il ne est en aucun lieu, de lui ne seroit rien fait, car, par neccessité, le corps qui est fait // de nouvel est ou lieu ou estoit celui de quoy il est fait. Et donques puisque les elemens ne sont faiz de non-corps ne d'autre que des elemens, il demeure que il sont faiz les uns des autres.

173c

Glose. Car [se]<sup>9</sup> il sont faiz de corps mixtes, il estoient en telz corps aucunement, si comme il fu dit ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre.<sup>10</sup>

11.—En le .xi.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il improuve aucuns opinions de la maniere comment les elemens sont faiz un de l'autre.<sup>1</sup>

Or convient après considerer par quele maniere les elemens sont engendrés ou faiz un de l'autre, a savoir mon se ce est si comme dient Empedocles et Democritus, ou comme les autres qui dient que il sont resoluz en superficies ou en aucune autre maniere.

Glose. Après il reprouve les premiers par .iiii. raysons.

Tiexte. Et ceulz qui tiennent l'opinion de Empedocles et [de]<sup>2</sup> Democritus ne se entendent pas et, selon ce que il dient, ce ne seroit pas vraie generacion d'un element de l'autre, mais gen-

<sup>6</sup> A generales.

<sup>7</sup> DE dont coustume soit.

<sup>8</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 8, 214b, 17-28; 216a, 23-216b, 17; 9, 217b, 21-27.

<sup>9</sup> AF omit 'se.'

<sup>10</sup> 168c. B ou .vi. c.

<sup>1</sup> BCDEF omit 'un de l'autre.' Guthrie, ch. vii.

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'de.'

173d

eracion selonc apparence; car il dient que l'element qui est fait de l'au- / tre estoit en cel autre et en est estroit par segregacion ou separacion, aussi comme d'un vaisseau et non pas comme d'une matiere dont une chose est engendree et faite par transmutacion substanciele.

Glose. Aussi comme en une masse mixtionnee de plusieurs metalz l'en estroit et separe un de ces metalz, semblablement il disoient que un element est estroit de l'autre ou il estoit ou que il est fait de l'autre par compression ou dilatacion.

Tiexte. Item, il s'ensuit a leur diz choses qui ne sont pas moins desraysonnables, car une meisme chose n'est pas faite plus pesante pour ce se elle est plus comprimee ou compressee. Et il convient que il octrient et dient que l'eaue, quant elle est segregiee et separee de l'aer, soit faite plus pesante seulement parce que elle est plus comprimee par tele segregacion.

174a

Glose. Mais l'en pourroit dire encontre: car, selon verité, quant eaue est faite de aer par vraie generacion,<sup>3</sup> la matiere est faite plus pesante par compression et condempnacion; item, une quantité de // laine ou une fuylle de or est plus pesante comprimee que espartie. Je respon et di que, quant eaue est faite de aer, la chose est faite plus pesante par alteracion et par vraie generacion et non pas seulement par compression, si comme il seroit selon l'opinion desus dite. Au secont, je di que la laine ou le or ne poise en rien plus pour la compression, mais devant le aer legier estoit enclos en la laine et le fueille de or ne peu(s)t pas si isnelement<sup>4</sup> descendre pour sa plate figure comme se elle estoit ronde comme une pomme. Mais ce n'est pas pour ce que elle poise moins. Après il met la tierce rayson contre ceulz qui mettoient tele segregacion sanz compression.<sup>5</sup>

174b

Tiexte. Item, des corps mixtes il n'est pas neccessité que celui qui en est separé obtienne plus grant lieu, mais quant aer est fait de eaue il occupe plus grant lieu, car ce qui est de plus subtiles parties est fait en plus grant lieu. Et voions que quant une chose moiste se evapore et enfle, elle rompt le vaisseau ou elle est. / Et pour ce, quant l'aer est fait de eaue par segregacion, se il n'y a aucun lieu vieu ou se les corps [ne]<sup>6</sup> se dilatent et estendent, ce est impossible, car il disoient que il ne [se]<sup>7</sup> dilatent pas. Et se il y a lieu vieu ou extension et dilatacion, ce est chose desraysonnable que ce qui est separé occupe plus grant lieu.

Glose. Car Democritus supposoit que il ne fust pas dilaté, etc.

Tiexte. Item, se les elemens estoient faiz un de l'autre par segregacion, il convendroit que ceste generacion cessast et deffaillist, car en quantité finie ne sont pas [corps]<sup>8</sup> equalz infiniz de certaine quantité. Et donques se d'une eaue finie l'en oste par segregacion aucune chose qui soit terre, et de l'eaue qui demeure encore semblablement l'en oste et estrait terre et ainsi sans fin, tousjours il s'ensuit que en ceste eaue sunt terres infinies et pour ce que ce est impossible, il s'ensuit que les elemens ne seront pas tousjours fais un de l'autre et que tele generacion cessera. Et ainsi est dit que les elemens ne sont pas faiz un de l'autre par segregacion.

Glose. Après il recite .ii. autres opinions.

<sup>3</sup> BCDEF faite de vraie generacion.

<sup>4</sup> BCDEF legierement.

<sup>5</sup> BCDEF teles segregacions ou compressions.

<sup>6</sup> A omits 'ne.'

<sup>7</sup> A il ne dilatent pas pas; DE repeat 'et estendent . . . ne se dilatent.'

<sup>8</sup> A omits 'corps.'

174c

Tiexte. // Or demeurent les opinions qui mettent que les transmutacions des elemens sont autrement faites et de ce dient .ii. manieres: une par transfiguracion, aussi comme de une meisme cire est faite une espere ronde ou un<sup>e</sup> cercle plat; autre maniere est par resolucion en superficies, si comme dient aucuns.

Glose. Après il improuve la premiere.

Tiexte. Et se les elemens sont faiz un de l'autre par transfiguracion, il convient octrier que aucuns corps sont indivisibles; car se touz estoient divisibles, il s'ensuiroit selon l'opinion de ces ici que aucune partie de feu ne seroit pas feu et que aucune partie de terre ne seroit pas terre; car il dient que feu est de figure pyramide et terre est cubique comme est un dé, et partie de pyramide ne est pas touzjours pyramide ne partie de corps cubique cubique.<sup>10</sup>

Glose. Un corps cubique<sup>11</sup> peut bien estre divisé en .viii. parties dont chascune est cubique, mais il peu(s)t estre divisé en parties non-cubiques et pyramide en non-pyramides. Après il reprouve l'autre maniere ou opinion par .vi. raysons. /

174d

Tiexte. Et se il sont fais un de l'autre par resolucion en superficies, le premier inconvenient qui s'ensuit est que il convendrait mettre que un des elemens ne peu(s)t estre transmué<sup>12</sup> en aucun des autres. Et convient que il le dient et ce n'est pas raysonnable chose, et le contraire appert sensiblement.

Glose. Verité est que des figures plaines et de droites lignes la premiere est triangle, la seconde quadrangle, la tierce est de .v. angles et la quarte de .vi., la quinte de .vii. et ainsi en procedant sans fin par les figures selon les nombres. Item, en la seconde figure, ce est quadrangle, sont .ii. triangles en trahant une ligne dyametral et en la tierce sont .iii. triangles en trahant lignes<sup>13</sup> d'un angle aus autres et en la quarte .iiii., en la quinte .v. et ainsi en procedant sans fin, si comme il appert ou sixte de *Geometrie* en la .xviii.<sup>e</sup> conclusion.<sup>14</sup> Et n'i a force ou difference se les costés de ces figures sont equalz ou inequalz et aussi de // leurs angles. Et selon ce les geometriens dient que toutes teles figures sont composees de triangles et resolutes en triangles, et ainsi, selon ceste ymaginacion, triangle est aussi comme element de toutes teles figures. Et, par aventure, selon ce vouloient les Platoniens que la terre qui est cubique en ses petites parties est composee de .vi. superficies quarrees et chascune de ces superficies est de .ii.<sup>15</sup> triangles comme dit est. Et aussi comme ces triangles ne peuvent estre resoluz en autres figures premieres, il convenoit que il octriassent que la terre ne peu(s)t estre resolute en autre element.

175a

Tiexte. Mais nous voions que tous les elemens sont transmués un en l'autre semblablement. Item, il convient que ces philosophes confessent choses contre ce qui leur appert sensiblement et par ce que il dient estre vray et qui leur appert. Et la cause est car il ne prennent pas bien les principes des choses, mais il veulent toutes choses reduire a leurs opinions et par ce il octrient choses desraysonnables; car, par aventure, les principes des choses sensi- / bles sont sensibles et des perpetueles perpetuelz et des

175b

<sup>10</sup> A une.

<sup>11</sup> BCDEF omit 'cubique.'

<sup>12</sup> B piramide.

<sup>13</sup> A transmuee.

<sup>14</sup> DE omit 'dyametral . . . trahant lignes.'

<sup>15</sup> Figure 2, p. 195. Cf. *Euclidis Elementa*, VI, 18, ed. I. L. Heiberg (*Euclidis Opera*

*Omnia*, Lipsiae, Teubner, 1884), II, 125-127. Cf. also the application of the proposition to figures of five or more sides, T. L. Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements* (Cambridge<sup>2</sup>, 1926), II, 229-232.

<sup>16</sup> EF .iii.

corruptibles corruptibles. Et ces ici ne font pas si comme l'en doit proceder en science naturele, car l'en doit prendre les choses sensibles ou que l'en voit sensiblement et puis enquerir les causes. Et il mettent les causes a leur guise et par ce il ne peuvent rendre rayon de ce que l'en voit sensiblement. Et pour ce il convient que il octrient que la terre est vray element plus que autre et que elle seule est incorruptible, car l'element est incorruptible<sup>10</sup> qui ne peut estre dissolut et la terre seulement ne peut estre dissolue en autre corps.

Glose. Aussi comme triangle ne peut estre resolut en autre figure comme dit est. Et ce que Aristote di(s)t que les principes des choses corruptibles sont corruptibles, ce est a entendre des principes dont la chose est composee ou de ses parties, et di(s)t *par aventure* pour la [premiere]<sup>11</sup> matiere qui est perpetuele, mais elle est subject de corrupcion et est selon ce corruptible aucunement. Et par ce il veult dire que chascun element est corruptible qui est principe de chose corruptible, et donques la terre est corruptible.

175c Tiexte. // Item, il convient par raison que ceulz qui mettent teles transmutacions parce que les elemens sont resoluz en triangles octrient que de ces triangles aucuns soient superflus pour ce que, par tele resolucion, il ne pourroient venir a equalité.

Glose. Il disoient, selon les expositeurs, que terre est composee de .iii. triangles et aer de .viii. et eaue de .xx. Et donques se de eaue est fait aer, les .xvi. triangles de eaue feront .ii. athomes de aer et les quatre qui demeurent ne feront rien, car nul aer, tant soit petit, selon eulz ne est de moins que de .viii. triangles.

175d Tiexte. Item, il convient que ceulz qui ainsi dient octrient que corps est engendré et fait de non-corps, car puisque telle generacion est faite de superficies<sup>12</sup> et superficies ne sont pas corps, elle est faite de non-corps. Item, ceulz qui mettent que aucun(s) corps est indivisible contredient aus sciences mathematiques qui sont tres certaines, car elles supposent que tout corps est entendu estre divisible. Et ces philosophes, pour ce que il veulent salver leur supposicion, ne dient que tout corps sensible soit divisible; et le / convient puisque il mettent que chascun element est fait de figures, car pyramide ou espere, dont sont composés le feu et le ciel, se elle est divisee,<sup>13</sup> les parties ne seront pas pyramides ne esperes. Et donques ce seroient corps premiers que elemens, et donques convendroit il que aucun corps fust qui ne seroit element ne de elemens, ou que tele pyramide ou espere soit indivisible et que tout corps ne soit pas divisible.

12.—Ou .xii.\* chapitre il monstre par .v. raisons generales que les elemens ne sont pas determinés par figures.

Tempter<sup>1</sup> a figurer les corps simples en la maniere que font aucuns est chose desraysonnable.

Glose. L'en doit savoir que, quant en superficies, figure est dite reguliere de laquelle les angles sont equalz et les costés equalz, si comme le triangle

<sup>10</sup> DE omit 'car l'element est incorruptible.'

<sup>11</sup> A omits 'premiere.'

<sup>12</sup> E omits 'de superficies.'

<sup>13</sup> BCDEF divisible. Cf. *Juntas*, 224F: figura

pyramidalis, et figura sphaerica, cum dividantur aliqua divisione . . .

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. viii.

qui a .iii. costés equalz et le quadrangle aussi qui a angles equalz; et tele  
 176a peu(s)t estre une figure de .v. angles et une de .vi. et une de .vii. et ainsi  
 sans fin. Et semblablement, un corps est dit regulier qui a faces // ou  
 superficies semblables et equales et angles aussi. Et combien que en figures  
 corporeles soit procés infini aussi comme es superficieles, car une peu(s)t  
 estre de .iiii. faces, autre de .v., autre de .x. et ainsi sans fin, toutevoies en  
 ce est dessamblable, car es superficieles regulieres est procés sanz fin  
 aussi comme es irregulieres, mais les corps reguliers sont tant seulement  
 .v. en espece de figure. Le premier est de .iiii. faces dont chascun[e]<sup>2</sup> est  
 triangle de costés equalz et est appellé pyramide et plus proprement  
 [t]etracedron,<sup>3</sup> car infiniz pyramides peuent estre qui ne sont pas corps  
 reguliers. Le secont a .vi. faces dont chascune est quadrangle quarré et  
 est comme un dé et est appellé *cubus* ou *exacedron*. Le tiers a .viii. faces  
 dont chascune est triangle equilater et est appellé *octocedron*.<sup>4</sup> Le quart  
 est de .xii. faces dont chascune est de .v. angles et de .v. costés equalz et est  
 appellé *duodecedron* et chascune de ses faces est appellee *pentagone*.  
 176b Le quint a .xx. faces, chascune triangulaire equilater et est appellé  
*ycocedron*. Et / est tres belle consideracion, car par neccessité tant en  
 peut estre; et que plus en soit ce est simplement impossible, car Dieu par  
 sa toute-puissance infinie ne pourroit faire un corps regulier d'autre figure  
 et tout ce appert es desreniers livres de Euclide.<sup>5</sup> Et aucuns anciens  
 atribuoient ces figures aus .v. corps simples qui sont les principalz parties  
 et elemens du monde, en disant que eulz sont composés de tres petis et  
 tres menus athomes qui sont corps reguliers, ce est a savoir le ciel de ceulz  
 qui sont de figure appelle[e]<sup>6</sup> *duodecedron*, le feu de pyramides,<sup>7</sup> le aer  
 de ceulz qui sont de figure dite *octocedron* et l'eau de *ycocedron* et la  
 terre de cubes. Et ce improuve Aristote.

Tiexte. Premièrement, car il convendroit que tout ne fust pas  
 plain mais que aucun lieu fust vieu, pour ce que entre<sup>8</sup> les  
 176c figures plaines ou superficieles regulieres .iii. seulement sont qui  
 réemplissent toute une superficie, ce est a savoir trigone ou  
 triangle, tetragone ou quarré et la tierce est exagone qui a .vi.  
 angles equalz. Mais // des figures solides ou corporeles .ii. seule-  
 ment sont qui réemplissent tout, ce est a savoir pyramide ou  
 tetraced[r]on<sup>9</sup> et cubus ou exacedron. Et il convendroit plus  
 prendre de teles figures pour ce que les elemens sont plus de .ii.

Glose. Je retourneray sus ceste rayson en la fin de ce chapitre.

Tiexte. Item, il semble que tous corps simples ou elemens soient  
 figurés selon la figure du lieu qui les contient, et meismement ce  
 voions nous de l'eau et de le aer. Et donques est ce impossible  
 que tel corps de element se determine propre figure, car, se ainsi  
 estoit, il ne se conformeroit pas du tout a la figure de la chose ou  
 du vaisseau qui le contient. Item, se les elemens estoient deter-  
 mineement de certaine figure, donques s'ensuiroit il que se l'en  
 mettoit eau en un vaisseau qui fust de tele figure comme est  
 aer, que l'eau devenist aer.

Glose. Car il disoient que la figure et la substance de l'element ensuient  
 un l'autre.

Tiexte. Item, il semble que nature le nous segnefie et est selon

<sup>2</sup> ABCDEF chascun.

<sup>3</sup> A de tracedron; F tetacedron.

<sup>4</sup> E carcedron.

<sup>5</sup> *Euclidis Elementa*, XIII, 6-18, especially 18, ed. cit., IV, 323-339, especially 336-339; 'Jam dico, praeter quinque figuras, quas nominavimus, nullam aliam construi posse

polygonis et aequilateralis et aequiangulis inter se aequalibus comprehensam.' (Heiberg, IV, 337).

<sup>6</sup> ACDF appelle; E omits.

<sup>7</sup> B omits 'le feu de pyramides.'

<sup>8</sup> BCDEF outre.

<sup>9</sup> ADE tetracedron.



176d

raison, car aussi comme nous voions / en autres choses le subject ou matiere<sup>10</sup> de quoy l'en fait les choses est sans espee et sans forme quant est de soy, et par ce l'en le peut miex appliquer a diverses formes, si comme il est escript ou livre appellé *Tymeus*<sup>11</sup> que toute chose qui reçoit doit estre denuee<sup>12</sup> ou despoillie de la nature de la chose que elle reçoit. Et ainsi doit l'en cuider que les elemens sont aussi comme la matiere de quoy sont faiz les corps composts ou mixtes. Et pour ce, eulz peuvent estre transmuéz en diverses formes et figures.

Glose. Aussi comme une porcion de cire peut estre transmuee de figure en autre et ce ne pourroit estre se elle estoit selon sa nature determinee-ment de certaine figure.

Tiexte. Item, se les elemens estoient figurés en la maniere que il mettent, l'en ne feroit des elemens ne char ne os ne autre corps mixte qui fust un corps continu, et non feroit l'en se les elemens estoient composts de superficies, car il seroient ou corps mixte mesléz par petites parties les unes emprés les autres. // Et ainsi, a droit dire, ce ne seroit pas generacion.

177a

Glose.<sup>13</sup> Mais seroit une mixtion tele comme se l'en mesloit ensemble forment et<sup>14</sup> seille et autres menus grains.

Or veul je retourner a declarer ce que dist Aristote en la premiere rayon. Premièrement, il dist et voir est que des figures rectilignes regulieres sont .iiii. seulement qui peuvent raemplir superficie, ce est a savoir trigone, quadrangle et exagone comme dit est. Et la cause est car, si comme il peut apparoir par geometrie ou premier de Euclide,<sup>15</sup> l'espace d'environ quelcun point en superficie contient .iiii. angles drois ou l'equivalent; si comme [se]<sup>16</sup> la ligne .ab. et la ligne<sup>17</sup> .ac. se entre-inter-sequent ou point .e., les<sup>18</sup> .iiii. angles d'environ ce point qui sont .f. et .g. et .h. et [k.]<sup>19</sup> tous ensemble valent .iiii. angles drois. Et donques toutes

177b

figures desquelles aucun nombre de leurs angles valent / .iiii. drois peuvent convenir en un point sanz viedenge et estre conjoins ensemble. Et ce est rëemplier espace. Et par ce appert que .iiii. quadrangles ou quarrés, si comme sont .a. et .b.<sup>20</sup> et .c. et .d., rëemplissent espace.<sup>21</sup> Item, il appert par geometrie que chascun angle de trigone vault .ii. tiers de angle droit, et donques .vi. telz<sup>22</sup> angles valent .iiii. angles drois et, par consequent, .vi. trigones, comme sont .a. et .b. et .c. et .d. et .f. et .g., rëemplissent espace environ le point .e. Item, de pentagone qui a .v. angles equalz il appert par geometrie<sup>23</sup> que les .v. ensemble valent .vi. angles droiz, et donques chascun par soy vault un angle droit et la quinte partie d'un angle droit<sup>24</sup> et, par consequent, les .iiii. valent moins de .iiii. angles drois et les .iiii. valent plus. Et donques teles figures en quelcun nombre ne peuvent

<sup>10</sup> A subject et ou matiere.

<sup>11</sup> 51A.

<sup>12</sup> B derivee; DE donnee.

<sup>13</sup> BCDEF omit 'Glose.'

<sup>14</sup> CD ensemble forme et s.; F ensemble ferme et s.

<sup>15</sup> This is a porism or corollary to Proposition XV, Book I: 'If two straight lines cut one another, they make the vertical angles equal to one another.' Cf. *Euclid's Elements*, ed. cit., I, 42. See also the discussion of the porism in T. L. Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, I, 278-9. If the porism was not available in the manuscript of Euclid used by Oresme, he could have known it from the commentary on Euclid by Proclus,

*Procli Diadochi in Primum Euclidis Elementorum librum Commentarii*, ed. G. Friedlein (Lipsiae, 1873), 301-305. Also available was the translation by Boëthius, generally employed in the mediaeval schools; cf. PL 63, 1307-1364, especially 1328.

<sup>16</sup> A omits 'se.'

<sup>17</sup> Figure 3, p. 195.

<sup>18</sup> E point et les .iiii.

<sup>19</sup> A et .b. tous.

<sup>20</sup> B comme sitare et .b.

<sup>21</sup> Figure 4, p. 195.

<sup>22</sup> E donques se tielx.

<sup>23</sup> Figure 5, p. 195. Cf. lemma to Proposition XVIII, Book XIII, ed. cit., IV, 338-341.

<sup>24</sup> B omits 'et la quinte d'un angle droit.'




Fig. 1  
(Fol. 165 b)




Fig. 2  
(Fol. 174 d)




Fig. 6  
(Fol. 177 c)




Fig. 3  
(Fol. 177 a)




Fig. 7  
(Fol. 178 a)




Fig. 4  
(Fol. 177 b)





Fig. 8  
(Fol. 194 d)




Fig. 5  
(Fol. 177 e)

177c estre appliquees environ un point sanz espace wide et ainsi // elles ne peuvent rëmplir espace. Item, de exagone qui a .vi. angles<sup>26</sup> equalz chascun vaut un angle<sup>26</sup> droit et la tierce partie d'un angle droit, et donques les .iii. valent .iiii. angles drois et, par consequent, .iii. exagones peuvent estre appliqués environ un point sanz viedenge. Et ce est rëmplir espace ou superficie. Item, de toutes les autres figures ensuiantes, si comme de celle de .vii. angles et de celle de .viii. et ainsi outre, chascune angle est plus grant que l'angle de exagone, car il procedent touzjours en cressant, et ainsi de chascune tele figure .iii. angles sont plus grans que .iiii. angles drois et les .ii. par necessité sont mendres que .iiii. angles drois. Et donques nul nombre de figure de .vii. angles ne peut rëmplir espace, et ainsi des autres infinies. Or avons donques, a l'entente desus dite, que de toutes figures regulieres .iii. seulement sont qui peuvent rëmplir espace; et ce dist Aristote et bien.

Après il dist que des figures solides où corporeles qui sont .v., les .ii. /  
 177d seulement peuvent rëmplir lieu et sont pyramide et cube. Et de cube qui est .i. corps figuré comme un dé, verité est que .viii.<sup>27</sup> telz se peuvent joindre ensemble sanz viedenge et ce appert legierement et le peut l'en veoir sensiblement. Et pour ce, se l'en prenoit une grant multitude de telz, si comme pour exemple un mieu de déz, l'en les pourroit<sup>28</sup> adjoûter et mettre en un vaisseau sanz ce que entre telz corps eüst espace ne lieu vieu<sup>29</sup> de tel[z]<sup>30</sup> corps. Et ce ne pourroit estre fait de corps semblables de quelcun autre figure fors de pyramides, mais convendroit que entre eulz eüst lieu vieu de telz corps et plain d'autre, si comme de aer ou de eue. Mais une autre figure est tele, ce est a savoir pyramide, qui a .iiii. faces triangulaires et .iiii. angles, si comme il fu dit devant. Et a ce prouver Averroïz fait un falsigrafme,<sup>31</sup> ce est a dire une fause rayson, qui est tele en sentence. L'espace corporele d'environ un point est rëmplie de .viii. cubes comme<sup>32</sup> dit est, et en ce point conviennent ensemble .viii. angles corporelz cubiques dont chascun est contenu de .iii. // angles drois superficielz. Et donques environ ce point sont .xxiiii. angles drois. Et de pyramide chascun angle est contenu de .iii. angles superficielz triangulaires dont chascun vaut .ii. tiers de angle droit. Et donques ces .iii. angles de angle de pyramide valent deux drois, et donques les .xxxvi. valent .xxiiii. angles drois, et .xii. pointes de .xii. pyramides tous ensemble mises ont .xxxvi. angles<sup>33</sup> superficielz. Par quoy il s'ensuit que .xii. pyramides rëmplissent toute l'espace corporele d'environ un point. Mais tout est vray siques a ceste desreniere consequence qui est fause,<sup>34</sup> car la porcion des angles corporelz entre eulz n'est pas selon la proporcion des angles superficielz qui les contiennent. Item, appert sensiblement que la conclusion que met Ave[r]roïz<sup>35</sup> est fause,<sup>34</sup> car posé que sus .vi. triangles qui font une superficie exagone soient mis .vi. pyramides qui ont .vi. pointes lesquelles conviennent ensemble ou point du milieu qui est .e.;  
 178b il appert manifestement que ces .vi. pyramides ne emplant pas tout / le lieu ou espace corporele qui est environ et desus ce point .e. Et semblablement .vi. autres pyramides mis desouz et encontre ces .vi. desouz<sup>36</sup> ceste superficie exagone ne rëmpliroient pas toute l'espace corporele qui est pres de ce point de l'autre partie. Et donques .xii. pyramides ne emplant pas toute l'espace d'environ .i. point. Item, se il estoit ainsi, il s'ensuiroit

<sup>26</sup>Figure 6, p. 195.

<sup>27</sup>A angles.

<sup>28</sup>A que le .viii.; B que .iiii. telz.

<sup>29</sup>B l'en ne pourroit.

<sup>30</sup>B omits 'vieu.'

<sup>31</sup>A tel.

<sup>32</sup>BCD.F omit 'falsigrafme.' Cf. Juntas,

t.c. 66, 225C-M.

<sup>33</sup>A cubes ensemble comme.

<sup>34</sup>E mises valent .xxxvi. angles.

<sup>35</sup>E faicte.

<sup>36</sup>AC Avenroys. Figure 7, p. 195.

<sup>37</sup>B desus.

par neccessité que ces .xii.<sup>87</sup> pyramides adjoustéz ensemble feissent un corps regulier de .xii. faces trigones et seroit duodecedron; et ce est impossible, car les .xii. faces de duodecedron sont pentagones et de .v. angles, si comme il appert en geometrie. Mais une autre chose est: car l'en pourroit demonstrier par geometrie et appert par experience que .xx.<sup>1</sup> pyramides reguliers emplant toute l'espace corporele qui est environ un point, et sont ou peuent estre conjoins ensemble sans aucune viedenge et font un corps regulier appellé *ycocedron*. Item, ou centre ou milieu de cest corps conviennent et sont assemblés .xx. angles ou pointes corporeles de ces .xx. pyramides. Item, cest corps di(s)t *ycocedron*, a .xx. co- // 178c stéz et .xii. angles<sup>88</sup> corporelz et en chascun de ces .xii. angles conviennent et sont assemblés .v. pointes ou .v. angles corporelz de .v. pyramides. Item, en chascune pointe de ces .xii. angles d'*ycocedron* peuent convenir sanz viedenge [xv. autres pointes de]<sup>89</sup> .xv. pyramides en faisant aveques ces .v. un *ycocedron* qui participe<sup>90</sup> aveques le premier. Et ainsi peu(s)t l'en adjouster et mettre ensemble sanz viedenge tant de pyramides comme il plaist et sanz fin. Mais pluseurs *ycocedrons* separés et qui ne participent ensamble ne peuent pas ainsi estre adjoustéz sanz viedenge ou sans entremesler pyramides. Et tout ce appert par raysons demonstratives et sensiblement, et est chose bien plaisante a experimenter. Item, pour ce que l'espace corporele d'environ un point vaut .viii. angles drois corporelz, si comme il fu dit devant, il convient que .xx.<sup>91</sup> angles de pyramides qui emplant tele espace vailent .viii. angles drois corporelz. Et donques les .v. valent .ii. et, par consequent, chascun tel angle de pyramide vault .ii. 178d quintes de angle droit corporel. Item, par ce s'ensuit que / .v. telz angles de pyramides valent .ii. angles drois corporelz. Et chascun des .xii. angles de *ycocedron* contient .v. angles de pyramide et donques chascun tel vault .ii. angles drois corporelz, et les .xii. valent .xxiii. et les .iiii. valent .viii. Mais l'en ne peut pas ainsi appliquer .iiii. *ycocedrons* ensemble et pour ce, ne sont ce pas corps qui tout rēemplent. Item, la proporcion des .iii. angles superficialz qui contiennent angle droit corporel aus .iii. angles superficialz qui contiennent angle de pyramide est comme .iii. a .ii. Et donques elle n'est pas tele comme la proporcion de angle droit corporel et de cube a angle de pyramide laquelle est comme de .v. a .ii., si comme il appert par ce que dit est. Et donques la consequence et la rayon que fait Averroïz sont fauses et est verité que seulement .ii. corps reguliers emplant espace et lieu en la maniere desus dite.

13.—Ou .xiii.<sup>[\*]</sup> chapitre il prouve encore par .ix. raisons plus especiales que les elemens ne sont pas determinéz par figures.

179a Mais encore, ces philosophes qui resgardent principalement aus proprietés // et aus vertus des elemens en leur assignant teles figures, leur distribuent incongruement et improprement, car au feu, pour ce que il est de legier mouvable et que il est eschaufant et embrasant, les uns le faisoient de figure sperique et les autres de pyramide. Et les premiers le disoient pour ce que figure sperique est de legier mobile et ne giest pas fermement, car elle touche pou ce sus quoy elle est; et pour ce que le feu est de legier mobile, il disoient que il est de tele figure. Mais pour ce

<sup>87</sup> B ces .vi. p.

<sup>88</sup> F omits 'et .xii. angles.'

<sup>89</sup> A omits 'xv. autres pointes de.'

<sup>90</sup> F principe.

<sup>91</sup> B .v.; CDEF .xxi.

<sup>1</sup> A .xiii.

que figure angulaire est pou gitive, elle est eschaufante et embrasante; et pyramide est toute angle, car de toutes les figures regulieres elle a les angles plus acuz; et pour ce, il dient que le feu est de figure pyramide.

Glose. Après il les reprent.

179b

Tiexte.<sup>2</sup> Mais premierement, il failent en ce que il dient de mouvement, car combien que ces .ii. figures, espere et pyramide, soient de legier mobiles, ce n'est pas de mouvement naturel a feu, car le feu est meü en haut et selon droite ligne et ces figures sont de legier mobile[s]<sup>3</sup> de mouvement appelé *volutacion* qui est comme / roeler ou tumber. Item, il dient que la terre est cubique pour ce que tele figure giest fermement et est habile a reposer; et la terre ne repose pas partout, mais seulement en son lieu et quant elle est en aucun lieu et elle<sup>4</sup> n'a empeeschement, elle est meüe a son lieu et le feu aussi et les autres elemens. Et donques, selon leur posicion, chascun element en autre lieu que ou sien seroit espere ou pyramide pour estre meü, et en son propre lieu il seroit cube ou cubique pour soy reposer. Item, se le feu eschaufe et art pour ce que il est de figure qui a angles, il s'ensuit que touz les elemens eschaufent, combien, par aventure, que un eschaufast plus que l'autre; car, selon cez ici, tous les elemens ont angles, si comme celui qui a .viii. faces et celui qui en a .xii. Et encore di(s)t Democritus que espere art pour ce que ce est tout angle et donques tous les elemens feroient chateur et ardroient un plus, l'autre moins; et ce appert manifestement faulz.

Glose. Il fu dit ou chapitre precedent comment les anciens atribuoient et distribuient les figures aus elemens.<sup>5</sup>

179c

Tiexte. Item, se le feu fait cha- // leur pour ce que il a angles, il s'ensuit que corps mathematiques es quelz ne est quelcunque qualité sensible ardroient et eschauferoient, car telz corps ainsi ymaginé ou consideréz sanz qualitez ont angles. Et selon cez ici, en telz corps sont pyramides et esperes indivisibles selon quantité. Et se les corps naturelz eschaufent et les mathematiques nón, l'en devroit dire la cause de la difference, et toutevoi[e]s,<sup>6</sup> la cause que il mettent est semblablement es uns<sup>7</sup> comme es autres. Item, se le feu art pour ce que il est espere ou pyramide, il s'ensuit par neccessité que la chose que il art et convertist en feu soit faite espere ou pyramide, car, selon cez ici, le feu divise la chose que il art. Et donques se elle estoit de figure pyramide, comme peu(s)t estre un fust, il la diviseroit en pyramides. Et dire que pyramides sont diviséz en pyramides<sup>8</sup> et esperes en esperes, ce est chose du tout desraysonnable et est semblable comme se l'en disoit que glaives sont diviséz en glaives et<sup>9</sup> falcilles en faucilles. Item,<sup>10</sup> dire que feu est de tele figure pour ce que de / sa nature il divise les choses, ce est une derision, car sa nature est plus congreger et assembler que separer ne diviser, car il depart et separe les choses qui ne sont pas d'une espece ou d'une maniere et assemble celles qui sont

179d

<sup>2</sup> E omits 'Tiexte.'

<sup>3</sup> A mobile.

<sup>4</sup> BCDEF omit 'est en aucun lieu et elle.'

<sup>5</sup> 175d et seq.

<sup>6</sup> A toutevois.

<sup>7</sup> A est semblablement est es uns.

<sup>8</sup> DE omit 'Et dire . . . diviséz en pyra-

mides.'

<sup>9</sup> A repeats 'et.'

<sup>10</sup> DE insert 'Item, dire que feu est de telle figure qui a angles, il s'ensuit que touz (E tous) les elemens eschaufent, combien que un eschaufast par nature (E aventure) plus que l'autre.'

d'une nature. Et est de sa nature que il fait congregacion et assemble et termine, mais il separe par accident ce qui n'est pas de la nature de la chose que il assemble. Et pour ce, cez ci lui deüssent baillier figure habile a assembler et a diviser, et plus a assembler.

Glose. L'en voit par experience que par force de feu d'une masse ou il a de l'or, l'or est tout assemblé en un et toutes les autres choses sont separees de l'or et chascune assemblee en un.

Tiexte. Item, pour ce que chaut et froit sont contraires, ce est impossible de rendre ou atribuer figure a element qui est froit, car il dient que element chaut est chaut pour sa figure. Et donques a element qui est froit de sa nature, il convendrait assigner figure contraire; et rien ne est contraire a figure quelcunue.

180a Glose. Si comme il appert par la diffinicion // de contraires.<sup>11</sup>

Tiexte. Et ces anciens lessierent a parler de ceste chose et toutevoies, il convenoit que il applicassent figures a tous les elemens ou a nul. Item, aucuns qui se efforcent de rendre cause de teles vertus dont une eschaufe et l'autre refroide dient contre eulz meïsmes, car il dient que l'element froit est froit pour ce que il est de grandes parties ou pieces, et pour ce il estraint le[s]<sup>12</sup> pores ou petis partuiz et ne peu(s)t entrer par telz pores. Mais l'element chaut entre et passe legierement par [telz]<sup>13</sup> pores pour ce que il est de tres subtiles et de tres petites parties. Et donques s'ensuit il que l'element chaut et le froit different par grandeur et par petitesce et non pas par figures; si comme il disoient. Item, se il dient que les pyramides sont inequales, donques les grandes ne seront pas feu et ne seront pas cause de arder ou de eschauffer, mais du contraire et de fredeur.

Glose. Et toutevoi[e]z,<sup>14</sup> il disoient que les elemens froiz ne sont pas de figure pyramide, mais le feu.

180b Tiexte. Or appert donques par / les choses desus dites que les elemens ne different pas par figures. Mais pour ce que les tres propres differences des corps naturelz sont [selon]<sup>15</sup> leurs vertus actives et passives et selon leurs operacions, nous dirons premiere-ment de ces choses et quant nous avrons de ce consideré, nous pa[r]lerons<sup>16</sup> des differences que telz corps ont un ou resgart de l'autre.

Cy fenist le tiers livre *Du Ciel et du monde*.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Metaphysicorum*, IV, 3-8; especially 1008a, 7-1011a, 2.

<sup>12</sup> ACF le.

<sup>13</sup> A omits 'telz.'

<sup>14</sup> A toutevoiz.

<sup>15</sup> A omits 'selon.'

<sup>16</sup> A palerons.

<sup>17</sup> BCDEF omit 'Cy fenist . . . du monde.'

Cy commence le quart livre du ciel et du monde ouquel Aristote determine selon sa propre opinion des corps meüs de mouvement droit, et contient .xii. chapitres.

[SOMMAIRE DES CHAPITRES DU QUART LIVRE].

- 1.—Ou premier chapitre il enquieret et met la diffinicion de chose pesante et chose legiere et que ce segnefie.
- 180c 2.—Ou secont il tracte aucunes opinions anciennes des choses desus dites lesquelles sont pesant et // legier.
- 3.—Ou tiers il commence a determiner selon son opinion des choses pesantes et des legieres, et premierement pourquoy les unes sont meües en haut et les autres en bas.
- 4.—Ou quart il declare plus a plain la cause desus mise.
- 5.—Ou quint il determine des differences des choses pesantes et legieres en tant comme teles.
- 6.—Ou sixte il monstre principalement que des corps simples il convient que aucun soit simplement legier et aucun simplement pesant.
- 7.—Ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> il conclut le nombre des elemens.
- 8.—En le .viii.<sup>e</sup> il reprouve aucuns opinions anciens.
- 9.—Ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> il monstre comment les figures des corps pesanz [et des legiers]<sup>1</sup> font a leur mouvement et comment non.
- 10.—Aprés sont .iii. chapitres du translateur comment les choses dehors ce monde sont en lieu et comment elles sont meües, et est le .x.<sup>e</sup> chapitre des choses incorporeles.
- 11.—Le .xi.<sup>e</sup> est quant a ce generalment des choses corporeles. /
- 180d 12.—Le .xii.<sup>e</sup> est en especial du corps de Jhesucrist.

[LIVRE IV]

1.—Ou premier chapitre il enquieret et met la diffinicion de chose pesante et de chose legiere et que ce segnefie.

Or est a considerer de chose pesante et de chose legiere, de chascune quoy ce est et quelle est leur nature et pour quelle cause elles ont ces vertus. Car la consideracion de ces choses est propre a la science naturele qui est de mouvement, pour ce que nous disons aucunement chose pesante et legiere en tant comme elle peu(s)t estre meüe naturellement, car nul ne les nomme ainsi se il ne cuide que elles aient tele inclination quant a leurs operacions. Et pour ce que science naturele est de mouvement et choses pesantes et legieres ont en elles principe de mouvement, tous naturiens usent en leur parler de leurs vertus; mais toutevoies, il ne en determinent fors pou de choses.

- 181a Glose. // Aussi comme une chose est nommee chaude pour ce que elle eschaufe et froide pour [ce]<sup>1</sup> que elle refroide, semblablement elle est dite pesante pour ce que elle est encline a descendre, etc.; et science naturele considere de mouvement. Aprés il touche l'ordre de proceder.

Tiexte. Et premierement, nous voirrons ce que les autres en ont dit et mettrons divisions ou distinctions teles comme sont necces-

<sup>1</sup> A omits 'et des legiers.'

<sup>1</sup> A omits 'ce.'

saires a ceste consideracion. Et ainsi nous dirons de ces choses ce que nous en semble.

Glose. Après il met une distinction.

Tiexte. Mais une chose est pesante ou legiere ou simplement ou resgart d'autre chose, car des choses pesantes nous disons que une est plus legiere et l'autre plus pesante, si comme fust est plus legier que aerain. Et des choses qui sont dites simplement teles, rien ne est dit par ceulz qui ont esté devant nous; mais de celles qui sont dites [teles]<sup>2</sup> ou resgart d'autre, encore ne dient il pas quoy est pesant ou quoy est legier. Mais des choses qui ont pesanteur, il dient bien quoi / est plus pesant et quoy est plus legier.

181b

Glose. Après il met .ii.<sup>3</sup> suppositions.

Tiexte. Et ce que nous disons simplement pesant ou legier appert par ce que s'ensuit: premierement, car unes choses tendent et sont meïes naturellement a soy esloingnier du milieu et les autres a soy approchier. Item, celle qui s'en esloigne, nous disons que elle est meïe en haut et celle qui tent au milieu, nous disons que elle est meïe en bas.

Glose. Après il met et puis oste .ii. erreurs.

Tiexte. Et cuider que ou monde ne<sup>4</sup> soit et haut et bas, ce est inconvenient, si comme aucuns disoient.

Glose. Anaximandrus et Democritus disoient que pour ce que tout est infini, il n'i a ne haut ne bas simplement.<sup>5</sup> Et Plato disoit<sup>6</sup> que pour ce que le ciel est tout environ semblable, il n'i a ne haut ne bas.

Tiexte. Car il dient que une chose n'est pas haut et l'autre bas pour ce que tout est samblable de toutes pars. Et se un homme environnoit la terre, il seroit antipode a soy meïsmes, ce est a dire que il avroit ses piés au contraire de la maniere comment il les a quant il seroit de l'autre part // de la terre. Mais nous disons que le extremité de tout, ce est a dire ce que est le plus loing du milieu, est haut selon posicion et est premier par nature. Et donques pour ce que ou monde a extremité et circunference et si y a moien et centre ou milieu, il convient que il y ait et haut et bas. Et ce dient plusieurs, mes non pas souffissanment et la cause est car il cuident que le ciel ne soit pas semblablement tout environ en circuite, mais que il n'i a de ciel fors sus nostre emispe.

181c

Glose. Et que la terre est desouz infinie, si comme il fu dit ou .xxvii.<sup>7</sup> chapitre du secont.<sup>7</sup>

Tiexte. Mais ceulz qui tiennent que le ciel est tel tout en circuite et regarde le milieu de toutes pars semblablement, il convient que eulz octrient que le ciel est haut et que le milieu est bas.

Glose.<sup>8</sup> Après il conclut la diffinicion ou descripcion de pesant et de legier simplement, et de plus pesant et de plus legier en resgart d'autre.

Tiexte. Et donques la chose est simplement legiere qui est meïe en haut et tout haut a la circunference concave de tout le ciel, et celle est sim- / plement pesante qui est meïe au milieu et au centre du monde. Et la chose est legiere ou resgart d'autre ou plus legiere, ou se .ii. choses ont pesanteur et sont d'une

181d

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'teles.'

<sup>3</sup> B .iii.

<sup>4</sup> B omits 'ne.'

<sup>5</sup> Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, I, 88; II, 134.

<sup>6</sup> *Timaeus*, 62D.

<sup>7</sup> 146b.

<sup>8</sup> DE omit 'Glose.'



quantité, celle qui par nature descent plus isnelement est la plus pesante.

Glose. Et l'autre est dite plus legiere. Et semblablement des choses qui sont naturellement meües en haut, celle qui monte plus tost est la plus legiere. Et tout ce est a entendre se les autres choses sont pareilles et se ces choses sont hors de leurs lieux naturelz et tout empeeschement soit osté. Mais que l'en doit entendre par haut et par bas, il fu plus a plain déclaré et en partie contre Aristoté ou tiers point de la glose du .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du premier.<sup>o</sup>

2.—Ou secont chapitre il tracte aucuns opinions anciens des choses desus dites qui sont pesant et legier.

182a

De<sup>1</sup> ceulz qui au devant de nous sont venus a ceste consideracion, presque la plus grande partie ont parlé seulement des choses qui sont telement pesantes et legieres que les unes et les autres ont pesanteur. Mais une est dite plus legiere que l'autre pour ce que elle est moins pesante, et en passant ainsi il cuident avoir déterminé de ce que est simplement legier et simplement pesant. Mais leur opinion ne est pas raysonnable, si comme il apparra en procedant et recitant leurs dis.

Glose. Après il parle de l'opinion de Plato.

Tiexte. Et les uns dient, si comme il [est]<sup>2</sup> escript in *Thymeo*,<sup>3</sup> que la chose est plus pesante qui est faite et composee de plusieurs triangles et celle est plus legiere qui est composee de moins, aussi comme en une meïsme espeece un plon est plus pesant que .i. autre mendre plon et aerain que aerain; et semblablement en autres choses qui sont d'une espeece, car chascune chose tant a plus de parties equales et elle est plus pesante. Et en ceste maniere est il des choses qui sont de diverses espees; et pour ce dient il que le plon est plus pesant que le fust, car toutes choses sont faites d'une meïsme chose et d'une matiere autre que les choses qui en sont faites.

182b

Glose. Après il blasme cest opinion par .ii. raysons.

Tiexte. / Mais par ce n'est pas<sup>4</sup> dit quelle chose est simplement legiere et maintenant nous voions que feu est tousjours legier [et tousjours]<sup>5</sup> est meü en haut, et terre et toutes choses terrestres sont meües en bas et au milieu. Et donques ce n'est pas pour ce que telz corps sont composés de pou de triangles, si comme il dient, que le feu est meü naturellement en haut, car tant seroit un feu plus grant et il seroit moins isnelement meü en haut et seroit plus pesant pour ce que il seroit composé de plus de trigones ou de triangles. Or est ainsi que l'en voit tout le contraire, car tant est un feu plus grant et il est plus legier et plus isnelement meü en haut, et tant est plus petit et il est plus isnelement et plus aesiement meü en bas, et tant est plus grant et il est plus tardivement meü en bas. Item, il dient que la chose est plus legiere qui a moins de telz triangles semblables et celle qui en a plus est plus pesante; et dient que le aer et l'eau et le feu sont d'uns meïsmes triangles, mais il different selon ce que

<sup>o</sup> 37d.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. ii. DE Se ceulz.

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'est.'

<sup>3</sup> 63C.

<sup>4</sup> A ce est n'est.

<sup>5</sup> A omits 'et tousjours.'

182c il en ont plus ou moins, et pour ce celui qui en a le moins est le plus legier et qui plus, plus // est pesant. Et donques s'ensuit que une grande multitude ou porcion de aer seroit plus pesante que une petite porcion de eaue, car elle avroit plus de telz triangles. Et l'en voit tout le contraire, car tant est un aer plus grant et il est plus tost meü en haut quant il est en eaue. Et briefment, chascune partie de aer est encline a estre meüe en haut quant elle est en eaue. Et ainsi determinent cez ici de pesant et de legier.

Glose. Après il met un autre opinion.

Tiexte. Et il semble aus autres que il ne souffist pas mettre tele difference entre pesant et legier, mais furent aucuns plus anciens qui entendent ceste chose plus subtilment.

Glose. Ce furent Democritus et Leucippus.

182d Tiexte. Car nous voions que de .ii. corps aucune fois le mendre est le plus pesant. Et donques ne souffist il pas dire que les corps sont equalment pesans qui sont de equalz nombres des premiers corps indivisibles, car touz corps peseroient equalment qui seroient de equale quantité. Et pour ce, ces ici ne se y arrestent pas. Mais ceus qui mettent les corps estre composés de superficies indivisibles / non-pesantes, il convient que il octrient moult d'inconveniens; et ceulz qui mettent que les corps sont de indivisibles solides et pesans assignent miex cause pourquoy une chose est plus pesante que l'autre. Car les corps qui sont composés de telz athomes indivisibles ne sont pas touz d'une maniere, mais voions que aucuns corps plus petis sont plus pesans que telz sont moult plus grans, si comme plun que laine. Et pour ce, cez ici assignent autre cause et dient que vieu- *vacuum*- est melley en aucuns grans corps et les fait estre plus legiers, et par ce avient moult de fois que .ii. corps sont composés de equalz nombres de athomes indivisibles et que le mendre poise le plus, et le grant est le plus legier. Et la cause est car plus de vieu est meslé ou mixtioné ou grant que ou petit. Et ce est ce que il dient.

Glose. Après il improuve ceste opinion par .ix. raisons.

183a Tiexte. Mais il fust necessité que ceulz qui ainsi determinent ne meüssent pas seulement que avoir en soy plus de vieu est cause en un corps d'estre plus legier, mais deüssent adjou- // ster et dire plus de legier et moins de plain ou de solide; car se un excède l'autre seulement en regardant a la proportion de vieu a vieu, celui<sup>a</sup> qui est le<sup>7</sup> plus legier ne seroit pas le plus legier. Et il dient que le feu est le plus legier des elemens pour ce que il a plus de vieu. Et donques s'ensuit il que un grant corps de or seroit plus legier que un petit corps de feu, car il a en soy plus de vieu que ce petit feu;—qui ne mettroit que cel or aveques ce a plus de solide ou de plain. Et donques il le deüssent dire.

Glose. Après il fait memoire d'aucunes opinions.

Tiexte. Et aucuns qui ne disoient pas que rien fust vieu ne determinerent rien de ces qualités pesant et legier, si comme Anaxagoras et Empedocles. Et ceulz qui en ont déterminé et ne ont pas dit que rien soit vieu, il ne ont pas dit<sup>a</sup> cause pourquoy les unes choses sont simplement pesantes et les autres simplement legieres, et que aucuns corps sont meüz tousjours en bas

<sup>a</sup> A vieu, et celui.

<sup>7</sup> DE omit 'et.'

<sup>a</sup> B omits 'que rien . . . dit.'

183b et les autres touzjours [en]<sup>9</sup> haut. Et encore ne se recorderent il onques de dire la cause de ce que aucuns / corps bien grans sont plus legiers que telz sont moult plus petiz, et si ne appert par leur diz comment l'en puisse salver les apparences que l'en voit sensiblement.

Glose.<sup>10</sup> Ce furent les Platoniens lesquelz il improuve après. Tiexte. Mais il convient par neccessité que cez ici encheient et soient detenuz en celles meïsmes difficultés comme ceulz qui dient que le feu est legier pour cause que il a en soy moult de vieu, car il dient que le feu est legier pour ce seulement que il a en soy moins de solide ou de plain, combien que selon aucuns il ait plus de vieu. Et donques sera une multitude de feu ou un grant feu duquel les solides ou plains contenuz en lui excederont<sup>11</sup> les solides d'une petite terre.

Glose. Et par consequent, ceste petite terre sera plus legiere que ce grant feu. Après il met la tierce rayson contre ceulz qui diroient que plain et vieu sont causes de ces choses.

183c Tiexte. Item, se il disoient que aveques plain ou solide vieu est cause de teles choses, je demande comment<sup>12</sup> il determineront simplement pesant: ou pour ce que il avra plus de solide? ou par- // ce que il avra moins de vieu?<sup>13</sup> Se il dient par plus de solide, donques un grant feu ou il a plus de solide que<sup>14</sup> en une petite terre sera plus pesant que la petite terre; et se il dient que ce est par moins de vieu, donques un petit feu ou il a moins de vieu que en une grant terre sera plus pesant que ceste terre et ceste terre plus legiere. Et ainsi sera aucune chose plus legiere que ce qui est simplement legier. Et la terre qui touzjours est meïe en bas sera plus legiere que ce qui est touzjours meï en haut; et ce est impossible, car ce qui est simplement legier est tousjours plus legier que ne sont les choses qui ont pesanteur et descendent en bas, mais ce que est plus legier ne est pas touzjours legier pour ce que de .ii. choses qui ont pesanteur, une est aucune fois dite plus legiere que l'autre, si comme l'eaue<sup>15</sup> est dite plus legere que la terre.

Glose. Après il argüe contre ceulz qui diroient que selon la proporcion que ont ensemble plain et vieu en un corps, selon ce il est plus pesant ou plus legier.<sup>16</sup>

183d Tiexte. Item, dire que une chose est plus legiere que l'autre / pour ce que le vieu qui est en elle a plus grande proporcion au plain qui est en elle que en l'autre chose, ce ne soufist pas a souldre ceste doubte, car il s'ensuit impossible; car en un grant feu et en un petit, le plain ou solide au vieu a tele proporcion en l'un comme en l'autre. Et nous voions que le grant est meï en haut plus isnelement que le petit, et semblablement le grant or est meï en bas plus isnelement que le petit,<sup>17</sup> et aussi du plun et de toutes autres choses pesantes. Et il ne seroit pas ainsi se choses legieres et choses pesantes estoient determinees en la maniere que il dient.

Glose. Car se ou petit feu sont .iii. de plain et. x. de vieu, donques ou feu

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'en.'

<sup>10</sup> BDE omit 'Glose.'

<sup>11</sup> E contenuz en l'air excederent.

<sup>12</sup> A demande et comment.

<sup>13</sup> E solide ou moins pour ce que il avra moins de solide vieu.

<sup>14</sup> DE solide ou parce que il avra moins de vuit que en une petite terre.

<sup>15</sup> BCDEF la terre.

<sup>16</sup> B omits 'ou plus legier.'

<sup>17</sup> D repeats 'et semblablement le grant or . . . que le petit.'

qui est plus grant au double sont .vi. de plain et .xx. de vieu; et la proporcion de .x. a .iii. et celle de .xx. a .vi. sont equales. Et donques ces .ii. feuz sont equalment legiers.<sup>18</sup> Après il argüe generalment que vieu n'est pas cause de legiere[té].<sup>19</sup>

- 184a Tiexte. Item, se les corps sont meüz en haut pour le vieu qui est en eulz et vieu de sa nature ne est meü en // haut, ce est inconvenient. Et se il est enclin de nature a estre meü en haut et plain a estre meü en bas et que pour ce il sont cause aus autres corps d'estre meüz les uns haut les autres bas, donques ne convenoit il pas parler des corps qui sont composts de vieu et de plain pourquoy les uns sont legiers les autres pesans, mais seulement il devoient dire pourquoy vieu est legier et plain est pesant. Item, se il est ainsi comme si est selon leur opinion, il ne pourroient assigner cause pourquoy plain et vieu ne se departent des corps ou il sont, et que un ne s'en va en haut et l'autre en bas.

Glose.<sup>20</sup> Car il convendroient que il fussent en telz corps en leur propre forme ou propre nature, et ne pourroit l'en dire cause qui les tenist ensemble.

Tiexte. Item, ce est chose desraisonnable de assigner a vieu region et lieu<sup>21</sup> aussi comme se vieu ne fust pas region et lieu.

Glose. Et si est selon eulz, car vieu est lieu qui n'est pas plain de corps. Et donques de lieu seroit lieu et ainsi sanz fin.

- 184b Tiexte. Item, se vieu est meü, il convient par neccessité que il ait un / lieu duquel il est transmué et<sup>22</sup> un autre lieu auquel il est transmué.

Glose. Et que ces lieux fussent contraires, et l'en ne pourroit telle contrariété assigner en l'espace wide infinie que mettoient ces philosophes.

Tiexte. Item, il ne peuvent<sup>23</sup> assigner cause du mouvement de vieu, car il dient que vieu tout seul ne se meut, mais plain et vieu ensemble.

Glose. Et ausi vieu ne a quelcunque nature, et nature est principe et cause de mouvement. Après il reprouve une autre opinion.

Tiexte. Et semblablement s'ensuiuent inconveniens se aucun disoit que legier et pesant sont determinéz par grandeur et par petitesse, posé que il meüssent que touz corps sont d'une matiere ou que il fussent de plusieurs matieres contraires.

Glose. Teles opinions furent recite[e]z<sup>24</sup> ou .ix.[e]<sup>25</sup> chapitre du tiers<sup>26</sup> et environ.

Tiexte. Car qui diroit que touz corps sont d'une meïsme matiere, rien ne seroit simplement pesant ou simplement legier, si comme disoient ceulz qui mettoient que tous corps sont composts de trignes.

- 184c Glose. Car se ceste matiere est pe- // sante, rien n'est simplement legier; et se elle est legiere, rien ne est simplement pesant.

Tiexte. Et ceulz qui mettent que les corps sont de matieres contraires comme sont plain et vieu, il ne peuvent rendre cause pourquoy des corps moiens les uns sont plus pesans ou plus legiers que les autres, puisque vieu par soy n'est simplement legier. Item, dire que les choses pesantes et legieres sont determinees par grandeur et par petitesse semble une chose feinte<sup>27</sup> plus que aucuns autres opinions devant dis, car ceulz qui mettent

<sup>18</sup> A legiers. Glose. Après.

<sup>19</sup> A legiere.

<sup>20</sup> DE omit 'Glose.'

<sup>21</sup> B vieu.

<sup>22</sup> E transmué en un.

<sup>23</sup> Lacuna in C extending to 186d, note 8.

<sup>24</sup> ABF recitez.

<sup>25</sup> A ix.

<sup>26</sup> 170d et seq.

<sup>27</sup> D faite; F feicte.

maniere par quoy les .iiii. elemens peuent estre distinguiez parlent plus subtilment; car a dire que tous corps sont d'une nature, mes pesant est de plus grandes parties et legier de plus petites et plus subtiles, il s'ensuit que rien n'est simplement legier ne meü en haut, mais tous corps seroient meüz une voie, un plus tost, l'autre plus tart, aussi comme nous voions des choses meües par violence. Item, se il estoit si comme il dient, il s'ensuiroit que une grande multitude de teles pe- / tites parties seroient plus pesante que un petit nombre de grandes parties, puisque toutes sont d'une nature. Et se ainsi estoit, un grant aer ou un grant feu seroit plus pesant que une petite eaue ou que une petite terre; et ce est impossible. Et ainsi sont recitez les diz des autres en ceste matiere.

184d

[Glose.]<sup>28</sup> Il me semble que par tele rayson comme est la quarte que Aristote fait contre ceulz qui mettent que le vieu qui est es<sup>29</sup> corps est cause de legiereté, l'en pourroit faire un fort argüement a prouver que les elemens ne sont pas es corps mixtes en leur propre forme; car Aristote di(s)t, et ce est verité, que se les corps estoient<sup>30</sup> pesanz et legiers plus ou moins selon la proporcion que plain et vieu, dont il sont composéz, ont l'un a l'autre, il s'ensuiroit que le grant et le petit qui sont d'une espece fussent equalment pesanz et legiers. Et semblablement, se les elemens estoient es corps mixtes en leur propre forme, il s'ensuiroit que le grant

185a

corps mixte et le petit d'une espece fussent equalment // pesans. Et nous voions le contraire. Et que il s'ensuie, je le monstre et suppose que l'isneleté d'un mouvement est selon la proporcion de la vertu motive a la resistance; et pour ce, se en .ii. corps meüz teles proporcions sont equales, il seront meüz de isneletés equales. Or pren je donques, pour exemple, .ii. corps de fin argent dont l'un soit quadruple a l'autre en quantité, et pose que ou petit les elemens pesans ou resgart des legiers soient comme .vi. a .i.,<sup>31</sup> et donques ou grant qui est de mixtion semblable il seront comme .xxiiii. a .iiii. et est tele proporcion comme de .vi. a .i.<sup>32</sup> Et donques par la supposicion devant mise, le petit et le grant seront meüz en bas d'une meïsme isneleté se les autres choses<sup>33</sup> sont pareilles et, par consequent, ces .ii. corps poissent equalment; et ce est faulz manifestement. Et donques les elemens ne sont pas en leur propre forme es corps mixtes. Item, pour declarer ceste rayson, je met pour exemple que en .i. cuir plain de aer, comme seroit une vessie, fust mis de plun tant que elle

185b

descendist mise en eaue, et que en une autre / fust aer au double et que l'en meüst dedens de plun au double plus que en l'autre; je di et appert par rayson que ces .ii. vessies descendroient en l'eaue equalment et peseroient equalment. Et semblablement, se un homme tire et meu(s)t une nef, .ii. hommes de equale force tireroient equalment une nef plus pesante au double. Et ausi se les elemens estoient es corps mixtes comme dit est, il seroient en tele proporcion ou grant comme ou petit d'une espece, et les legiers resistant aus pesans, et donques le grant mixte ne seroit pas plus tost ne plus pesant que le petit. Et la resistance de l'aer [ou]<sup>34</sup> de l'eaue dehors par quoy telz corps sont meüz ne empeesche en rien<sup>35</sup> ceste rayson, car encore a plus de tele resistance le grant que le petit, et donques il devroit estre meü plus tardivement; et ce est faulz. Et pour ce plus declarer, je argüe au contraire et pose que en une masse de terre pure ou de pierre fussent bien espés et equalment ou semblable-

<sup>28</sup> ABCDEF omit 'Glose.'

<sup>29</sup> DE omit 'es.'

<sup>30</sup> B corps mixtes estoient.

<sup>31</sup> E .vi. a .viii.

<sup>32</sup> B .vi. a .ii.

<sup>33</sup> B autres .ii. choses.

<sup>34</sup> A omits 'ou.'

<sup>35</sup> DE meuz ou empeesches en rien.

- ment semés petis pertuis ou pores plains de aer, aussi comme pour  
 185c exemple .x. pores, et que en une tele qui fust .c. foyes plus grande fussent  
 mil // telz pores: il ne est pas vraysemblable que la grande ne fust plus  
 pesante que la petite et que elle ne fust plus tost meüe en bas; et  
 semblablement droit l'en d'une grande piece d'argent et d'une petite,  
 posé que les elemens fussent en elles en propre forme. Item, se les elemens  
 ne sont en propre forme es corps mixtes, toutevoi[e]<sup>35</sup> il y sont selon  
 leurs vertus lesquelles sont en ces corps en tele proporcion comme seroient  
 les elemens, se il estoient en leur propre forme. Et donques par la rayson  
 desus dite, se elle valoit, l'en conclurroit que le petit corps mixte est  
 aussi tost meü et aussi pesant comme le grant de semblable espeece. Au  
 premier, je di que, ou cas mis, la grant pierre seroit moult plus pesante que  
 la petite et plus isnelement meüe en l'aer, car l'aer en son lieu n'est pesant  
 ne legier, mais en eue la raison conclude que elles peseroient equalment;  
 et cuide que ce soit vray se les autres choses estoient pareilles. Au secont,  
 je di que quand l'en di(s)t que les elemens sont selon leurs [vertus]<sup>37</sup>  
 185d en un corps qui est mixte et est de parties semblables, ce n'est pas a  
 enten- / dre quant a propos que ces vertus contraires qui sont pesanteur  
 et legiereté soient ensamble par tout tel corps en leur propre forme,  
 car ainsi concluderoit cest argüement. Mais en tel corps est tant seulement  
 une tele qualité ou vertu motive, ce est a savoir pesanteur, et est mendre  
 et plus remisse que la pesanteur de terre qui est pur element. Et pour  
 ce, tel corps est plus legier selon vertu et ou resgart de terre pure ou  
 d'aucun autre corps, et non pas pour ce que il soit legier ne que il ait en  
 soy aucune legiereté en quelcunque proporcion.<sup>38</sup> Et ce est selon ce que  
 di(s)t Aristote ou quart chapitre du tiers<sup>39</sup> et en plusieurs autres lieux.  
 Mais [se]<sup>40</sup> les elemens estoient en tel corps en propre forme, il seroit  
 autrement. Et ce est la difference par quoy appert la response au secont  
 argüement. Et autrefois ay je monstré des autres qualités contraires,  
 comme sont chaleur et froideur, que elles ne peuvent estre ensamble par  
 tout un subject.

- 3.—*Ou tiers chapitre il commence a determiner selon son opinion des  
 choses pesantes et legieres, et premierement pour quelle cause les unes  
 186a sont // meües en haut et les autres en bas.*

Nous<sup>1</sup> dirons premierement de ce de quoy aucuns doubtent  
 mais[me]ment,<sup>2</sup> ce est a savoir pourquoy aucuns corps sont  
 meüz en haut et les autres en bas et touzjours selonc nature,  
 et les autres sont meüz en haut et en bas. Et après ce, nous  
 determinerons de pesant et de legier et de leurs accidens ou  
 passions, de chascun pour quelle cause il est fait.

Glose. Après il met .iiii. supposicions.

Tiexte. Et de ce que chascun corps mobile de mouvement naturel  
 est meü a son lieu, l'en doit estimer et cuider que la cause est  
 a mettre semblablement comme es autres mouvemens et gen-  
 eracions et transmutacions. Item, les mouvemens sont de .iii.  
 manieres: car un est selon magnitude ou quantité, ce est  
 augmentation et diminucion; l'autre est selon espeece ou qualité,

<sup>35</sup> A toutevois.

<sup>37</sup> A omits 'vertus.'

<sup>38</sup> B porcion.

<sup>39</sup> 161d.

<sup>40</sup> A omits 'se.'

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. iii. B nous devons; E nous avons.

<sup>2</sup> A maisment; D mesment.

186b

ce est alteracion comme de chaut en froit et ainsi des autres qualités; et l'autre est mouvement selon lieu. Item, en chascun de ces mouvemens nous voions que transmuta- / cion est faite de termes contraires a termes contraires et par les entremoiens, et non pas de chose contingente en autre contingente.

Glose. Ce est a dire d'une chose et non pas en quelcunque, mais seulement en sa contraire; si comme de chaleur non pas en blancheur ou en douceur, mes en froideur. Et ne convient pas que les termes de tous mouvemens soient simplement contraires, mais souffist que il y ait distance; si comme entre petit et grant en augmentation, et entre tres chaut et moins chaut en alteracion, et entre bas et plus bas en mouvement local ou autrement selon aucune distance.

Tiexte. Item, aussi comme le subject qui peut estre alteré et celui qui peu(s)t estre augmenté different en tant comme telz, [aussi different]<sup>3</sup> la vertu alterative et la vertu augmentative. Et en ceste maniere en mouvement selon lieu ou local, le subject en tant comme tel differe des subjects des autres mouvemens et semblablement de la vertu motive, car elle ne tent pas a quelcunque fin ou terme indifferamment, mais a certain terme.

186c

Glose. Si comme la vertu motive qui meu(s)t i. corps en bas ne tent pas en // tant comme tele a chaleur ne a acressement en augmentation, mais a certain lieu. Après il veult prouver ceste conclusion que les corps pesans et legiers sont meüz a leurs lieux naturelz pour avoir leur perfection.

Tiexte. Et donques se la vertu motive qui meu(s)t i. corps en bas est ce qui le fait pesant, et celle qui meu(s)t un autre corps en haut est ce qui le fait legier, et subject mobile est ce qui peu(s)t estre pesant ou legier, il s'ensuit que de chascun corps estre meü a son lieu, ce est estre meü a son espece, ce est a dire a sa forme et a sa perfection.

Glose. Et donques ce qui le meu(s)t t[en]t<sup>4</sup> a celle fin et meu(s)t pour ce que le corps meü ait sa perfection, car tousjours oeuvre nature pour aucune fin, si comme il est dit ou secont de *Phisique*.<sup>5</sup> Et doit l'en savoir que aucune fois ce qui meut en bas la chose pesante, ce est ce qui l'engendre et fait et aucune foys, si comme après ce que elle [est]<sup>6</sup> faite, se elle est hors de son lieu, .ii. choses la moevent: une est ce qui oste l'empeeschement par quoi elle estoit tenue hors de son lieu; autre est sa propre pesanteur; et semblablement de la chose legiere en haut.

186d

Et tout ce / sera déclaré plus a plain ou chapitre ensuiant.<sup>7</sup> Item, la cause final prochaine de tel mouvement et que entent la vertu motive est la perfection de ce corps meü pour ce que en son lieu naturel il est miex conservé et gardé et peu(s)t miex atteindre a la fin principal pour quoy nature l'a fait, et est par ce en son droit ordre entre les corps du monde. Après il conferme son propos en ostant un opinion contraire.

Tiexte. Et ainsi appert de ce que aucuns anciens disoient que la terre et les autres corps sont ainsi meüz pour ce que chascune chose est meüe a son samblable; mais il ne est pas tousjours ainsi, car qui transposeroit ou transporterait<sup>8</sup> la terre la ou est maintenant la lune, et une petite partie de terre fust ici, elle ne seroit pas meü[e]<sup>9</sup> vers la terre qui seroit la ou est la lune, mes

<sup>3</sup> AB comme teles la vertu.

<sup>4</sup> A tout.

<sup>5</sup> *Physicorum*, II, 8, 199b, 32.

<sup>6</sup> A omits 'est.'

<sup>7</sup> 187b et seq.

<sup>8</sup> C lacuna extending from 184b, note 23, ends with trans-.

<sup>9</sup> A meü.

seroit meüe la ou est maintenant la terre. Et ainsi convient il que toute terre soit meüe d'un mouvement et a un lieu, posé que en cel lieu soient corps semblables ou differenz. Et au lieu ou une petite partie est encline<sup>10</sup> a estre meüe, a ce lieu est enclin son tout.

- 187a Glose. Et donques // est la terre meüe en bas pour ce que ce est son lieu ou elle a sa perfection. Après il met a ce la tierce rayson.

Tiexte. Item, lieu est le extremité ou desrenier terme de la chose qui contient.

Glose. Ce est la diffinicion de lieu declaree plus a plain ou quart de *Phisque*.<sup>11</sup> Et donques le lieu d'une chose est la superfice concave du corps qui la contient ou qui<sup>12</sup> est plus prochaine de la chose contenue.

Tiexte. Et le lieu extreme ou plus [haut]<sup>13</sup> et le moien contiennent toutes choses qui sont meües en haut et qui sont meües en bas.

Glose. Le lieu extreme, ce est la superfice concave du ciel qui contient le feu; et la superfice concave de l'espere du feu, ce est le lieu moien qui contient le aer,<sup>14</sup> et le aer l'eau, et l'eau la terre.

Tiexte. Et ce qui contient est aucunement espee, ce est a dire forme ou perfection a la chose que il contient; et pour ce, estre meü a son lieu est estre meü a son semblable, car les<sup>15</sup> elemens qui sont ordenéz et contiennent l'un l'autre sont semblables aucunement, si comme l'eau a l'aer qui la contient et le aer au feu.

- 187b Glose. Es qualités simboles, car le feu et le aer sont / chaux, et le aer et l'eau sont moistes, et l'eau et la terre sont fredes.

Tiexte. Et pour ce en descendant vers les moiens et non pas en m[ontan]t<sup>16</sup> vers l'extreme, l'un est perfection de l'autre, si comme le aer de l'eau et l'eau de la terre,<sup>17</sup> car tousjours l'element desus a celui qui est souz lui a tel resgart aucunement comme forme ou espee<sup>18</sup> a matiere.

Glose. Car aussi comme forme est perfection de matiere, semblablement l'element contenant et qui est desus donne perfection a celui qui il contient, en tant comme en ce lieu est sa conservacion et generacion.

#### 4.—Ou quart chapitre il declare plus a plain la cause desus mise.

Et faire question pourquoy le feu est meü en haut et la terre en bas, ce est une meïsme chose comme qui demanderoit pourquoy un corps qui peu(s)t avoir santé, se il est transmué et alteré en tant comme tel, il vient a santé et ne vient pas a blancheur; et semblablement de tous corps alterables ou qui peuent estre alteréz.

Glose. Car se le corps est transmué par alteration qui est ou tent a santé,<sup>1</sup> se aveques ce il devient blanc, ce est par accident et non pas en

- 187c tant comme // alterable a santé, mais par une autre alteration.

Tiexte. Et aussi se un corps a possibilité d'estre augmenté ou creü et il soit mué selon ceste possibilité et en tant comme tel,

<sup>10</sup> A enclinee.

<sup>11</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 4, 210b, 34-212a, 30; especially 211a, 28; 211b, 19-29; 212a, 28-31.

<sup>12</sup> DE contient un (E ung) qui est.

<sup>13</sup> A omits 'haut.'

<sup>14</sup> A contient le fe le aer.

<sup>15</sup> DE car se les elemens.

<sup>16</sup> A moult; BCDEF mout.

<sup>17</sup> B omits 'et l'eau de la terre.'

<sup>18</sup> E espere.

<sup>1</sup> DE qui est ostant (E obstant) sante.



il ne vendra par ce en santé, mais en excès de magnitude ou de quantité; et semblablement de chascun corps selon ce que l'un est transmué en qualité, l'autre en quantité,<sup>2</sup> l'autre selon lieu. En ceste maniere, les choses legieres sont meües en haut et les pesantes en bas.

Glose. Et ainsi Aristote a mise similitude et convenience entre mouvement local et les autres mouvemens. Après il met difference.

Tiexte. Mes il y a difference, car les choses pesantes et legieres semblent avoir en soy principe et cause de leur transmutacion local et les autres non. Mais le principe ou la vertu motive est hors le corps meü, si comme de celui qui est alterable a santé et de celui qui est transmutable en quantité et en cressance, combien que aucune foys par .i. petit mouvement fait par cause dehors tel[z]<sup>3</sup> corps soient transmuéz de eulz meïsme[s]<sup>4</sup> et vient l'un a santé et l'autre en cressance.<sup>5</sup> Et pour ce que un me- / isme corps subject est receptible ou peu(s)t recevoir santé et langueur, se il est meü selon ce ou en tant comme il est receptible de santé, il est meü et transmué en santé. Et se il est meü selon ce que il est receptible de enfermeté, il sera meü a enfermeté. Mais les choses pesantes et les legier[e]<sup>6</sup> semblent plus avoir en soy meïsme principe ou cause efficiente de leurs mouvemens pour ce que leur matiere est tres prochaine de leur substance.

Glose. Car il sont, quant aus elemens, composés seulement de forme et de matiere, si comme il fu dit ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre du tiers;<sup>7</sup> ou l'en pourroit dire que leur matiere est pres de leur substance, ce est a dire de ces qualités motives pesanteur et legierté qui sont naturellement premieres.

Tiexte. Et de ce est signe que es corps absoluz, ce est a dire mixtes et perfectz, mouvement local est desrenier par generacion.

Et donques il est premier selon substance et selon perfection.

Glose. Car les bestes ont en elles alteracion et augmentacion avant que il aient mouvement local, et donques est ce // mouvement plus perfect; et tout ce appert en le .viii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>8</sup> Mais l'autre difference que il met devant entre<sup>9</sup> mouvement local et les autres est obscure et douteuse, car verité est que un element legier ou pesant comme terre ou eaue quant il est par violence hors de son lieu et l'empeschement est osté, telle terre ou eaue se meut par soy meïsme et descent. Et la forme substantiele de elle aveques sa pesanteur est cause efficiente<sup>10</sup> de ce mouvement. Et toute ceste eaue par raison de sa matiere<sup>11</sup> est subject de ce mouvement. Et selon ce est a entendre que tel element<sup>12</sup> a en soy principe de son mouvement local. Mais, par aventure, ausi bien pourroit l'en dire que tele chose a en soy principe de son alteracion et semblablement, car quant une eaue ou une pierre est par violence eschaufée et mise hors de sa fredeur naturele et empeschement est osté, elle retourne toute par soy a sa propre nature et a plus grant fredure que ne est celle de l'aer circunstant. Et ainsi l'en diroit que la forme substantiele de ceste chose, aveques sa froi- / dure essencele ou naturele ou le residu de elle, est cause efficiente de ceste alteracion; et ceste chose par raison de sa matiere en est subject. Et semblablement l'en diroit que .i. corps enferme retourne par soy meïsme a sa santé naturele quant l'empeschement est

<sup>2</sup> B omits 'l'autre en quantité.'

<sup>3</sup> ACDEF tel.

<sup>4</sup> A meïsme.

<sup>5</sup> F omits 'combien que aucune foys . . . l'autre en cressance.'

<sup>6</sup> A legiers.

<sup>7</sup> 167c.

<sup>8</sup> *Physicorum*, VIII, 7, 261a, 13-28.

<sup>9</sup> E autre.

<sup>10</sup> B suffisiente.

<sup>11</sup> BCDEF nature.

<sup>12</sup> BF mouvement.

osté, combien que, pour ce que il est dessemblable en ses parties, une altere l'autre, si comme le cuer les autres membres; mais peu(s)t estre que aucune altere et guerist soy meïsme. Et donques droit l'en que les corps ont ausi bien en eulz principe de alteration comme de mouvement local. Mais, par aventure, Aristote veult dire que il ne appert tant et que pour ce dist il: *nisi quod hec vident[ur]<sup>13</sup> habere, etc., hec<sup>14</sup> autem non.*<sup>15</sup> Après il declare comme telz corps sont meüz selon lieu.

188c Tiexte. Et donques quant de l'eaue est fait aer et de pesant legier, il est meü en haut et est ensemble et en un temps fait legier et meü en haut. Et quant il est fait du tout, il ne est plus fait ne plus meü, mais est en son lieu. Et par ce appert que ce qui estoit en puissance ou possi- // bilité de venir a aucun fait, vient a tel fait selon forme et substance et selon qualité et selon quantité. Et par ceste meïsme cause, quant le feu et l'eaue sont ja fais et il ne est chose qui les empeesche, il sont meüz a leurs lieux.

188d Glose. En la generacion d'un element d'autre, si comme quant aer est fait de eaue, est premierement alteration.<sup>16</sup> Et l'eaue eschaufee et rarefíee e[s]<sup>17</sup> faite plus legiere et en ce ne est rien fait ensemble soudainement, mais chascune de ces qualitez est faite partie après autre et est ceste transmutacion successive en .ii. manieres: une est selon les parties de la matiere ou du subject et selon extension; l'autre est selon les degrés ou intension de chascune tele qualité. Et ceste alteration est dispositive et preparative a la generacion de l'aer et de sa forme substanciele, laquelle generacion est successive seulement en la premiere maniere, ce est a savoir selon les parties du subject en quel la forme est introduite partie après autre, mes non pas selon les degrés de tele forme, car elle ne est pas ainsi divisible. Et donques / la chose qui fait et engendre aer de eaue eschaufe et rarefie et alegie la matiere et après introduist la forme partie après<sup>18</sup> autre comme dit est. Et quant la legiereté de la matiere<sup>19</sup> aveques la forme de le aer seürmonte la<sup>20</sup> pesanteur de elle et autre resistance, adonques ce corps est meü en haut tousjours plus et plus selon ce que plus y a de la forme de le aer et de legiereté. Et se empeeschement est par quoy la matiere soit detenue et ne puisse estre meüe en haut, nientmoins peu(s)t estre que le aer sera fait et après, quant l'empeeschement sera hors, il sera meü en haut par sa forme et par legiereté.

Tiexte. Et ausi en un corps vif quant le nourrissement est prest, il est meü au membre ou il doit aler se empeeschement n'i est. Et semblablement est meü et alteré un corps a santé.

Glose. Et donques, si comme je ay dit devant, un corps est alteré de soy meïsme ou par soy, ausi comme il descent ou monte par soy. Après il parle encore du principe motif.

189a Tiexte. Et ce qui meu(s)t tele chose legiere ou pesante, ce est [ce]<sup>21</sup> qui la fait ou commencement; et aucune fois // est ce qui oste l'empeeschement, ou la chose qui la fait retourner ou ressortir ou rebondir, si comme il fu dit es premieres paroles ou nous determinasmes que rien de telles choses ne meu(s)t soy meïsme.

Glose. Ce est [en]<sup>22</sup> le .viii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>23</sup> Et quant a propos, verité est que la chose pesante ou legiere se meu(s)t de elle meïsme, mais tout ne est pas mouvant et tout meü, car la matiere de l'element ne est pas cause motive ou mouvante, si comme il appert par ce [que]<sup>24</sup> je ay dit

<sup>13</sup> A vident.

<sup>14</sup> B etc. et hec.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Juntas* 251A.

<sup>16</sup> B omits 'est premierement alteration.'

<sup>17</sup> ACDEF et.

<sup>18</sup> DE introduist la partie formé apres.

<sup>19</sup> BCDEF omit 'de la matiere.'

<sup>20</sup> B aer sont monte la p.

<sup>21</sup> A omits 'ce.'

<sup>22</sup> A omits 'en.'

<sup>23</sup> *Physicorum*, VIII, 4, 225a, 1-255b, 13.

<sup>24</sup> A omits 'que.'

devant. Et nientmoins, tel mouvement ne peu(s)t estre sans autre vertu motive qui est cause du commencement de cest mouvement et est ce qui fait et engendre tel corps, et donques est il dit estre meü de puissance ou de possibilité essencial; ou ce est [ce]<sup>21</sup> qui oste l'empeschement, et donques est il dit estre meü de puissance ou de possibilité accidental. Mais de ce que Aristote parle de ce qui fait la chose ressortir, ce est en mouvement violent duquel fu dit ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre du secont.<sup>22</sup>

Tiexte. Or est donques dit pour quelle cause chascun corps pesant ou legier est meü et quoy ce est que estre meü a son lieu.

- 189b 5.—*Ou quint chapitre il determine / des differences<sup>1</sup> des choses pesantes et de[s]<sup>2</sup> legieres en tant comme teles.*

Or<sup>3</sup> disons donques maintenant les differences et les accidens des choses pesantes et des legieres. Et premierement soit determiné, si comme il semble a touz, que corps simplement pesant est celui qui repose ou est mis souz tous autres, et celui est simplement legier qui est sus tous autres.

Glose. Ce est la propre descripcion ou diffinicion de simplement pesant et de simplement legier et est donnee par repos; et l'autre que il mist ou premier chapitre<sup>4</sup> est donnee par mouvement le quel ne est pas si propre a telz corps comme est repos, car il ne sont meüz fors quant il sont faiz ou engendrez hors leur lieu ou quant il en sont hors par violence. Et est a savoir que le feu en son lieu ne repose pas du tout, mais il repose par privacion de mouvement droit. Item, de ce que Aristote dist que corps simplement legier est sus tous autres, ce est a entendre sus tous autres<sup>5</sup> qui sont mobiles ou mouvables de mouvement droit, car le ciel est sus le feu,—a prendre *sus* en une maniere.<sup>6</sup> Après il expose ceste descrip- //

189c cion.

Tiexte. Et je entent les corps estre simplement telz en resgardant a leur gerre ou a leur nature es quelz ne sont pas les .ii. qualitez, ce est a savoir pesanteur et legiereté. Et tel corps comme je entent est le feu duquel quelcunque partie, tant soit petite, est meüe tout en haut se elle ne a empeschement; et un autre tel est la terre de laquelle [chascune]<sup>7</sup> partie est semblablement meüe tout en bas. Et aussi de telz corps tou[t]<sup>8</sup> le plus grant est meü plus isnelement.

Glose. Ce est a entendre se<sup>9</sup> les autres choses sont pareilles et se telz corps sont hors de leurs lieux, etc. Après il met la diffinicion des corps qui sont telz et non pas simplement.<sup>10</sup>

Tiexte. Mais pesant et legier sont dis autrement des corps qui ont ces .ii. qualitez et qui sont meüz ou sont sus aucuns corps et sont souz autres, si comme sont le aer et l'eaue. Car nul de ces .ii. ne est simplement legier ou pesant, mais touz .ii. sont plus legiers que terre, car chascune partie de ces .ii. corps, tant soit petite, est ou t[en]t [a]<sup>11</sup> estre sus la terre; et ces .ii. corps sont plus pesans que le feu, car chascune partie de eulz, / tant soit petite,

189d

<sup>22</sup> 105c.

<sup>1</sup> E omits 'des differences.'

<sup>2</sup> A de; BCDEF omit 'de.'

<sup>3</sup> Guthrie, ch. iv.

<sup>4</sup> 181b.

<sup>5</sup> B omits 'ce est . . . autres.'

<sup>6</sup> CDEF le feu a pres sus; B omits 'a pren-

dre . . . maniere.'

<sup>7</sup> A omits 'chascune.'

<sup>8</sup> A touz.

<sup>9</sup> C est a en se; DE est air se.

<sup>10</sup> B omits 'et non pas simplement.'

<sup>11</sup> A tout. ABCDEF omit 'a.'

est ou tent a estre souz le feu. Et se ces .ii. corps sont comparéz un a l'autre, un est simplement plus pesant et l'autre est simplement plus legier, car tout aer, tant soit grant ou petit, est sus l'eaue ou tent a estre, et toute eaue souz<sup>12</sup> l'aer.

Glose.<sup>13</sup> L'en ne doit pas entendre que aer ou eaue aient en soy .ii. qualités motives, pesanteur et legiereté, absolument aussi comme, selon aucuns, .ii. contraires sont ou moien, si comme chaleur et fredeur en ce qui est tyede; mais l'aer a une seule qualité motive aussi simple<sup>14</sup> comme est celle du feu ou de la terre, laquelle est dite legiereté ou resgart et ou lieu de la terre et de l'eaue, et est dite pesanteur ou resgart et ou lieu du feu. Et semblablement est il de la qualité motive de l'eaue ou resgart d'autres corps. Après ce que il a dit que ces qualités sont es corps simples, il parle de leurs differences es corps mixtes.

190a

Tiexte. Et par ce peu(s)t apparoir comment les corps autres que les elemens ont pesanteur et legiereté, car la pesanteur et la legiereté des corps simples est cause de toute la difference de teles qualités es corps composts et mixtes, // car selon ce que il a plus ou moins<sup>15</sup> de elemens pesans et legiers es corps composts, selon ce sont telz corps les uns plus legiers, les autres plus pesans. Et pour ce l'en doit dire et determiner, quant a ces qualitéz, des elemens et des premiers corps, car les autres les ensuient. Et est ce que nous disions que il convient faire et deüssent faire ceulz qui mettent que plain est cause de pesanteur et vieu de legiere[té].<sup>16</sup>

190b

Glose. Ce fu en la quinte rayson du secont chapitre.<sup>17</sup> Et doit l'en savoir que quant a propos sont .ii. manieres de corps mixtes: car aucuns ne sont pas continuz du tout ou masseiz, mais ont en eulz pertuis ou pores es quelz sont autres corps qui ne sont pas parties de cez ici, si comme en fust ou en os sont petis pertuis ou est aer ou eaue ou autre chose; mais autres corps mixtes sont simplement partout continuz et masseiz, si comme par aventure or ou argent ou tele chose, et en telz corps les elemens ne sont pas en leur propre forme, si comme il fu dit en la fin du secont chapitre<sup>18</sup> et ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre du tiers.<sup>19</sup> Et aussi telz corps mixtes n'ont / pas ensemble pesanteur et legiereté, mais une seule qualité qui est en resgart un ou autre selon ce que tel corps a en soy des uns elemens plus et des autres moins selon vertu. Après il assigne la cause d'une experience.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, il avient que telz corps composts ou mixtes ne sont pas equalment pesans et legiers en tous lieux, car un quintal<sup>20</sup> de fust est plus pesant en l'aer que une livre<sup>21</sup> de plun, et en l'eaue le fust est plus legier et est pour la difference des premiers corps ou elemens. Et la cause est car tous les elemens ont pesanteur excepté le feu; et est chose neccessaire, car l'eaue a partout pesanteur fors en terre et le aer partout fors en eaue et en terre.

Glose. Et donques le grant fust a en soy .iii. elemens pesans,—aer et eaue et terre,—ausi bien comme a le petit plun et si les a en moult plus grant quantité; et ainsi il poise plus en le aer que ne fait le plun. Mais en l'eaue, le fust<sup>22</sup> et le plun ont .ii. elemens legiers, .s. le aer et le feu, et il

<sup>12</sup> B sus.<sup>13</sup> BDE omit 'Glose.'<sup>14</sup> B omits 'aussi simple.'<sup>15</sup> A moiens.<sup>16</sup> A legiere.<sup>17</sup> 133a.<sup>18</sup> 184d et seq.<sup>19</sup> 168c.<sup>20</sup> BCDEF omit 'quintal.'<sup>21</sup> E lune.<sup>22</sup> F feu.

190c sont ou grant fust a<sup>23</sup> trop plus grant quantité; et pour ce est il plus legier que le plun en l'eaue. Et // touzjours est a entendre que les elemens sont en telz corps selon vertu et non en propre forme. Après il monstre que le aer est pesant en son lieu.

Tiexte. Et tous les elemens ont pesanteur chascun en sa region, excepté le feu et meisme le aer; et ce appert par signe. Car un vaisel de cuir, comme est une vesie, trait ou poise plus quant il est enflé et plain de aer que quant il n'a rien dedens; et donques se un corps a plus en soy de aer que de eaue et de terre, il sera en l'eaue plus legier d'un autre et en le aer plus pesant. Et donques il ne sera pas soustenu en aer, mais il sera soustenu<sup>24</sup> en eaue et noera.

Glose. Et ce est la cause, selon Aristote, pourquoy le grant fust poise plus en le aer que le petit plun, et en l'eaue est au contraire, si comme je ay déclaré devant. Mais il me semble que le aer en sa region et en son<sup>25</sup> tout ne est pesant ne legier, et meismement aer en sa propre nature. Et que il ne soit pas pesant il appert, car il ne se efforce ou tent aucunement a descendre et ne foule en rien l'eaue ne la terre. Et nous qui en avons

190d tant sus nous deüsso[ns]<sup>26</sup> sentir sa / pesanteur. Item, il me semble que les auteurs qui ont tractié de la science des pois mettent que nul element en son lieu ne est legier ne pesant.<sup>27</sup> Item, par samblable l'en diroit que touz elemens en leur region ont legiereté fors la terre, aussi comme tous ont pesanteur fors le feu. Et a l'experience que met Aristote de la vessie enflée, premierement, si comme recite saint Thomas<sup>28</sup> d'Aquin, Simplicius et Themistius et aucuns autres tempterent ceste chose a grant diligence et fu trouvé que aucune tele chose plaine de aer pesoit equalment comme wide de aer, et aucune fois moins et aucune fois plus; et peut estre que plus souvent plus pour ce que le aer de cibas est mixtioné de vapeurs et plus froit que pur aer, ou pour ce que en emplant tel vaisel le aer estoit alteré et engroucié et refredi et appesanti, et aucune fois estoit alteré au contraire et alegi. Et donques la cause de ce que un grant fust poise en le aer plus que .i. petit plun et en l'eaue au contraire est ceste:

191a car l'un et l'autre en le aer a .ii. elemens // pesans, .s. eaue et terre, et le grant fust en a moult plus et se il [en]<sup>29</sup> a plus du feu qui est legier, ce est en mendre proporcion. Mais en l'eaue chascun a .ii. elemens legiers, .s. aer et feu, et le fust en a moult plus que le plun et se il a plus [de]<sup>30</sup> terre, ce est en mendre proporcion et pour ce il noe en eaue. Et je cuide que le aer qui est enclos es pores du fust et qui ne est pas de sa nature face plus a ce que le fust noe que ne fait son aer complexionel qui est en lui selon vertu, comme les elemens sont en corps mixte. Et ce appert

<sup>23</sup> B sont en feu a.

<sup>24</sup> F omits 'en aer, mais il sera soustenu.'

<sup>25</sup> A sont.

<sup>26</sup> A deus souz.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Pierre Duhem: 'La Scientia de Pontederibus', *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, I (Paris, 1906), p. 274, and Duhem's historical analysis of the problem, *ibid.* p. 16ff.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. note on Book IV, *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, Leonine ed., III (Rome, 1866), p. xii; *Themistii in Libros Aristotelis de Caelo*, ed. S. Landauer (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca V, Berlin, 1902), p. 233, l. 9 ff.; *Simplicii in Aristotelis de Caelo Commentaria*, ed. I. L. Heiberg (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, VII, Berlin, 1894), p. 710, l. 26 ff. Cf. also note to tract. 5, p. 309, in *Traité du Ciel d'Aristote* traduit en français par J. Barthélemy Saint-

Hilaire (Paris, 1866): 'Simplicius conteste l'exactitude de cette expérience, et il déclare que, l'ayant essayé plus d'une fois, il a constaté que l'outre gonflée d'air n'a pas plus de poids et qu'elle en aurait peut-être moins que quant elle est vide. Il a cependant quelque peine à contredire Aristote; et il suppose que le philosophe n'aura sans doute pas fait attention en gonflant l'outre, que l'haleine qui y soufflait l'air y introduisait aussi de l'humidité et un peu d'eau. Il paraît d'ailleurs que Simplicius ne faisait ici que répéter une objection de Ptolomée. Saint Thomas, en rapportant cette discussion, y fait figurer Themistius à la place de Ptolomée.'

<sup>29</sup> A omits 'en.'

<sup>30</sup> A omits 'de.'

par .ii. signes: un est car quant tel fust a longuement trempé en l'eau, tant que le aer qui estoit en ces pores est hors et que il sont plains de eau, lors le fust descent en l'eau; un autre signe est car aucun fust est de tele nature que il descent en eau, et en a de tel assés pres de Paris. Et la cause est car il a en soy pou ou nul de telz pores ou aer soit enclos pour ce que il est ferme et compact.

6.—*Ou sixte chapitre il monstre principalement que des corps simples il convient que aucun soit simplement legier et aucun simplement pesant.* /

191b Et que aucun corps est simplement legier et aucun simplement pesant il appert par ce que s'ensuit. Et je entent par simplement legier corps qui est touzjours meü en haut en quelcunque lieu que il soit ailleurs, et par simplement pesant celui qui est partout enclin a estre meü en bas se il ne est empeeschié; car telz sont ces corps et ne est pas si comme aucuns cuident, .s. que tous corps aient pesanteur. Mes pesanteur est en aucuns autres corps et sont touzjours meüz en bas<sup>1</sup> en aucuns lieux, et semblablement telz corps ont legiereté.

Glose. Ce sont les .ii. elemens moiens, comme souvent dit est. Après il prouve son propos par .ii. raysons principales.

191c Tiexte. Or voions nous, si comme il est dit devant, que toutes choses terrestres sont desouz toutes autres et sont meües au milieu. Et ce milieu est déterminé et en certain lieu. Et donques, se aucune chose est que est portee et meüe sus toutes autres,—si comme est le feu lequel est meü en haut en le aer meïsme qui repose,—il s'ensuit que ce feu est meü au plus haut, aussi comme la terre est meüe au // plus bas. Et donques est ce impossible que il ait aucune pesanteur, car se ainsi estoit, le feu seroit souz<sup>2</sup> aucun autre corps; et se ainsi estoit, cel autre corps seroit meü tout au plus haut par desus tous autres. Et l'en ne voit onques quelcunque tel corps. Et donques le feu ne a quelcunque pesanteur ne la terre quelcunque legiereté, car elle est souz<sup>3</sup> toutes autres choses et tele chose est meüe au milieu.

Glose. Legiereté est une qualité motive qui encline a estre meü en haut en aucun lieu; et il ne est lieu ou la terre soit a ce encline. Et donques elle n'est legiere en qulcunque lieu ne ou resgart de quelcunque autre corps, ne le feu pesant par semblable rayson.<sup>4</sup> Après il prouve une chose que il avoit supposee et par .ii. raysons.

191d Tiexte. Et que un milieu soit auquel sont meües les choses qui ont pesanteur et duquel se esloignent les legieres, il appert par pluseurs choses; premierement, car ce est impossible que mouvement droit procede sanz fin et soit infini, car tout tel mouvement est d'au- / cun terme et tent a aucun terme certain.

Glose. Ce fu prouvé plus a plain ou premier livre ou .xiii.<sup>[5]</sup> et ou .xviii.<sup>\*</sup> chapitre et en pluseurs lieux.

Tiexte. Item, quant pluseurs parties [de feu sont meües en haut et pluseurs parties]<sup>6</sup> de terre en bas, ces movemens sont fais selon lignes qui causent sus corps speriques semblables angles,

<sup>1</sup> F omits 'en bas.'

<sup>2</sup> DE sans.

<sup>3</sup> BCDF sus. Cf. *Juntas* 259A: cum descendat sub omnibus corporibus.

<sup>4</sup> B omits 'ne le feu . . . rayson.'

<sup>5</sup> A xiii; E xviii; B omits. 22d, 29a et seq.

<sup>6</sup> A omits 'de feu . . . parties.'

et donques convient il que ces lignes, se il estoient pourtraictes, eüssent concurrence ou milieu et ou centre.

Glose.<sup>7</sup> Ceste rayson fu mise ou .xxix.\* et ou .xxx.\*<sup>8</sup> chapitres du secont et declaree en figure.

Tiexte. Et donques par neccessité, tout corps qui a pesanteur est meü au milieu, mais se ce est au milieu<sup>9</sup> de la terre ou au milieu de tout le monde, ce est un autre propos.

192a Glose. Ceste question fu determinee ou .xxx.\* chapitre du secont<sup>10</sup> et appert assés la response par ce que fu dit ou tiers chapitre de ce quart,<sup>11</sup> car se toute la terre estoit maintenant la ou est la lune et une partie de terre fust ici faite de nouvel, ceste terre ne seroit pas meüe vers le ciel mais vers le // centre<sup>12</sup> du monde. Après ce que il a prouvé que le lieu de bas est certain et déterminé, il prouve ausi du lieu de haut.

Tiexte. Et pour ce que tout corps qui est souz touz autres est meü au milieu et au centre, il convient par neccessité que le corps qui est sus touz soit meü a certaine circunference laquelle est extremité de la region ou tel[z]<sup>13</sup> corps font leur mouvement; car le milieu et tele extremité sont lieus<sup>14</sup> contraires et ne peuvent plus estre distans, et aussi le corps qui est souz touz est contraire a celui qui est sus touz.

192b Glose. De ce fu dit ou .xviii.\* chapitre du premier.<sup>15</sup> Or appert donques, selon Aristote, que aussi comme rien ne peu(s)t estre plus bas que le centre du monde, semblablement ce est impossible que rien soit plus haut que la circunference de la region des elemens, laquelle est superficie convexe<sup>16</sup> de l'espere du feu qui est conjointe a la superficie concave de tout le ciel. Et par ce s'ensuit que a prendre *haut* et *bas* ou *desuz* et *desouz* selon ce que il resgardent monter et descendre, le ciel ne est haut ne bas, ne ou ciel ne sont ces differen- / ces. Et se ou ciel ou hors le ciel estoit une porcion de feu ou de terre, elle ne avroit quelcunque inclination a descendre ne a monter ne, par consequent, pesanteur ne legiereté. Et de ce fu dit plus a plain en la fin du .xxiii.\* chapitre [du premier].<sup>17</sup> Après il met la seconde rayson a sa principal conclusion.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, a parler raysonnablement, .ii. choses sont: une simplement pesante et l'autre simplement legiere. Et la cause est car .ii. lieus souverainement distans et contraires sont, ce est a savoir le milieu et la extremité ou circunference.

Glose. Après il monstre que aucuns corps sont qui ne sont pas simplement pesans ne simplement legiers.

Tiexte. Mais entre ces .ii. choses est moien le quel est legier ou resgart de l'une et pesant ou resgart de l'autre, car entre les .ii. lieus desus dis, dont un est le centre et l'autre la circunference, [est moien qui est circunference]<sup>18</sup> ou resgart de l'un et milieu<sup>19</sup> ou resgart de l'autre. Et pour ce, en ce lieu moien sont .ii. corps, un pesant, l'autre legier et sont eaue et aer.

192c Glose. Car ce est impossible que tel lieu moien soit vieu. Et doit l'en // savoir que se un vaisel plain de eaue estoit en l'espere du feu pres du ciel et en cel[le]<sup>20</sup> eaue fust aer, cest aer monteroit siques au ciel et naturellement. Et semblablement, eaue descendroit siques au centre du

<sup>7</sup> DE omit 'Glose.'

<sup>8</sup> AB xxx. 149c et seq. Cf. Figure 36.

<sup>9</sup> E omits 'mais se ce est au milieu.'

<sup>10</sup> 151a et seq.

<sup>11</sup> 186a et seq.

<sup>12</sup> A pas ciel centre.

<sup>13</sup> AD tel.

<sup>14</sup> E leurs.

<sup>15</sup> 29b.

<sup>16</sup> A convexe.

<sup>17</sup> 35c et seq. A omits 'du premier.'

<sup>18</sup> A omits 'est moien . . . circunference.'

<sup>19</sup> BCDEF moyen.

<sup>20</sup> ABCF cel.

monde, se elle estoit en aer<sup>21</sup> qui fust la desouz. Et pour tout miex entendre, je repete un cas que je mis ou quart chapitre du premier,<sup>22</sup> et pose par ymaginacion que un tuel ou canel de cuivre ou d'autre matiere soit si long que il ataigne du centre du monde siques au ciel; et met ou pose premierement que il soit plain de aer fors que emprés le ciel soit un petit de eaue. Je di que ceste eaue descendroit siques au centre. Item, je met que ce tuel fust plain de eaue fors que pres du centre fust un petit de aer. Je di que cest aer monteroit siques au ciel. Item, je met que il fust plain de feu qui est pur element fors que pres du ciel fust un petit de aer. Je di que cest aer descendroit siques au centre par le semidyametre de l'espere des elemens. Et la cause est pour ce que l'ordenance naturele des elemens est tele que eaue descent en aer et aer / en feu et monte en eaue et partout. Et combien que, par aventure, l'en pourroit dire que telz mouvemens en ce cas ne sont pas du tout naturelz, si comme je dis ou quart chapitre du premier,<sup>23</sup> toutevoies il me semble que l'en doit miex dire que chascun de ces mouvemens est du tout et en tout naturel et d'une maniere et n'i pourroit pas bien assigner proprement difference. Je di donques que ce est possible que aer soit meü naturellement du centre siques au ciel et au contraire, du ciel siques au centre.<sup>24</sup> Et peu(s)t l'en dire [que]<sup>25</sup> ces .ii. mouvemens ne sont pas proprement contraires, car il ne sont pas faiz par un moien, car un est par eaue et l'autre par feu; et ausi par ces .ii. mouvemens le aer tent a une meisme fin, ce est a estre en son ordre naturel selon ce que il est possible. Et donques chascun de ces .ii. mouvemens li est naturel. Et ce que Aristote di(s)t ou tiers chapitre du premier<sup>26</sup> que d'un corps simple est .i. seul mouvement simple, ce est a entendre en un meisme moien. Item, pour ce se l'aer descent naturellement // en tel cas siques au centre du monde, il ne s'ensuit pas que il soit simplement pesant, car il ne seroit pas ainsi meü par tout autre element moien. Et semblablement, se en autre cas il monte tout en haut siques au ciel, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que il soit simplement legier, car il ne monteroit pas ainsi parmi tout autre element moien et n'est pas en ce cas sus tous autres elemens. Après Aristote monstre une habitude ou resgart que les elemens ont ensemble.

Tiexte. Et nous disons que l'element qui contient est si comme espece ou forme, et celui qui est contenu est aussi comme matiere. Et ceste difference est en touz gerres et en qualité et en quantité que un est comme forme et l'autre comme matiere, et semblablement en contrariété qui est selon lieu, car le lieu qui est haut est comme forme et le lieu de bas ou le corps qui est bas est comme matiere.

Glose. La forme substantial est plus parfaite que la matie[re]<sup>27</sup> et est perfection, et la conserve et contient et termine aucunement. Et pour ce que l'element qui contient l'autre est desus et plus / perfect et conserve ce que il contient, il est aussi comme forme ou resgart de l'autre qui est contenu; et ce fu dit ou tiers chapitre.<sup>28</sup> Et en toutes transmutacions un terme est plus perfect que l'autre, et en contraires, si comme blanc que noir, chaut que froit, grant que petit, feu que aer et aer que eaue, haut que bas et ainsi des autres. Et le perfect est dit forme ou resgart de l'autre. Et selon ce appert ou secont livre<sup>29</sup> de *Generacion*<sup>30</sup> que quant feu

<sup>21</sup> BCF omit 'aer'; DE lieu.

<sup>22</sup> 10ab.

<sup>23</sup> 10ab.

<sup>24</sup> BCDEF omit 'Je di . . . au centre.'

<sup>25</sup> A de.

<sup>26</sup> 8a.

<sup>27</sup> A matie.

<sup>28</sup> 186a et seq.

<sup>29</sup> D Et secont apert ou livre; E Et le second apert ou livre.

<sup>30</sup> De *Generacione*, II, 4, 331b, 12-27.



est fait de aer, l'en di(s)t que ce est generacion et quant est au contraire, l'en di(s)t que ce est corrupcion combien que ce soit generacion de aer. Et aussi disons nous quant charoingne est engendree de beste ou de homme que ce est corrupcion. Après il declare encore ce que il a dit.

193c

Tiexte. Et pour ce un meïsme corps, si comme est eaue, peu(s)t estre corrompu en plus pesant et en plus legier aussi comme un corps peu(s)t estre transmué a maladie et a santé, et a possibilité a chascune de ces qualités par diverses raysons. Et ce que est simplement legier est partout meü en haut et ce que est de matiere simplement pesante tousjours et // partout est meü en bas. Et les autres qui ont ces qualités non pas simplement mes en resgart, si comme le aer et l'eaue, l'eaue est souz touz elemens fors souz la terre, et le aer sus tous fors sus le feu.

7.—Ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il conclut le nombre des elemens.

Et<sup>1</sup> comme ainsi soit que un element est le quel est sus touz et un autre le quel est s[o]us<sup>2</sup> tous, il s'ensuit par neccessité que .ii. autres elemens soient qui sont souz un des .ii.<sup>3</sup> desus dis et sont sus l'autre.

Glose. Ceste consequence n'est pas ici prouuee, mais elle appert assés ou secont livre de *Generacion*<sup>4</sup> la ou Aristote conclut le nombre des elemens par la combinacion de[s]<sup>5</sup> .iiii. premieres qualités actives et passives, car un element est chaut et sec, et est le feu; l'autre chaut et moiste, [et est l'aer;<sup>6</sup> l'autre fret et moiste,]<sup>7</sup> et est l'eaue; l'autre froit et sec, et est la terre. Et pour ce que l'element qui est sus l'autre sanz moien est son lieu et le contient et conserve et comme forme du contenu, si comme il fu dit ou chapitre precedent,<sup>8</sup> ces .ii. elemens ont convenienc en une qualité, si comme le feu et le aer en chaleur et ainsi des autres. /

193d

Mais afin que generacion soit faite entre eulz les uns des autres, telz elemens prochains ont contrariété en une qualité, si comme le feu a l'aer en ce que il est sec, et le aer est moiste et ainsi des autres; et pour ce di(s)t il après.

Tiexte. Et pour ce convient il que les matieres des elemens soient en tel nombre et que il soient .iiii., mais elles sont .iiii. tellement que il ont une matiere commune, car autrement ne seroient il pas faiz les uns des autres.

Glose. Ce [est ce]<sup>9</sup> que l'en appelle premiere matiere qui est commune et une meïsme souz<sup>10</sup> la forme d'un element et après souz la forme de l'autre. Et les .iiii. elemens peuent estre dis .iiii. matieres des corps mixtes.

Tiexte. Et entre choses contraires est moien ou un ou plusieurs, si comme il est es couleurs.

Glose. Car entre blanc et noir qui sont couleurs contraires sont plusieurs couleurs moiennes. Et aussi, a propos, entre le lieu ou est le feu<sup>11</sup> et le lieu ou est la terre est lieu moien qui ne peu(s)t estre vieu. Et donques convient il que il y ait un corps ou .ii. au moins et ce ne peu(s)t estre //

194a

un seul, car il convient que le feu, qui est chaut et sec, ait un corps

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. v.

<sup>2</sup> AB sus.

<sup>3</sup> DE sont un de .ii.

<sup>4</sup> De *Generacione*, II, 3, 330a, 30-332a, 28.

<sup>5</sup> ACF de.

<sup>6</sup> F omits l'autre chaut et moiste. et est

l'aer.

<sup>7</sup> A omits 'et est l'aer; l'autre fret et moiste.'

<sup>8</sup> 193a.

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'est ce.'

<sup>10</sup> DE sus.

<sup>11</sup> DE omit 'est le feu.'

simple contraire par nature; et ce est l'eau qui est froide et moiste. Et par semblable, il convient que la terre ait un corps contraire, et ce est le aer. Et donques le aer et l'eau sont moiens<sup>12</sup> selon lieu entre le feu et la terre. Mais Plato<sup>13</sup> prouve ceste conclusion par ce que entre .ii. nombres cubiques par neccessité sont .ii. autres nombres moiens selon une porcion et ne peuent estre plus ne moins; si comme en .viii.<sup>14</sup> et .xxvii.<sup>15</sup> qui sont premiers cubiques sont .xii. et .xviii. moiens<sup>16</sup> selon porcion sequialtere continuele. Et pour ce, selon Plato, entre le feu et la terre sont .ii. elemens. Après Aristote retourne a monstrier que le aer et l'eau ont pesanteur et legiereté.

194b Tiexte. Et des elemens qui ont pesanteur et legiereté, chascun a pesanteur en sa region et la terre l'a en toutes, et les autres moiens ne ont legiere[té]<sup>17</sup> fors la ou il sont meüs en haut. Et que le aer et l'eau aient pesanteur en leur region il appert, car pour ce / [que]<sup>18</sup> quant l'en detrait ou soustrait les corps qui sont sous eulz, il descendent en bas, ce est a savoir le aer en la region de l'eau et l'eau en la region de la terre. Mais qui diviserait ou osterait du feu qui est desus le aer, cel aer ne monterait pas en haut en la region du feu fors par violence, ausi comme l'eau est traite par violence en la region de l'aer quant aucune chose est conjointe a la superficie de l'eau et aucun la trait en haut plus isnelement que l'eau ne descendrait en bas.

Glose. Aussi comme quant une aes de fust est tiree de l'eau bien isnelement, l'eau la suit<sup>19</sup> afin que rien ne demeure vieu; et ausi comme l'en attrait le aer par .i. calemel qui touche l'eau et donques l'eau monte par violence par ce chalemel.

Tiexte. Mais la terre n'est pas ainsi, car la superficie ne se peu(s)t pas ainsi conjoindre a un autre corps. Et pour ce, en un vaisel qui est chauffé, l'eau est attrait en haut et la terre non.

194c Glose.<sup>20</sup> Si comme quant un pot boillt et il est couvert, l'eau est eslevee par fumee contre le couvercle, et les choses terrestres qui sont en ce // pot n'i sont pas eslevees.

Tiexte.<sup>21</sup> Et ausi comme la terre n'est onques meüe en haut fors par violence, non est le feu en bas<sup>22</sup> fors par violence qui soustrairait l'aer qui est souz lui, car le feu ne a quelcun pesanteur ne en sa region ne ailleurs, ausi comme la terre ne a quelcun legiereté. Mais les .ii. elemens moiens sont meüs en bas quant l'en soustrait ce que [est]<sup>23</sup> souz eulz, car la terre est simplement pesante et souz tous autres. Et chascun des elemens moiens est aucunement pesant et<sup>24</sup> en resgart et en sa region pour la similitude de la matiere des corps sus quoy il est.

Glose. Car en le aer qui est pres de l'eau et de la terre sont vapeurs, et a similitude a l'eau et est plus gros et moins subtil et plus froit et, pour ce, plus pesant ou moins legier que selon la nature de aer qui est pur element.

194d Mais il semble que Aristote veuille dire generalment ou quint chapitre et en cestui que tout aer est pesant en sa region et ce veult prouver sa rayon, et a ce il met ou quint chapitre<sup>25</sup> une experience a la- / quelle fu

<sup>12</sup> F moistes.

<sup>13</sup> Timaeus, 43B.

<sup>14</sup> A .viii.<sup>o</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> B .xviii.

<sup>16</sup> DE omit 'moiens.'

<sup>17</sup> A legiere.

<sup>18</sup> A omits 'que.'

<sup>19</sup> BCDEF omit 'l'eau la suit.'

<sup>20</sup> E omits 'Glose.'

<sup>21</sup> E omits 'Tiexte.'

<sup>22</sup> BCDF haut.

<sup>23</sup> A omits 'est.'

<sup>24</sup> A repeats 'et.'

<sup>25</sup> 190c et seq.

- faite response. Et pour declarer ce que je entent de ceste chose, je<sup>26</sup> suppose que toute la masse des .iiii. elemens et des corps<sup>27</sup> qui sont en eulz est une espere solide de laquelle [le]<sup>28</sup> semidyametre procede de .a., le centre du monde, siques a .b., la superface concave du ciel. Et donques aucun pourroit ymaginer que ceste masse ou espere est divisee en .iiii. parties selon .iii.<sup>29</sup> pouns signés en ce dyametre par distance equale ou inequale de inequalité quelle que elle soit. Et soient ces .iii. // pouns .c. et .d. et .e., et que selon ce sont .iiii. regions determinees chascune pour un element selon leur ordre;<sup>30</sup> et semble que ce fu l'opinion d'Aristote. Mais je cuide que elle n'est pas vraie, premierement car l'en ne pourroit certainement assigner ou signer lieux ou fussent ces .iii. pouns determineement. Et pour exemple, je pren le point .d. qui est entre le aer et eaue: car posé que il soit en un lieu déterminé, donques s'ensuit il que se le aer descent plus bas, ce sera hors son lieu et hors sa region; et donques ce sera par violence, aussi comme l'eaue monte oultre .d. par violence. Et par consequent, le aer ne a pas plus pesanteur en sa region que l'eaue a legiereté en la siene, et toutevoies Aristote dist le contraire. Item, il s'ensuiroit que la partie de terre qui est decouverte d'eaue en la maniere que fu dit ou .xxxi.<sup>31</sup> chapitre du secont fust en la region de l'eaue ou que l'eaue ne fust pas en sa propre region; et donques seroit ce chose desnaturele et violence et, par consequent, ce ne pourroit durer tant /
- 195b longuement. Item, je met que un vaisel comme une cuve fust plaine de eaue fors que ou fonz fust un pou de aer; il est certain se ceste cuve estoit cent toises en parfont desouz le point .d., que cest aer monteroit en haut et naturellement. Mais posons que ceste cuve fust tout en haut emprés le point .e., cest aer monteroit tellement ne plus ne moins comme le faisoit quant il estoit souz .d., et ainsi par toute l'espace ou distance moienne, car touzjours monte aer quant il est en eaue, osté empeeschement. Et ne pourroit l'en dire que ce fust violence, et donques est le aer legier en sa region; et se region a, et il est, il ne deüst pas monter a la region du feu. Item, se ceste cuve estoit tout haut<sup>32</sup> sus le point .e. en la region du feu et cest aer fust en mi l'eaue, se il a region, il devroit descendre parmi l'eaue et venir vers sa region; et ce semble chose desraisonnable. Item, mettons que ceste cuve fust pres [du]<sup>33</sup> centre du monde et que elle fust plaine de aer fors que en mi fust une goutte
- 195c d'eaue, nul ne diroit que // ceste goutte d'eaue montast en haut parmi cest aer, et toutevoies si devroit faire pour venir a sa region, se region<sup>34</sup> a. Item, selon ce que je dis ou sixte chapitre,<sup>35</sup> se un tuel ou canel ataignoit du centre siques au ciel et il fust plain d'eaue fors que .i. pou de aer fust pres du centre, cest aer monteroit siques au ciel de mouvement naturel, car l'en ne pourroit signer lieu ou il commensast estre violent fors en adiv[i]nant<sup>36</sup> et sans rayson. Et semblablement, se cest tuel estoit plain de aer fors que emprés le ciel fust une goutte d'eaue, ceste goutte descendroit naturellement siques au centre parmi cest aer.<sup>37</sup> Et se ceste eaue<sup>38</sup> ou cel aer avoient region determinee, il s'i devroient arrester sanz passer oultre ou se il passaient oultre, ce seroit violence, et l'en ne pourroit signer ou elle commenceroit, si comme dit est. Item, selon

<sup>26</sup> A chose et je.

<sup>27</sup> Figure 8, p. 195.

<sup>28</sup> A omits 'le.'

<sup>29</sup> BCDEF .iiii. pouns.

<sup>30</sup> CD element se leur ordre; E element si leur ordre.

<sup>31</sup> ABC xxxi. 155b et seq.

<sup>32</sup> B hors.

<sup>33</sup> A pres le centre.

<sup>34</sup> E omits 'se region.'

<sup>35</sup> 192c.

<sup>36</sup> A adivnant.

<sup>37</sup> B siques au cest aer.

<sup>38</sup> E cuve.

- 195d Aristote en *Metheores*,<sup>39</sup> aucunes montaignes sont tant hautes que elles passent la moienne region de l'aer, si comme est une appelee Caucasus<sup>40</sup> et une autre Parnasus es quelles sont estances; et se une cisterne / plaine de eaue estoit tout sus, ceste eaue y reposeroit aussi naturellement comme en une qui seroit en basse terre, et qui soustrairait la terre desouz, aussi descendroit l'eaue de l'une comme de l'autre.<sup>41</sup> Et donques par ces raisons, je conclu premierement et di que les elemens n'ont pas regions ainsi determinees et distinctees<sup>42</sup> comme il est dit devant, mais toute la distance de entre le centre<sup>43</sup> du monde et le ciel est indeterminée et indifferente quant a ce, fors tant que le plus pesant est ou tent a estre sous le moins<sup>44</sup> pesant et souz<sup>45</sup> le plus legier, c'est a savoir ou centre ou plus pres du centre selon ce que il est possible; et semblablement du legier ou plus legier ou resgart du ciel, car tele est leur ordenance naturele et a celle fin tendent leurs mouvemens naturelz. Et pour ce, se une goute ou porcion de eaue estoit ou centre et autre chose plus pesante ne fust par desus elle et qui la comprenist ou pesast sus elle,<sup>46</sup>
- 196a ceste eaue reposeroit illeques naturellement, car a ce lieu pourroit elle estre meïe / naturellement selon le cas devant mis en la penultime rayson. Et semblablement par celle meïsme raison pourroit une porcion de aer reposer emprés le ciel en un tuel qui seroit plain de eaue desouz cest aer, car a ceste eaue et a cest aer ce est le ordre naturel et sont les lieux naturelz qui en telz cas leur sont possibles. Mais quant .i. element est mis hors de son lieu et de son ordre naturel trait par violence, et l'autre l'ensuit pour rēemplier le lieu que il ne soit vieu, tel mouvement est violent. Après je di que les elemens moiens, .s. aer et eaue, ne ont en leurs lieux naturelz pesanteur ne legiereté. Et ce dient Ptholomee et les autres aucteurs qui ont tractié des poies<sup>47</sup> des choses, et le prouvent par ce que se un homme est bien en parfont en eaue, il ne la sent en rien peser sus soy aussi comme non fait celui qui est pres de la superficie de l'eaue. Et semblablement le aer ne poise rien sus nous et nient plus
- 196b ne le sent peser sus soy celui qui est bien bas que / fait celui<sup>48</sup> qui est sus une tres haute montaigne et qui a moins de aer sus soy. Et a l'experience que Aristote met au contraire, il fu respondu ou quint chapitre,<sup>49</sup> si comme je ay dit devant.

8.—En le .viii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il reprove aucuns opinions anciens et par .iiii. raisons.

Et par ce que s'ensuit il appert que il convient par neccessité que les differences des qualités ou vertus motives des elemens soient equales en nombre aus elemens.<sup>1</sup>

Glose. Il veult dire que aussi comme .iiii. elemens sont, aussi sont .iiii. vertus qui les moeuent differentes en espece, car combien que la legiereté du feu et celle de le aer soient d'un meïsme gerre prochain, toutevoies elles ne sont pas d'une meïsme espece tres especial, mais ont plus grant difference que selon plus et selon moins, et semblablement de la pesanteur de la terre et de celle de l'eaue. Mais les anciens que il a reprouvéz et veult encore reprouver ne mettoient que .ii. vertus ou .ii. choses estre

<sup>39</sup> *Meteorologicorum*, I, 13, 349b, 35-350a, 30.

<sup>40</sup> DE cantasus.

<sup>41</sup> B descenderoit l'une contre l'autre.

<sup>42</sup> B distantes.

<sup>43</sup> DE d'oultre le centre.

<sup>44</sup> A moiens.

<sup>45</sup> B sus.

<sup>46</sup> BCDEF omit 'et qui . . . sus elle.'

<sup>47</sup> Cf. 190d, note 27.

<sup>48</sup> F omits 'qui est bien bas que fait celui.'

<sup>49</sup> 190c.

<sup>1</sup> B omits 'aus elemens.'

- 196c causes de pesanteur et de legierté et des mou- // vemens en haut et en bas, si comme il appert par ce que s'ensuit.

Tiexte. Car se tous les elemens estoient d'une meisme matiere en laquelle fust mixcion de vieu et de plain ou de athomes grans et petis ou de triangles, il convendroît que touz les elemens fussent meüz en bas et que d'eulz ne fust autre mouvement ou que rien ne fust simplement legier, mais que touz declinassent en bas, et plus les uns que les autres selon ce que il seroient de plus grans athomes ou triangles ou de pluseurs teles choses ou que en eulz avroit plus de plain.

Glose.<sup>2</sup> Car selon leurs opinions, toutes les choses de quoy les elemens sont sont pesantes, si comme sont triangles ou athomes ou plain, car se vieu est en telz corps, si n'est il pas legier, si comme il fu prouvé ou secont chapitre.<sup>3</sup>

Tiexte. Et nous voions et est monsté devant que aussi comme aucune chose est touzjours et partout meüe en bas, semblablement est aucune chose qui est touzjours et partout meüe en haut. Item, se ainsi est que vieu ou aucune<sup>4</sup> tele chose est qui soit cause de mouvement / en haut, donques ne sera pas touzjours mouvement en bas, mais convendra il que aucun des elemens<sup>5</sup> moiens soit meü plus isnelement en bas que n'est la terre, car en un grant aer sont plus de triangles ou de solides et de plain ou de petiz athomes que en une petite terre. Et toutevoies, l'en ne voit onques que quelcunque partie de aer soit meüe en bas. Et semblablement diroit l'en de la chose legiere se en elle estoit plus de la matiere qui fait monter en haut.

196d

Glose. Briefment, ces opinions et ceste rayson et autres furent mises plus a plain ou secont chapitre<sup>6</sup> et pour ce je me passe de ce plus declarer.

Tiexte. Item, se ces ici mettent que .ii. elemens moiens sont, il ne pourroient salver selon leur opinion ce que nous voions estre fait de le aer et de l'eaue. Car se aucun di(s)t que les elemens sont de vieu et de plain et que feu est vieu<sup>7</sup> et pour ce il est meü en haut, et que terre est plaine et pour ce elle est meüe en bas, et le aer a en soy plus de feu que de terre et l'eaue a plus de terre // que de feu, et donques s'ensuit il que une grant eaue avra en soy plus de feu que ne a un petit aer et que .i. grant aer avra en soy plus de terre que ne a une petite eaue, et ainsi il convendroît que cest aer fust meü en bas plus isnelement que la petite eaue; et l'en ne voit onques tele chose.

197a

Glose. Et se aucun disoit que il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que cest grant aer aussi comme il a plus de terre que la petite eaue, aussi a il a l'avenant et selon proporcion plus de feu et de legiereté et par ce il ne sera pas meü en bas, je respon et di que ce ne vault, car il s'ensuiroit que de tous corps composéz de plain et de vieu le grant et le petit qui sont d'une espece fussent meüz d'une isneleté, et ce est faulz. Et tout ce appert par une quinte rayson mise ou secont chapitre.<sup>8</sup>

Tiexte. Item, il convient donques par neccessité que aussi comme le feu est meü en haut pour ce que il est tel si comme vieu selon leur opinion, et la terre en bas pour ce que elle est plaine, aussi convient il que le aer soit meü a son lieu et sus l'eaue pour / ce que il est tel, ce est a savoir par sa propre qualité ou vertu

197b

<sup>2</sup> DE omit 'Glose.'

<sup>3</sup> 182d et seq.

<sup>4</sup> F omits 'ainsi est que vieu ou aucune.'

<sup>5</sup> B mouvemens.

<sup>6</sup> 181d et seq.

<sup>7</sup> DE omit 'et de plain . . . vieu.'

<sup>8</sup> 184a.

motive,<sup>9</sup> et l'eau aussi en bas sous le aer<sup>10</sup> pour ce que elle est  
tele et non pas pour ce que le aer et l'eau participent en une  
difference plus ou moins ou en .ii.

Glose. En une, si comme en triangles ou en athomes ou en vieu ou en  
plain, ou en vieu et plain qui sont .ii.<sup>11</sup>

Tiexte. Car se ainsi estoit, il s'ensuiroit de l'un et de l'autre que  
le grant excedast le petit tellement que une grant eau<sup>12</sup> fust  
plus tost meüe en haut que un petit aer, et un grant aer en bas  
plus tost que une petite eau, si comme moult de fois est dit.

Glose. Ceste raison quartie n'est fors conclusion et repeticion des raisons  
devant mises ou secont chapitre<sup>13</sup> et en cestuy. Et donques chacun  
element a sa vertu motive differente des autres et qui lui est propre et  
par quoy il est meü et repose en son ordre, et pour ce la legiereté du  
feu et celle de l'aer different en espee et aussi la pesanteur de la terre  
et celle de l'eau, si comme devant est dit.

197c 9.—Ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il monstre comment les figures des corps pesans et  
des legiers // font<sup>1</sup> a leurs mouvemens et comment non.

Les<sup>2</sup> figures des corps pesans et celles des legiers ne sont pas  
cause de telz corps estre meüz simplement ou en bas ou en haut,  
mais elles sont bien cause d'estre meüz plus isnelement ou plus  
tardivement. Et n'est pas fort de veoir les causes pourquoy ce est.

Glose. Après pour ce declarer il propose .ii. doubtes.

Tiexte. Mais maintenant l'en fait doubte pourquoy une grant  
piece de fer ou de plum qui est de figure laee noe en l'eau.

Glose. Si comme un bacin ou une poile.

Tiexte.<sup>3</sup> Et une autre chose moins pesante qui sera ronde ou  
besloingne, aussi comme une acuille, descendra en l'eau. Item,  
pourquoy aucunes choses terrestres pour leur petite quantité, si  
comme poudre, et aucunes autres pour la tenuité ou tenüece de  
leur figure, si comme feuilles d'or, se tiennent en l'aer sanz estre  
meües en bas.

Glose. Après il met une response qui n'est pas vraie.

197d

Tiexte. Et cuider ou dire que de toutes ces choses la cause soit  
telle comme / mettoit Democritus, ce n'est pas a droit dit, car  
il disoit que les exalacions ou vapeurs chaudes qui sont esleveez  
de l'eau en haut rencontrent ces choses pesantes et laees et  
le[s]<sup>4</sup> reboutent en haut et empeeschent que elles ne peuvent  
descendre, mais les pesantes et de figure estroite cheent et  
descendent en l'eau pour ce que elles encontre pou de teles  
chaudes exalacions.

Glose. Après il oste ceste response.

Tiexte. Mes il convendroit que tele chose fust faite plus en le  
aer que en l'eau.

Glose. Pour ce que il y a plus de teles chaudes exalacions.

Tiexte. Et ceste instance<sup>5</sup> faisoit Democritus contre soy, mais  
il y soult et respont fieblement, car il disoit que teles exalacions

<sup>9</sup> DE omit 'ou vertu motive.'

<sup>10</sup> BCDEF omit 'sous le aer.'

<sup>11</sup> BCDEF omit 'Glose. En une . . . qui sont  
.ii.'

<sup>12</sup> BCDEF omit 'eau.'

<sup>13</sup> 181d et seq.

<sup>1</sup> BCDE sont.

<sup>2</sup> Guthrie, ch. vi.

<sup>3</sup> E Glose.

<sup>4</sup> A le.

<sup>5</sup> E resistance.

et vapeurs, quant elles viennent et sont en l'aer, elles se espartissent et pour ce elles ne ont pas force de soustenir les choses pesantes et laees.

- 198a Glose. Il ne reprouve plus ceste response, car elle a trop pou d'apparence et est assés reprouvee par les causes // que il met après. Et premierement il met .ii. distinctions.

Tiexte. Et des corps continuz les uns sont divisibles de legier et les autres le sont moins de legier.<sup>9</sup> Et celui qui est de legier divisible, ce est celui qui est bien terminable, ce est a dire de terme d'autre<sup>7</sup> corps qui le contient et l'un plus ou miex et l'autre moins, si comme le aer est divisible plus de legier que n'est l'eau et se termine plus de legier ou configure au corps ou au vaisseau que il touche. Et l'eau est plus [de legier]<sup>8</sup> divisible que la terre et se configure plus legierement aus corps durs qui sont pres de elle que ne fait la terre. Et ainsi en chascun gerre ou maniere de corps, un est plus de legier divisible et peu(s)t plus legierement estre distrait et l'autre moins. Item, des corps qui peuvent diviser est il en ceste maniere, car les uns peuvent diviser plus legierement et les autres moins.

- 198b Glose. Selon la quantité de leur pesanteur et selon la qualité de leur figure.<sup>9</sup> Après il explique sa response.

Tiexte. Et pour ce que il est ainsi, / l'en doit cuider que ce sont les causes de ce dont estoit doubte. Et donques les corps qui ont grant latitude selon leur figure demeurent en haut ou ne peuvent pas si isnelement descendre pour ce que il comprennent souz eulz mout du corps moien par lequel il seroient ou sont meüz, lequel il ne peuvent pas de legier diviser et ne peut de legier estre detrait desouz telz corps. Et il est au contraire de ceulz qui sont autrement figuréz de figure estreote ou acue pour ce que il comprennent pou du moien ou du corps qui est desouz eulz, et pour ce sont il meüz en bas et peuvent tel corps legierement diviser. Et ce peuvent il mout plus en aer que en eau, de tant comme l'aer est plus legierement divisible que n'est l'eau.

Glose. Et par ce appert que la figure du corps pesant fait au mouvement aussi comme par accident,<sup>10</sup> car par ce le corps est disposé ou miex ou pis a ce que il soit meü de la vertu motive laquelle est pesanteur en mouvement naturel. Et selon ce il di(s)t après.

- 198c Tiexte. Et pour ce que pesanteur a ou est une vertu selon laquelle le corps pesant est meü en bas et les corps moiens sont continuz et resistent que il ne soient distrais ne diviséz, l'en doit ces .ii. choses comparer une a l'autre. Car se la vertu de la pesanteur excède la vertu qui est ou moien par laquelle il resiste que il ne soit distrait et divisé, le corps pesant passera par cest moien, et tant plus le excèdera et il sera meü plus isnelement; et se la pesanteur est plus fieble que ceste resistance, il demourera desus aussi comme se il noüst.

Glose. L'en doit prendre la pesanteur qui est comme une livre ou .ii. ou si comme il plaist, et aveques ce l'en doit prendre toute la habilité et disposition que elle a pour la figure du corps pesant ou autrement; et d'autre partie, l'en doit prendre toute la resistance du corps moien par lequel seroit le mouvement. Et se ces .ii. choses sont equales ou se la resistance est plus forte, le mouvement ne se fera pas. Mais se la vertu

<sup>9</sup> B omits 'et les autres . . . legier.'

<sup>7</sup> DE dire determine d'autre.

<sup>8</sup> AB omit 'de legier.'

<sup>9</sup> DE omit 'et selon . . . figure.'

<sup>10</sup> BCDEF corps pesant au mouvement comme par accident.

198d motive est plus grande, le corps sera meü, et selon ce que ce sera en plus grant porcion, l'isneleté sera plus grant. Et par ce appert response aus .ii. doubtes desus mises.<sup>11</sup> / Après il recapitule.

Tiexte. Et en ceste maniere soit determiné de pesant et de legier et des accidens qui sont vers teles choses.

[Glose].<sup>12</sup> Ce que dit est en ce chapitre ne soufist pas pour response a la doubte desus mise et a ce declarer, pour grace d'exemple, soit prins un vaisel plat et lae comme un bacin le quel a un bort<sup>13</sup> en maniere de circonference et un funz<sup>14</sup> ront qui est comme un cercle plat. Et soit mis ce bacin en eaue. Je di donques que le fonz de ce bacin tout seul comprennent autant d'eaue souz soy comme fait tout le bacin, et tout le bacin poise plus que ne fait le fonz tout seul; et donques par la response devant mise, se elle estoit soufissante, tout le bacin devroit plus descendre en l'eaue et non pas noer que le fonz tout seul, car la vertu motive ou pesanteur du bacin est plus grande que du fonz tout seul, et la resistance de l'eaue est equale, car autant en comprennent<sup>15</sup> souz soy l'un comme l'autre. Et toutesvoies nous voions sensiblement que le bacin noera et le fonz tout seul descendroit, // et pour ce il convient en ce cas et en samblables assigner et mettre autre resistance que celle par quoy l'eaue resiste a ce que elle ne soit divisee ne distraite. Et me semble que ce est l'aer qui est ou bacin qui resiste a descendre en l'eaue. Et toutevoies ce n'est pas pour ce que l'aer ait region determinee de laquelle il refuse et resiste a issir, car se ce bacin estoit en eaue sus la plus haute montaigne du monde, il noeroit en l'eaue semblablement comme il fait ici bas et resisteroit l'aer a descendre; et toutevoies il seroit en sa region se il a region determinee, mais non a, si comme il fu déclaré ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre.<sup>16</sup> Et donques ce est seulement pour ce que il resiste a descendre en l'eaue, comme dit est. Item, pour ce plus declarer, l'en doit savoir que, selon les aucteurs qui ont tractié des poies des choses pesantes,<sup>17</sup> une chose se elle noe en eaue aussi comme ce bacin, elle occupe lieu en l'eaue et en ce lieu pourroit estre ou estoit outant pesant de eaue comme la chose poise; si comme se ce bacin [poise .x. livres, l'eaue qui estoit ou pourroit estre en la fosse que il fait en celle eaue poise]<sup>18</sup> .x. livres, et semblablement d'une nef ou de quelcunque vaisel. Et ce est la cause / pourquoy le vaisel plus chargé y entre plus avant et fait plus grant fosse, et pourquoy aucune fois il y entre tout et pourquoy il entre moins en eaue de tant comme elle est plus pesante, si comme en la mer que en eaue douce, etc. Item, quant un vaisel, aussi comme ce bacin, noe ainsi en eaue, il ne porroit plus aval descendre se le aer qui est contenu en ce bacin ne descent aussi, car autrement le lieu demoureroit vieu se autre corps n'i estoit; et ce est impossible naturellement que lieu soit vieu. Et pour ce, quant le bacin est descendu tant que il a widié de l'eaue souz soy autant pesant comme il poise ou pres, lors le aer que il contient resiste que il ne descende plus aval. Mais le fonz tout seul ne contient point de aer en soy, et pour ce l'eaue est tantost desus et ce fonz descent aval. Et se tout le bacin estoit en l'eaue sanz aer, il descendroit plus isnelement que le fonz tout seul, et nientmoins il peu(s)t noer desus et

199a

199b

<sup>11</sup> BCDEF omit 'et par ce . . . mises.'

<sup>12</sup> ABCDEF omit 'Glose.'

<sup>13</sup> B bout.

<sup>14</sup> DE fin.

<sup>15</sup> BE equale et comprennent; CDF equale en comprennent.

<sup>16</sup> 194a.

<sup>17</sup> An abbreviated statement of the Archimedian principle first formulated in the fifth proposition of the first book of Archimedes'

*De corporibus fluitantibus*: cf. *Archimedes Omnia Opera*, ed. I. L. Heiberg, II (Lipsiae, 1913), p. 329. The work or works to which Oresme had reference are doubtless those mentioned by Duhem in his chapter "La Scientia de Ponderibus et Léonard de Vinci" in *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, I (Paris, 1906), pp. 257-316.

<sup>18</sup> A omits 'poise .x. livres . . . en celle eaue poise.'



- le fonz seul non. Or avons donques que en ce cas et en touz semblables  
 199c autre resistance est plus grande que ne est celle par quoy l'eaue resiste  
 a estre // distraicte et divisee. Et en telz cas ceste est tres petite,<sup>19</sup> et  
 pour ce n'en font compte les aucteurs qui mettent que la chose qui noe  
 fait ceder souz elle autant pesant de eaue comme elle poise. Et nientmoins,  
 quant la liquer est forment continue et tenante ensemble, la chose qui  
 noe en elle n'[e]n<sup>20</sup> fait pas ceder souz soy tant pesant comme elle poise,  
 mais en eaue il s'en fault tres pou. Item, il me semble, sauf meilleur  
 opinion. que un vaisel qui noe en l'eaue en la maniere souvent dite repose  
 illeques naturellement, les choses estantes teles, car il ne peu(s)t plus aval  
 descendre ne plus monter sans force et sans violence, si comme il appert  
 par experience. Item, chose violente quelcunq ne peu(s)t naturellement<sup>21</sup>  
 durer longuement et se ce vaisel estoit de matiere perpetuele et l'eaue  
 perpetuelle, il y reposeroit perpetuellement. Et se plus legiere ou moins  
 pesante chose est souz tel vaisel, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que il ne  
 199d repose naturellement, car se ou centre du monde avoit un pou de aer  
 en un petit treu, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que / toute la terre reposast  
 violement, si comme il fu déclaré ou .xxiii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre du premier.<sup>22</sup>  
 Et donques en ce cas, a ce que tel vaisel repose naturellement, il soufist  
 que les choses pesantes soient ordenees sus le[s]<sup>23</sup> moins pesantes, etc.  
 selon ce que il est possible, tout considéré. Item, aussi comme aer resiste  
 a descendre ou lieu de eaue ou en eaue, semblablement feu qui seroit  
 pur element resiste a descendre en aer et par ce s'ensuit que se un  
 vaisel de matiere pesante estoit lasus en haut entre l'espere du feu et  
 celle de le aer, le feu resisteroit que il ne descendist en la maniere que  
 le aer<sup>24</sup> resiste que tel vaisel ne descende en l'eaue, si comme il est dit  
 devant. Et donques, entre le feu et le aer, sus le aer pourroit noer un  
 vaisel pesant et illeques reposer naturellement tellement comme une naif  
 repose en la mer ou en Seine. Et ce fu déclaré plus a plain en le .xi.<sup>e</sup>  
 chapitre du secont livre<sup>25</sup> et illeques fu respondu aus argüemens qui  
 pourroient estre au contraire.

- 10.—Après sont .iii. chapitres du translateur et sont comment les choses  
 200a dehors ce monde sont // en lieu et comment elles sont meües, et est le  
 premier chapitre des choses incorporeles et [est]<sup>1</sup> le .x.<sup>e</sup> chapitre.

- Après ce que dit est des lieux et des mouvemens localz des principalz  
 corps ou elemens de ce monde et de leur ordre, nombre et figure et de  
 plusieurs autres propriétés et accidens de telz corps, il est bon de  
 recapituler et dire aucune chose des choses qui sont ou peuent estre  
 hors ce monde. Je di donques que de teles choses les unes sont in-  
 corporelles, les autres sont ou peuent estre corporelles. Et les incorporeles  
 sont de .iii. manieres: les unes sont les angelz ou intelligences; les autres  
 sont les ames separees et une autre est Dieu en Trinité. Et premierement,  
 des angelz il fu dit ou secont chapitre du secont<sup>2</sup> comment et en quelle  
 maniere il sont en lieu et en quelz lieux il sont; item, comment un angel  
 peu(s)t estre ensemble sus le ciel et en terre et en cent mille lieux distanz  
 200b en terre et en plus de cent mille lieux distanz, et sans ce que il / tienne  
 plus de lieu que devant ou plus d'espace que est l'espace d'un pié ou

<sup>19</sup> A petitece.

<sup>20</sup> A non.

<sup>21</sup> B omits 'naturelment.'

<sup>22</sup> 36c.

<sup>23</sup> A le.

<sup>24</sup> BCDEF omit 'le aer.'

<sup>25</sup> 102c et seq.

<sup>1</sup> A omits 'est.'

<sup>2</sup> 68a.

- moins mille foiz; item, comment les angelz sont ou peuent estre meüz selon lieu et en quantes et quelles manieres; item, que par ce que concedent ou octrient Aristote et Averroïz et par vraie astrologie, l'en peu(s)t conclurre contre Aristote et contre Averroïz que il convient par neccessité que les angelz que il appellent intelligences sont meües. Et tout ce est déclaré ou secont chapitre du secont.<sup>3</sup> Secondement, des ames separees je di que, quant a estre en lieu et quant a estre meües, il est de elles ne plus ne moins aussi comme il est dit des angelz. Et par ce s'ensuit que l'ame de la glorieuse vierge Marie ou une autre sainte ame peu(s)t estre ensemble sus le ciel et en terre et en cent mille lieux distanz et plus sans estre en plus grant lieu que l'espace qui seroit simplement equale a l'espace que occupe une petite pomme. Tiercement, de Dieu je di que Il est partout et seroit simplement impossible que Il se absentast d'aucun lieu quelcunque qui soit ou qui puisse estre. // Item, par ce s'ensuit que Il est du tout immobile. Et la maniere comme Il est partout fu mise ou secont chapitre du secont.<sup>4</sup> Item, nonobstant ce que Il est partout, si est Il simplement indivisible et aveques [ce]<sup>5</sup> infini selon .iii.<sup>6</sup> propriétés lesquelles sont divisibles es creatures, et les povons appeller duracion et posicion et puissance ou perfection; car des creatures leur duracion temporele est divisible selon succession, leur posicion meïsmement des corporeles est divisible selon extension, et leur puissance est aucunement divisible selon degrés ou intension. Mais de Dieu la duracion est eternité indivisible et sanz succession de laquelle fu dit ou .xxiii.<sup>7</sup> chapitre du premier;<sup>8</sup> sa posicion, ce est immensité indivisible et sanz extension de laquelle fu dit ou secont chapitre du secont;<sup>9</sup> et sa toute puissance ou perfection est plus que infinie et indivisible sanz intension.<sup>10</sup> Et de ces choses fu dit et a ce mises concordances ou premier chapitre du secont.<sup>11</sup> Item, encore di je que Dieu est simplement et souverainement / indivisible nonobstant la trinité des personnes divines de laquelle fu dit ou premier chapitre du premier<sup>12</sup> en faisant mencion comment trinité est en pluseurs autres choses. Et sans celles trinités qui la furent mises encore est une autre trinité qui fait a ce propos, car selon ce que fu dit ou .xii.<sup>13</sup> chapitre du tiers,<sup>14</sup> .iii. figures plaines regulieres sont, c'est a savoir trigone et quarré et exagone, dont chascune peu(s)t rëmplir espace superficiele ou superficie. Et est simplement neccessaire a ymaginacion que il en soit tant et impossible que il en soit plus; et semblablement sont et par neccessité .iii. personnes divines dont chascune rëemplit tout. Et de ce disoit le prophete Ysaïe: *sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus, etc.*,<sup>15</sup> *plena est omnis terra gloria tua*. Et est un Dieu qui di(s)t par son prophete Jeremie: *celum et terram ego impleo*<sup>16</sup> et duquel disoit Virgile: *Jovis omnia plena*.<sup>17</sup> Or avons donques comment les choses incorporeles qui sont ou peuent estre hors ce monde sont en lieu et quelles ne // peuent estre meües et quelles le peuent et comment.

# 11.—Le .xi.<sup>e</sup> chapitre est quant a ce des choses corporeles.

Se nous prenons ce monde en la maniere que le prent Aristote pour le

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. et seq.

<sup>4</sup> 68b.

<sup>5</sup> ABC omit 'ce.'

<sup>6</sup> B .iiii.

<sup>7</sup> 38b et seq.

<sup>8</sup> 68c.

<sup>9</sup> BCDEF extension.

<sup>10</sup> 65c et seq.

<sup>11</sup> 4c et seq.

<sup>12</sup> 176b.

<sup>13</sup> B et. Cf. Isai. vi. 3: Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus exercituum, plena est omnis terra gloria eius.

<sup>14</sup> Jer. xxiii, 24.

<sup>15</sup> Bucolica, III, 60.

- desrenier ciel meü circulairement appelé *firmament* et pour les corps qui sont dedens, encore hors ce monde est aucun corps non-vif, car selon la sainte Escripiture ou livre de *Genesi*<sup>1</sup> eaues sont sus le firmament, et de Dieu dist David le prophete: *qui extendit celum sicut pellem; qui tegis aquis superiora eius*;<sup>2</sup> et en *Daniel* est escript: *benedicite aque omnes, que super celos sunt, Domino*.<sup>4</sup> Et ceste eae n'a pas inclinacion a descendre, si comme il appert par ce que fu dit ou .xxiiii.<sup>10</sup> chapitre du premier<sup>5</sup> et ou sixte chapitre du quart.<sup>6</sup> Et posé que elle fust pesante, nientmoins elle reposeroit illeques naturellement, si comme il fu dit ou .xxiiii.<sup>6</sup> chapitre du premier<sup>7</sup> meïsmement, car selon les docteurs, elle est aussi comme glacie et engelee, et pour ce il le appellent le ciel glacial ou cristallin. Item, sus touz les cielz sont ou peuent estre / pluseurs corps vifz, si comme le corps de Jhesucrist duquel dist le Prophete: *qui ascendit super celum celi*,<sup>8</sup> et que l'en doit entendre par *celum celi* il fu dit ou premier chapitre du secont,<sup>9</sup> et ou preface de la messe dit l'en de Jhesucrist: *qui ascendens super omnes celos*.<sup>10</sup> Et illeques en sa compaignie<sup>11</sup> seront les corps de ceulz qui seront salvéz après la resurrection final. Et pour ce Il leur disoit en l'Evangile: *vado parare vobis locum*,<sup>12</sup> et iterum: *ubi ego sum, illic et minister meus erit*.<sup>13</sup> Or di je donques que ces corps ici, pour ce que il ne sont pas ou seront en la concavité du ciel, il ne seront en cel lieu pesans ne legiers, si comme il appert par ce que fu dit ou sixte chapitre du quart,<sup>14</sup> mais l'en peu(s)t ymager .iii. manieres comment il y peuent estre: une est que l'espace ou il seront soit maintenant simplement wide, et quant il y seront que il n'i ait autre corps qui les contienne, mais est un lieu ymaginé vieu et infini,—ce est le immensité de Dieu et Dieu<sup>15</sup> meïsmes, si comme il fu déclaré en la fin du .xxiiii.<sup>6</sup> chapitre du premier.<sup>16</sup> Et peu(s)t estre que ce entendoit Job quant il dist de Dieu: // *qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum*.<sup>17</sup> Une autre maniere est que telz corps fussent en un corps supercelestial ou ciel aussi comme nous sommes maintenant en le aer, et que ce ciel cedast aus corps glorifiéz sourvenans aussi comme le aer nous cede, fors que ce seroit sanz quelcunque alteracion, excepté, par aventure, rarefacion et con-  
201b  
201c  
201d

<sup>1</sup> *Gen. i, 7*: Et fecit Deus firmamentum. Divisitque aquas, quae erant sub firmamento, ab his quae erant super firmamentum.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Psalms* ciii, 2-3: Extendens coelum sicut pellem; qui tegis aquis superiora eius.

<sup>3</sup> B omits 'omnes.'

<sup>4</sup> *Dan.* iii, 60.

<sup>5</sup> 36c. A .xxiiii.

<sup>6</sup> 191c.

<sup>7</sup> 38b.

<sup>8</sup> *Psalms* lxxvii, 34.

<sup>9</sup> 66a.

<sup>10</sup> Preface of the Mass for the feast of Ascension.

<sup>11</sup> BCDEF omits 'en sa compaignie.'

<sup>12</sup> *Joan* xiv, 2. E vobis parare.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Joan.* xii, 26: et ubi sum ego, illic et minister meus erit. E omits 'illic.'

<sup>14</sup> 192a et seq.

<sup>15</sup> BCDEF omits 'et Dieu.'

<sup>16</sup> 38b. BCDEF .xxiiii.

<sup>17</sup> *Job* xxxvi, 7.

<sup>18</sup> A omits 'ne.'

<sup>19</sup> DE donnez.

descendre ne autre resistance dedens eulz comme dit est; et pour ce il seront meüz seulement par volenté.<sup>20</sup> Item, quant est de resistance qui seroit dehors eulz, se il sont meüz par vieu selon la premiere maniere maintenant touchiee ou se plusieurs corps seront ensemble selon la tierce maniere, telz corps glorieux ne ont dehors qui resiste a leur mouvement; mais se il sont meüz parmi un corps ou un ciel qui leur cede selon la seconde maniere, tel corps est plus rare et plus subtil que le aer de tant comme il est plus haut et encore plus et est aussi comme esperituel; et pour ce se il fait resistance, elle est si tres petite et tele que elle ne empeesche en rien que tielx corps ne soient meüz de si grant isneleté comme il veulent, et peuent estre quant il leur plaist sus ce monde la ou il leur plaist, ou endroit des poles ou de l'equinocial ou d'orient ou d'occident, etc.

12.—Le .xii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre est en especial du corps de Jhesucrist. //

- 202a L'en pourroit dire, par aventure, que le benoit corps de Jhesucrist est en haut sus en<sup>1</sup> la maniere que seront les autres corps glorifiéz, si comme il est dit ou chapitre precedent, fors tant que Il est doué<sup>2</sup> et a en Soy les dons glorieux tres excellement et merueilleusement outre mesure, plus que quelcunque autre corps. Et pour ce que Il est tant bel, tout aussi comme les angelz se delectent en voier Dieu duquel saint Pierre dist en sa *Canonique*: *in quem desiderant angeli prospicere*,<sup>3</sup> semblablement les corps beneürés se delecteront en resgarder corporelment<sup>4</sup> nostre humanité en leur createur et redempteur qui est tant glorieuse. Mais pour ce que<sup>5</sup> plusieurs ne tiennent pas le conseil du Sage qui dist de Dieu: *in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus; non est enim tibi necessarium, ea que abscondita sunt, videre*,<sup>6</sup> aucun tel trop curieux pourroit demander en quelle maniere pourra chascun beneüré veoir corporelment ceste humanité
- 202b devant soy face a face, car il seront tres grant / multitude: *vidi turbam magnam, quam dinum[er]are<sup>7</sup> nemo poterat*.<sup>8</sup> Et donques convendra il que les uns soient devant ceste humanité, les autres a senestre ou desouz, comment ne en quelle disposicion peuent il estre, etc. Et pour respondre a ce, je pensé pieça a une consideracion que<sup>9</sup> je veul exprimer: et premierement d'une impression commune que nous appellons l'arquenciel qui est de .iii. couleurs. Je suppose que toutes ces couleurs et chascune de elle[s]<sup>10</sup> est par toute la nue ou appert cest arc et qui est a ce disposee; et nientmoins, ces couleurs ne apparent pas a un homme par toute la nue, mais en certaine figure et posicion<sup>11</sup> qui est tele que la ligne droite qui vient du centre du corps du soleil et passe par le ouyl, selon ymaginacion ceste ligne s'en va tout droit au centre<sup>12</sup> de cest arc ou de la circumference circulaire dont il est porcion. Et par ceste s'ensuit que .ii. hommes ne plusieurs, se il ne estoient en celle ligne, ne peuent veoir cest arc en .i. meïsme lieu ne proprement un arc, et toutesvoies un [le]<sup>13</sup> voit aussi
- 202c comme l'autre et de- // vant sa face se il lui plaist. Et tout ce je suppose

<sup>20</sup> BE violence.

<sup>1</sup> A sus les en.

<sup>2</sup> BDE donne.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Pet. i, 12.

<sup>4</sup> F proprement.

<sup>5</sup> BCDEF omit 'pour ce que.'

<sup>6</sup> Eccle. iii, 22, 23. DE pluribus eius operibus non.

<sup>7</sup> A dinumare.

<sup>8</sup> Apoc. vii, 9. B quam nemo dinumerare; F nemo non poterat.

<sup>9</sup> A repeats 'que.'

<sup>10</sup> AB elle; DF eulz; E eux.

<sup>11</sup> E porcion.

<sup>12</sup> BCDEF omit 'du corps du soleil . . . droit au centre.'

<sup>13</sup> A omits 'le.'

sans plus declarer comme verité pure et neccessaire et demonstree en *Metheores*<sup>14</sup> et en un petit tractié qui se commence: *Inter omnes impressiones, etc.*,<sup>15</sup> et a ce s'acorde ou concorde toute experience que l'en peu(s)t avoir de ceste chose. Et tel pourroit faire la doubte desus dite qui ne savroit ceci entendre. Et pour ce, je lui demande pourquoy Dieu qui est tout puissant ne peu(s)t faire sus les cielz chose presque semblable, ce est a savoir ou ciel supercelestial ou seront les corps salvéz selon la seconde ou tierce maniere mises ou chapitre precedent,<sup>16</sup> et que par tout ce ciel et en chascune partie soit tout le corps de Jhesucrist et chascun de ses membres en la maniere que les couleurs desus ditez et l'arc aussi sont par toute une nue, fors que ce corps soit partout un meisme selon nombre.<sup>17</sup> Et ainsi Il se monstrera et chascun corps saint ou que il soit le verra devant soy face a face en sa propre figure, aussi comme dit est de l'arc corruptible que nous voions ici bas. Et en ceste maniere ou sens

202d que les docteurs / appellent anagogique seroit lors acompli ce que nostre Seigneur promist a l'umain lignage quant Il dist: *Arcum meum ponam in nubibus celi, et erit signum federis inter me et terram, etc.*<sup>18</sup> "Je mettray," dist Il, "mon arc es nues du ciel," c'est a savoir la ou seront les corps salvéz desquelz dist Ysaïe: *qui sunt isti, qui ut nubes volant.*<sup>19</sup> Et ainsi sera Jhesucrist entre ses sains: *quasi arcus refulgens inter nebulas glorie. Ecclesiasticus libro.*<sup>20</sup> Et est et ser[a],<sup>21</sup> comme dit est, le signe d'aliance<sup>22</sup> entre Dieu le Pere et creature humaine, si comme Il dist par son prophete Ysaïe: *dedi te in fedus populi;*<sup>23a</sup> et est mediateur de Dieu et des hommes selon ce que dist l'Apostre.<sup>23b</sup> Item, en autre lieu en la sainte Escripiture le Sage excite cuer humain a desirer la veüe de cest arc glorieux en disant ainsi: *vide arcum, et benedic qui fecit illum: valde speciosus est in splendore suo;*<sup>24</sup> Il est tres bel et tres resplendissant, car Il est si comme dist David: *Speciosus forma pre filiis hominum.*<sup>25</sup> Et après

203a sanz moien dist le Sage: *Giravit celum in circuitu- // tu glorie sue;*<sup>26</sup> Il environne le ciel ou circuite de sa gloire. Et par ce sembleroit que le Sage a la lettre entende de cest arc supercelestial, car celui n'est pas si glorieux que nous voions ici bas en aer tenebreux et plain de obscurté: *in caliginoso loco tenebrarum harum.*<sup>28</sup> Et en signe de ce, l'en pourroit exposer et entendre de [son]<sup>29</sup> secont avenement du jugement final ce que dist saint Jehan en son Apocalipse: *Vidi alterum angelum fortem*<sup>30</sup> *descendentem de celo amictum nube, et yris in capite eius, et facies eius sicut sol.*<sup>32</sup> Item, en cest aer nubileux ici bas appert aucune fois un secont arc contenant le premier le quel est principal, et aussi comme dit est du premier, toutes les couleurs de ce secont et chascune de elles sont par toute la nue ou ces .ii. arcs apparent et ne peuent naturellement apparoir

<sup>14</sup> *Meteorologicorum*, III, 1, 371b, 19-5, 377a, 28.

<sup>15</sup> Apparently this work of Oresme has been lost. Cf. E. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXXI, Heft 3) Münster, 1934, p. 16.

<sup>16</sup> 201c.

<sup>17</sup> DE partout selon un meisme nombre.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Gen.* ix. 13: *Arcum meum ponam in nubibus, et erit signum foederis inter me et inter terram.*

<sup>19</sup> *Isai.* lx. 8.

<sup>20</sup> *Eccle.* i. 8. E libro ecclesiasticus libro.

<sup>21</sup> A seroit.

<sup>22</sup> DE Et est sera comme est signe.

<sup>23a</sup> *Isai.* xlii. 6.

<sup>23b</sup> Cf. I *Tim.* ii. 5: *Unus enim Deus, unus*

et mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Jesus.

<sup>24</sup> B eum.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Eccle.* xliii. 12: *Vide arcum, et benedic eum qui fecit illum: valde speciosus est in splendore suo.*

<sup>26</sup> *Psal.* xlv. 3.

<sup>27</sup> B girant.

<sup>28</sup> *Eccle.* xliiii. 13.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. I *Pet.* i. 19: *quasi lucernae lucenti in caliginoso loco, donec dies elucescat.*

<sup>30</sup> A omits 'son.'

<sup>31</sup> B omits 'fortem.'

<sup>32</sup> CDEF faciem.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Apoc.* x. 1: *Et vidi alium angelum fortem descendentem de coelo amictum nube, et iris in capite eius, et facies eius erat ut sol.*

203b pluseurs. Et donques, par aventure, pourroit aucun dire que le corps de la glorieuse vierge Marie qui contint<sup>33</sup> en soy celui de Jhesucrist est aussi comme le secont arc et que ces .ii. corps glorieux, qui sont si prochains par nature, / sont ou seront par tout le ciel la ou seront les corps beneüréz et le reëmpliront pareillement quant a ce, et seront veüs par tout ce ciel en leur propre figure en la maniere que dit est des .ii. arcs corruptibles que nous voions cibas. Et ainsi nous avriens de ceste chose .ii. concordances en .ii. similitudes: une naturele des .ii. arcs desus diz qui sont par toute la nue, et l'autre mathematique en ce que seulement sont .ii. corps reguliers dont chascun reëmplist lieu ou espace corporele, et ne peuvent estre pluseurs: un est pyramide ou tetracedron, l'autre est cube ou exacedron, si comme il fu dit et déclaré ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du tiers.<sup>34</sup> Et tout ce je di et met sans affermer a grant humilité et cremeur de cuer, salve tousjours la majesté de la foy catholique, et pour reprimer la curiosité ou presompcion d'aucuns qui, par aventure, la voudroient calumpnier ou impugner ou trop avant enquerir a leur confusion, car si comme dist le Sage: *qui perscrutat[or]<sup>35</sup> est maiestatis opprimetur a gloria.*<sup>36</sup> //

203c Et ainsi a l'aide de Dieu, je [ay]<sup>37</sup> acompli le livre *Du Ciel et du monde* au commandement de tres excellent prince Charles, quint de ce nom, par la grace de Dieu roy de France, lequel en ce faisant m'a fait évesque de Lisieux. Et pour animer, exciter et esmouvoir les cuers des jeunes hommes qui ont subtilz et nobles engins et desir de science, afin que il estudient a dire encontre et a moy reprendre pour amour et affection de verité, je ose dire et me faiz fort que il n'est homme mortel qui onques veüst plus bel ne meilleur livre de philosophie naturele que est cestui, ne en ebreu, ne en grec ou arabe<sup>38</sup> ne en latin, ne en François.

Ecce librum celi. Karolo pro rege peregi.

Regi celesti gloria, laus et honor.

Nam naturalis liber unquam philosophie

Pulcrior aut potior nullus in orbe fuit. /

203d

En ces .iiii.<sup>1</sup> livres sont choses bien notables desquelles pluseurs peuvent estre trouvees par l'intitulacion des chapitres et par la table qui s'ensuit ici, laquelle ne pourroit bonnement estre ordenee selon l'ordre des lettres de l'a b c.<sup>2</sup>

#### OU PREMIER LIVRE.<sup>3</sup>

De la trinité divine ou premier chapitre et ou .x.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du quart. [6a, 200d]

De mixtion de mouvemens et comment de pluseurs mouvemens drois peu(s)t estre fait mouvement circulaire, et de pluseurs circulaires mouvement droit, ou tiers chapitre.[8a]

Comment aer peu(s)t monter et eaue descendre naturellement du centre siques au ciel et du ciel siques au centre, ou quart chapitre; et de ce plus a plain ou sixte chapitre du quart.[10a, 192c]

D'une mutacion merveilleuse qui apparut jadis en l'estoille journal ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.<sup>4</sup>[14b]

<sup>33</sup> BDEF contient.

<sup>34</sup> 175d et seq.

<sup>35</sup> A per scrutatie.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Prov.* xxv, 27: sic qui scrutator est maiestatis, opprimetur a gloria.

<sup>37</sup> A omits 'ay.'

<sup>38</sup> B omits 'ou arabe.'

<sup>1</sup> CDEF omit 'iiii.'

<sup>2</sup> B omits this entire paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> To make this summary of practical use as an index to the work, the editors have supplied folio references.

<sup>4</sup> DE .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.

- 204a Comment ce est possible<sup>5</sup> naturellement que le soleil et les estoilles leveront // de la partie ou il couchent maintenant et coucheront de la partie ou il lievent, en le .viii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre; et de ce par autre maniere ou .xxxi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du secont.[16d, 154c]  
 Que Dieu et nature ne font rien pour nient, en le .viii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[16b]  
 Comment l'en peu(s)t ymager un corps pesant infini de toutes pars qui ne pesera que une livre, et toutevoies chascune partie de ce corps pesera, en le .xi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre vers la fin.[20c]  
 Contre Aristote qui met ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre et ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> de *Phisique* que de tant comme la puissance motive est plus grande, de tant proporcionelment elle meu(s)t plus ysnelement; mais ce est faulz, si comme je [ay]<sup>6</sup> demonstré ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[21a]  
 Contre Aristote qui met que se un corps est infini, il convient que il soit infini de toutes pars; et comment il est possible ymager un corps [in]fini<sup>7</sup> equal a celui qui n'est que d'un pié en tous sens ou mendre. Et ce corps est infini en lonc et en lae de tous costés. Et un autre / corps sera simplement infini qui n'est infini fors seulement en lonc, ou .xiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[23a]  
 Un fort argüement contre ce que Aristote di(s)t que se un autre monde estoit, la terre de celui seroit meüe au centre de cestui et la response a ce, ou .xvi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[27b]  
 Comment lieu est dit en .ii. manieres, ou .xvii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[28b]  
 Quelz mouvemens sont plus isnelz en la fin que ou commencement et quelz [non],<sup>8</sup> et comment et pour quelle cause, ou .xix.<sup>o</sup> chapitre. Et de ce plus a plain ou .xiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du secont.[30c, 106b]  
 Ave[r]roïz<sup>10</sup> met que en une espece inmateriele<sup>11</sup> ne peu(s)t estre que un seul supost;—raisons contre ce par les dis de lui meïsme et de Aristote, ou .xx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[31a]  
 Quelles choses sont hors le ciel, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre; et de ce plus a plain es .iii. chapitres qui sont après la fin du quart livre.[35c, 200a]  
 Comment eternité est toute ensemble et en un moment, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre; et de ce ou premier et ou secont chapitre du secont.[34d, 65a, 68a]  
 204c Responses aus resons<sup>12</sup> // que fait Aristote a prouver que il ne peu(s)t estre fors un seul monde, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[35c]  
 En quantes et en quelles manieres peuvent estre pluseurs mondes, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre. [35c]  
 Se une porcion de terre ou d'autre element ou un corps mixte estoit ou ciel ou hors le ciel, il ne seroit pesant ne legier et n'avroit inclinacion au centre de ce monde ne au contraire, et est contre Aristote, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre; et de ce ou sixte chapitre du quart.[36c, 192b]  
 Il ne convient pas que la terre repose violementement pour ce se plus legiere chose est ou centre du monde, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[37a]  
 Comment sus le ciel peu(s)t estre eaue pesante, ou .xxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.<sup>13</sup> [36d]  
 Comment les vertus actives et passives sont determineez ou resgart des choses en quoy elles peuvent, ou .xxix.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[43a]  
 Comment naturellement aucune lumire peu(s)t avoir commencement sanz ja avoir fin, contre Aristote ou .xxix.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[44b]

<sup>5</sup> DE impossible.

<sup>6</sup> A omits 'ay.'

<sup>7</sup> A fini.

<sup>8</sup> B .xvi. c.

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'non.'

<sup>10</sup> AC Avenroiz.

<sup>11</sup> B materiele.

<sup>12</sup> DE omits 'aus resons.'

<sup>13</sup> AB .xxiiii. c.

- 204d Comment ce est possi- / ble<sup>14</sup> que aucun mouvement ait commencement et dure sans fin, contre Aristote ou .xxix.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[46a]  
 Contre ce que Aristote met que se un corps infini estoit, un autre corps infini ne pourroit estre ne que aussi ne peuvent estre .ii. temps<sup>15</sup> infiniz, ou .xxx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[47c]  
 Contre ce que il met que d'une chose la possibilité a estre ne peu(s)t durer par temps infini ne aussi la possibilité de elle a non estre, ou .xxx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[50a]  
 En quantes manieres est dit *possible* et en quantes *impossible*, ou .xxx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[48b]  
 Contre ceulz qui prouvent que Dieu est par un sophisme et cuident demonstrier, ou .xxx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[51a]  
 Repenses aus resons que Aristote fait a prouver que chose corruptible ne peu(s)t durer sans fin, ou .xxx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[50a]  
 Response a une raison que il fait a prouver que chose qui durera sanz fin ne peu(s)t avoir eü commencement, ou .xxx.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[50d]  
 205a Responses aus raisons d'Aristote et d'Averroiz par les- // quelles il cuident prouver generalment que ce est impossible que chose qui ne a eü commencement ait fin, et que chose que ne avra fin ait<sup>16</sup> eü commencement, et que par neccessité toute chose qui a commencement a fin, et qui a fin a commencement, ou .xxxi.<sup>o</sup> et .xxxii.<sup>o</sup> et .xxxiii.<sup>o</sup> et .xxxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre. [52a, 53c, 54b, 56b]  
 Contre Averroiz qui suppose que un infini soit plus grant que l'autre; et le contraire est monsté par beles ymaginacions, ou .xxxiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[55a]  
 Comment se le monde avoit esté sanz commencement et durast sanz fin, l'en pourroit assigner cause naturellement neccessaire pourquoy une chose qui avroit duré sanz commencement cesse estre en certain moment et ne peut en autre; et pourquoy chose qui durera sans fin commence estre en un moment en non en autre, contre Aristote et contre Averroiz, ou .xxxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[56d]  
 Que naturellement aucunes choses ont commencement qui dureront sans fin, contre Aristote, ou .xxxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[58a] /  
 205b Que, selon philosophie, il ne convient pas querir cause fors la volenté de Dieu pourquoy il cree une chose maintenant et non pas plus tost ne plus tart, ou .xxxiiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[58b]  
 Contre Aristote est monsté que chose corruptible peu(s)t durer sanz fin et responses aus raysons que il fait<sup>17</sup> au contraire, ou .xxxv.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[59b]  
 Contre Aristote est monsté que chose materiele et corruptible et qui a contraire selon ses qualités peu(s)t durer sans fin et responses aus resons contraires, ou .xxxvi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[60d]

## OU SECONT LIVRE.

Que est a dire *seculum seculi* et *secula seculorum* et *celum celi* et *celi celorum*, ou premier chapitre.[65b]  
 Que estoit avant que ce monde fust, ou premier chapitre.[66b]  
 Comment Dieu est ou ciel et comment Il est partout, ou secont chapitre. [68a]

<sup>14</sup> BCDEF impossible.<sup>15</sup> BCDEF corps.<sup>16</sup> DE omit 'et que chose . . . fin ait.'<sup>17</sup> A il a fait.<sup>18</sup> ABCDF .xxxv. chapitre.<sup>1</sup> DE celum celorum.



- 205c Comment les angelz // sont en lieu et en quelz lieux il sont, ou secont chapitre.[69c]  
 Que il convient octrier selon philosophie que les intelligences sont meües, ou secont chapitre.[70c]  
 Comment un angel peu(s)t estre en un meïsme temps en ciel et en terre et en plus de cent mille lieux distans sanz tenir plus de lieu ou d'espace equivalent<sup>2</sup> que l'espace d'un pié, ou secont chapitre.[71b]  
 Comment les angelz sont meüz et en quantes et en quelles manieres il peuent estre meüz, ou secont chapitre.[71c]  
 Que le ciel est meü sans labour et sans resistance, ou tiers chapitre.[73c]  
 Que desus et desouz, destre et senestre, devant et desriere sont ou corps du ciel selon Aristote, ou quint chapitre.[77d]  
 Que le ciel n'est pas corps vif par raysons natureles et contre Aristote, ou quint chapitre.<sup>3</sup>[78a]  
 Que en tout corps meü circulairement sont desus et desouz, et meïsmement ou ciel et en quelle maniere, ou quint chapitre.[79d]  
 205d Comment les .vi. differences de posicion desuz dites / sont ou ciel selon Aristote, ou sixte chapitre.[81d]  
 Contre Aristote est monsté que, posé que le ciel fust corps vif, destre et senestre, devant et derriere ne sont ou ciel fors par similitude, ou sixte chapitre.[82c]  
 Contre Aristote est monsté que selon verité, pour ce que le ciel n'est pas corps<sup>4</sup> vif, desus et desouz ne sont ou ciel fors par similitude, ou sixte chapitre.[86a]  
 Belles raysons contre Aristote qui met que nous qui habitons vers occident et vers le pole artique sommes en la partie senestre du monde et que ceulz qui sont vers orient et vers midi sont en la destre, ou .vii.<sup>5</sup> chapitre.[87a]  
 Comment nous .crestiens, meïsmement de cest païs, qui sommes vers occident et vers le pole artique sommes en plus noble lieu et en plus noble assiete de terre ou resgart du ciel que ne sont ceus qui habitent vers orient ou vers l'autre pole di(s)t antartique, ou .vii.<sup>6</sup> chapitre.[88b]  
 Contre ce que Aristote dit que il convient, se Dieu est, que le mouvement du ciel soit // perpetuel, en le .viii.<sup>7</sup> chapitre.[91d]  
 206a Contre ce que il<sup>8</sup> di(s)t que se le ciel est meü, il convient par neccessité que la terre repose ou milieu du ciel; et le contraire est monsté par plusieurs raysons en le .viii.<sup>9</sup> chapitre.[92c]  
 Que mouvement local est autre chose que le corps ainsi meü, en le .viii.<sup>10</sup> chapitre.[93c]  
 Contre ce que Aristote dit que se terre est, il convient que feu soit, en le .viii.<sup>11</sup> chapitre.[94c]  
 Contre ce que il di(s)t que se terre et feu sont, les autres elemens sont par neccessité, en le .viii.<sup>12</sup> chapitre.[94d]  
 Contre ce que<sup>13</sup> il di(s)t que [se]<sup>14</sup> les .iiii. elemens sont, il convient que generacion soit, en le .viii.<sup>15</sup> chapitre.[94d]  
 Contre ce que il di(s)t que se generacion est, il convient par neccessité que plusieurs mouvemens soient ou ciel,<sup>16</sup> en le .viii.<sup>17</sup> chapitre.[95a]  
 Concordance de poëtes et des hystoires des paiens a l'Escripture qui met que le soleil se arresta ou temps de Josué, en le .viii.<sup>18</sup> chapitre.[95a]  
 Que figure circulaire est la plus tres petite de toutes les figures super-  
 206b ficieles et fi- / gure sperique la tres plus petite de toutes les figures

<sup>2</sup> DE equalment.

<sup>3</sup> B omits 'Que le ciel . . . ou quint chapitre.'

<sup>4</sup> DE fors.

<sup>5</sup> F omits 'dit que il convient se Dieu est

. . . contre ce que il.'

<sup>6</sup> ACDF omit 'se.'

<sup>7</sup> B omits 'ou ciel.'

<sup>8</sup> BCDEF omit 'Que rien . . . en le .xi.<sup>19</sup> chapitre.'

corporelles; et par ce s'ensuit de neccessité? que figure circulaire et figure sperique sont de plus grant capacité et plus peuvent contenir que quelcunques autres figures, ou .x.\* chapitre.[100c]

Que l'element de le aer est figuré presque aussi comme l'aubin d'un euf, en le .xi.\* chapitre.[101b]

Que rien n'est si parfaitement sperique ne si parfaitement poli comme est le ciel, en le .xi.\* chapitre.<sup>9</sup>[102c]

Que corps materiel ne peu(s)t estre parfaitement poli quant est de soy, en le .xi.\* chapitre.[103a]

Comment corps pesans peuvent reposer sans violence lasus en haut sus l'element de le aer, en le .xi.\* chapitre.<sup>9</sup>[103b]

Quatre<sup>10</sup> causes qui peuvent mouver a enquerir de choses tres fortes, et la quarte est approuvee et les autres non, en le .xii.\* chapitre.[104c]

Que tout mouvement qui a fin et commencement ne peu(s)t estre regulier, ou .xiii.\* chapitre.[105c]

Que tout tel mouvement commence a *non gradu* et que c'est a dire, ou .xiii.\* chapitre.<sup>11</sup>[106c] //

206c Pourquoi tel mouvement, quant il est naturel, est plus isnel vers la fin et pourquoy son isneleté procede en cressant, ou .xiii.\* chapitre.<sup>11</sup>[106c]

Pour quelles causes mouvement violent est plus isnel et plus fort aucune foys plus pres du commencement, aucune foys plus loing, ou .xiii.\* chapitre.[107a]

Les causes des accidens et des experiences que l'en voit en mouvemens violens, ou .xiii.\* chapitre.[107a]

Contre Aristote est monstré comment ce est possible<sup>12</sup> a ymaginacion et simplement que l'isneleté du mouvement du ciel soit venue touzjours continuellement e[n]<sup>13</sup> cressant par temps infini passé, et que elle procede touzjours en appetisant par le temps infini a venir, au .xiii.\* chapitre.<sup>14</sup> [109c]

Que le mouvement du ciel est regulier et difforme et est uniforme quant a circuite, ou .xiiii.\* chapitre.[110c]

Comment le mouvement d'une chose qui descent et est meüe en bas peu(s)t estre uniforme et sa descendue difforme, ou .xiiii.\* chapitre.[110d]

206d Que chascune estoille est / de la nature et de l'espece du ciel ouquel elle est, ou .xv.\* chapitre.[111b]

Comment et pour quelle cause mouvement autre que du ciel est cause de chaleur, ou .xv.\* chapitre.[114b]

Comment et pourquoy et en quelles choses le mouvement du ciel est cause de chaleur, ou .xv.\* chapitre.<sup>15</sup>[115b]

Que chascune planete et chascune estoille est fichiee en son ciel ou espere, et meüe au mouvement du ciel ou elle est fichiee aussi comme le clou qui est fichié en une nef, etc., ou .xvi.\* chapitre.<sup>16</sup>[116a]

Pour quelle cause les estoilles semblent aucune fois sintiller et ouilleter,<sup>17</sup> ou .xvi.\* chapitre.[117a]

De la tache ou figure qui appert en la lune, quelle elle est et pour quelle cause, ou .xvi.\* chapitre.[118a]

Contre une rayson que Aristote fonde sus l'apparence de ceste figure a

<sup>9</sup> F interchanges the order of the last two items.

<sup>10</sup> On fol. 208d to 209c the scribe of A began to repeat himself from this point, continuing through to the end of 207a.

<sup>11</sup> BC .xiii. c.; DE .xiii. c.

<sup>12</sup> BE impossible.

<sup>13</sup> ACF et.

<sup>14</sup> E .xiii. c.

<sup>15</sup> BCDEF omit 'Comment et pourquoy . . . ou .xv.\* chapitre.'

<sup>16</sup> B .xviii. c.; CDEF .xviii. c.

<sup>17</sup> DE subtiliter ou illeter.

- monstrer que les estoilles ne sont pas meües par elles, ou .xvi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[119a]
- 207a Contre Averroïz et contre autres qui disoient que touz les cielz ou esperes du ciel sont d'une meïsme espece, // ou .xvi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[120b]
- Contre ceulz qui dient que corps du ciel quelcunque n'est cause de fredeur, ou .xvi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[120d]
- Contre ce que Aristote di(s)t que se les estoilles faisoient son par leurs mouvemens, elles estonneroient et corromproient par leur son les corps de cibas, ou .xviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[124b]
- Que les corps du ciel par leurs mouvemens ne font pas s[o]ns<sup>18</sup> sensibles, ou .xviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[124d]
- Quelles proporcions<sup>19</sup> sont armoniques et quelles non, et quelles sont consononcies et quelles non, ou .xviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[125c]
- Comment ou ciel et sus le ciel est une musique esperituelle et insensible, ou .xviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[126a]
- Que .iii. manieres de musique sont: une humaine, autre mondaine, autre divine, et quelles elles sont, ou .xviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[126c]
- Comment les principalz regars des corps celestielz sont selon les proporcions de musique humaine ou selon parties de elles, ou .xviii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.<sup>21</sup>[127a]
- 207b Comment la cause que / assigne Aristote pourquoy les mouvemens du ciel et des planetes sont pluseurs et telement ordenéz n'est pas vraie; et la vraie cause pourquoy<sup>22</sup> ce est, ou .xxii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[132b]
- Que la cause que il met pourquoy en le .viii.<sup>o</sup> ciel sont si grant multitude de<sup>23</sup> estoilles et en chascun des autres une seule n'est pas vraie; et la vraie cause de ce<sup>24</sup>, ou .xxiii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[135b]
- Que l'en ne pourroit prouver par quelcunque experience que le ciel soit meü de mouvement journal et la terre non, ou .xxv.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[138b]
- Que ce ne pourroit estre prové par rayson, ou .xxv.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[138b]
- Pluseurs belles persuasions a monstrer que la terre est meüe de mouvement journal et le ciel non, ou .xxv.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[138b]
- Comment teles consideracions sont profitables pour la deffense de nostre foy, ou .xxi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.<sup>25</sup>[144c]
- Que le centre de la terre n'est pas le centre du monde.[153b]
- Pourquoy une partie de la terre est descouverte de eaue.[153d]
- Comment diluge universel pourroit estre sans pluie. // [154a]
- 207c Comment ce est possible<sup>26</sup> naturellement par autre maniere que il ne fu dit en le .viii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du premier<sup>27</sup> que le soleil et les estoilles ou temps a venir leveront de la partie ou il couchent maintenant et coucheront de la partie ou il lievent.[154c]
- Que il peu(s)t plus de eaue en un vaisel plat quant il est bas que quant il est haut.[155b]
- Que une tour faite a plum est plus large haut que bas et pluseurs teles choses.[155c]
- Que la voie d'un lieu a autre sans monter et sans devaler n'est pas si brive comme seroit une en devalant et puis en montant.[155c]
- Que le circuite de la terre n'est pas grant et seroit fait en pou de temps se l'en pavoit aler environ, et pou s'en fault que il ne peüst bien estre fait.[156a]

<sup>18</sup> A sens; B ne sont pas son sensibles.

<sup>19</sup> E porcions.

<sup>20</sup> A .xviii.

<sup>21</sup> The material beginning at 206b, note 10, and ending here is repeated by the scribe of A on folios 208d-209c, cf. 208c, note 7.

<sup>22</sup> BCDEF n'est pas vraie cause pourquoy.

<sup>23</sup> A des.

<sup>24</sup> DE n'est pas vraie cause de ce.

<sup>25</sup> ACDF .xxv. c.

<sup>26</sup> E impossible.

<sup>27</sup> 16c.

Que se .ii. hommes le faisoient en un meisme temps en alant un vers orient et l'autre vers occident, celui qui yroit vers orient avroit deux jours artificielz et .ii. nuis plus que celui qui iroit vers occident et en un meisme(s) temps, et pluseurs autres choses belles a considerer, tout ou .xxxi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.<sup>28</sup>[156b] /

207d

## OU TIERS LIVRE.

Contre ce que di(s)t Aristote que chose non-pesante adjoustee a autre pesante ne la peu(s)t faire plus pesante; .ii. fortes instances et responses a elles, ou tiers chapitre.[161a]

Une tres forte rayson du feu qui seroit ou centre du monde et sans parfaite response, ou quart chapitre.[162b]

Quelle chose est element, ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[167c]

Que matiere et forme sont premiers elemens, ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[167d]

Que matiere ne peu(s)t estre sans forme ne forme materiele sans matiere, ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[167d]

Que les .iiii. elemens ne sont pas es corps mixtes en leurs propres fourmes, ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre; et de ce ou secont chapitre du quart.[168b, 184d]

Comment toutes figures superficieles rec[ti]lignes<sup>1</sup> sont de triangles et resolutes en triangles, en le .xi.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[174d]

Comment .iii. manieres de teles figures regulieres sont dont chascune peu(s)t emplir espace superficiele, ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre. // [177a]

208a Comment .v. manieres de corps reguliers sont et ne peuvent estre pluseurs, ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[177d]

Que .ii. manieres de telz corps sont dont chascun peu(s)t emplir lieu ou espace corporele, et est impossible que pluseurs soient, etc., ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[177d]

Comment Averroiz fait un faulz sophisme mathematique a monstrier que .xii. pyramides emplent lieu; et ce est faulz, ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[177d]

Comment .xx. pyramides emplent lieu et pluseurs belles considerations en ceste matiere, ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[178b]

## OU QUART LIVRE.

Une belle rayson a monstrier que les elemens ne sont pas es corps mixtes en leurs propres formes et arguemens au contraire et responses, ou secont chapitre; et de ce ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre du tiers.[184d, 167c]

208b La cause final pourquoi les choses legieres sont meü- / es en haut et les pesantes en bas, ou tiers et ou quart chapitre.[186c, 188a]

Les causes motives ou efficientes de telz mouvemens, ou quart chapitre. [188c]

Pourquoy un grant fust poise plus en le aer que un petit plum, et en l'eaue est le contraire, et ainsi de pluseurs autres corps, ou quint chapitre en .ii. lieus.[190bc]

Contre ce que Aristote di(s)t que le aer est pesant en sa region, ou quint chapitre; et de ce plus a plain ou .vii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.[190d, 194c]

Que il n'est rien plus haut que l'element du feu et que outre ou ciel n'est haut ne bas; et se un corps terrestre y estoit ou autre, il ne seroit

<sup>28</sup> DE ou .xxxvi.<sup>o</sup> c.

<sup>1</sup> A recalignes.

<sup>2</sup> B omits 'ou .xii.<sup>o</sup> chapitre.'

<sup>1</sup> ACD vii.

de fait pesant ne legier, ou sixte chapitre; et de ce ou .xxiiii.\* chapitre du premier.[192ac, 37c]

Comment ce est possible<sup>2</sup> que une porcion de aer soit meüe naturellement en montant du centre siques au ciel,<sup>3</sup> et aussi naturellement en descendant du ciel siques au centre, ou sixte chapitre.[192c]

Que les elemens ne ont pas .iiii.\* regions determinees, si comme il semble que Aristote entende, ou .vii.\* chapitre. // [194c]

208c Que leur ordre naturel est que le pesant soit sous legier et soubz moins pesant, et le plus legier sus<sup>5</sup> le moins legier selon ce que il est possible tout consideré, ou .vii.\* chapitre.[194c]

Que aer et eaue ne sont pas pesans en leur lieux naturelz; et est contre ce que dit Aristote, ou .vii.\* chapitre.[195a]

Que une goutte ou porcion de eaue peut reposer naturellement ou centre du monde et une porcion de aer emprés le ciel, en la fin du .vii.\* chapitre.[196a]

Que la legiereté du feu et celle de l'aer different en espee et aussi la pesanteur de la terre et celle de l'eaue, en le .viii.\* chapitre.[196b]

Comment la cause que met Aristote pourquoy aucuns corps pesans noent en eaue ne souffist pas et la principal cause pourquoy ce est, ou .ix.\* chapitre.[198d]

Comment choses pesantes peuvent reposer naturellement sus l'espere de l'aer, ou .ix.\* chapitre.[199d]

De la trinité divine, ou .x.\* chapitre.[200d]

Comment les corps de[s]<sup>6</sup> beneürés seront en paradis, en le .xi.\* chapitre. [201d]

Comment le corps de Jhesucrist est lasus en paradis, ou .xii.\* chapitre.<sup>7</sup> [202a]

<sup>2</sup> B impossible.

<sup>3</sup> B montant siques monte le ciel.

<sup>4</sup> B .iiii.

<sup>5</sup> B sous.

<sup>6</sup> ABC de.

<sup>7</sup> Beginning at the top of 208d: 'Les choses notables qui sont en ce contraire. Comment .iiii. causes sont qui peuvent mouvoir aucun a enquerir de choses tres fortes et la quarte est approuvee ou .xii.\* chapitre. Que tout mouvement qui a fin et commencement ne peu(s)t estre regulier, ou .xiii.\* chapitre.' This material is practically identical with the passage beginning 206b, note 10, ending on 209c with: 'Comment les principalz regars

des corps celestielz sont selon les proportions de musique humaine ou selon les parties de elles, ou .xviii.\* chapitre,' found at the bottom of 207a. In this material repeated by the scribe there are a few minor differences of vocabulary, sufficient to indicate that he copied from a second manuscript rather than that he merely turned back a folio in that which he had been copying up to this point. This repetition is peculiar to A and does not appear in any one of the five other manuscripts. In the middle of 209c appears the characteristic signature of the Duke of Berry: 'Ce livre est au duc de Berry Jehan B.'

## INTRODUCTION

## I. HISTORICAL

"AT the command of the very noble and very excellent prince Charles, fifth of that name, by the grace of God king of France," Nicole Oresme, the foremost French savant of the Fourteenth Century, translated from Latin to French, between 1370-1377, four treatises of the sovereign philosopher Aristotle. No document exists to explain precisely the king's purpose in requesting these translations, but it is not difficult to imagine several plausible motives any one of which would have justified the undertaking. Concerning the *Ethics*, *Politics* and *Economics*, Oresme wrote in the preamble to his version of the first named treatise: "Pour ce que les livres morals de Aristote furent faiz en grec, et nous les avons en latin moult fort a entendre, le Roy a voulu, pour le bien commun, faire les translater en françois, afin que il et ses conseilliers et autres les puissent mieulx entendre . . ."<sup>1</sup> No one familiar with the mediaeval Latin versions of Aristotle will dispute the accuracy of Oresme's description of them as "moult fort a entendre," and it is hardly surprising that Charles V, in spite of Christine de Pisan's assurance that "he understood Latin very competently,"<sup>2</sup> should have desired to possess these works, inherently difficult in substance as well as in style, in a more easily comprehensible language. But Charles was not interested solely in his own understanding of Aristotle. Oresme states explicitly that it was the king's intention that these works should be read by the members of his council and others. It is, therefore, clear that in this case translation implied definitely the vulgarization of knowledge in a truly social sense. By permitting the use of his library in the Louvre and lending his manuscripts to members of the nobility and to others who enjoyed his friendship, the most enlightened French monarch between Saint Louis and Francis I pursued throughout his reign a course calculated to enhance the wisdom of his *entourage* and thus to increase the general welfare of his subjects. Doubtless it was this aspect of his work which Oresme had in mind in his reference to "le bien commun." We know that one of the important political innovations of Charles' reign, whereby the king's council was instructed to elect the royal chancellor, previously an appointive office, coincided closely with the completion of the translation of the *Politics* in 1372.<sup>3</sup> This coincidence may have been quite fortuitous, but it is not impossible that the king's council had been prepared for this unprecedented event by a reading of Book III of the *Politics* in Oresme's new French version.

A lover of learning and of books in general, Charles V was especially fond of books in his own language. More than any of his predecessors he enjoyed reading in the vernacular and his *cabinet des livres* in the Louvre contained scores of French works, many of which had been translated at his own command. The king's passion for books was, moreover, aesthetic as well as intellectual; as Malet's inventory indicates,<sup>4</sup> the manuscripts made for him were generally "tres

<sup>1</sup> *Le Livre de Ethiques*, ed. Menut (New York, 1940), p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> *Le Livre des faiz et bonnes moeurs*, ed. Michaud et Poujoulat (Paris, 1847), part III, ch. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Emile Bridrey, *Nicole Oresme. Etude d'histoire des doctrines et des faits*

*économiques. La Théorie de la monnaie au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1906), p. 456. See also A. Coville in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, IV (Paris, 1909), pp. 182-217.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. L. Delisle, *Recherches sur la librairie de Charles V*, II (Paris, 1907), p. 24 et seq.

bien hystoriés." He sought out the best talent available to illuminate them with splendid miniatures and vignettes. A desire to possess these Aristotelian treatises in attractive and beautiful volumes must certainly be accounted an additional reason for his command to Oresme. It is only necessary to recall the great prestige of Aristotle's name in every field of knowledge to understand why this exceptionally intelligent monarch would have desired to include among the numerous translated works of antiquity which he was collecting in his magnificent library easily readable versions of his favorite Aristotelian treatises. Besides the four treatises entrusted to Oresme, the king commissioned his court physician, Evrart de Conti, to translate the *Problemata* (1372). For Charles also was executed the unique and beautiful copy of the thirteenth-century French version of a portion of the *Meteorologica*, now preserved in the Belgian Royal Library.<sup>14</sup> It is interesting to note that this earliest vernacular translation of an Aristotelian scientific treatise (ca. 1270) was made by a compatriot of Oresme, the Norman Mahieu le Vilain, native of Rouen, who is shown in the principal miniature presenting his work to his patron, the Count Eaufort of Eu.

Among the earlier works translated for Charles V were several pertaining to astrology. In 1360, when he established his residence in the Hotel Saint-Pol, he took with him his professional astrologer Pelerin or Peregrin de Prusse who, besides writing several treatises on astrology, translated from Latin to French a number of short Arabic works of similar nature.<sup>15</sup> Some of these may perhaps be identical with the series of brief astrological tracts<sup>16</sup> found in Bibl. Nat., MS. Franç. 1083, following after Oresme's translation of *De Coelo et mundo* and his *Traité de l'esperance*. It was probably at about this same time that Oresme trans-

<sup>14</sup> *Catalogue des MSS. de la Bibl. Royale de Belgique* (Van den Gheyn), MS. 2903 (11200), *Traduction des Météores d'Aristote*, 102 ff. Incipit: (Prologue) A [Aulfort, conte d'Eu, fils du roy de Jherusalem, par la grace de Dieu, Mahieu le Vilain du Neuf Chastel de Drincourt, salut et subjection. (Text) Li philosophe dit: Nous avons dit des premieres causes de nature . . . The work ends with the fourth chapter of Book III, omitting six chapters and Book IV entirely. On the history of the MS. cf. L. Delisle, "Notice sur deux livres ayant appartentus au Roi Charles V," *Notices et Extraits des MSS. de la Bibl. Nat.*, XXXI (première partie, 1884), pp. 1-16; a transcription of fol. 45<sup>v</sup> is given, p. 25. This early translation is mentioned by G. Paris, *Hist. de la littérature française au moyen âge* (5<sup>me</sup> éd., Paris, 1914), p. 159, without reference to the MS. and Gröber, *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, I, 2, p. 1030, cites G. Paris. The three fine miniatures are reproduced in J. Barrois, *Bibliothèque prototypographique* (Paris, 1830), pp. 224, 297 and 322. Delisle observes that Mahieu's version is rather a paraphrase than a literal translation. On the early vernacular versions of Aristotelian treatises, cf. *Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le Livre de Ethiques*, ed. A.D. Menut (New York, 1940), p. 4. A French version of the spurious *Liber de Causis* (late 12th cent.) and Jofroi de Watreford's paraphrase of the spurious *Secretum secretorum* (ca. 1340) complete the list of vernacular renditions of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works available before 1370. Cf. C. Pinchbeck, *The Works of Jofroi de Waterford* (London, 1936), pp. 6-10.

<sup>15</sup> On astrologers at the court of Charles

V, see L. Thorndike, *History of Magic and Experimental Science*, III (New York, 1934), pp. 585-89. Cf. also R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, II (Paris, 1912), p. 279.

<sup>16</sup> The titles given in MS. Franç. 1083 are the following Fol. 146a, "Ci commence le livre des jugemens d'astrologie selon Aristote. Le prologue du derrenier translateur en le translatant de latin en François pour tres noble et tres puissant prince Charles aîné filz du Roy de France, duc de Normandie et delphin de Vienne . . ." Fol. 171d, Le Livre Messehallac astrologien des conjonctions et recepcion es Interrogacions. (This is apparently Messahala's *De Receptione*.) Fol. 183, *Traité Messehallac arabe pour savoir la pensee et la cogitacion d'aucun qui veult demander d'aucune chose.* (Messahala's *De Intentione et cogitatione*.) Fol. 184a, Le Livre Messehallac des choses occultes et muscees et des jugemens selon ce. (Messahala's *De Occultis*.) Fol. 186c, Le Epistre Messehallac des choses des eclipses de la lune et du soleil. (Messahala's *Epistula de lunae eclipsis et planetis*.) Fol. 189b, Le Livre que fist Zehel des jugemens d'astrologie (Zehel's *De iudiciis astrorum*.) Fol. 214c, Table of contents. Another similar group of astrological tracts is attributed to Pelerin by Delachenal, "Note sur un manuscrit de la bibliothèque de Charles V," *Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes*, LXXI (1910), pp. 33-38, the manuscrit in question being Arsenal, MS. 2872, ff. 57-84; ff. 85-309d, Le Livre des .ix. anciens juges de astrologie. Explicit: "Cestui livre fu translaté de latin en François par maistre Robert Godefroy, maistre es ars et astronomien de tres noble et puissant prince Charles, ainné filz du roy de France, duc de Normandie et delphin de Vyannois."

lated Plato of Tivoli's Latin version of Ptholemy's *Quadripartitum* including Aegidius of Thebaldis' version of Haly ibn-Ridwan's commentary.<sup>7</sup> In the preamble to the latter work Oresme refers to Charles as "hoir de France, a present gouverneur du royaume," which must signify that he was writing during the period of John II's absence in England, between 1356-1360, when the dauphin Charles was acting as regent. Possibly with the intention of counter-acting the dauphin's evident predilection for astrology, Oresme wrote at this same period the first of his treatises attacking judicial astrology, *Contra judi-ciarios astronomos*, of which he prepared later a French version, *Le Livre or Le Traitié des divinacions* (ca. 1366). Oresme's arguments appear to have had no effect upon Charles. After his accession to the throne in 1364, the king continued to consult an astrologer before any important undertaking and he called to his service the most celebrated practitioners of the art. In 1368, the Italian Thomas of Bologna became his official astrologer. Returning to the attack, Oresme produced a more elaborate defense of his objections to astro-logical judgments, *Contra divinatores horoscopios* (1370). It is a mark of the tolerance of the king that instead of showing resentment for Oresme's opposition, he commissioned him at this time to translate "aucuns livres lesquelx fist Aristote le souverain philosophe" and presently placed him among his councillors and made him his chaplain.<sup>8</sup>

Whether *De Coelo et mundo* was originally included among the treatises which Oresme was asked to translate is a moot question. However, there can be little doubt that it was Charles' interest in astrology which determined the selection of this work in preference to some other of the scientific corpus. Doubtless the translator's purpose was of a somewhat different order. Already Oresme had behind him a long list of scientific treatises of his own which bear witness to his extraordinary interest in the physical universe and his excep-tionally keen insight into some of its central problems. These he had written in Latin for the world of scholars; now he wrote in French, and we may accept his own statement of purpose in the explicit of *Du Ciel et du monde*:

"Et pour animer, exciter et esmouvoir les cuers des jeunes hommes qui ont subtilz et nobles engins et desir de science, afin que il estudient a dire encontre et a moy reprendre pour amour et affection de verité, je ose dire et me faiz fort qu'il n'est homme mortel qui onques veüst plus bel ne meilleur livre de philosophie naturele que est cestui, ne en ebreu, ne en grec ou arabe, ne en latin, ne en françois." (203c)

From this it is clear that Oresme considered his task to be the spreading of scientific knowledge by means of the vernacular, and the substance of his commentary, avoiding as it does the more abstruse problems examined in his Latin tracts, bears out this assumption. Thus the earliest complete version of an Aristotelian scientific work in any of the modern languages was not made for the specialist but quite definitely for the educated layman, to acquaint him with the fundamental concepts of the Aristotelian system, interpreted and cor-rected in the light of the best available knowledge of the time. Indeed, the principal interest of *Du Ciel et du monde* for our own time resides in the

<sup>7</sup>Since Oresme was grand master of the College of Navarre from 1356-1362 and since Latin was prescribed as the language of the college, Meunier, *Essai sur la vie et les ouvrages de N.O.* (Paris, 1857), p. 8, held that it was improbable that Oresme would have written in French before his resignation from Navarre freed him from this obligation. Although Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, III (Paris, 1913), p. 348, and E. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei N.O.*, (Münster in Westfalen,

1934), p. 10, accept Meunier's assumption, it is certainly doubtful if this prohibition would have prevailed in the face of a request from the regent of France.

<sup>8</sup>Evidence that Oresme was actually a member of the king's council is incon-clusive, in spite of Briday's statement, *op. cit.*, p. 454. The only evidence that he was a chaplain to the king is contained in his own reference to himself in the prologue of *Les Politiques* as "vostre humble chapel-lain."



glimpse it affords through Oresme's commentary of the state of "natural philosophy" in the Fourteenth Century. Because Oresme was the leading French savant of his age, his criticism of the Aristotelian system may fairly be considered to represent the most advanced scientific thought of the time, although his most important contributions to knowledge are contained in other works.

Since the facts and conjectures concerning Oresme's life have been presented in connection with a recent critical edition<sup>9</sup> of his translation of the *Ethics*, it will be sufficient here to summarize the principal events only. The earliest mention of Nicole Oresme thus far discovered is the inclusion of his name among the twenty students of theology enrolled at the College of Navarre in the fall of 1348. The register of the University of Paris indicates that he belonged to the Norman "nation" and the presence of his family name among the inhabitants of the city of Caen in the early years of the Eighteenth Century warrants the assumption that he was born in that vicinity. The date of his birth is generally given, though conjecturally, as 1323.

The royally sponsored College of Navarre admitted students only upon proof that they were too poor to pay their expenses at the University of Paris. From this fact the conclusion has been drawn that Oresme came from one of those sturdy peasant families whose sons have so often attained high honors in the annals of French scholarship. From his subsequent accomplishments it is clear that Oresme did not devote the years spent at Navarre exclusively to the study of theology. Almost certainly, he attended the lectures<sup>10</sup> of the most celebrated teacher of the period at the University of Paris, Jean Buridan, whose speculations in the realm of "natural philosophy" were presently carried forward by Oresme himself. Upon receiving the doctorate in 1356, Oresme was at once appointed grand master of his college, a position of high distinction because of the exceptional reputation which this school enjoyed.

There is a persistent legend, often repeated and easily credible in spite of the absence of documentary evidence,<sup>11</sup> that during his incumbency at Navarre Oresme was a *precepteur* of the future Charles V. Certain it is that already he enjoyed the confidence of Charles' father, the unfortunate John II, at whose command he wrote in 1356 his justly celebrated treatise—probably also one of his earliest—*De Mutationibus monetarum*. In 1359, Oresme signed an act of the Chambre des Comptes with the title "secretaire du Roy." At this time John II was expiating his defeat at Poitiers (1356) by Edward III as the latter's hostage in London, while the dauphin Charles, acting as regent, was skilfully striving to restore royal authority after a period of serious civil disturbances. By this time, at least, intimate relations between the Norman cleric and his future sovereign and patron had been firmly established. Through a score of years their fruitful collaboration links their names together in the crowning intellectual achievement of fourteenth-century France.

In 1361, Oresme sought and obtained the archdeaconship at Bayeux, but was soon obliged to resign the appointment as the result of a suit brought before the Parlement of Paris forbidding him to hold this office in conjunction with the mastership of Navarre. In 1362, he left Navarre to accept an appointment as canon at Rouen; soon afterward he was made canon at La Sainte Chapelle,

<sup>9</sup> *Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le Livre de Ethiques d'Aristote*, ed. A.D. Menut (New York, 1940), especially Introduction, pp. 3-91.

<sup>10</sup> Oresme does not mention Buridan in his works and there seems to be no documentary proof that he studied under the famous regent of the University of Paris. But there is evidence of their close friendship in the following unusual passage in

Buridan's unpublished *Quaestiones super tres libros Meteororum* (Quaestio 20, liber III, fol. 257<sup>r</sup> in Bibl. Nat., Ms. lat. 14723) concerning the observation of a parhelion: "Reverendus Nicolaus Oresme dixit mihi se semel vidisse ex utroque latere Solis unum . . ." Cf. J. Bulliot, "Jean Buridan et le mouvement de la terre," *Revue de Philosophie*, XXV (1914), p. 12.

obtaining a semi-prebend there. On Christmas eve, 1363, he preached a sermon<sup>12</sup> before the papal court of Urban V in Avignon, whither he had been sent with a party of royal emissaries from John II. On January 3, 1364, John set sail on what was destined to be his last journey to England, in a chivalric gesture towards Edward III, who complained of the escape of one of the French princes held as hostage for the fulfillment of the treaty of Calais. Charles again assumed the powers of regent and there can be little doubt that he used his influence to assist Oresme in securing appointment as dean of the cathedral of Rouen. This act was recorded March 18, 1364. Three weeks later the death of John in London established Charles V upon the throne of France. While dean of Rouen, Oresme served his king as chaplain and as counsellor, produced several of his Latin treatises and, between 1370-1377, made the earliest complete versions of authentic Aristotelian treatises in any of the modern languages. Elevated to the bishopric of Lisieux in 1377, with the king again intervening in his favor, Oresme outlived his royal patron by two years; he died in 1382.<sup>13</sup> By succeeding generations he was almost invariably remembered as "Maistre Nicole Oresme, doyen de Rouen," which recalled the two titles he held during the active years of his scholarly career in the service of his sovereign and his Church.

## II. ORESME'S SCIENTIFIC WRITINGS

In the course of the past thirty years our knowledge of Oresme's contribution to scientific thought has been greatly advanced by the studies of Duhem, Wieleitner, Thorndike and others.<sup>1</sup> However, much remains to be done before a definitive estimate of this important aspect of his work can be confidently undertaken. His principal Latin treatises are still unprinted or available only in fifteenth or sixteenth century editions difficult to obtain. Recently Thorndike,

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Menut, *ed. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup> This sermon was published three times during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries; cf. *Le Livre de Ethiques*, p. 31. The only other theological work thus far published is the short tract on a passage in the *Sententiae* entitled *De Communicatione idiomatum in Christo*, written while Oresme was grand master of the College of Navarre (ca. 1360); cf. Ernst Borchert, *Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik nach dem Traktat de Communicatione idiomatum des Nicolaus Oresme, Untersuchungen und Textausgabe* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band XXXV, Heft 4/5, Münster in Westfalen, 1940, Introduction, 153 pp., Text, 41\* pp.) The popularity of this work is indicated by the existence of 27 manuscripts collated by Borchert.

<sup>13</sup> Oresme became grand master of Navarre October 4, 1356; canon of Rouen November 23, 1362; canon of La Sainte Chapelle February 10, 1363; spoke at Avignon December 24, 1363; dean of Rouen March 18, 1364; bishop of Lisieux August 3, 1377; received the gift of two rings from Charles V January 28, 1378; died July 11, 1382. (These dates are from Denifle et Chatelain, *Chartularium universitatis parisiensis*, II (Paris, 1894), p. 641 and *Gallia christiana*, XI (Paris, 1759), col. 789; see also P. Férret, *La Faculté de théologie de Paris. moyen âge*, III (Paris, 1896), pp. 459-475.

<sup>1</sup> Pierre Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci. Troisième série. Les Précurseurs parisiens de Galilée* (Paris, 1913), pp. 346-

405; *idem*, *Le Système du monde*, IV (Paris, 1916), pp. 157-64; H. Wieleitner, "Der Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum des Oresme," *Bibliotheca mathematica*, XIII (1913), pp. 115-145; *idem*, "Ueber dem Funktionsbegriff und die graphische Darstellung bei Oresme," *Bibliotheca mathematica*, XIV (1914), pp. 193-243; E.J. Dijksterhuis, *Val en Worp. Een bijdrage tot de Geschiedenis der Mechanica van Aristoteles tot Newton*, (Groningen, 1924), pp. 70-123; Hugo Dingler, "Ueber die Stellung von Nicolas Oresme in der Geschichte der Wissenschaften," *Archeion*, XI (1929), num. supp., pp. xv-xxiii; *idem*, *Geschichte der Naturphilosophie* (Geschichte der Philosophie in Längsschnitten, no. 7, Berlin, 1932), pp. 72-79; Lynn Thorndike, *History of Magic and Experimental Science*, III (New York, 1934), pp. 398-471; Ernst Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band XXXI, Heft 3, Münster in Westfalen, 1934); Alexandre Koyré, *Etudes galiléennes* (Paris, 1940), pp. 78-93. D. B. Durand, "N. Oresme and the Transition from Mediaeval to Modern Science," *Speculum*, XVI (1941), pp. 167-185; C.B. Boyer, *The Concepts of the Calculus* (New York, 1939), pp. 79-86 and *passim*. This impressive list is not complete; numerous short items may be found in the excellent bibliography contained in Borchert's work cited above and in the extensive but more general bibliography in Menut's edition of *Les Ethiques*, pp. 86-91.

Borchert and Durand have revealed the existence of several items attributed to Oresme in manuscripts not previously examined.<sup>2</sup> Although far from complete and final, these investigations have demonstrated that the scope of Oresme's scientific writing was much more extensive than had formerly been supposed. Because the number of competent scholars who have examined these works at first hand is necessarily limited, it is too early to draw conclusions, on the basis of the opinions thus far advanced, as to their ultimate significance for the history of science. At present this opinion is quite definitely divided. The great French student of mediaeval science, Pierre Duhem, hailed Oresme as the precursor of Copernicus, Galileo and Descartes; while the scholarly American authority, Lynn Thorndike, although admitting Oresme's superiority over his contemporaries, has demonstrated with abundant examples his limitations and his failure to combat some of the most glaringly erroneous ideas in what passed as the scientific learning of his age. Probably the truth will be found to lie somewhere between these two extreme views; further research will perhaps place Oresme among the near great whose greatness has consisted in their ability to anticipate a few of the important and productive theories exploited by modern science.

Only one of Oresme's Latin works bears a definite date in the manuscript copies. This is the attack on judicial astrology beginning: "Utrum res future per astrologiam possint presciri;" in two manuscripts the explicit reads: "Et sic finitur questio contra divinatores facta anno .mcccclxx." In several instances internal evidence as to the sequence of his writings is supplied by references to these in his French commentaries on Aristotle, of which the dates are approximately known; but, as Thorndike has pointed out,<sup>3</sup> it would be unwise to assume that these references furnish final and absolute proof that a specific work was completed before the work in which it is mentioned. Nor is it feasible to establish a sequence on the basis of an inner logical development of the writer's ideas, since Oresme frequently repeats himself and the style of his writing admits of great diffuseness and redundancy. There is sound historical reason<sup>4</sup> for placing the *De Mutationibus monetarum* as early as 1356 and the French translation of Ptolemy's *Quadripartitum* about 1360.<sup>5</sup> The latter seems to have been his first work in French. The short treatise against astrology, *Contra judicarios astronomos*, was assigned by Meunier and Jourdain to 1360-1361 and the free French version of this work, *Le Livre des divinations*, made by Oresme himself and later translated back to Latin by an unknown translator, has been assigned for plausible reasons to 1366.<sup>6</sup> Oresme's French translation of *De Mutationibus monetarum* was placed as early as 1358 by Bridrey;<sup>7</sup> but it seems probable that this *Traité des monnoies* was among the works translated for Charles V after he became king in 1364. The approximate date of *Du Ciel et du monde* is clearly fixed by the following statement in the explicit: "Et ainsi a l'aide de Dieu, je [ay] accompli le livre *Du Ciel et du monde* au commandement de tres excellent prince Charles, quint de ce nom, par la grace de Dieu roy de France, lequel en ce faisant m'a fait évesque de Lisieux." (203c) Since Oresme became bishop of Lisieux in 1377, it follows that this translation was either in progress or completed at that time.

The several attempts to fix the dates of Oresme's other scientific writings must be considered as largely conjectural. If we could rely upon the references found in the glosses and commentaries which accompany his translations of Aristotle, it would be possible to fix a *terminus ad quem* for several works. For example, there is mention of *Le Traité de l'espere* in *Du Ciel et du monde*; of *De*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bridrey, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-77.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Menut, ed. *Les Ethiques*, pp. 21-28.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-60.

<sup>6</sup> These items are included in the table of Oresme's scientific works, pp. 10-17.

<sup>7</sup> Thorndike, *Hist. of Magic, etc.*, III, p. 400.

*Proportionibus proportionum, De Commensurabilitate et incommensurabilitate motuum celi* and *De Uniformitate et difformitate intentionum* in *Le Livre de Politiques* (ca. 1374). Sometimes the titles vary in such a way as to cause confusion or again in a manner to raise doubt if Oresme is referring to his own or to another's work of similar title. Such chronological evidence as we possess makes it appear probable that the scientific writings of Oresme were accomplished in large part between 1360-1370, that he did little original work after he undertook the task of translating Aristotle in the latter year and that we can hardly hope to arrive at a more accurate estimate of the dates of the majority of his works save in the unlikely event that a contemporary list of these should in the future be discovered.

The scientific writings of Oresme with which we are at the present time acquainted, roughly classified in accordance with their subject matter, are briefly described in the following table:<sup>6</sup>

## ORIGINAL WORKS

I.—*Astrology.*

1. *Contra judiciarios astronomos et principes in talibus se occupantes*. Incipit: "Multi principes et magnates noxia curiositate . . ." Published, ed. H. Pruckner, *Studien zu den astrologischen Schriften des Heinrich von Langenstein* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 227-245, from Erfurt Stadtbücherei, Cod. Amplonianus Q.125, ff. 142-149<sup>v</sup>. Manuscripts: Erfurt Stadtbücherei, Cod. Amplon. Q.205, ff. 54-60<sup>v</sup>; Vienna Nationalbibliothek, MSS. 4613, ff. 147-151<sup>v</sup> and 4948, ff. 162-168; Vatican, MS. 4275, ff. 35-40; Bibl. Nat., MSS. Lat. 14580, ff. 100-104 and 10709, ff. 78-84; Florence, Laurentian Library, Ashburnham 210, ff. 84<sup>r</sup>-89. Cf. L. Thorndike, *History of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 400.
2. *Livre or Traitié des divinations*. Incipit: "Mon entencion a l'aide de Dieu . . ." (prologue); "Pluseurs ars ou sciences sont . . ." (text). Unpublished. Manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., MSS. Franç. 1350, ff. 39-60 and 19951, ff. 1-31; Berne, MS. 476, ff. 25-42. A free French version of *Contra judiciarios astronomos*, plagiarized by Eustache Deschamps in *Demoustracions contre sortileges*; cf. G. Coopland, "E. Deschamps and N.O.," *Romania*, LII (1926), 355-61.
3. *De Divinationibus*. Incipit: "Plures artes seu scientie sunt per quas scitur de futuris seu occultis . . ." A literal Latin translation of *Le Livre des divinations* by some one other than Oresme. Unpublished. Manuscripts: Bodleian, Canon. misc. 248, ff. 28-33<sup>r</sup>; Basel, Cod. F.V.6, ff. 48-53<sup>v</sup>. The explicit in the Basel MS. reads: "Liber magistri Nicholai Oresme de divinationibus translatus in latinum quia ipsius (sic) composuit in gallico scriptus anno Domini .mcccxvj. Sed hic scriptus anno 1411<sup>o</sup> ipso die beati Remigii." Assuming that .mcccxvj. represents a scribal error for .mccclxvj., it has been conjectured that *Le Livre des divinations* was written in 1366. Cf. A.D. Menut, ed. *Le Livre de Ethiques*, p. 27; see also, Thorndike, *Hist. of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 401.

<sup>6</sup>For convenience, the titles given in Thorndike and Kibre, *A Catalogue of Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin* (Cambridge, 1938), have been adopted with few exceptions. Because of war-time conditions, it was found impossible to scrutinize manuscripts in German, Austrian

and Italian libraries and these manuscripts are cited from Borchert, Thorndike and Durand. For Oresme's non-scientific writings, see Menut's ed. of *Le Livre de Ethiques*, pp. 30-33; the present table corrects several errors in the description of the scientific works listed by Menut.

4. *Contra divinatores horoscopios.*

Incipit: "Utrum res future per astrologiam (astrologos) possint presciri." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurentian Library, *Ashburnham* 210, ff. 3-21; Bibl. Nat., *MS. Lat. 15126*, ff. 1-39. The explicit gives the date: "Et sic finitur questio contra divinatores facta anno 1370 . . ." See below the closely related work *Quotlibeta annexa questioni premissae*. Cf. Thorndike, *Hist. of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 402-4.

II.—*Mathematics.*

1. *Algorismus.*

Incipit: "Presul Meldensis Philippe quem . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Cambridge, St. John's College, *MS. 188*, fol. 104.

2. *Algorismus proportionum.*

Incipit: "Algorismum proportionum . . ." (prologue); "Una media debet sic scribi" or "Una medietas scribitur sic" (text). Published, ed. M. Curtze, Berlin, 1868, from a MS. in the Gymnasium at Thorn. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurentian Library, *Ashburnham* 210, ff. 172-177<sup>v</sup>; Bruges, *MS. 530*, ff. 25-30<sup>v</sup>; Brussels, Bibl. Royale, *MS. 1043*, ff. 74-79; Utrecht, Universitätsbibliothek, *MS. 725*, ff. 53-59; Bibl. Nat., *MS. Lat. 7197*, ff. 104-109.

3. *Questiones super geometriam Euclidis.*

Incipit: "Circa dictum tamquam in quo dicitur . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Vatican, *Cod. 2225*, ff. 90-98<sup>v</sup>.

III.—*Natural Phenomena and Physical Law.*

1. *De Proportionibus proportionum.*

Incipit: "Omnis rationabilis opinio de velocitate . . ." (prologue); "Omnes proportionales equalitatis sunt . . ." (text). Published, Venice, 1505. Manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., *MS. Lat. 7371*, ff. 269-278<sup>v</sup>; Venice, Marciana, *MS. VI. 133*, ff. 50-72; Erfurt Stadtbücherei, *Cod. Amplon. Q.385*, ff. 67-82<sup>v</sup>; Cambridge, Peterhouse College, *MS. 277*, ff. 93<sup>v</sup>-110<sup>v</sup>.

2. *De Proportionibus velocitatum in motibus.*

Incipit: "Ut circa ardua asperaque fantasmata ex difformibus . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Arsenal, *MS. 522*, ff. 126-168.

3. *De Commensurabilitate motuum celi.*

Incipit: "Zenonem et Crisippum maiora egisse . . ." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Arsenal, *MS. 522*, ff. 110-122; Vatican, *Cod. 4082*, ff. 97<sup>v</sup>-108<sup>v</sup>; Bibl. Nat., *MS. Lat. 7281*, ff. 259-273; Florence, Laurentian Library, *Ashburnham* 210, ff. 159-171<sup>v</sup>; Utrecht, Universitätsbibliothek, *MS. 725*, ff. 172-193.

4. *De Configuratione qualitatum.*

Incipit: "Cum imaginationem meam de uniformitate et difformitate ordinare cepissem . . ." (prologue); "Omnis res mensurabilis extra numeros ymaginatur ad modum quantitatis continue . . ." (text). Unpublished. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurentian Library, *Ashburnham* 210, ff. 101<sup>v</sup>-129; Arsenal, *MS. 522*, ff. 1-28; Vatican, *Cod. 3097*, ff. 1-22<sup>v</sup>; Bruges, *MS. 486*, ff. 159-173; Bibl. Nat., *MSS. Lat. 7371*, ff. 214-226, 14579, ff. 18-40<sup>v</sup> and 14580, ff. 37-60<sup>v</sup>; Erfurt Stadtbücherei, *Cod. Amplon. Q.150*, ff. 1-14; British Museum, *Sloane* 2156, ff. 169-194<sup>v</sup>; Florence, Bibl. Nazionale, *Conventi soppressi I.IX.26*, ff. 14-36; Basel, *MS. F.III.31*, ff. 2-29.

5. *De Instantibus.*

Incipit: "Circa tractatum de instantibus intendo primo per ordinem

- ponere quasdam regulas." Unpublished. Manuscript: Arsenal, MS. 522, ff. 169-187.
6. *Quotlibeta annexa questioni premissae*.  
Incipit: "Ut autem aliquantulum pacificentur animi . . ." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurentian Library, Ashburnham 210, ff. 21-70<sup>v</sup>; Bibl. Nat., MS. Lat. 15126, ff. 39-85. A sequel to *Contra divinatores horoscopios*, this is largely an independent work; in the latter MS. its sections are indicated: "Rationes et cause plurium mirabilium in natura," "Quotlibeta et diverse questiones" and "Solutiones predictorum problematum." Cf. Thorndike, *Hist. of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 440-471, also "Coelestinus' Summary of Nicholas Oresme on Marvels," *Osiris*, I (1936), 629-35.
  7. *De Uniformitate et difformitate*.  
Incipit: "De uniformitate et difformitate qualitatium . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Bruges, MS. 466, ff. 131-139<sup>v</sup>. The relation of this work to *De Configuratione qualitatium* has not yet been investigated.
  8. *Questiones super meteorum*.  
Incipit: "Utrum de impressionibus meteoricis sit scientia . . ." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Erfurt Stadtbücherei, Cod. Amplon. Q.299, ff. 51-103<sup>v</sup>; Breslau Stadtbibliothek, Cod. Wratislav IV.Q.27, ff. 44-96; St. Gall Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sangallensis 839, ff. 1-54. Although A. Birkenmajer, *Studja nad Witelonem* (Cracow, 1921), I, 76-78, attributes this work to Albert of Saxony, there are several references to it in Oresme's works which apparently justify Borchert's ascription to the latter. Cf. Ernst Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme* (Münster in Westfalen, 1934), p. 71.
  9. *Questiones super librum de anima*.  
Incipit: "Questio primi libri de anima est . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Bruges, MS. 514, ff. 71-111. Cf. C. Michalski, "La Physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Bull. International de l'Académie polonaise*, Cracow, 1928, p. 139. According to Borchert, *op. cit.*, p. 18, this same work is found in Munich, Clm. 761, ff. 1-40<sup>v</sup>, with a somewhat different incipit: "Circa librum de anima sunt questiones, prima est utrum scientia huius libri . . ." The explicit ascribes the work to Oresme: "Explicit questiones super libro de anima parisiis disputate per venerabilem doctorem dominum nicholaum de Horem."
  10. *De Motibus spherarum*.  
Incipit: "Ad pauca respicientes de facili . . ." Unpublished. Manuscripts: British Museum, Sloane 2542, ff. 55<sup>v</sup>-59; Erfurt Stadtbücherei, Cod. Amplon. Q.299, ff. 113-126; Bamberg, MS. HJ.V.8, ff. 81-98; Florence, Bibl. Riccardiana, Cod. 33, ff. 26-40.
  11. *Traité de l'espere*.  
Incipit: "La figure et la disposition du monde . . ." Published, Paris, 1508 and *ibid.*, without date, L. McCarthy, Thesis, 1942, Toronto. Manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., MSS. Franç. 1350, ff. 1-38<sup>v</sup>, 565, ff. 1-22, 1083, ff. 126-146, *nouv. acquis.* 1052, ff. 1-39; *nouv. acquis.* 10045, ff. 1-39; Berne, MS. 310, begins with chapter 13; Bibl. Nat., MS. Franç. 7487 ends with chapter 17, out of 49 chapters. At the end of Book II of *Du Ciel et du monde* (157a), Oresme suggests that this *Traité* be considered as an introduction to the former work.

#### TRANSLATIONS

##### 1. *Le Quadripartite de Ptolomee*.

Incipit: "Anciennement le commun langage du peuple romain estoit latin."

(prologue). "Iesuri, c'est a dire, oiés, monsignour." (text). Unpublished. Manuscript: Bibl. Nat., *MS. Franc. 1348*, ff. 1-223.<sup>1</sup>

2. *Du Ciel et du monde*.

Incipit: "Ou nom de Dieu ci commence le livre d'Aristote . . ." (prologue); "La science naturele presque toute est des corps et des magnitudes qui sont." (text). Unpublished. Manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., *MSS. 1082*, ff. 1-203<sup>v</sup>, 565, ff. 23-171<sup>v</sup>, 1083, ff. 1-125<sup>v</sup> and 24278, ff. 1-146<sup>v</sup>; Berne, *MS. 310*, ff. 28-152<sup>v</sup>; Paris, Bibl. de la Sorbonne, *MS. 571*, ff. 1-213.

UNCERTAIN ATTRIBUTIONS

1. *De Latitudinibus formarum*.

Incipit: "Quia formarum (formarum quia) latitudines multipliciter variantur . . ." Published, Padua, 1482 and 1486; Venice, 1505; Vienna, 1515. Manuscripts: *Arsénal, MS. 522*, ff. 29-33; Bodleian, *Canon. misc. 506*, ff. 458-462<sup>v</sup>; Venice, Bibl. Marciana, *MS. VI. 62*, ff. 139-142 and *MS. VI. 149*, ff. 24-27; Thorn, *Gymnasium, Cod. R.4<sup>o</sup>.2*. Of this work Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, III, 400, wrote: "Il est certain . . . que nous n'y trouvons pas un ouvrage original, mais bien un résumé, composé par quelque disciple, du traité *De difformitate qualitatum* [De Configuratione qualitatum]." H. Wieleitner, "Ueber den Funktionsbegriff und die graphische Darstellung bei Oresme," *Bibliotheca mathematica*, XIV (1914), pp. 239-40, also denies the authenticity of the attribution to Oresme in the following terms: "Der *Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum* ist keineswegs ein Auszug, sondern eine mehr lehrbuchartige, kompendiöse Darstellung der Grundlagen der wahrscheinlich von Oresme selbst eingeführten graphischen Darstellung . . . Ueber den Verfasser . . . und die Zeit der Bearbeitung dieses Traktates hat man bis jetzt keinerlei Anhaltspunkten . . . Vermutlich ist aber auch der *Tractatus* noch im 14. Jahrhundert fertiggestellt worden. Da die Schüler eines Meisters doch gewöhnlich auch dessen Ausdrucksweise übernehmen, der *Tractatus* aber durchaus die Bezeichnungsweise derjenigen hat, die Oresme als die "Modernen" bezeichnet, so ist es wohl unwahrscheinlich dass der Verfasser des *Tractatus* ein direkter "Schüler" Oresmes war."

2. *Questiones super perspectiva*.

Incipit: "Utrum lux multiplicetur per radios . . ." Published, Valence, 1503 and attributed in title to Henry of Hesse; ascribed to Oresme in an inventory (1412) of the library of Amplonius Ratynck, "Optime questiones Orem super perspectiva," cited by P. Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliotheks Kataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz*, Munich, 1928, II, 468. Manuscript: Erfurt Stadtbücherei, *Cod. Amplon. F.380*, ff. 29-40<sup>v</sup>. Cf. Thorndike, *Hist. of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 509-10.

3. *Utilitates algorismi proportionum*.

Incipit: "Est autem istarum regularum de . . ." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurentian Library, *Ashburnham 136*, ff. 173-177<sup>v</sup>; *Arsénal, MS. 522*, ff. 122<sup>v</sup>-126.

4. *Questiones super de celo et mundo*.

Incipit: "Utrum ens mobile localiter . . ." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Erfurt Stadtbücherei, *Cod. Amplon. Q.299*, ff. 1-50 and *Q.325*, ff. 57-90<sup>v</sup>. Ascribed to Oresme on inside cover of *Q.299*, but Thorndike and Kibre, *Catalogue of Incipits*, Cambridge, 1938, col. 754, suggest that the author may have been Buridan.

<sup>1</sup>The French version of the *Quadripartitum* contained in Bibl. Nat., *MS. Franc. 1349*, ff. 1-214, followed by the *Centilogie*, ff. 215-266, is not Oresme's translation. It is of

approximately the same period, but is stylistically inferior; the identity of the translator is unknown.

5. *Questiones super generatione et corruptione.*

Unpublished. Manuscript: Florence, Bibl. Nazionale, *Conventi soppressi* H.IX. 1628, ff. 1-76<sup>v</sup>. Ascribed to Oresme by D. B. Durand, "N.O. and the Mediaeval Origins of Modern Science," *Speculum*, XVI (1941), 167-85.

6. *De Visione stellarum.*

Unpublished fragment. Manuscript: Florence, Bibl. Nazionale, *Conventi soppressi* J.X.19, fol. 43<sup>v</sup>. The fragment consists of an astronomical diagram and the concluding lines of text: ". . . earundem qui etiam stella super cenith comprehenditur proprie in suo loco, non est autem idem de magnitudine, sed cum hac stella non videtur inter illas inter quas existit et in eadem constellatione vel congregacione celi in qua est, et hoc sufficit, nec(?) concedamus ipsius(?) repugnatur."

7. *Liber de reprobatione judiciarum astrologie.*

Incipit: "Distinctio prima de reprobatione judiciorum astrologie . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Vatican, Cod. 3097, ff. 23-50<sup>v</sup>. Incomplete text of work ascribed by L. Thorndike, "A hitherto Unnoticed Criticism of Astrology," *Isis*, XXXI (1939), pp. 68-78, to Oresme, Henry of Hesse or Bernard of Verdun.

8. *Questiones de sphaera.*

Incipit: "Utrum terra quiescat naturaliter in centro mundi . . ." Unpublished. Manuscript: Florence, Bibl. Riccardiana, MS. 117, fol. 126<sup>v</sup>. Fragment ascribed to Oresme by D. B. Durand.

9. *Collectio conclusionum mathematicarum et naturalium.*

Unpublished. Manuscript. Erfurt Stadtbücherei, Cod. Amplon. Q.385, ff. 155-158. Described as a series of minor articles on mathematical subjects and natural phenomena. Fragments similarly described are contained in Bibl. Nat., *Nouv. Acq. Franç.* 1052, fol. 39 and fol. 60. These are ascribed to Oresme in the *Catalogue*.

10. *Questiones parvorum naturalium.*

Unpublished. Attributed to Oresme in Erfurt Stadtbücherei, Cod. Q.299, ff. 104-109. A fragment is found in Munich, *Clm.* 761, fol. 41.

Several references by Oresme to a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* justify the supposition that he wrote such a work, although no trace of it has been found.<sup>9</sup> In *Du Ciel et du monde*, II, 2, (72d) Oresme refers to a commentary which he had written on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*: "si comme je monstrai pieça sur *Sentences*." This work has not been recovered. The following titles of unidentified works attributed to Oresme but otherwise unknown are found in an inventory of the library of Amplonius Ratinek (1410-12), preserved at Erfurt and cited by P. Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliotheks Kataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz*, II, 468: *Commentum super phisionomiam*; *Tractatus de complexionibus cum glosa*; *Questiones super De secretis mulierum*; *De Terminis confundentibus*.

While several of Oresme's scientific tracts, especially the shorter ones, have not yet been critically analyzed, it is probable that his most important and original contributions to scientific thought have been laid bare by the research of numerous scholars during the past century.<sup>10</sup> As early as 1852, the Abbé

<sup>9</sup> Five references to a commentary on the *Physics* are found in the *Du Ciel*; see ff. 30a, 30b, 109c, 162b, 166d. Borchert, op. cit., p. 16, notes the following reference to a *traitié* otherwise unidentified: "Et tout ce je suppose sans plus declarer comme verité pure et neccessaire et demonstree en *Metheores*, et en un petit tractié qui se commence: 'Inter omnes impressiones.' Cf. *Du Ciel*, fol. 202c.

<sup>10</sup> Among the earlier studies of Oresme's scientific works were the following: E. de Fréville, "Mémoire sur la cosmographie du moyen âge. Le Traité de la sphère par N.O. et les découvertes maritimes des Normands," *Revue des Sociétés savantes des départements*, 2<sup>me</sup> série, II (1859), pp. 705-29; M. Curtze, *Die mathematischen Schriften des N.O.* (Berlin, 1870); Heinrich Suter, "Eine bis jetzt unbekannte Schrift des Nicole



Picard<sup>11</sup> called attention to the importance of the still unpublished *De Configuratione qualitatum*. It is in this work that Oresme presented what seems to have been the first method of representing graphically the coordinates of a variable.<sup>12</sup> This he accomplished by drawing a straight base line, representing the measure of time or space; upon this line he erected verticals whose length varied in proportion to the corresponding "intensity" or position of the variable. By connecting the ends of the verticals, he obtained a curve giving a visible picture of the fluctuation in the "intensity" of the variable. By logical stages, he proceeded from simple to more complicated cases, passing from linear to plane surfaces, until he had formulated, in the terminology of the mathematics of his day, the basic principle for the measurement of variables upon which our modern science of natural law and the technical application of this is so largely dependent. It is doubtful if Oresme himself recognized the importance of his discovery that motion is a function of time. The exploitation of this concept could not be accomplished until the science of mathematics had progressed to the point where a numerical equivalent of Oresme's geometrical representation was feasible and this further advance required more than two centuries for its ultimate fulfillment.

Thus it is probably an exaggerated claim that Duhem has put forth that Oresme was the "inventor" of analytical geometry.<sup>13</sup> While admitting that Galileo may have known the *De Configuratione qualitatum* and may even have found in it the starting point of his formula for the first law of motion, Wieleitner has convincingly demonstrated that the work contains nothing pertaining to analytical geometry in the Cartesian sense.<sup>14</sup> Hailing Oresme as "einer der grössten Denker der Geschichte," Hugo Dingler declares that Oresme's geometrical concept of variables leads directly to the general idea of functional exponents upon which kinematics and dynamics are based and that this discovery marks the beginning of the new age of rational mastery over nature.<sup>15</sup> However, if it be admitted that Oresme's discovery "leads directly" to the idea of functional exponents, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that a considerable gap exists between this discovery and the ultimate perfection of the concept to the point of making it practically useful. Duhem was on safer ground in regarding Oresme as the precursor of Galileo and Descartes;<sup>16</sup> this judgment is as far as one can safely venture on the basis of our present knowledge of his works.

Oresme," *Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik*, XXVI (1882), pp. 117-128, in which the author reports the discovery of *Questiones super metheorum* in *Cod. Sangallensis* 839, ff. 1-54; Charles Jourdain, "N.O. et les astrologues à la cour de Charles V." *Revue des Questions historiques*, XVIII (1875), pp. 136-159.

<sup>11</sup> "Dissertation sur un traité philosophique de N.O.," *Précis analytique des travaux de l'Académie des Sciences, Belles-lettres et Arts de Rouen*, XI (1852), pp. 445-72.

<sup>12</sup> H. Wieleitner, "Ueber dem Funktionsbegriff und die graphische Darstellung bei Oresme," *Bibliotheca mathematica*, XIV (1914), pp. 115-145, reproduces the figures drawn by Oresme to illustrate his method. The most important are found also in Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, III, pp. 385-88.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, III, p. 275 et seq. The carefully weighed judgment of C.B. Boyer, *The Concepts of the Calculus*, p. 80, may serve to correct this exaggeration: "The work of Oresme . . . makes most effective use of geometrical diagrams and

intuition, and of a coördinate system to give his demonstrations a convincing simplicity. This graphical representation . . . marked a step toward the development of the calculus, for . . . it was the study of geometrical problems and the attempt to express these in terms of number which suggested the derivative and the integral and made the elaboration of these concepts possible."

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 143-45.

<sup>15</sup> *Geschichte der Naturphilosophie*, p. 76 et seq.

<sup>16</sup> "Un Précurseur français de Copernic, N.O.," *Revue générale des sciences pures et appliquées*, XX (1909), pp. 866-73. Boyer, *ibid.*, p. 82, evaluates Oresme's study of variables as follows: "Oresme's work marks a notable advance in mathematical analysis in that it associated the study of variation with the representation by coördinates. He was apparently the first to take the significant step of representing an instantaneous rate of change by a straight line. He could not, of course, give a satisfactory definition of instantaneous velocity, but he strove to

In a very real sense Oresme's speculations in the realm of natural phenomena was, as Duhem has shown,<sup>17</sup> the culminating point of a half century of persistent effort to explain the mechanics of the universe along rationalistic lines. This movement developed out of the teaching of William of Ockham at the University of Paris in the first half of the Fourteenth Century. From Ockham it derived its rigorously logical search for scientific truth and its determination to avoid all undemonstrable suppositions of possibility. The first notable figure in this revival of Nominalism at Paris was Ockham's pupil, John Buridan (ca. 1300-ca. 1360). Buridan attacked the Aristotelian theory of motion as erroneous and proposed in its stead a revival of the long discarded "impetus" theory originally stated by Hipparchus (ca. 140 B.C.), which was transmitted to the Middle Ages by the Greek commentator of the *Physics*, John Philoponus (6th cent.). In the fourth Book of the *Physics*, Aristotle holds that a moving object is impelled by the air displaced by it. The "impetus" theory assumes that the object moved is impelled by the "impetus impressed" upon it by the mover, the motion being transmitted in the same direction as that which the mover has impressed upon it and at the same velocity throughout its course. Buridan made several refinements upon this theory, particularly with respect to the velocities, which he perceived to be variable at different stages of the motion, and he applied this concept to the celestial bodies. In the latter attempt, he was able to throw off the onus of the Aristotelian Intelligences, which had caused so much debate among his predecessors, and to prepare the way for the development of celestial mechanics. Borchert has demonstrated the close parallel between passages in *Du Ciel et du monde* and Buridan's *Questiones in De celo et mundo*, pertaining to the daily rotation of the earth;<sup>18</sup> Oresme's arguments are similar to those of his former teacher and his examples are in several instances identical. Continuing in the direction indicated by Buridan, another pupil, Albert of Saxony (+1390) carried forward his speculations on natural phenomena and in the latter's *Questiones* on the *De Coelo* (1368), the velocity of a falling object is established as proportionate to the space traversed. To Oresme was reserved, as we have seen, the representation through geometrical figures of the functional relation of a moving object to a measurable constant.

The number of manuscript copies of the *De Configuratione qualitatum* still extant justifies the assumption that this work was widely known in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. Yet it must seem an unfortunate accident of chance that it was not this work which was selected for publication in the early years of the printing press, but rather its pale and, as Wieleitner has shown, its distorted shadow, the *Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum*. Even this manual was, however, sufficiently impressive to induce Maximilian Curtze to regard its author—whom he assumed to be Oresme himself—as the precursor of Descartes in analytical geometry.<sup>19</sup> It was also Curtze who, in his study of the *Algorismus*

clarify this idea by remarking that the greater the velocity is, the greater would be the distance covered if the motion were to continue uniformly at this rate.

<sup>17</sup> *Le Système du monde*, IV (Paris, 1916), pp. 91-183, ch. ix, "L'Astronomie parisienne au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle: les physiciens." (Section on Oresme, pp. 157-164.)

<sup>18</sup> *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei N.O.*, pp. 68-70. On the history of the theory of the daily rotation, cf. G. McColley, "The Theory of the Diurnal Rotation of the Earth," *Isis*, XXVI (1937), pp. 392-402. Jean Buridan anticipated Oresme's arguments in favor of rotation in his *Quaestiones de Coelo et Mundo*, Liber II, Quaestio 22 (ed. E.A. Moody, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, pp. 226-

233), and appears to have been the first mediaeval philosopher to raise the question. Like Oresme, Buridan finally decides against rotation, but is clearly impressed with the advantages of the arguments he advances in its favor.

<sup>19</sup> *Die mathematischen Schriften des Nicole Oresme*, pp. 26-35. Of the historical role of the doctrine of the latitude of forms Boyer gives the following estimate: "In spite of the reputation maintained by the great proponents of the doctrine [Calculator, Oresme, Blasius of Parma, et al.] the type of work they represented was not destined to be the basis of the decisive influence in the development of the methods of the calculus. The guiding principles were to be

*proportionum*, revealed Oresme's use of a practical method of representing fractional exponents,—a method regarded by Cantor<sup>20</sup> as the earliest in any way related to the modern system.

The dominant characteristic of the later Parisian Nominalist School was their sceptical attitude toward any and all rationally undemonstrable hypotheses. It was probably this scepticism which prompted Oresme to criticize adversely the practices of the astrologers in an age when their hold upon popular imagination was almost universal. Thorndike's analysis of the three tracts against the astrologers shows that Oresme's arguments were based upon the strong doubt that he held with respect to the commensurability of the movements of the heavens; if these movements are incommensurable and of disproportionate velocities, it is ridiculous to presume that any system can be devised for forecasting future events from the position of heavenly bodies. All that can be accomplished is the approximate prediction of eclipses and conjunctions.<sup>21</sup> The discussion of the movement of the heavenly bodies forms the substance of *De Commensurabilitate motuum celi*, of which the third and last section is in the form of a debate between Arithmetic and Geometry, with the former supporting commensurability and the latter opposing. The issue is left undecided, but the stronger arguments are presented by Geometry.<sup>22</sup>

The same questioning attitude of mind permeates the commentary on *De Coelo* and leads to Oresme's keen criticism and refutation of many of Aristotle's explanations of natural phenomena. A favorite method of refutation is to cite Aristotle against himself, a device at once effective and requiring a wide and intimate knowledge of the scientific corpus. Recurrent in this commentary is the clearly expressed intention to examine Aristotle's arguments freely and frankly with the conviction that whenever these arguments can withstand the searching test of rational analysis they should be adopted into the Catholic faith. Thus the Church will be preserved from the danger of erroneous [*scilicet* irrational] teaching in the field of natural philosophy, which for Oresme is merely a subordinate branch of theology. "Et mon entencion est de les [les raisons d'Aristote] reciter loialment et examiner diligeamment en monstrant les defautes d'aucunes de elles en rayson naturelle, pour oster occasions d'aucunes grandes erreurs en la foy catholique."<sup>23</sup> The preoccupation of modern science to establish a clear boundary between science and theology was wholly absent from the mind of this fourteenth-century scholar, a fact which tends to act as a serious barrier to a just appreciation of his solid intellectual accomplishments. If, however, we examine his commentary with the realization that much of our modern thinking is based upon theories which in the future may seem as naïve as those held by Oresme which we have now discarded, we shall be more likely to judge him fairly as an expert wielder of the only scientific instrument with which he was acquainted,—logic as this was understood by the schoolmen and recently strengthened and revitalized under the influence of Ockham's

supplied by the geometry of Archimedes, although these were to be modified by kinematic notions derived from the quasi Peripatetic disputations of the Scholastic philosophers on the subject of variation." (*Concepts of the Calculus*, p. 88.)

<sup>20</sup> M. Cantor, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, II (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1900), pp. 128-37. Cantor's knowledge of mediaeval mathematics was obtained at second hand and his discussion of Oresme's use of fractional exponents was taken from Curtze's introduction to his edition of the *Algorismus proportionum* (Berlin, 1868). Cantor's estimate is important, however, because of the large perspective which his

erudition in more recent periods provided. Still another mathematical problem which interested Oresme was that of infinite series; several passages in the commentary on *De Coelo* contain suggestions along this line, notably fols. 19a, 20c, 21a and 23a. Boyer, *ibid.*, p. 86, indicates how this interest grew out of the consideration of the latitude of forms and points out that Calculator anticipated Oresme by several years in this field. This topic was essential in the development of the calculus.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, III, p. 406.

<sup>22</sup> This is the only use of allegory found in Oresme's works thus far.

<sup>23</sup> Fol. 41d.

razor. The idea of experimentation as we understand the term today was wholly foreign to Oresme's mind; but he was a keen observer of the world around him and he was not afraid to point out the discrepancies between his observations and the accepted explanations whenever these seemed to contradict rational truth. Whatever advances he made were the result of his keen critical judgment and the sheer speculative powers of his intelligent mind applied to the problems which, under the impact of Greek and Arabic philosophy, had been agitating Western European scholars for more than two centuries.

### III. MEDIAEVAL LATIN VERSIONS OF *DE COELO ET MUNDO*

Jaeger's recent investigation<sup>1</sup> of the place occupied by *De Coelo et mundo* in the development of the Aristotelian corpus has demonstrated three facts: 1° the work is correctly ascribed to Aristotle; 2° it was written after the lost treatise *De Philosophia*, portions of which it contains, while it refutes the general concepts of the earlier work; 3° it contains numerous emendations and several important contradictions of concepts discussed in the *Physics*, and these represent a more mature understanding of many similar problems common to both treatises. Thus the *De Coelo* belongs to a later period than the *Physics* as a whole, although revisions of the latter work were probably subsequent to the completion of *De Coelo*. Throughout the period between the Twelfth and the Sixteenth Centuries, the *De Coelo* enjoyed a popularity at least as great as that of the *Physics* and its influence upon scientific speculation was proportionately as extensive. Thorndike lists forty-eight commentaries or questions on the *De Coelo* in his *Catalogue of Incipits*, omitting Oresme's French commentary, the only one in a vernacular language made during the period covered by his invaluable index of mediaeval scientific writings.

The Arabs possessed at least two versions<sup>2</sup> of *De Coelo*, the earlier by Ibn-el-Batric, chief of the Bagdad school during the califate of Mamûn (813-833), and a later version, mentioned by Averrhoës as "not literal," by Abul-l-Faraj. Doubtless both these versions were made from the Syriac, possibly from the translation from Greek to Syriac attributed to Sergios of Resh' Ainâ (+536). Western Europe first became acquainted with the work through the outlines of several Aristotelian treatises included in the *De Divisione philosophiae* (ca. 1150) of Dominicus Gundisalvi, archdeacon of Segovia, who utilized Alfarabi's *De Scientia* and *De Ortu scientiarum* (ca. 950), and the translation of portions of the *De Coelo* contained in Avicenna's *Liber sufficientiae*, made by Gundisalvi with the aid of Avendeath. About 1170, Gerard of Cremona, greatest of the Toledan translators, completed the first Latin version of *De Coelo*, whose incipit reads, in the thirteenth-century manuscript, Vienna Hofbibliothek, MS. 2318, "Summa cognitionis nature et scientie ipsam significantis in corporibus existit et in reliquis magnitudinibus." Scattered citations from this earliest Latin *De Coelo* have been noted in the writings of Daniel of Morlay at the end of the Twelfth Century and in the *Summa de bono* of Philippe de Grève (+1236). Before 1230, Michael Scot had completed a new Latin version from the Arabic, accompanied by the Middle Commentary of Averrhoës. The text of this version begins: "Maxima cognitio nature et scientia demonstrans ipsam est in corporibus et in aliis magnitudinibus," and the commentary as follows: "In primo tractatu istius libri continentur decem summae magnae." Both these versions from the Arabic were employed by Albertus Magnus in his commentary.

<sup>1</sup> Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, (English trans., Oxford, 1934), pp. 293-308.

<sup>2</sup> On the transmission of the Aristotelian scientific corpus, cf. S.D. Wingate, *The Mediaeval Latin Versions of the Aristotelian Scientific Corpus, with Special Reference*

*to the Biological Works* (London, 1931); concerning *De Coelo*, see especially pp. 94-96. The pioneer work of Amable Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote* (2nd ed., Paris, 1843) is still useful.

The first Latin translation from the Greek text of *De Coelo* is attributed to William of Moerbeke. The incipit reads: "De natura scientia fere plurima videtur circa corpora et magnitudines." Since William is known to have completed a translation of Simplicius' commentary on *De Coelo* in 1271, it is assumed that he had already made his translation of the Aristotelian work before that year, though probably not before 1270. Saint Thomas used this version<sup>3</sup> along with the commentary of Simplicius as the basis for his own commentary on *De Coelo*, which was completed by his disciple Peter of Alvernia, in 1272. In the extant manuscripts this Greek-Latin translation is frequently accompanied by Simplicius' commentary and often appears in the same codex with William's translation of the *Meteora*. The superiority of the Greek-Latin version was generally recognized by later mediaeval scholars and the Arabic-Latin versions were little used by them, although Scot's translation of Averrhoës commentary was frequently cited. Until the fifteenth-century translations of Trapezuntius (ca. 1440) and Argyropylos (ca. 1460), this version attributed to William of Moerbeke remained standard. It was several times printed during the first century of the printing press.<sup>4</sup>

#### IV. ORESME'S TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

Like the great majority of fourteenth-century scholars, Oresme knew no Greek. His translations of Aristotle were all made from mediaeval Latin versions and in every instance he chose as his original the Latin text translated directly from the Greek. In the case of the *Ethics* and the *De Coelo*, for which Arabic-Latin versions were available, he used the latter sparingly as secondary texts, referring to them in his commentary as "l'autre translacion." With respect to the *De Coelo*, of which there were two Arabic-Latin translations, there is no evidence that Oresme consulted the earlier (ca. 1170) by Gerard of Cremona; he often cites the commentary of Averrhoës, which accompanied Michael Scot's translation (ca. 1230), and the quotation from "l'autre translacion" in fol. 4c is taken from the *nova translatio*, as Scott's version was called in the Renaissance. It appears, therefore, that Oresme ignored the older Arabic-Latin version but kept Scott's translation of Aristotle's text with the Middle Commentary of Averrhoës constantly before him. The basic text of his original was the so-called *antiqua translatio* from Greek to Latin by William of Moerbeke (ca. 1270), which had superseded the earlier versions from the time of its adoption by Saint Thomas. Several manuscript copies of this version contain also William's translation of Simplicius' fifth-century commentary; undoubtedly Oresme used such a manuscript as his original, probably similar in every respect to Toulouse, MS. 733, ff. 245-267 or Rennes, MS. 149, ff. 119-136, both of the Thirteenth Century, with Simplicius' commentary partly marginal and partly interlinear.

All of William's translations from the Greek are characterized by an extreme literalness, to the extent that they have proved highly serviceable in re-establishing the Greek texts. In the prologue to *Le Livre de Ethiques* Oresme set forth the guiding principles under which he proposed to carry out his translating: "Je doy estre excusé en partie, "he writes, "se je ne parle en ceste matiere si proprement, si clerement et si ordeneement comme il fust mestier; car . . . je ne ose pas esloingnier mon parler du texte de Aristote, qui est en plusieurs lieux obscur, afin que je ne passe hors son intencion et que je ne faille." After this declaration we are prepared for a literal rendering, but

<sup>3</sup> It is still published with the works of Saint Thomas; Leonine edition, III (Rome, 1886), pp. 1-257.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Gesamt Katalog der Wiegendrucke*, I (Leipzig, 1926), items 2354-57. The only

French translation from the Greek is J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, *Traité du ciel d'Aristote traduit en français pour la première fois et accompagné de notes perpétuelles* (Paris, 1866.)

actually he took no inconsiderable liberties with his originals; his translations are indeed so free that they have been judged to be paraphrases and it is certain that he frequently interpolated phrases and expressions not present in the original text. This he did in order to make the vernacular version abundantly clear to the lay reader. His translations are free in the best sense of the term. Their characteristic qualities may be seen at a glance by placing corresponding passages of the Latin and French texts in juxtaposition:

*De Coelo*, ed. *Juntas*, 66D-67A.

Simul autem manifestum est quod neque locus neque vacuum, neque tempus est extra coelum. In omni enim loco, corpus esse possibile est. Vacuum autem esse dicunt, in quo non est corpus possibile autem est esse. Tempus autem est numerus motus, motus autem sine naturali corpore non est.

Extra autem coelum quod neque est neque contingit esse corpus ostensum est. Manifestum igitur est quod neque locus, neque vacuum, neque tempus est extrinsecus. Quapropter neque quae illic sunt, nata sunt in loco esse, neque tempus ipsa facit senescere, neque ulla transmutatio ullius eorum est, qui super extima disposita sunt latatione, sed inalterabilia et impassibilia, optimam habentia vitam et per se sufficientissimam perseverant toto aevo. Etenim hoc nomen divine enunciatur est ab Antiquis; finis enim quod continet vitae uniuscuiusque tempus, cuius nihil est extra secundum naturam, aevum uniuscuiusque vocatum est. Secundum eandem autem rationem et totius celi finis, et finis omne tempus ac infinitatem continens, aevum est ab eo quod sit semper, sumpta de nominatione, immortale et divinum. Unde et aliis pendet, his quidem exactius, his autem obscurius esse et vivere. Etenim, quemadmodum in vulgaribus sententiis circa divina saepe declaratur rationibus quod divinum ipsum intransmutabile esse necesse est omne, primum ac maxime summum. Quid sic se habens attestatur iis quae dicta sunt, neque

*Du Ciel et du monde*, ch. 24,  
fols. 34bcd-35bc.

Aveques ce puet apparoir que hors le ciel ou hors ce monde n'est lieu ne vieu ne temps, quar en tout lieu puet estre corps. Et ceulz qui dient que vieu puet estre, dient que vieu est la ou n'est quelconque(s) corps. Et est possible que aucun corps y soit. Et temps est nombre et mesure de mouvement. Et mouvement n'est pas sanz corps naturel, et il est monsté devant que hors le ciel n'est et ne puet estre quelconque(s) corps. Et donques appert il que hors le ciel n'est lieu ne vieu ne temps. Et pour ce, les choses qui sont yleuques ne sont pas habiles a estre en lieu, ne temps ne les fait envieillir, quar nulle transmutacion ne puet estre de quelconque(s) des choses qui sont sus ce qui est meü ordeneement. Mais [c]es choses sont sanz alteration et impassibles et ont vie tres bonne, et par soy tres sufisante et parfaite, et l'ont en tot le temps pardurable. Quar cest non *pardurable* fu par les anciens enoncié et approprié a la divinité ou aus choses divines pour ce que la fin qui contient le temps de la vie de quelconque(s) chose, duquel temps rien de ceste chose n'est hors selonc nature, il l'appelloient le pardurable ou l'éternité ou siecle de celle chose. Et selonc ceste rayson, la fin de tout le monde et tout le temps et la perfection qui contient infinité est pardurableté, et prent sa d[en]ominacion ou est ainsi dicte de ce qu'i est chose immortelle et divine. Et de ce est as autres choses communiqué et dirivé estre et vivre, as unes plus clerement et as autres plus obscurément. Quar si comme il est mainte foys declairé par raysons es livres des choses divines, ce qui est divin et premier et souverain est intransmuable par necessité et ne puet estre transmué. Et ce que il est en ceste

enim aliud melius est, quod moveat; illud enim esset utique divinius, neque habet pravitatem ullam, neque indigens suorum bonorum ullo est. Et incessabile utique motu movetur rationabiliter; omnia enim quae moventur, quiescunt, cum venerint in proprium locum. Eius autem corporis quod circulariter movetur, idem est locus unde incoepit et in quem finit.

*De Coelo*, ed. Juntas, 161D.

Nos autem dicamus primum utrum habeat motum, an maneat. Nam uti diximus, alii quidem ipsam unum astrorum esse faciunt, alii autem in medio ponentes, volui et moveri dicunt circa medium polum. Quod autem impossibile sit, manifestum est sumpto principio, quod si fertur sive in medio existens, sive extra medium, necessarium est ipsam violentia moveri hoc motu, non enim ipsius terrae est: etenim particularum unaquaeque hanc haberet lationem: nunc autem super recta omnes feruntur ad medium; quapropter cum violentia sit et praeter naturam, non possibile est sempiternam esse: mundi autem ordo sempiternus est.

maniere donne testimonie aus choses devant dictes. Quar se telle chose estoit transmuee ou meüe, celle qui la mouvroit seroit meilleur et plus devine. Et rien n'est meilleur de la chose dessus dicté. Item, il n'a en soy rien de mal ne defaut de quelconque(s) bien. Et donques s'ensuit il par rayson que il moeve le ciel par mouvement qui onques ne cesse, quar toutes choses qui sont meües et cessent de leur mouvement et repousent, c'est quant elles sont venues en leur propre lieu. Et du cors qui est meü circulairem[en]t, le lieu est un meïsme et dont il commence et la ou il fine.

*Du Ciel et du monde*, II, ch. 29, fol. 148d.

Nous dirons donques premierement, a savoir mon, se la terre a mouvement ou repos, car, si comme nous avons dit, les uns dient que elle tourne environ le centre aussi comme une autre estoille; les autres mettent que elle est ou milieu et que elle est tournée et revolue environ son centre et environ son pole ou ses poles. Mais que ce soit impossible il appert; premierement, car posé que elle soit hors le milieu ou en milieu, il convient par neccessité que mouvement circulaire lui fust violent, car tel mouvement n'est pas naturel a la terre. Car chascune partie de elle avroit tel mouvement, et nous voions que toutes tendent au milieu par mouvement droit. Et donques seroit ce mouvement circulaire violent a la terre; et ce ne est pas possible que chose violente et qui est hors nature soit perpetuele, et l'ordre du monde est perpetuel.

These representative passages demonstrate the extent of Oresme's ingenuity as a translator. Clearly, he was no slave to the letter of the original, yet his rendering is faithful to the meaning of the text. His occasional interpolations generally assist the understanding of the original and his French, in spite of its heavy burden of scientific neologisms, conveys the feeling of originality. On the general excellence of Oresme's workmanship the foremost French translator of Aristotle in the Nineteenth Century, Bartélemy Saint-Hilaire, commented: "L'oeuvre d'Oresme est faite avec le plus grand soin . . . Au mérite d'être la première traduction en langue moderne, celle d'Oresme en joint un autre: c'est celui de cette clarté, de cette classification des choses, de cette netteté qui sont toutes françaises . . . A l'époque où vivait Oresme, il n'existait peut-être point en Europe un autre homme capable d'en faire autant que lui."

<sup>1</sup> *Les Politiques d'Aristote*, I (Paris, 1837), Préface, p. xxvii.

As in all his translations of Aristotle, Oresme does not in *Du Ciel et du monde* follow the division of chapters found in the original; for the sake of clarity, he divides again and again and his chapter headings might serve as a useful outline of the contents of the work. The commentary interspersed throughout is more voluminous than the text and is the most extensive of any of his translations. With the exception of three rather extended passages, the comment in *Les Ethiques* hardly deserves to be called "commentary," but might more properly be designated "gloss." In *Les Politiques* the translator's contribution is much greater, with many passages meriting the designation "commentary." Roughly, the proportion of commentary in *Les Politiques* is about one half that of *Du Ciel*. The most extensive commentary appears in Book II of the latter work; the last two books contain proportionately far less original material. This material ranges over a vast field of subjects dealing with the cosmological speculations of the original text. Sometimes Oresme points out an inconsistency between a passage in *De Coelo* and a related Aristotelian text, most frequently the *Physics*. Again, he explains the terse language of Aristotle in simple terms which an educated layman might be expected to comprehend, with examples drawn from concrete instances in nature or easily observed experience. Again, the commentator brings out a significant relationship between a statement of Aristotle and the doctrine of the Church; when a conflict appears to exist between the two, he seeks to show by logical argument why the doctrine of the Church may reasonably be accepted as true. Often he finds himself at odds with the principle expressed in the text; on such occasions we may expect an extended passage involving skilful discussion of abstruse problems,—the character of a continuum, the existence of a vacuum, the concept of infinity, the nature of motion, the daily rotation of the earth, the plurality of worlds and many others. These are the sections of the work that offer the maximum interest to the modern reader; because of their bearing upon the science of Oresme's time their importance has been recognized by Duhem and Borchert, both of whom have published and discussed substantial portions in the course of their investigations in the history of science.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the text Oresme inserted numerous short references to parallel or analagous passages in other parts of the text or in other works, comparable to reference foot-notes in a modern work of similar type. In this way the translator bound the work together in a closely knit organization, so that the unity of the whole is constantly emphasized. Finally, in order to make easier the use of such a compendious work, Oresme added at the end (ff. 203d-208c) a table of "choses notables"—a topical summary of his principal commentaries, with chapter references; this helpful outline of the translator's strictures upon the text bears witness to his fondness of orderly arrangement and his concern for the reader's convenience. With the addition of folio references, this table becomes a serviceable index.

## V. SUMMARY OF ORESME'S COMMENTARY

Oresme begins his commentary with definitions of several technical terms: *magnitude*, *continuu*, *divisible*, *ligne*, *longitude*, *latitude*, *spissitude*, *dimension*, etc. (3c). He notes that in common speech the longest dimension of an object is called *longitude*, the next in length *latitude* and the shortest *spissitude* ou *profondeur* (4a). To Aristotle's remark that three is the sum of all possible

<sup>2</sup>Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, III, pp. 346-375; *idem*, *Le Système du monde*, IV, pp. 159-163; *idem*, "Un Précurseur français de Copernic, N.O.," *loc. cit.*, pp. 866-73. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei N.O.*, cites *Du Ciel* frequently

in foot-notes, pp. 23-68. The topics which receive most attention in Oresme's commentary are often the same as those discussed at length and more penetratingly in Buridan's *Quaestiones de Coelo et Mundo* (ca. 1340).



dimensions he adds a reference to this topic in the pseudo-Ovidian *De Vetula*, adding that "en chascune chose est aucune trinité." (4c). This leads to a discussion of the mystic significance of the number three, with citations from Vergil and the *Livre des mysteres des nombres* and examples drawn from arithmetic and geometry (5a). Oresme explains how a moving point traces a line, a moving line traces a surface and a moving surface traces a solid body. (5d). The theological connotation of the term *trinity* is expounded at length.

According to their nature, all corporeal things are capable of motion,—the heavens, the four elements and all possible combinations of the four elements—either to their natural locus when they are accidentally displaced or within their locus as, for example, the celestial spheres. Anticipating upon his speculation that the earth may move (92b-94c, 138b-144c), even though Aristotle and Averroes held that the center of the universe must necessarily be motionless, Oresme refers the reader to these commentaries and declares briefly that it is possible and perhaps even necessary that the earth be moved "aucune foys." All motion must be either (1) in a straight line (2) circular or (3) mixed, i.e., composed of (1) and (2). There are three kinds of simple motion: (1) in a straight line away from the center of the earth (2) in a straight line towards the center of the earth and (3) circular motion around the center of the earth. (7a). Simple bodies will have simple motions, while mixed bodies will have mixed motions (8a). But this statement requires lengthy explanation. Oresme gives numerous examples of mixed motion: a fly walks along the handle of a lance which is being moved in the opposite direction; a man walks across the deck of a ship which is proceeding forward; the sun has a daily motion differing from the motion of its sphere; the motion of the planets is a further example of mixed motion. (8b). Such mixed motions are controlled by the motive quality which dominates in the object moved (9b), which makes it necessary to know the qualities of the four elements, each of which has naturally a straight linear motion; the natural motion of the heavenly bodies is circular (9d). Each element seeks its natural locus; but Oresme imagines a situation in which air is made to descend to the center of the earth to show that by violence the elements may move contrary to their natural motion. (10a).

Contrary motion is explained. Fire naturally ascends; but if fire be made to descend, this constitutes a contrary motion for this element. Aristotle maintains that any motion can have only one contrary, but Oresme points out that if fire is moved in a circle, such motion would represent a second contrary, which is contrary to logic; therefore circular motion of fire does not constitute a contrary motion, which explains why it is possible for the sphere of fire to move in its orbit without violence. (10c). It is the natural circular motion of the celestial spheres which causes the celestial fire to move in a circle, contrary to the natural linear motion of fire ordinarily observed. Thus is shown the power of the higher—and consequently, nobler—spheres above the spheres of the elements to determine the motion of all the celestial bodies (11c). The planets are nearer to the earth at certain times than at others, but this is not due to linear motion; it is attributable to the fact that they move in epicycles. Comets have linear motion; but comets are not really stars at all, as Aristotle has shown in the first book of *Meteors* (12d).

The heavens are not subject to the ordinary effects of generation and corruption by heat, cold, health, taste, etc., for they were not created by the natural processes of change from one state of being to another but divinely created by God (13d). Aristotle maintains that the heavens are incorruptible since no change had been observed in their appearance before his time. But Varro declared on the authority of certain ancient mathematicians that in the time of King Ogiges the sun changed its color, its strength, its appearance and its course. At this time occurred a great flood—about 760 years B.C. (14b). Moreover, the

sun stopped completely in the time of Joshua and was eclipsed at the time of the crucifixion. This is Oresme's first mention of the biblical account of Joshua; he uses it to disprove the idea of incorruptibility on several occasions (92b, 95b, 142a, 144a) and to prove the power of divine might to accomplish supernatural actions, such as the creation of the world so positively denied in the thesis of the Peripatetics that the world had neither beginning nor end. This teaching, being contrary to the Christian doctrine of creation, had been condemned by all previous Christian commentators of *De Coelo* and Oresme spares no pains to refute it in numerous passages (14c).

Although it is true, as Aristotle states, that circular motion has no contrary, it is possible to imagine the heavens or any spherical body turned about on its poles so that the effect produced would be to give the appearance of contrary motion. Thus we can credit in part at least the statements of Pomponius Mela and Solinus that the sun now sets where it formerly rose. This is, of course, not literally true, for the world has not existed long enough for the arctic pole to reach the position once occupied by the antartic pole; but such a phenomenon is imaginable if we concede that the earth itself moves, as will be shown in the discussion of this latter possibility in a later chapter (138a-144a). This passage prepares us for Oresme's cogent arguments for the rotation of the earth (16b).

On the basis of the mathematical theory of infinite series, it is conceivable that a body moving in a circle might pass through infinite space in a finite period of time or conversely, through a given space in infinite time. But this could not happen in nature; for the heavenly bodies proceed at a fixed rate of speed and do not increase or decrease their speed according to any mathematical proportion. It might be said that beyond the heaven which we see other heavens could exist in infinite number moving at various rates of speed; this is imaginable, but is naturally impossible because the movement of natural bodies is fixed at a certain speed. Parts of a moving body may slow down to zero speed, but they can not increase their speed beyond that of the parent body. To imagine that many heavens exist beyond the heaven which we see is pure speculation and is contrary to appearances and disproved in philosophy (19a).

To refute Aristotle's theory that a body moves at a rate of speed proportionate to its weight, Oresme introduces an argument drawn from the "impetus impulsus" concept of motion widely subscribed to by the Parisian School at the time and frequently mentioned by Oresme in the present work. He declares that the rate of speed of an object is not determined by the proportional increase or decrease of the *puissance motive* but rather by the increase or decrease of the proportion between the *puissance motive* and the resistance of the body. This proportion he calls *medietas sequialtere* (21c). Against Aristotle's statement that an infinite body must extend infinitely in every direction, Oresme contends that one can imagine a body infinite in only one dimension which would be no less infinite than a body infinite in all dimensions. It would be possible, he declares, to draw conclusions far more wonderful from this hypothesis, but he restrains himself "quant a present" (23a). To Aristotle's suggestion that the weight of a falling object increases proportionately to the speed and, conversely, that the speed increases in proportion to the weight, Oresme reverts again to the "impetus impulsus" theory and declares that this supposed increase in weight is an accidental quality caused by the "enforcement" which results from the increased speed. On this subject he refers the reader to a passage in his now lost commentary on the *Physics*. This accidental quality may be termed *impetuosity* and is not to be confused with weight. For a stone weighing one pound, being dropped from a point one league above the earth, would not naturally weigh more at one part of its descending course than at another.

This impetuosity exists in all kinds of motion natural or violent whenever the speed increases, except in the motion of the celestial spheres (29d). Heavy bodies fall faster than light, but any object moved violently moves more slowly at the end of its flight than at the beginning. This is because of the impetus imparted by the mover. The speed increases for a period while this impetus is in effective ascendancy; then the speed decreases because of resistance (30c). From this general rule Oresme excepts the motion of iron attracted by a magnet, which he states to be faster the nearer the iron approaches the magnet (30d).

Against the Peripatetic doctrine that there can be but one world Oresme argues upon theological lines that such a theory is not sufficiently proven. Here he follows the anti-Aristotelian wing of Scholasticism,<sup>1</sup> which had long refused to place limits upon the divine creative power; building upon the Platonic principle of plenitude, this group held it possible, as Oresme phrases it, that "pluseurs corps premiers et pluseurs movemens soient . . . et que tous ces mondes et ceulz qui les meuvent soient souz un souverain createur" (31b). Having rejected the doctrine of a single possible world, Oresme summarizes the arguments for the Platonists in this longest commentary in Book I. First, he assumes the possibility of a successive series of worlds following one another in time, after the manner suggested by Empedocles, whose theory Aristotle will presently refute (41a). Second, Oresme speculates at length upon the possibility of one world being contained within another, employing all the strings of the scholastic instrument of dialectic to prove that this possibility must not be ruled out. At the end, however, he admits that there is little likelihood that this hypothesis is true nor should one assume a thing to be true which has no appearance of truth nor support an opinion whose contrary is probably true. Just the same, it is good to have considered if this might be possible (36a). Third, the possibility of worlds outside our world must be considered and it is clear from the seriousness of the argument that Oresme favored this theory which Giordano Bruno was later to develop into his apocalyptic vision of an infinite universe run in accordance with the Copernican system of celestial mechanics. The contention that the element of earth in worlds outside our world would be attracted to the earth of our world Oresme rejects, declaring that the earth of other worlds than our own might just as naturally be attracted to the earth of other worlds of which it was a part (36d). It is easy to refute the argument that since there is but one God there can be but one world with the answer that the one God is infinite and that an infinite number of worlds would be within the scope of His infinite power. Also, the statement that all matter is contained in our present world is refuted by the fact that God has the power to create a world *ex nihilo*. The Peripatetic doctrine that nothing can exist in the void assumed to prevail beyond the outermost celestial sphere is not acceptable to Oresme, for whom this void becomes infinite space wherein God could create infinite worlds at His pleasure (38c). Actually, however, there has never been but one corporeal world and there probably never will be, as Aristotle has maintained (39c).

Having explained Aristotle's use of the term *possibilité* (potence), and its opposite, Oresme enters into a discussion of commensurability and incommensurability, referring the reader to his Latin treatise entitled *De Commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi*. To refute the doctrine that everything which has a beginning must have an end, he falls back again upon the evidence supplied by the infinite series which never reaches infinity. Fol-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. A.O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), ch. iv; also D.B. Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth-Century Italy," *Journ. of the*

*History of Ideas*, IV (1943), p. 12. See also Buridan, *Quaestiones de Coelo et Mundo*, Liber I, Quaestio 18 and 19 (ed. Moody, pp. 83-90).

lowing this line of reasoning, Oresme assumes, on the basis of incommensurable numbers, that it is possible to conceive of a motion which never began which will end at a given time; it is also possible to conceive of a motion which began at a given moment which will continue without end. It is amusing to find Oresme accusing Aristotle and Averroes of sophistry and declaring his inability to show the fallacy of their logic after his own extended excursus into mathematical subtleties. This is probably the most penetrating commentary in Book I (44d).

Oresme has divided chapter xii of his original into six chapters of very unequal length. Against Aristotle's doctrine of an ungenerated and indestructible world Oresme marshals all the subtleties of his logical razor, expanding his previous argument, citing Scripture, Ovid, *De Generatione* and the *Physics* to confound the Stagyrte (48b). Basically, his objections, which are both extensive and numerous, are directed against the placing of any limitations whatsoever upon the omnipotence of God. Rightly enough, he complains that the reasoning employed in the original is tortuous and dependent upon the interpretation of unusual terms. He charges both Aristotle and Averroes with sophistic and obscure reasoning (52a), with insufficient proof and he attempts to clarify the text for the reader by introducing figures (24, 25 and 26) to show the logical relation between contraries, contradictories and convertible terms (52d). Oresme repeats with greater detail his previous argument based upon the numerical phenomenon of the infinite series (cf. 44d) and in chapter xxxiv the discussion enters the realm of metaphysics, turning upon such terms as necessity, duration, eternity, etc. (54b). Finally, Oresme openly declares his long evident preference for Plato against Aristotle (62d); for, as Saint Augustine remarked, Plato's doctrines are more in keeping with the tenets of the Catholic faith. Admittedly an excellent philosopher, Aristotle frequently made the mistake of overreaching himself in his efforts to disprove his master's doctrines which, according to Eustrathios, he hated unreasonably. Oresme's attitude was shared generally by the so-called Parisian School of fourteenth-century philosophers whose anti-peripatetic scholasticism explains the motive of their stringent analysis of the Aristotelian corpus and the severe criticisms which they leveled at it.

After the definition of terms customary at the beginning of a Book (65a), Oresme enters upon an extended discussion of the heavens as the abode of God (68a), combining pagan descriptions with scriptural attributes and passing on to the question of the Intelligences or angels (69d). The Aristotelian system is outlined and corrected in accordance with the system of epicycles attributed to Ptolemy. Oresme holds that the Intelligences are moved with the celestial bodies which they cause to move; they are related to the bodies they control as the human soul is related to the human body (70d). This is not to be construed to mean that an angel is restricted to any particular body; an angel may be in Paris, Rome and Rouen at one and the same time, just as a piece of wax could be so elongated as conceivably to reach to the sky (71d). Four ways are imagined whereby an angel may change position; but wherever they may move, they are never far from God, who is everywhere (72b). Rumor has it that angels inhabit certain places more than others by preference; both Scripture and pagan writers support this thesis (73a).

Do the heavens revolve without resistance or effort? Aristotle affirms this; but Oresme doubts (73c). There is a special kind of resistance to motion in the heavenly bodies which does not incline them to any other motion or absence of motion, but merely governs the speed at which they rotate. This does not mean that the motion of the heavens is in any sense comparable to labor or effort; a stone falls without labor, fire burns without effort. The angels which move the heavenly bodies must set their speed at a certain velocity since an

infinite force with all its force cannot move a body having limited resistance, for this would result in infinite speed, which is impossible (74a). In the same way, it is said that God could not make a creature so perfect that He could not make one more perfect still (74b).

Against Aristotle, Oresme argues that the heavens are not composed of living matter; they are moved by the Intelligences, but these do not give life to the bodies to which they attach themselves (77d). To maintain the contrary as Aristotle does would offer comfort to idolaters who worship the sun, moon, etc. (79a).

With the aid of several figures (3, 4, 5 and 6), Oresme defines at length the meaning of right and left, front and reverse, up and down (79d). Do these directions apply to the heavens? Only in a relative sense on the basis of an arbitrarily chosen point observed by a person on the unmoving earth. This accounts for the fact that astrologers have chosen an imaginary point situated in the center of the Eurasian land-mass which they call Arim,<sup>2</sup> from which point they determine east and west motion on the earth's surface (83a). The discussion permits Oresme to interpose a few words on the habitability of the earth; he holds that the inhabitable parts are more noble than the uninhabitable and that the heavens over these parts participate in the qualities attributed to the earth beneath,—which seems to overlook the assumption that the heavens are in constant circular motion and therefore one could only say that the northern heavens are more noble than the southern. Oresme repeats twice that the two ends of the inhabitable earth are at no great distance from each other,—an idea that appears in a justly famous passage of Aristotle's text at the end of Book II (152 d), where Oresme elaborates further upon it (83d). The ingenious arguments advanced to disprove the existence of absolute direction in the heavens are summarized (86d) with a further declaration that Aristotle has failed to prove the heavens to be a living body on the basis of analogy with the human body. The heavens were moved in the first instance from the exterior and once set in motion the perfectly smooth surfaces of the celestial spheres offer no resistance to perpetual motion—as long as it may please God to maintain it thus (87a).

Regarding the position of the habitable portion of the earth, Oresme argues that it can hardly be, as Aristotle states, situated in the left portion of the southern hemisphere. Not only is it impossible to speak of direction absolutely in this sense, but it is unlikely that God would have placed Rome, the center of Christianity, in the least noble portion of the terrestrial sphere. On the contrary, it seems wiser to assume that Rome is in the upper right and therefore in the noblest quarter of the sphere. However, Oresme admits the statement that the arctic pole is at the bottom of the earth and concludes that it must be true that we live in the lower hemisphere (87a). But there are many compensations to mitigate this apparent disadvantage: we have a greater multitude of stars above us; because of *aux solis*, our winters are milder and our lands more suitable for habitation. Quoting from his *Traité de l'esperie*, Oresme observes that the planets move from west to east and discusses their motion in relation to the sun and moon and he notes that with respect to the pole of the planets, sun and moon, the habitable parts of the earth are in the upper and more noble portion of the earth (89a).

With several ingenious arguments, Oresme attacks the Aristotelian precept

<sup>2</sup>The idea of a world center appears to have originated with the Hindus and was transmitted to the West with the translation of the *Khorazmian Tables* by Adelard of Bath (ca. 1130) from the Arabic version of the *Little Sindhind* by Al-Khwarizmi. Arim

or Arin was supposedly situated 90° east of the prime meridian of the west, but came to be placed arbitrarily 10° east of the city of Baghdad. Cf. J.K. Wright, *Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades* (New York, 1925), pp. 82, 86-87.

that the earth must of necessity be in repose at the center of the universe because the center of any sphere in motion must itself be motionless (92c). It is not necessary to assume that the heavens are moved while the earth rests in order to arrive at a reasonable explanation of observed phenomena (95a). There is the story of Joshua to prove that on one occasion at least the heavens stood still for twenty-four hours; but this does not imply that the other normal processes of nature were stopped coincidentally. There is also the story of Jupiter making one night last for forty-eight hours on the occasion of his wooing of Alcmena. Possibly this occurred at the same time as the miraculous stoppage of the sun in its course at the prayer of Joshua (95c).

It is necessary to assume the absolute sphericity of the heavenly spheres since any other figure,—ovoid or elliptical—would imply an interpenetration of the spheres in connection with circular motion (99d). That a spherical figure is the smallest figure capable of containing a given quantity is demonstrated in geometry; therefore a sphere is the logical figure to assume for the shape of the heavens, which contain all things (100c). Without naming its author, Oresme states the Archimedean theory that a body in water will displace its own weight: fresh water will support a lighter weight proportionately than sea water. It is conceivable that the same law would apply to bodies in other elements, e.g., fire in air (103a).

The "impetus" theory of motion is explained in greater detail than previously and a definition of the term *non gradu* is given. No violent motion can be absolutely regular throughout its duration, but parts of any motion may be proportionate to other parts (106b). Three distinct stages are perceptible in any motion and these may be defined (107a). The speed of an object in motion is determined by the proportion between the *vertu motive* and the resistance of the object to this propellant energy (108a). The motion of the celestial spheres does not involve resistance; however, if the speed of their motions was to be doubled or trebled, it would not be observable to human beings provided a similar increase were applied to all earthly objects at the same time (108b). It is conceivable, however, that the celestial bodies within the heavenly spheres might alter their speed and consequently their position with respect to the other bodies (108d). The motion of the celestial spheres is regular, while that of material objects with which we on earth are familiar is irregular. The motion of the heavens is, however, *difformis*, because the parts near the poles and at the center move more slowly than other parts, while the circumferences move at equal speeds. This is why it is possible to divide any spherical body into an equal number of degrees representing equal angles (110c).

Oresme agrees with Aristotle that the stars are a part of the spheres of stars in which they are contained—more noble than other parts because of their light-giving properties (112b). Does the motion of the celestial spheres generate heat? Oresme enters into a lengthy discussion of rarefaction and concludes (113d) that only violent motion produces sufficient friction to cause heat. The rotation of the celestial spheres produces no heat because "la superficie concave du ciel . . . est souverainement polie . . . et donques n'est faite confricacion . . . ne eschaufement par consequent." (114c). However, the light of the celestial bodies produces heat and warms the air and the earth beneath (115b). The apparent motion of the fixed stars may be due to optical illusion (117a) in so far as this apparent motion is distinct from their motion as part of the sphere of which they are an integral part. The moon appears to move, but there are conflicting opinions on this question; Oresme adopts the Ptolemaic explanation based on the theory of the epicycle (118a). Against Aristotle, Oresme contends that the different bodies in the heavens are not necessarily of identical species, adducing several reasons why this may be so (120b).

The question as to whether the heavens in moving produce sound—the

harmony of the spheres—is debated and leads to a discussion of the proportions involved in the musical scale. Supported by Holy Scripture, Macrobius, Plato and Saint Augustine, Oresme concludes that this celestial music exists but is inaudible to the human ear (124b).

For an explanation of the arrangement of the planets and the other celestial bodies Oresme refers the reader to his *Traité de l'esperie*, where the subject is treated in full, in accordance with the ideas set forth in Sacrobosco's *De Sphera* (127c). The phases of the moon are explained (from the same source) on the basis of conjunction and opposition. The speculations of various "astrologiens" that there are mountains visible on the surface of the moon are dismissed as "divinailles." (130a).

In the most striking and interesting of all his commentaries, Oresme speculates on the possibility of reversing the Aristotelian system and postulates the rotation of the earth at the center of an otherwise motionless universe. In support of this thesis he refers to its early promulgation by a contemporary of Aristotle, Heraclitus of Pontus, whose ideas were known but generally discredited during the Middle Ages (138b). Oresme accepts the principle set forth in Witelo's *De Perspectiva* that to be perceptible to man, motion must always be observed in relation to two or more objects. Thus he reasons that to a spectator situated in the heavens it would seem that the earth rotates and the heavens would appear to be at rest (139a). It is impossible to prove experimentally that the heavens move and the earth does not move (140a). Arguments are presented both for and against the rotation of the earth; but somewhat abruptly the conclusion is reached: "et je cuide que il [le ciel] est ainsi meü et la terre non . . . nonobstans les raisons au contraire, car ce sont persuasions qui ne concludent pas evidamment." (144b). Four propositions summarizing Oresme's argument for the rotation of the earth are found in the "Table des choses notables" appended at the end of the work (207b).

Again drawing upon his *Traité de l'esperie*, Oresme states the length of a degree on the meridian to be approximately 43 leagues while the circumference of the earth is about 15,750 leagues (152d). The earth may be considered as having three centers: (1) a true geometrical center (2) the center of its mass (3) the center of its weight. These centers are not identical (153b). The quantitative and the gravitational center would vary slightly in conformity with the surface contour—mountains, valleys, seas, etc. (153c). This observation leads to further discussion of the limits of habitable land (154a). The distance around the earth at the latitude of Rouen is far less than at the equator (Rouen is about 50° North). To traverse the earth at a parallel of high latitude would not be impossible; for, as Aristotle says, the terminus of habitable land in the west is not far distant from habitable land in the east (156b). This observation leads to the problem of the traveller going eastward, who would pass one more day and night (*nuit artificielle*) than had he remained at home; if he went westward, his time would be increased by twenty-four hours. This apparent enigma sets Oresme's poetic muse to work and he concludes his commentary (156c) with a Latin poem of twenty-four lines, the longest poetic effusion found anywhere in his entire works. It will be expedient for the reader who wishes fully to comprehend the present work to consult the author's *Traité de l'esperie*, which might advantageously be bound together with *Du Ciel et du monde* in one volume. Such a book would make a noble and excellent tome on natural philosophy (157a).

Oresme refers to his lost commentary on the *Physics*, where he had discussed the question of infinite indivisibles and speculates upon the action of a ball of fire placed at the center of the earth and attracted from every conceivable direction toward its natural locus in the celestial sphere of fire (162b). The terms of this discussion emphasize the vastly different point of view held by men in Oresme's time from that held today with respect to the nature of

matter. Natural and violent motion are defined in detail with numerous examples (166a). A stone thrown straight downwards would travel faster than if allowed to fall by its own gravitational attraction, but such motion is neither violent nor mixed since it accords with the natural motion of the object. However, a stone thrown transversely combines natural motion with violent and thus such transverse motion is correctly considered mixed (166b). As Aristotle states, air or some other medium is necessary in order that there may be motion; but this medium is not the efficient cause of violent motion, which is due rather to a "vertu motive" imparted to the object by the "premier motif." (166c).

From Aristotle's definition of an element in the *Metaphysics*, Oresme develops an explanation of the composition of things from Form and Matter. Homely examples are given to elucidate the commoner terms of metaphysics. The question whether the elements are present in their proper form in a complex object is answered in the negative, with reference to a discussion on this topic in Oresme's *Quaestiones super generacione et corrupcione* (167c). Several geometrical figures are defined with the statement that such figures are composed of and consequently may be resolved into triangles; the triangle, however, can not be resolved into any other figure. The Greek idea of the composition of the elements was based upon the supposition that each element is composed of a characteristic number of triangles (174d). Further definitions of regular solid figures are given with their geometrical names, in several instances introduced here for the first time in a French work (176b). Oresme explains what plane and what solid figures can be so arranged around a given point as to form a completely filled plane or solid figure (177a).

It is further argued that the elements are not present in their proper form in complex bodies (184d). The substantial form of a body is the efficient cause of its motion toward its natural locus and the same cause may be posited to explain the return of a body to its natural temperature after artificial heating or cooling (188a); thus bodies have in themselves a principle of alteration just as they have a principle of local movement. The extension and intension of qualities is said to account for change in physical bodies. When the quality of lightness, for example, is increased (intension), the body will tend to rise in keeping with the principle that lightness tends upwards while heaviness tends downwards (188c). However, there must be a "puissance accidental" in addition to the "puissance essential" and it is the former which causes the beginning of a motion (189a). Wood is heavier in air than in water, while lead is heavier in water than in air. This is due to the presence of air in the pores of the wood, this air being absent in lead; but when the air disappears after long immersion, the wood sinks in water just as the lead does. Wood which is not porous tends to sink in water and such wood is found near Paris (190c). Oresme repeats an example given in Book I (10a) to show that the natural action of the elements is relative to the milieu in which they are accidentally found. Water will rise above earth, but will not rise above air; air will rise above water, but not above fire, etc. Ultimately each element tends towards its natural locus (192a). The element which contains another element—as the sphere of air contains the earth or the sphere of fire contains the air—is situated above the element contained and is therefore more perfect or noble and may be said to give form to the contained element. In all transmutations of the elements, one term is more perfect than the other—fire is more perfect than air—and generation is said to occur when a lower element, such as air, becomes a higher element, such as fire. The contrary action is called corruption, as when a beast or a man is transformed into carrion (193a).

Each element has its special qualities,—fire is hot and dry, water is wet and cold—and generation results from the interpenetration of one of the qualities



common to the two elements, as when the heat of fire is fused with the heat of air. Plato expressed this relation between the elements in terms of numerical proportion (193c). The regions of the elements are not as limited as Aristotle seems to think. He himself speaks of high mountains like the Caucasus or Parnassus, which are among the higher portions of the earth. If a cistern of water were located at the top of one of these mountains, it would remain *in loco* unless the earth were removed from under it. Nevertheless, it is true that the lighter element tends to rise and the heavier to descend (195d). However, in their natural locus, neither air nor water have either weight or lightness. Such was the opinion of Ptolemy and of others, who state that a man in deep water does not sense more pressure than in shallow water. And the air over us weighs nothing, for a person on a high mountain who has less air above him does not feel less pressure than a person on low ground (196a). Oresme restates the Archimedean principle of the displacement of water equal in weight of the body placed in that medium and explains why a basin will not sink beyond a certain depth; the reason is that the air in the basin refuses to descend from its proper region into the water (198d). In the same way, fire resists descending into air or into water. It seems probable that a basin placed between the spheres of fire and of air would act in the same way since the fire would resist descending into the element of air beneath it. Under these conditions, we may suppose that a ship could float on the surface of the sphere of air just as naturally as it would on the Seine River or the surface of the sea (199d).

Having completed the translation of *De Coelo*, Oresme offers the reader a brief account of his understanding of the Christian concept of the abode of the blessed beyond the celestial spheres. This account he divides into three chapters numbered to follow chapter ix of Book IV and it seems that he intended his contribution to be a final corrective to Peripatetic cosmology. The motion of the angels or Intelligences is again reconsidered (cf. Bk. II, ch. ii) and the nature of the Deity as infinite, indivisible and omnipotent is stressed with an additional proof of the triune nature of God drawn from the realm of geometry (200c). Three possible ways of interpreting the existence of the blessed in the regions above the firmament are considered with interesting speculations regarding the physical problems involved (201b). Finally, the vision of God which the blessed souls of the saved may eternally enjoy is considered as a practical problem in perspective (202a). Oresme refers the reader to his *Quaestiones super Meteorum* and to an otherwise unknown treatise, also presumably his own, entitled *Inter omnes impressiones*; he compares the vision of God enjoyed by the multitude of the blessed to the view of a rainbow as seen by a multitude of people on earth; all see the rainbow from a slightly different angle of vision, but to all it appears to be directly in front (202b). The appropriateness of his comparison Oresme supports with a citation from Ecclesiasticus (202d). The occasional appearance of a double rainbow suggests to Oresme the analogy between this phenomenon of nature and the close relationship between the vision of Christ and that of His Blessed Mother, who is compared to the second arc of the double rainbow (203a). With true humility and trembling heart the author-translator offers his work to the glory of God and of the Catholic faith and to the confusion of all who calumniate (203b). His task, undertaken at the command of his king, Charles V, is completed and he has been rewarded with the bishopric of Lisieux (1377). No finer work of natural philosophy has been written in any language; the author hopes that it may stimulate young men to the study of science in order that they may reply to its arguments and learn to love truth (203c). These closing remarks are repeated in the form of a Latin quatrain. There follows the "Table des choses notables," a useful chapter index to Oresme's principal commentaries.

VI. THE MANUSCRIPTS OF DU CIEL ET DU MONDE:  
DESCRIPTION AND DIALECT STUDY*Manuscript A*

Paris, Bibl. Nat., Ms. *Franç.* 1082 (ancien 7350). Vellum, 209 fols., 325 × 225 mm. in two columns of 36 lines. Gothic *lettre de forme*, late 14th century.<sup>1</sup> Fol. 1-203<sup>r</sup>, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*, text and commentary *entresuivant* indicated by *Tiexte* and *Glose* (T.,G.); fol. 203c, explicit; fol. 203d, list of *choses notables*, brief summaries, serving as an Index, of each of the longer commentaries of the four books with chapter references; top of fol. 208d, the scribe repeats almost verbatim fol. 206b-207a (q.v.), ending fol. 209c with the signature: 'Ce livre est au duc de Berry Jehan B.' Geometrical figures illustrate the text and on fol. 3<sup>r</sup> a quadrilobe miniature finely executed represents God seated, His right hand raised in benediction and holding in His left a circle of fire within which is drawn a symbolical representation of the globe. Within the globe is a group of mediaeval buildings standing on the brink of a stream in which numerous fish are swimming. Above the globe is the inscription: 'Vir insipiens non cognoscet et stultus non intelliget hec.' In the right margin, a swan amid vignettes which completely encircle the folio. With it is the inscription: 'Le temps venra.'<sup>2</sup> At the bottom of the folio is the coat-of-arms of the Duke of Berry. Colored capitals throughout.

A has been chosen as the basic manuscript of this edition because it is apparently earliest in time, presents the most intelligible text with fewest omissions, bad readings, corrections and is the most carefully done in one hand. All geometrical figures are executed and it is perhaps the closest to the original of all extant manuscripts. It is a *de luxe* book on Reserve at the Bibliothèque Nationale.

*Vowels*

1. Epenthetic 'e' appears in: moies 89a19; boies 111b16; voiez 123a5; 126b15; 167d3; masseiz 129b5; voier 130b2; poiene 169c4; viedenge 177b2; 177c5; 177d3; 178b13; 178c4; giest 179a6; 179b2; moiens 190a2; aes 194b9; moien[s] 195d9; poies 196a10; 199a12;<sup>4</sup> between two consonants: planetes 75d14.
2. Epenthetic 'i' appears with:<sup>5</sup>
  - (a) 'é < a > ei(ey)': tanteit 10a12; neis 32b9; traytey 46c10; thouchey 72a7; donney 106c11; signey 106c11; avancey 108c8; Tractey 127c10; melley 182d8.
  - (b) 'a': commençassent 47b18; duraissent 49d2.
  - (c) 'e' and with 'e' from 'oi': etheir 14d3; 14d5; acressement 19b14; veir

<sup>1</sup> There is a record of the existence of *Le Livre du ciel et du monde* which may well be ours in the *Inventaire ou catalogue des livres de l'ancienne bibliothèque du Louvre, fait en l'année 1373 par Gilles Mallet*, (Paris, 1836), p. 51: art. 233: "De celo et mundo, en françois, translâté par Maistre Nicole Oresme, evesque de Lixiex, couvert de soie vermeille a queue. a .ii. fermes d'argent dorés, haschiés aux armes de France." Then follows the entry: "a monss. d'Anjou, vii dess. dit." This entry is obviously not of the inventory of 1373; it was probably of the year 1380, on the 7th of October, the year of Charles' death. Cf. L. Deslisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, III, (Paris, 1881), p. 137. The only paleographical characteristic worth noting is the broad flat-bottomed 'u' which has evidently found time to introduce

itself securely into so conservative and stereotyped a script as *lettre de forme*. This trait tends to confirm the date assigned—the end of the 14th Century. The surrounding of the folio with vignettes and vignettes only and the diapered or checkerboard background of the miniature go back to the middle of the 14th and so are useless in dating this particular manuscript.

<sup>2</sup> Ps. xci, 7.

<sup>3</sup> The motto of Jean, Duke of Berry.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E. Walberg, *Le Bestiaire de Philippe de Thaün* (Lund, 1900), p. lxxviii, and L. Menger, *Anglo-Normand Dialects* (New York, 1904), p. 61 and p. 64.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. E. Wahlgren, 'Sur la question de l' "i" dit parasite', *Mélanges de Philologie offerts à Johan Vising* (Paris, 1925), pp. 290-335.

48a8; feivre 113a8; martelleiz 123b2; creistre 129d15; decreistre 129d15; metteit 165a12.

(d) 'ie': mateire 46a4; pey 71c12; piey 71d7; p[i]ey 71d14; pieiz 72c8.

(e) 'o': encloie 48c10.

(f) 'u': fuissent 104b5.<sup>6</sup>

Epenthetic 'u' appears in: conveux 15a11; consonancieus 122d15.

3. Final feminine 'e' was evidently pronounced quite weakly. It falls in: altere[e] 13c7; un[e] 14d11; 16a8; 193a13; dit[e] 15a13; infini[e] 21c18; chascun[e] 27b11; 176a7; cause[e] 30a7; determine[e] 43d7; el[le] 44c9-10; meü[e] 46b15; 90b7; 116a13; 146d14; 164a12; eü[e] 47b7; corrompu[e] 61c5; figure[e] 71d14; cree[e] 74a12; termine[e] 74b13; 100d7; appelle[e] 74c18; 96c1; 138d9; 176b8; noir[e] 79c2; tout[e] 92a4; ymagine[e] 110a15; eclipse[e] 118d5; 130a6; 138a2; 138a3; prochain[e] 132d14; enlumine[e] 130b7; 130b14; 130b15; gecte[e] 139c7; cel[le] 153a8; 192c2; quarre[e] 152a2; divise[e] 162c11.<sup>7</sup>

Final feminine 'e' falls before 's' in: parti[e]z 6a9; altere[e]s 13d3; un[e]s 28d14; toutevoi[e]s 84c4; distincte[e]s 86d12; meü[e]z 123d9; legier[e]s 187d6.<sup>8</sup>

4. Unhistorical 'e' is added in: continuee 17b11; infinies 22d2; infinie 24c8; 56a4; enclinee 150b4; rondee 152c3; violente 166c10; une 174c4; convexee 192a14; laee 197c8; in the p.p. of first conjugation verbs: finiee 19c11; uniees 28d2; engendree 166d15; transmuee 174d3; in the p.p. of third conjugation verbs: meüee 73d10; conteneuee 96d16.<sup>9</sup>

5. 'E' is found in hiatus very frequently with doubtful value: in the infinitives: veoir 43d9; 43d10; 43d11; 44a1; etc.; seoir 48b16; 48b18; etc.; cheoir 75a3; 149c6; 154d11; etc.; in the past participles: meü 1b15; 4a16; 8a11; 8b14; etc.; creü 1b9; 13a6; meüe 4a11; 4a13; 7a9; 8b3; eü 1d11; 1d13; etc.; meüs 1c9; etc.; creüe 11a10; 61c6; 92a5; etc.; creües 36c9; deü 14a17; 79d4; 80b15; etc.; peü 57b11; veü 80b6; 131c11; veüe 66d11; 89d3; 124c10; etc.; creüz 67a4; congneües 70a14; apparceü 17a6; 110b15; 124c14; etc.; apparceües 70a14; congneüs 81a2; deüe 97d4; 137a8; 160c7; etc.; veües 119d11; 152c12; 161a18; etc.; pourveü 124b8; acreüe 132a2; deceü 144b4; deceüs 144b6; 147c4; veüs 203b2; in the past definite: eüt 1d21; feüst 6c6; 57c10; etc.; veüst 9d17; 154d8; 203c8; meist 23d20; 185b2; pourvoüst 57c10; in the imperfect subjunctive: peüssent 1c16; 22b9; 32a2; 47b7; etc.; peüssons 32b5; peüsse 47a11; peüst 35d12; 47c12; eüst 6c6; 35d3; 38d9; 38d16; etc.; eüssent 40d19; sceüse 47a11; feüssent 113d5; 124a20; 124c2; etc.; meüst 80b15; feüst 123c3; deüst 144c17; 145a16; 145a17; etc.; eüssons 146b7; creüssent 170b12; meüssent 182d16; 184b12; deüssent 137c3; 137c5; 179d8; etc.; apparceüst 139c13.

Also raëmplissant 70a2; raëmplir 71b4; quarreüre 8b16; endenteüre 78c15; seür 103b2; deüement 107c2; 134d6; 135a5; etc.; mirëeur 118c9; beneürees 126c15; 126d12; beneürés 202a8; 203b2; 208c17; beneüré 202a13.

Hiatus never occurs in the imperfect subjunctives fust or fussent. It is not found either in: ronde 96a9; 144c9; 144d3; etc.; mireur 118c15; 118c17; 118d7; etc.; benoit 202a1; voier 130b2; 202a6.

6. 'Ie' from 'iee' preceded by a palatal: aloignie 11a10; appeticie 61c5; 113c10; esloignie 62c10; mucie 68c16; fichie 68d12; 136a5; 136a9; appropriie 70c6;

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Schwan-Behrens, *Grammaire de l'ancien français* (Leipzig, 1923), 342R, where this form is considered a characteristic of the Walloon dialect.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. L. Menger, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. E. Walberg, *Deux Versions inédites*

*de la Légende de l'Anticrist* (Lund, 1928), p. xlii.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. G. Tilander, *Les livres du Roy Modus et de la Roynne Ratio*, Soc. des Anc. Textes fr. (Paris, 1932), I, pp. xiii-xiv.

touchie 83c4; fichies 88d1; 115c14; 127c6; 135d2; etc.; tesmoingnie 95c18; empeeschie 113c10; 164d4; taillie 117d6; depecie 153a7; plungie 154a5; tractie 162b7; escuillie 166d2; despoillie 176d5; glacie 201a14; consonancies 207a10.

7. 'Ie' for 'e' from checked open 'e': tiexte 4b13; 4c5; 4c16; etc.; for 'e' from free 'a': lesquielz 125b17; tielz 144a8; tielx 201d12; lesquiex 157a2.<sup>10</sup>
8. Countertonic 'e' is raised to 'i' in: mervilleuse 11c7; mervilleuses 14b6; signeurie 28d4; ligier 74d9; 99a11; 133a10; 133a12; 139d14; 145c17; ligierement 100c11; 101a6; nient 114c14; 117c8; 119b2; etc.; fignoient 135a2; tournier 138b3; octrier 141a2; 141a7; 174c8; etc.; octrient 172a4; 173d12; etc.; octriasent 175a8; ligiers 157c13; ligieres 161d15.<sup>11</sup>  
'E' appears for initial 'i' in: melieu 12b5; 64c8; 137c6; 137c7; 141b9; 146c7; disciples 65a7; cf. disciples 6c15; descontinuation 16d2; 16d8; cf. discontinuacion 16c5.
9. 'Ie' is reduced to 'e' in: matere 1d18; 3c6; 61b9; 61d1; 61d8; inymisté 5a12; amisté 41a16; 164c15; 165b1; mateire 46a4; enquert 64b1; pey 71c12; tracté 75a1; 126a15; regular 100a18; in the unaccented 'ie' of aveillé 50b12; aveillé 50b12.  
The 'ier' of the infinitive is reduced to 'er' in: cuider 74c7; 75d3; 75b21.  
'Ié' of the past participle to 'e' in: traytey 46c10; thouchey 72a7; touché 73d12; aveillé 50b12; appliquees 177b13; appliqués 177c5.
10. 'Ie' is reduced to 'i' in: lumire 204c14; brive 207c10.<sup>12</sup>
11. 'Oi' is reduced to 'o' in: contradictores 51d19; 53d13; 57a6; 59d18; Destroz 153a3.<sup>13</sup>  
In appoement 93a5, we have apparently 'oi' for 'ui' with 'oi' reduced to 'e' and the orthography 'oe'.<sup>14</sup>  
In mouel 100a6, (modiolus) there is apparently a reduction of initial 'oi' to 'o'.
12. 'Ui' is reduced to 'u' in productes 92b8; reducte 94d2; appoué 118b3; 'ui' is reduced to 'i' in amensier 92b2.<sup>15</sup>
13. 'Ai' is reduced to 'a' in: fantasie 9a4; il tracte 64b14; 157b6; 180b14; etc.; tracté 78a1; 126a15; tracte 166c12; tractee 105a22; tractié 119a8; 168b8; etc.; Tractey 127c10.
14. 'Uei' is reduced to 'ui' in: ouilx 117a5; ouylz 130b2; ouil 134d8; ouyl 119a5; 135c6; 144b3; 202b11; escuillié 166d2; fuyll 174a2; fuilles 197c14.<sup>16</sup>
15. The spelling 'ou' appears for 'o':  
(a) for tonic latin 'au': in the tonic forms of poser and its compounds: pouse (1 s.) 20d4; 23b7; 44b13; etc.; pouse (imperat.) 27b9; supouse (1 s.) 36b15; suppouse (3 s.) 17b10; 25b5; etc.; suspouse (3 s.) 19b1; supouse (1 s.) 21b3; dispouse (3 s.) 24d4; repouse (3 s.) 26b8; 26c10; 48c14; etc.; repousent 26b12; 26b14; 35c3; etc.; depouse (3 s.) 50a9; 57a6; propouse (3 s.) 41c13; expouse (3 s.) 52c14;

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Menger, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40 and B. Eggert, 'Entwicklung der normanischen Mundart im departement de la Manche', *Zeit. für rom. Philol.* XIII (1889), pp. 397-398.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. G. Tilander, 'Notes sur le texte du Roman de Renart', *Zeit. für rom. Philol.* XLIV (1924), p. 716. Cf. also Pope, *op. cit.*,

#422, and .xviii., p. 489.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Menger, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. E. Walberg, *Deux Versions*, p. xliii.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Menger, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81 and p. 52.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Eggert, *op. cit.*, p. 365 and p. 370.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *From Latin to Modern French* (Manchester, 1934), #1169.

- (b) for atonic latin 'au': in the atonic forms of poser and its compounds: suspousé 1c10; suppousé 1c20; etc; pousé 11c10; 21d10; etc.; suspousees 14a1; compousé 17c5; 22c13; 23c13; etc.; suppouser 19a4; 20c10; 48b12; etc.; supousé 20c3; 21b3; suspousicion 21c11; 49b4; 49d7; etc.; supousicion 21c12; 32a9; 47c9; etc. suppousees 22c2; 54b6; suppousicions 26b5; 26c12; 26c14; etc.; repouser 26b6; repouserait 26c9; suppousons 27b6; 44d4; 53a3; dispousée 41b11; 46b5; 46b12; etc.; pousons 44d6; 49a9; 51d12; etc.; dispousees 44b2; pousant 50a8; suppouserait 59a13; etc.;
- (c) for close 'o' pretonic, free or checked: voulenté 4d10; 35c12; 39d3; etc.; hounourable 12a6; hounorable 105a4; 105a19; etc.; oudeur 13d7; courrompus 26b10; courrompu 33a5; courrompre 42c9; coupulative 51a16; souleil 79a9; nouviesme 96a6; prouchain 101c8; roumain 104c5; oudourent 123c11; prouchaines 133d14; poussiet 132d14; coulourer 138b7; ouneur 157a1; engroucié 190d12;
- (d) for tonic close 'o': fourme 6c1; 9c2; 32a14; etc.; fourme (3 s.) 32c8; coutes 47b15; fourmes 207d10;
- (e) for tonic open 'o': glouse 25d8; molz 61d14;<sup>17</sup> olz 79c1.
16. On the other hand, the spelling 'o' for 'ou' occurs in: loé 4d12; totes 5a8; 5c10; 23b4; etc.; tote 7a15; 12c19; 13c4; etc.; corve 7b4; entor 7b8; mouvement 8a6; 10d17; 14d18; etc.; movemens 8d6 16b5; 22c3; etc.; soffist 10b13; noer 9a5; 106b18; 198d12; etc.; noera 190c11; 198d15; noe 191a5; 191a7; 197c8; etc.; noast 198c8; noeroit 199a7; noent 208c11; tot 9c4; 15a4; 17c15; movoir 16b10; 21a20; 21d2; etc.; movra 21a14; movroit 21b10; 21c5; 79d7; tor 18d9; doble 21c6; dobte 32a7; provables 25a1; provable 57c9; foir 37a15; oir 39d7; 43d13; oyr 43d12; roe 46a4; 46b1; 46b3; etc.; totevoies 42d15; 61b4; morir 58d15; sostenir 62b9; loenge 62c20; aoroient 79a7; loe (3 s.) 95d2; fornese 103d11; roes 113c7; roeler 116c7; 179b1; roele 116c7; molin 141b10; cors 144a2; couleurs 193d13; prover 49a6; 53c12; 58c16; etc.; prove (3 s.) 1c6; 29c8; 53b5; etc.; prové 52d20; 207b9; reprover 52b11; 64c4; 145a19; reprove (3 s.) 1c11; 20d11; 41a10; etc.; reprovant 64b20; reprové 90a19; improve (3 s.) 58a1; povoir 49c2; 51d2; etc.; povons 27d16; 35a14; 39b12; etc.; porroit 9b4; 21d20; 43b12; etc.; povoit 16b10; 17c3; 23d14; etc.; povoient 16b9; 40b14; 40b16; etc.; porra 20a17; 45a14; volons 41d8; retorner 62c6; 189a2; retornera 62c11; retorna 140c11; torne 86c2; 104a11; torné 81d19; tornera 18a6; tornant 80b11.<sup>18</sup>
17. 'An' appears for 'en' in: samblable 5d16; 78b5; 92d15; etc.; ensamble 7a9; 70b3; 71d7; etc.; consequante 7c6; circonference 7c15; 8c6; samblablement 8b5; 68c3; 74b9; etc.; consequant 9b10; 11d13; 15b3; etc.; apparantes 14a9; souffisance 14b9; creance 14b9; differances 15a18; difference 17b16; consequence 20a7; 29c15; 39a7; etc.; souffisanment 20d11; 39b17; 39d4; resistance 21b1; 21b4; 43b8; represanter 32d12; cressance 36d2; evidanment 37c1; 48b18; 57a15; etc.; apparence 38a14; anemis 39d5; diligeantment 41d12; diliganment 102b17; avanture 43d8; influence 50c5; 62a6; commencement 56c2; antescendant 57d15; ensuiantment 60c7; 88a3; recommande 62d13; sambleroit 66b3; 101c13; 102c20 etc.; samble 71b16; 72b2; 72c14; etc. espandre 75a3; samblera 79b18; 132b11; etc. dessemblables 80d4; 83d17; etc.; indifferanment 84c5; 84c11; 84d2; etc.;

<sup>17</sup> Cf. C. Beaulieux, *Histoire de l'orthographe française*, I, 1927, pp. 166-167, 276. It is interesting to note that some purist has expunged the 'u' of suppose 13a16; compousée 17b11; pousons 18c11; pousé 20b12. For a similar case cf. Beaulieux, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Beaulieux, *op. cit.*, p. 176 and p. 276

wherein is discussed the question of 'ouïsme'. It is interesting to note that the same corrector's hand has corrected tote 36a12; tot 44b4 to toute and tout by superscript 'u'. It is worthy of note too that the scribe uses the 'o' forms most frequently at the end of the line when cramped for space.

espant 91d14; examples 92a9; vraisemblable 92b14; 95b13; 95c4; etc. samblables 94d8; 97a19; 111a19; etc. excellanment 101c6; differanment 105c2; puissanment 116d11; sambler 116d13; 126d1; samblent 117a3; 117a15; 119d2; etc.; evidant 144b15; assamblees 151a8; dessamblable 153c11; 167d15; 168a10; 176a5.<sup>19</sup>

18. 'En' is found for 'an' in:  
distances 22d2; encienne 40a4; superabondence 42d16; distance 43c1; venter 88b5; vennent 146c8; amengier 148a8.
19. 'Iau' appears for 'eau' in:  
yauue 8a2; 9c5; 10a3; etc. a total of seven times out of 292; yauue 9c6; 9c8; oysiaus 28d7; biauté 68c19; 68d3; 68d15; etc.; nouviaux 126b12; chastiaulz 139b8.
20. 'Oi' is found for 'ai' in:  
poiens 4d18; 117b19; 159a11; comparoyson 36c2; essoierons 91a15; soit (sapit) 105b9; comparoison 121d3; 171d9; estroit (p.p.) 173d1; 173d7; estroit (3 s.) 173d6.<sup>20</sup>
21. 'Oi' appears for 'ei' in poine 73b12; 73c5; 73c11; 75c4; 137b8; poiene 169c4; 'ai' appears for 'ei' in paine 137b7; amaint 146a9; destaint 172d15; estaint 173a5.
22. Metathesis of unaccented 'er' and 're' appears in extermité 27a12; 29a2; confremee 38d8.
23. Close 'o' tonic and free is written 'ou' and 'u' in:  
labour 73b7; 73b12; 73c2; etc. demoure 49b4;<sup>21</sup> labourent 145b10.
24. Close 'o' tonic and followed by 'l' appears with the spelling 'u', 'o', and 'ou':  
mule 106c18; mole 106d5; 106d6; 141b10; moles 113b16; soult 197d13.<sup>22</sup>
25. The spelling peuls 105b11 and poulz 105b9 would seem to indicate that 'eu' and 'ou' were similar in sound and indicated a 'u' sound. Hence in the case of treu 154d9; 154d11; 199c15; 'eu' may again indicate the regular 'u' sound and not the northwestern development to 'o'.<sup>23</sup>
26. Delabialization of 'eu' to 'e' appears in:  
avec 6b9; aveques 8b3; 11d9; 16c8; etc.; avecques 78c12; 78c17; 79a9; ileques 62a12; yleques 62c19; illecques 137c4; 137c6; pesanter 73c14; 136b14; preve 26a12; je viel 44b11; il weille 50a4; 51d3; il vielle 120d2; refroidier 121b2; liquer 155a14; 199c4; repreve 159d5; imprever 115d17.<sup>24</sup>
27. On the other hand, 'e' appears to be labialized to 'o' in:  
somydiamettre 10a14; tole 101d2; homispere 152d7.
28. 'Ain' and 'ein' fall together in a great many words, very likely with the value of 'en'. The spelling 'ein' for 'ain' appears in: arein 32a17; 32a19; proceine 56b18; proceins 71c3; hauteines 127b11, with 'ein' reduced to 'en': lointene 56c2.  
'Ain' appears for 'ein' in: plaine 4b2; 36c14; 48a14; etc.; plain 4b7; 10a11; 23d19; etc. plainement 6c16; 169d15; plainnement 66c16; plainne 112b11; 118a17; 125d9; faintes 19b16; faint 36b4; fainte 129b9; mains 23c5; 91a4;

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Schwan-Behrens, *Grammaire de l'ancien français*, tr. O. Bloch (Leipzig, 1923), 3e partie, p. 121; Cf. also, M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #450.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *From Latin to Modern French*, #1223, p. 458.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Schwan-Behrens, *op. cit.*, p. 120 and M. K. Pope *op. cit.*, #230 and xviii, p. 495.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #554.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #549.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #230 (iii); and B. Eggert, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

112a10; etc.; restraite 72c2; contraint 75a6; 75a9; 75b13; contrainte 73d11; 75b10; constrainsist 75b8; amaine 97a10; amaintent 146a9; maine 116c6; mainent 135a1; demaine 135a7; vaines 119c17; paine 137b7; distaint 172d15; estaint 173a5.<sup>26</sup>

29. 'E' for 'ai' is frequent: lessast 4a9; 4a11; 5d10; lesseroit 4a13; 93a9; 99a10; lessoit 4a15; 154d11; 166a18; lesse 71a6; 72b8; 82a1; lessent 73a3; lessa 71a6; lessaient 77c15; lessassent 99a6; lessier 104c4; lessons 118c18; lessiees 145a10; lessiee 149c6; delessier 72b9; delessaient 76d15; delessast 163c5; lessierent 180a2; fet (3 s.) 17a7; 30a16; 38c5; etc.; fere 33a10; 60a13; 60b5; fet (p.p.) 39c5; 33a8; 114c11; fete 60b8; 83c12; 97a19; etc.; fetes 83c2; 106c15; 111c3; etc.; fesoient 153d12; mes 18d18; 21b10; 29b23; etc.; james 45a11; 52b3; 62c11; etc.; deplest 39d7; plest 58b2; 125d4; mauvés 62b21; 71b6; 71c9; 81a16; etc. resons 105b17; 107d20; 109c9; etc.; resonnable 95a15; 97b9; 108b6; etc.; desresonnable 109b7; 115c13; 117c7; exel 93a13; 103a16; 104a1; malfesant 103d8; fornese 103d13; scet 104c9; 104c15; freent 113b2; 113c1; 113c4; etc.; freer 113b4; 112d15; 141c9; freement 113b13; 113b17; bies 152a4; passeré 42a10; pensé 202b5.
30. 'Ai' is found for 'e' in: maittre 4d10; declaray 52c6; nay 111a14; 111b16; 166b9; naif 138c7; 138c8; 138d10; etc. claire 160d4.
31. 'E' for 'oi' appears in: realment 3c10-11; 5a17; 86a9; etc.; crestre 13a8; 13c4; 36b3; etc.; crest (3 s.) 13c8; 13c10; 29a16; etc.; cressoit 29d5; cressant 30b2; 30d4; 107a2; etc.; crestroit 92a2; 107c9; cressaient 108a13; creistre 129d15; cressance 13c5; 36d2; 76a16; etc. acressement 19b14; accressement 30a8; 106a16; 106d9; etc.; acrestre 100c5; 109b8; acrestant 100c15; neer 28d18; creroient 32a11; veir (verus) 48a8; seer 48b9; fredure 60d14; 112d7; 112d8; etc.; fredure 111d2; 188a14; crere 67b11; 74c15; mouver 71b14; 72b11; 72b10; etc.; arder 95a14; 103d12; 180a15; direct 97b15; directes 106a9; redeur 106d11; 106d14; etc.; decreistre 129d14; fredes 187b2; refredi 190d12; creet 38a4; metteit 165a12.  
An indication of the pronunciation is given by vouer 68d12 (veoir).<sup>26</sup>
32. 'Ai' appears for 'ei' in: maisment 36d3; 133d7; 158a12.
33. Initial 'a' appears for 'e' in: aloignie 11a10; raëmplissent 70a2; raëmplir 71b4; 177a6; parsuasion 101b13; radeur 107b17; charroit 138c8; rapaisa 142a1; partuiz 180a7.<sup>27</sup>

### Consonants

34. 'R' fall in: propo[r]cionelles 60c2; monstre[r] 44b11; cecle 82d13; 82d14; 86b9; etc.; demi-cecle 87a17; terrestre 103a5; terrestres 182b3; ve[r]cunde 104c13; mabre 114a16; tetaced[r]on 176c3; pa[r]lerons 180b6;  
'r' inorganic appears in: propose(r) 1a5; conclud(r)ent 29a7; est(r)é 40a11;  
'r' is dissimilated to 'l' in durel 27d9;  
'l' is dissimilated to 'r' in Argorisme 97c12.  
'l' falls in: universement 60c20; aterables 40b17; anges 149c13.
35. Plural 's' falls in: autre[s] chose[s] 11c9; opposite[s] 15a9; elle[s] 22c1; 91d15; 151b5; etc. partie[s] 36b16; 151b4; determinee[s] 37a10; di[s] 36c2; terme[s] 67c12; chappitre[s] 66d18; consequence[s] 89d17; longue[s] 100c17; elle[s] meisme[s] 129b13; autre[s] 129b3; tel[z] 177d7; 187c17; meisme[s] 187c17; moi(e)en[s] 195d9; mobile[s] 179a18.

<sup>26</sup>Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #1159; #1224.

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Beaulieux, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Menger, *op. cit.*, p. 62, (4a).

Final 's' is wrongly added in:

celle(s) 20b6; quelconque(s) 4b9; 7d2; etc.; meisme(s) 1d22;<sup>28</sup> 9c12; 11a10; etc. autre(s) 10d13; ne(s) 13d6; composé(s) 17c8; espece(s) 28a20; chose(s) 42d7; la(s) 61c1; Ystoire(s) 54d16; heure(s) 55d2; infini(z) 65b15; Aristote(z) 67a20; 115d17; cause(s) 146c12; angle(s) 177c3.<sup>29</sup>

Organic 's' falls in:

suposé 20c3; supouse 36b15; e[s]t for est 12a5; 17d3; 32a16; etc.; sophi[s]mes 47a13; toutevoies 12a2; 12d15; 15a13; etc.; sou[s] 48d2; peü[s]t 66b5; arresta[s]t 80d7; Ari[s]tote 47b7; soudouble 110a9; 110a12; au[s]quelz 122c11; moin[s] 195d9. Inorganic 's' appears in: e(s)t for et 9c7; 37c2; 40a2; etc.; di(s)t 4b12; 4c8; 12c16; etc.<sup>30</sup> peu(s)t 22d16; 47c12; 54a12; etc.; eü(s)t 40a4; 50d5; 52d2; etc. meu(s)t 70b13; 73c18; 74b5; etc. desriere 131c12; di(s)t (noun) 147c17; di(s)t (p.p.) 178b16; 205d16.<sup>31</sup>

36. 'S' is doubled after 'n' in ainssi 46b5; 99b10; and when intervocalic in posse 15d6; plusieurs 4a8; 4a17; 4c3-4; etc.; lunne 45c1; mattiere 47b3; 60c3; 88b5; also in après 21c11; Affrique 87b10; etc.

Voiceless intervocalic 's' is written 's' in:

apetisement 14a3; chausement 16b11; appetisant 30d7; impossible 16d13; 28b14; ausi 73c18; 77d13; 79c2; etc. vaisseau 101a9; 155b3; 173d2; etc. cresance 106c2; vaisei 146d3; 146d4; 190c6; etc.; vesie 190c6; as 'z' in: appetizee 92a5; mazon 97b15; appetizant 107a8; 154d15.<sup>32</sup>

Voiceless intervocalic 's' is represented by 'sc' in: parfondesce 4a7; 4b5; etc.; espesce 5c3; 5d2; 5d4; etc.; espasce 7a14; 18b11; etc.; noblesce 14b5; 69c6; 132a16; trespasce 17d6; trespasce 18d16; apetisement 21c2; espesces 22c10; 22c12; 31b8; etc.; petitesce 29a16; 36b2; 44a13; etc.; descenblables 39b16; Gresce 40a3; sceüsce 47a11; puisce 48c15; antescendant 57d15; espesceté 62a9; hautesce 68d17; 74d2; 143c9; tristesc 75a16; rondesce 82c12; 102b9; 144d6; etc.; aspresce 125b6; hardiesce 131a11; by 'sc' initially: sceüsce 47a11; scet 104c9; 104c15; scevent 170d16;

'S' is written 'c' in:

ce (pro.) 62a17; (conj.) 4a13; 21d16; 28a21; etc.; centense 31a16; celonc 41b8; recistant 46d4; chace 71b18; univercelement 90b7; engroucié 190d14.

'S' is written for 'c' in:

sibas 11a17; ses(adj.) 22c12; 34c14; 44d14; etc.; se(pro.) 42a15; 49c13; dimensions 23a12; consevoir 60b12; proporsion 21a11; trespersast 99d4; enforsant 106c1; persassent 116b12; sydre 168a15; commensast 195c6;<sup>33</sup> le is found for les 71c5; 106c13; 180a7; etc.; de for des 81a4; 87a5; 112c10; etc.; des is found for de 86c1;

Final 's' and 'z' are interchanged most frequently, e.g. croiz 97b18 but crois 97b17; je faiz 100d15 and nuis 95b5; partuiz 180a7 but pertuis 185b15.

37. 'T' initially is written 'th' in thouchey 72a7; 't' final falls in son[t] 14d14; soy[t] 110b6; 't' final is retained in: tanteit 10a12; tantet 10b2; conclut (3 s.) 12a3; 26c13; 28d17; etc.; dissolut (pp.) 33a5; 172d10; 172d13; etc.; salut 74c9; resolut (p.p.) 162a2; 167c5; 172c7; 't' intervocalic and 'd' remain in: exclude (3 s.) 20b4; concludent 29a7; 44b13; 132c5; etc.; conclude (3 s.) 31a17;

<sup>28</sup> Cf. #47.

<sup>29</sup> It is interesting to note the scribe's correction of "en soy meismes" 94c2 to "en soy meisme" by deleting the final 's'.

<sup>30</sup> Ordinarily the present indicative 3rd singular appears as "dit". Alongside it, we encounter the form "dist" which is ordinarily reserved for the past definite. We have taken the liberty to distinguish between them. Cf. E. Walberg, *Deux versions inédites de la Légende de l'Anticrist* (Lund,

1928), p. xxxii.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. G. Tilander, 'Notes sur le texte du Roman de Renart', *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, XLIV (1924) p. 716, and E. Walberg, *Deux Versions*, p. xlv.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Marie de France, *Lais*, ed. Warnke, p. lxxxviii.

<sup>33</sup> For the confusion between 's' and 'c', cf. W. Foerster, *Chevalier as deus espees*, p. liii.



31d10; 49d8; etc.; conclute 61a10; absolument 76c6; solute 143a11; revolute 148d5; dissolute 175b9; absolutes 171a14; resolute 169c13; 170c8; 170c9; resolute 162a3; 175a9.<sup>34</sup>

38. Palatalized 'l' is written 'll' in paretles 30d10; enviellir 34c7; cornelle 65c8; envielli 88b19; veulle 194c15.
39. The nasal til is lacking in: covendroit 10d9; sot 22b17; predre 28c13; faisoiet 32a8; circulairemt 35c; fermet 36d6; autremt 37b9; distigue 42a9; ensuie-ment 46d10; simplemt 56d4; istances 57c12; maïsment 67b11; iherence 71b11; trasparente 84d1-2; avenimement 88b11; trasmutacion 135a6; poiz 162a4.  
On the other hand, there is an unhistorical 'n' in cen 54b18; la(n) 154d9.<sup>35</sup> Palatalized 'n' appears for 'n' in magniere 5b9; 8c2; 8d5; maintieng 6d2; tesmoing 97a10; 123d6; guaing 134c14.<sup>36</sup>
40. Doubling of initial consonants appears in: a ffin que 28d1; 51d6; de ffigure 38d10; de ffait 40d18; 40b19.<sup>37</sup>
41. 'C' is found before 'a' and 'e' arising from 'a' in: canel 10a6; 195c3; carriere 36c11; camuseté 32d19; 32d20; camuse 33a2; proceine 56b18; proceins 71c3; brecque 88a16; approcant 130b12; cauquetrepe 96d15; 171c1; calemel 194b11; cf. chalemel 194b12; before 'i' in cifre 97c12; 97c13.
42. 'G' before 'e' has the value of 'gu' in guerre (genre) 5d2; but gerre 5d4; 31b3; 96c4; etc.; before 'a' in diliganment 12b1.
43. 'Ch' is found for francian 'c' in commenche 64a1.
44. Initial 'v' appears as 'w' in: weult 20c2; 29b4; 44a3; weul 36a1; 46a1; 46d2; wit 38d4; wide 39a3; 39a10; 39a15; etc.; weille 50a4; 51d3; widié 199b9.

#### *Morphology and Syntax*

45. The Picard feminine article 'le' is found in: le immensité 39b3-4; 69d2; le elevacion 81a3; le isneleté 94b14; 124d7; le .viii.\* espere 108b10; 127d5-6; 128c4-5; etc.; le extremité 181c2; 187a3; the feminine pronoun direct object appears as 'le' in 134a11; 171d10.
46. 'A' is found for 'au': 7c5; 28b3; 84c6; 'au' is found for 'a': 1b11; for 'ou' (or) 135c12; 'en' is found for 'ou or au' (in, at): 10a9; 13b14; 60b11; etc.; for 'ou(or) 4a4; 9a10; 106a17; 114c17; etc. 'Ou' is found for 'en' (in) 169a11; 'outant' appears for 'autant' 199a14; Change of prefix occurs in 'a encient' 117c16.
47. There are some traces of the retention of the flexional 's' for the masculine nominative singular: 22b7; 22b10; 34a6; 49a5; etc. The nominative feminine of adjectives, especially 'quelconque' and 'meïsme' very often has 's': 15b6; 18c2; 21a2; 21a20; etc. The nominative feminine has added flecional 's' in 54d16. This final 's' penetrates into the accusative both masculine and feminine: 1d22; 4b9; 7d2; etc. We have adopted the device of enclosing such endings in brackets.

<sup>34</sup> Conclude is corrected from conclue 49d8. Cf. Tilander, *Roy Modus*, p. xxxvi.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. E. Walberg, *Deux Versions*, p. xlv. who points to it as a Walloon trait. Cf. also M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #830.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. F. Apfelstedt, *Lothringischer Psalter* (Heilbronn, 1881), p. xl.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. K. Nyrop, *Grammaire historique de la langue française*, I (Copenhagen, 2nd edition, 1904), #316.

48. 'Il' appears for the feminine plural subject 'elles': 25c20; 76d5; 117d13; etc. and used in this way it is written 'i' in 44a11; for the singular feminine 'elle' in 22d15; 34d5; 165a6.  
'Il' appears as 'i': 69b7. On the other hand, 'i' is written 'il': 34a15; 109a22; 169c3.<sup>38</sup>  
'El' appears for 'elle': 44c9.<sup>39</sup>
49. The possessive adjective 'son' appears as *sen* 80c5.
50. 'Eux' is found quite often for 'il' as nominative plural masculine subject: 14c11; 25d15; 26d2; 41a3; 50c4; etc.
51. The relative pronouns 'qui' and 'que' are sometimes confused. 'Que' is found for 'qui' quite frequently as subject of 'estre' with *nueter* value and with the force of an indefinite relative: 1c11; 1d9; 5c9; 5d6; 7c11; etc.<sup>40</sup>  
It is found less frequently as subject of other verbs: 45b2; 57c2; 81a1; 133b4; 191b15; etc.<sup>41</sup>  
'Qui' is found for 'que': 93a14; 137b18; 140b11; 187b9; for 'que' conjunction: 10d19; 11a15; 38b14; 61a14; 110d9; 139c5.<sup>42</sup>
52. The infinitives *seer* 48b9; *mouvoir* 71b14; 72b10; 72b11; 73c10; 74b15; etc.; *arder* 95a14; 103d12; 180a15 appear for *mouvoir*, *seoir* and *ardoir*; *voier* 130b2 and *vouer* 68d12 for *veoir*.  
*Durel* appears for *durer* 27d4. (cf. No. 34).<sup>43</sup>  
*Maitre* is written for 'mettre'. 4d10. (Cf. No. 30).  
For the feminine past participles of the first conjugation in '-ie,' cf. No. 6.  
*Est* is written for *ait* 40c12; 49c13; 51a13; 59b1; 59b4; etc.
53. The future of 'avoir' appears as *ara* 1d12; 47a17; 53a2; the conditional as *aroit* 18c10; 156a14; *auriens* 203b4.<sup>44</sup>  
The future of 'monstrer' appears as *monstra* 24a8; the future of 'mouvoir' as *mourra* 21a5; the conditional of 'redescendre' as *redescenderoit* 30a14; the future of 'demourer' as *demourra* 56b5; the conditional of 'demourer' as *demorroient* 73a8.  
The present subjunctive of 'seoir' appears as *sieche* 49b11.<sup>45</sup>
54. The first person present indicative and imperative appears as '-on': *avon* 13a3; *ymaginon* 18a3; 82d13; *meton* 18b1; 50a; *pouson* 59b4; *poson* 161a13.<sup>46</sup>  
In only one case does the third person plural present indicative end in '-ant': *approchant* 155b12.
55. The analogical first person singular present indicative appears infrequently: *dis* 36d10; *respons* 38c10; 94d12; *conclue* 86d7; *demande* 86d7; 92d13; 141c4; etc.; *cuide* 27d7; 72d2; 75d13; etc.  
The analogical forms *preingne* 42a8; *prengne* 20b19 are substituted for the etymological forms.<sup>47</sup>
56. A singular verb is used with a compound subject 16b7; 39b4; 35b3; 50c5-6; 48b5-6; 57a7-8; 57b7-8; 95a12; etc.; a singular verb is used with a plural subject 99d2; 113c14.  
On the other hand, a plural verb is used with a singular subject 'ad sensum' 23a6; 117a14.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. K. Nyrop, *op. cit.*, II, #528 and Blondheim, *Romania* LII, (1924), p. 21.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #1251.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. L. Foulet, *Petite syntaxe de l'ancien français* (3rd ed. Paris, 1930), #249, p. 177.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. L. Foulet, *op. cit.*, #247, p. 176.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. G. Rydberg, *Zur Geschichte des*

*französische e* (Uppsala, 1907), p. 999 ff.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. G. Tilander, *Roy Modus*, p. xxii.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #919, p. 347.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #1276, p. 470.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #894, p. 339.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #931, p. 352.

57. The indicative is found instead of the subjunctive 92d7; 95d4; 100d1; 100d3; 156b3.
58. The dependent genitive is expressed without the use of the preposition 14c5; 14c7; 55a2; 69c13.<sup>48</sup>
59. 'Car' is frequently used for 'que' conjunction 6b10; 28b8; 50a8; 53c8; 53c11 etc. On the other hand, 'que' is used for 'car' 128d11.
60. 'Comment' is used for 'comme' 70b14; 72a9; 72b18; 103d13; 110b17.
61. 'Loing' is used for the adjective 'long' 88d7; 95c3; 99c2; 99c15; 128a14; and 'besloingne' for 'beslongue' 99b14. 'Loing' is used as substantive for 'long' 7a16; 55b13; 79d2; 80d14.<sup>49</sup>
62. The conjunction 'pour ce que' is frequently replaced by 'parce que:' 10b4; 28c7; 51b2; 80d18; etc.
63. 'En' is found for 'a' 10a4; 12d2; 59a7. On the other hand, 'a' is found for 'en' 50d14.
64. 'Entre' is found with 's' added: 5c4.
65. The possessive adjective 'leur' appears as invariable and with flexional 's' indiscriminately: leurs mouvemens 3a3 and leur mouvemens 9b2; leur parties 9c2; and leurs parties 8a4.<sup>50</sup>
66. 'Opinion' may be either masculine or feminine. 'Memoire' 95c4 is masculine. 'Triangle', 'circuit', 'epicicle', 'horloge', 'umbre', 'exemple', 'principe', 'contradictoire', 'hemisphere' are all masculine. Esperis 113d14 is feminine. Angle 177c7 is feminine but otherwise masculine.
67. Sometimes the past participle agrees with the following direct object: 8c6; 19a15; 26a18; 68d3; 91c7; 103a2; 115a5; 115c16; 151b8.
68. Third declension adjectives appear with and without the flectional analogical endings 'e' and 'es'. There is no uniformity of treatment observable except that perhaps, the third declension adjectives in '-al' seem to resist such endings. This is by no means invariably so.
69. Adverbs formed from third declension nouns and the suffix '-mente' vary in the appearance of the analogical 'e-' of the feminine adjective: perpetuelment 6d20; perpetuellement 61b12; naturelment 9a13; and naturellement 16c11; condicionelment 41a2; and condicionellement 80d10; isnelment 74a9; and isnelement 73d16; proporcionelment 143b12; and proporcionelement 110c4.
70. A redundant 'et' appears in 16a4; 170a8; 170c5; etc.
71. There is some confusion between the use of 'pour' and 'par'; pour is used for the agent in 152a11; 164a9; 'par' is used for 'pour' in 103b9.

It will be seen that for the most part the dialectal traits, although they are not numerous, seem to point to the north of France and specifically to the Normand territory. This conclusion is strengthened by the appearance of such words as Blancdurel 120c3; espartir 174a2; seille 177a4.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. L. Foulet, *op. cit.*, #31, p. 21.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. O. Bloch, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*, II (Paris, 1932), art.

loin, p. 21.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. M. K. Pope, *op. cit.*, #861, p. 330.

*Manuscript B*

Paris, Bibl. Nat., Ms. *Franç.* 565 (ancien 7065). Vellum, 171 fols., 375 × 250 mm., in two columns of 39-40 lines. Early 15th century. Fols. 1-22v, Oresme's *Traité de l'esperie*; fols. 23-168, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*, text and commentary *entresuivant* with, however, no indication of text or author's gloss; fols. 168v-171v, *Table des choses notables*. Bound in red morrocco leather with the arms of France on front and back and with the arms of Louis XV on back. Belonged to Jean, Duke of Berry, who wrote at fol. 171d: 'Ce livre est au duc de Berry Jean B.' Formerly at Fontainebleau where it bore the number 971, anc.cat.453.<sup>1</sup> Finely executed miniatures: fol. 1ab, Oresme seated at the left at a desk and at the right foreground a large celestial globe; background a checkerboard design with blue, red and gold colours, fleurs-de-lys, marginal vignettes;<sup>2</sup> fol. 23ab, Oresme presenting the volume to the seated king attended by three figures, two of which are standing and the third in kneeling position supports the sceptre which the king holds over his right shoulder; background a canopy of diapered silk decorated with fleurs-de-lys. At the right is the sphere of the fixed stars surrounded with a crenellated circumference. Inside the sphere is set a smaller one in which there is a threefold division: at the bottom a body of water, at the right a walled city outside of which are trees and a castle, at the left fire;<sup>3</sup> fol. 69cd, the eighth sphere and God with His right hand raised in benediction peering from above; fols. 81cd and 82ab blank; fol. 136cd, the heavens above studded with stars and fringing it shafts of fire radiating upwards to the circumference of the heavens. On the horizon between earth and fire-fringed heavens, a background of gold and blue flowers; fol. 152a, a small miniature representing heaven and earth,—under a starry heavens birds flying through the air, some alighting on a height of land at the left. In the centre, animals at the base of the height of land. Vignettes and gold colored capitals. The majority of the geometrical figures have not been executed although there is space left for them. *B* is at once the most elegantly ornamented and the poorest textually of the extant manuscripts abounding in scribal errors, repetitions, omissions.

'tee' > 'ie' occurs<sup>4</sup> frequently. The phrase 'estaille fichie' and 'estailles fichies' is almost constant: 68d11-12 etc., and 82d1 etc. Other examples: alongie 11a10; touchie 35d10; appeticiez 36c9; verifie 58c9; commence 60a5; mucie 68c16; 131c12; glacie 201a14.

'Ai' > 'a': vaseau 69a3; passible 102d12; stationares 106a9; soustraroit 195d3. We have not listed the numerous cases of 'tractier' and its derivatives; the spelling 'ct' seems to indicate the presence of the palatal element.

'Oi' > 'o': memore 14b10; 95c4; veor 43d10; 202a13; apparosterait 44b5; contradictoire 51b12; contradictiores 51c8; 53d13; 56d3; etc.; estolle 54c7; gloire 68d18; Istore 122b14; conjonte 192a14.

'Uei' > 'ui': escuillie 166d2; fuille 174a1; 174a7; fuillez 197c14.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. P. Paris, *Les manuscrits français de la bibliothèque du Roi*, IV (Paris, 1841), pp. 348-352. That the manuscript existed in 1416 is attested by entry no. 111 of *La Librairie de Jean duc de Berry au Château de Mehun-sur-Yèvre*, 1416, ed. Hiver de Beauvoir (Paris, 1860), pp. 51-58: "un livre en français de l'Aristote, appelé: *du ciel et du monde*; couvert d'un drap de soye ouvré doublé d'un viel cendal, à deux fermoers d'argent doré esmailliés aux armes de Monseigneur, assis sur tixus de soye vermeille. Bibliothèque impériale no. 7065, avec cette annotation autographe: ce livre est au duc de Berry, Jehan."

<sup>2</sup> This miniature is reproduced in E.

Buron, *Ymago Mundi de Pierre d'Ailly*, I (Paris, 1930), p. 224.

<sup>3</sup> This illumination bears a striking resemblance in tone, texture and execution to certain miniatures contained in *Fascimile de livres copiés et illuminés pour le roi Charles V, offert à ses amis par L. Deslisle* (Paris, 1903), especially Plate III (B.N. 1792) and Plate X (B.N. 1950) done in 1379 by Henri du Trévor.

<sup>4</sup> In analyzing the dialects of BCDEF, only those characteristics are pointed out that may be distinctive and significant. Not all cases of these characteristics are singled out, but only sufficient to indicate the tendency and its diffusion in the manuscript.

- 'Ie' > 'e': matere 38a10; enquert 64b1; 167b9-10; secle 65b3; particulier 70b4; pey 71d7; acquert 134a16; 134d8; enquerent 145d8; querent 146c14; 148a4; Pere 202a6.
- 'Ie' > 'i': possit 132d9; 132d14; partite 168b12; Liseux 203c41.
- Tonic close 'o' > 'ou', 'o': odour 13d7; coulour 14c2; labour 73b7; hore 95d8; mole 113b2; 113b16; 141b10.
- 'Ai' > 'oi': poiens 4d18; 6b15; 68b12; etc.; essoierons 91a15; scoit 104c15; soit 105b9; responderoy 140b2.
- 'Oi' > 'ai': lais 4d6; 40a8; 67d17 etc.
- 'Ai' is written 'e' frequently and when final in mettré 138b10; and passeré 42a10. Inversely 'e' is written 'ai' in traif 30a15; nais 32b9; 32d19; naif 77a13; 185b5; nay 166b9.
- 'Oi' is frequently written 'e' as in crere 67b11; 74c15; sef 148a7; 148b3; veci 163b14 and in the imperfects creet 38a4; conformet 74d6; lessiet 154d11.
- 'Oeu' is written 'ou' in ouvrent 24a14; ouvre 30d11; ouvrier 134d6; 10.
- 'Oi' is written 'oe' in noese 124a13; voes 126b15; coeffe 153d7.
- 'Ui' is written 'ue' in cuerent 95c6.
- 'E' from latin 'a' appears as 'ey': appeticey 1b9; ley 4a7; 23c7; 55b13; etc.; depecey 41a18; commencey 47c2; 79c13; fichey 83b14; empirey 88b18; avancey 108c8; brouley 164c2; mesley 182d8. The epenthetic 'i' appears also in piey 71c12; pey 71d7.
- Intrusive 'i' appears in: language 5b13; Saige 62c18; 132a6; metal 129c9; faison 151a17; visaige 169c7; chescun regularly; creist 29a16; 29d15; freidure 111d2; 121b7; 173a5 etc.; freide 115a16; poirot 162c5; 162c8; fluent 159b2; freis 180a16; vaiseil 190d11.
- Intrusive 'e' appears in: nieant 13a11; foiez 20b7; 20b9; 30a6; etc.; Juies 40a9; poiez 42d11; 43b3; autrefoiez 45b11; viede 164b4; vieude and vieudenge regularly; voies 167d3.
- 'E' is labialized to 'o' in voïst 144b2; envelope 153d6;
- Initial 'e' is raised to 'i' in lichon 57a3; depicie 153a7; intrer 180a7; signeur 202d2; cristians 205d13.
- Initial 'e' is lowered to 'a' in charroit 138c8; 138c12.
- Nasalised 'ei' appears as 'oi' in: poine 73b12; poinne 73c5.
- 'L' inorganic appears in elz 105c13; dyalphanes 119a10; 'i' appears for 'il' 72a7; 169b18 and inversely 'il' for 'y' 34a15; 109a22.
- 'R' is lost in vespe 83d9; engendé 95c9; mabre 114a16; arbes 120c4; martelleuz 123a15; tait 128b8. Inorganic 'r' appears in: ordrenance 95d14; desordrené 95a18; martellers 123b2. "R" is dissimilated to 'l' in leul 202a9.
- 'T' final is lost in: on 4d11; 137c15; don 11b11; 150a4; meu 21a7; 75c3; nien 61d8; son 125a6; acquer 155a2. Final inorganic 't' is added in: soit 69c12; out 102a9; Pithagorient 136d6; je veult 142a14; repost 189b9. Initial 't' > 'th': thesmongne[e] 95c18.
- 'P' initial > 'b': boles 81a19; plasmer 104c22; blate 166d1.
- 'C'[a] > 'c' in: canel 10a6; 195c3; camus 32b8; camuseté 32d19; 32d20; camuse 33a2; touce 66d12; brecque 88a16; ciens 123c11; cescun 178c1; blanceur 186b5; calemel 194b11; 12.
- Francian 'c' is written 'ch' in lichon 57a3; appetichee 113c10; Chipre 152c12.
- Francian 'ch' is written 'c' in the majority of the forms of 'prochain' and 'approcher'. This is a distinctive feature of this manuscript: procainz 8a1; 71c4; 82d16; approucant 14d12; 19a7; approcement 13c21; approcier 84a4; 102c14; 133b6; 133d5; etc.; approcast 133c19; approcoit 155d9; etc. Possibly the key to the value of 'c' is seen in proceain 97d13.
- Palatalized 'l' is written 'll' or 'l': ballie 14b11; merveilleuse 17b16; 68d4; 68d10; etc.; parelles 21a17; 30c9; 106c2; etc.; veulle 50a4; 51d3; 120d2; cornelle 65b8; merveilleux 68c18; 68d14; oeul 129d14; 134d8; 135c6; oeulz 130b2; solal

144a11; brouley 164c2; consell 202a10; ouelletier 206d10.

'S' final is lost: Charle 1a2; 203c2; le for les 1d6; 19b11; 28b9; etc.; de for des 3a2; 51c20; 85d12; etc.; dunque 11d12; pluseur 23a10; 111a19; tre 100b10 etc.<sup>6</sup> Medial is lost: moite 13b20; peüt 17a3; 21a20; 36d2; etc.; suppots 31b10; et for est 35c6; 34d4; 130a15; mit 147a9; etc. Inorganic final 's' is added: dez for de 1d6; 4c17; 5b2; etc.; les for le 7a9; 13a10; 31a17; etc.; ces for ce 137b10; ous 81a5.

Inorganic medial 's' is added: est for et 9d2; briesve 15c11; viste 18b5; peust 24a2; 38b15; 103b12; etc.; eust 40a4; 50d5; 52d16; etc.; est for ait 59c11; etc. 'S' is written 'c': ces by ses 3d12; 6c15; 36c9; etc.; ce by se 12d19; 176d8; seder 199c3.

'C' is written 's': desa 86b12; 156a1; se pendant 95b2-3; se for ce 95c16; ses for ces 130a6; faisons 151a17; etc.

The feminine article and the feminine personal pronoun object third person singular appear as 'le' relatively frequently: le isnelte 21b17; 94b14; le heure 56a4; le lance 8b3; de le quelle 72b6; le plus noble chose 142d7; le eaue 145c15; 146d5; 160b18; etc.; le .viii.<sup>o</sup> espere generally; le extremité 181c2; le habilité 198c10; le disposicion 198c11.

As pronoun object 71c15; 166b13; 166c13; etc.

The first person plural ending appears as '-on': avon 6a15; 43d16; diron 12a20; 41c14; monstieron 17c10; ymaginon 18a3; metton 18b1; 50a6; poson 18c11; 59b4; 161a14; dirion 76d6; dision 76d7; dison 96a15; 189b3; pourrion 139a14.

In the future and conditional 'e' is lost in: montroit 16c3; argurons 17c10; demourroit 98b18; 162c15; 199b7; demourra 163b9; 198c7. On the other hand, epenthetic 'e' appears in the future and conditional in: mouveroient 7a5; 16b8; 37b3; etc.; entenderoit 40d18; descendera 61d4; 197c11; cresteroit 92a2; contenderoit 101a6; descenderoit 103a16; 151b8; etc.; attaineroit 110a10; apperceveroit 110c1; 117b3; apparroisteroit 118d8; responderoit 167b6-7; corromperoit 207a5.

Northern forms of the verb appear in aroit 4a16; 80b15; siece 49b11; aroient 93d3 and in the infinitives seïr 48b9; 48b18; cheïr 166a18.

### Manuscript C

Bern. Bibl. Bongarsiana, Ms. 310. Parchment, 152 fols., 380 × 220 mm., late 14th century, in two columns of 33 lines. Fols. 1-27v, *Traitié de l'espere*, fragmentary, beginning with chapter 13; fols. 28-152v, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*; explicit fol. 147r; fols. 147v-152v, *Table des choses notables*. Text through Bk. I. ch. 16 (to fol. 47a) in gothic *lettre de forme*; remainder of text and entire commentary in *lettre bâtarde*; text and commentary *entresuivant*, indicated from fol. 47a on by *Glose* and *Texte*. Good text, much corrected; geometrical figures fairly well executed to fol. 47a; thereafter geometrical figures are not executed although space is left for them. Fine colored capitals, no miniatures. Except for an extended lacuna and the omission of geometrical drawings, C gives a good dependable text comparable in excellence to A which it generally corroborates. Textual emendations in the present edition are derived from C unless otherwise indicated.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Scribal errors may and do account for so many of the losses and additions of final 's' that we have limited ourselves to listing only those which are felt to be distinctive and characteristic of the manuscript. For that reason too, we have omitted dealing with the loss and addition of 'e' final or medial.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the description of the manuscript in J. R. Sinner, *Catalogus codicum Mss. bibliothecae Bernensis*, I (Bern, 1760), pp. 284-285; III, pp. 438-442 where specimens are given and in H. Hagen, *Catalogus Codicum Bernensium* (*Bibliotheca Bongarsiana*), Bern, 1874, p. 323.

- 'Tee' > 'ie': as in *B* 'fichie' and 'fichies' are almost invariable with 'estoille' and its plural. Other examples are: touchie 35d10; 46b14; percie 48c16; 154d8; 155a9; commencie 60a5; appeticie 74c1; froissie 107d9; enforcie 108d18; esloignies 108d10; aproprie 128d15; lessies 145a10; depecie 153a7; segregie 173d12 etc.
- 'Ai' > 'a': trasist 27c5; attraroit 30c13; ordinare 68b4; plasoit 108c8.
- 'Oi' > 'o': hystores 5a2; 206a15; memore 14b10; 183a10; motey 27b8; 60b15; etc.; congnostre 39b14; noctore 44c12; contradictore 50a9; 51b12; contradictores 51c8; 56d3; 57a5-6; Istore 57c6; 122b14; glore 68a7; 68d18; 72d12; etc.; voes 73a5; Gregore 113d8; dont 142d11; voer 197c5.
- 'Ui' > 'u': ensuroit 49d13.
- 'Ie' > 'e': moiteys 3d8; 130a7; moitey 3d8; 19a8; 19a13; etc.; pey 71d7; 23b5; motey 27b8; 27b9; 46d7; etc.; amistei 41a16; traitey 43d2; 44d2; tractey 45c12; 46c10; matere 46a4; enquet 64b1; 167b9; 180b12; etc.; secle 65b3; request 69c14; 71c16; 72a5; etc.; messenger 72c7; acquet 133b13; 134a16; 134b3; etc.; millers 154c2; etc.
- 'Te' > 'i': lumire 6c11; 44c6; 45a9; etc.; moity 29c18; 80d21; 110a7; 13; 14; etc.; brifement 54a12; sige 136d3; virge 200b11.
- 'Oi' > 'oe': voez 122d15; voes 123a13; noese 124a13; coeiffe 153d7; foes 199b3.
- 'Oi' < 'ai': lays 4d6; 40a8; 67d17; lay 40a4; retourneit 8d3; eschaufait 24a9; vaient 72d16; fais 124a3; 124c13; fraissies 119b4.
- 'Ai' > 'oi': poiens 4d18; 6b15; etc.; diroy 118c17; respondroy 140b2; vroie 150c5; mettroy 202d4.
- 'Ei' > 'oi': poine 73b12.
- 'Eau' > 'iau': iauue 10b7; 28c3; tonniau 28c2; oysiaux 28d7; biauté 68c19; 68d15; 69a5; vaisiau 129b8; chastiaulz 139b8.
- 'E' is raised to 'i': ensigne 4d13; envillir 14a3; envilli 14b14; Signeur 14c5; fignoient 135a2.
- 'Eu' is delabialised to 'e': plusers 68c4; 181c6; pesanter 73a14; mile 148c13; pe 149a16; liquer 155a14; 199c4; fielle 174a7.
- 'E' < 'a' appears as 'ey' in past participles of first conjugation verbs frequently and generally; also in: appetitey 1b9; 13a6; moitey 3d8; moitey 3d8; 19a8; 13; etc.; ley 4a7 23c7; 55b13; provey 10a15; bailley 14d11; amistei 41a16. Also in 'ie' < 'e': piey 20b18; 55b13; 71d14; pey 23b5; 71d7; pieys 72c8; 77a6.
- 'Ai' is written 'e' frequently and even final: monstrerey 40b8; 47c9; passeré 42a10; direy 74d13. On the other hand: lay (pro.) 33c14; nay 111a14; 111b16; monstray 159d3.
- 'Oi' is written 'e' frequently. In the imperfect indicative ending: receit 14a2; povet 17c3; creet 38a4; procedet 29c14; conformet 74d6; prenostiqueent 76c10; lessiet 154d11.
- Intrusive 'e' appears in: foies 4c6; 7a7 and regularly; mouveroient 7a5; 37b3; estoielles 12d8; 108d2; voier 15b12; 130b2; 3; etc.; poies 20a18; 20d5; 42d11; etc.; mouvera 21a14; mouveroit 21b5; soiet 30b8; Juies 40a9; contrepoies 46b12; pierre 75b6; mouveront 71a12; poyes 107b12; 199a12; boyes 111b16; boies 112d14; voies 123a5; 10; 126b15; etc.; moies 152b15.
- Intrusive 'i' appears in: chescun regularly; freidure 13d6; faice 14a8; receit 14a2; freit 111d3; effeys 114a3; freide 115a16; crestre and its forms; endreit 140a8; faicent 161a12; 13.
- 'Ng' final is written 'g'. This is characteristic of Manuscript C. Loig 6c12; 17b3; 19c14; etc.; loigene 56c2; guaig 134c14.
- 'R' is lost in cece generally; abre 80b2; mabre 114a16; monstre 146a8; considere 160a14; retourne 177a5; joinde 177d3. Inorganic 'r' appears in tourjours 130a5.
- 'L' appears for 'r' in umble 152a11. 'Il' occurs for 'y' 34a15; 62c16; 109a23; etc.; 'y' for 'il' 32c13; 32d13; 38b15; etc.

- 'N' inorganic appears in *voienment* 116d14; *ainsin* 175d15. Final 'n' is written 'm' regularly in *'bacin'* and *'plun'* and in: *nom* 118b11; 119b17; *ycocedrom* 176b9.
- 'T' final is lost in: *meu* 21a7; 75c3; *tan* 10d5; *souffis* 12a20; *pourroi* 23a9; on 40b7; 121b6; 137c15; *peu* 65d15; *endroy* 67c3; *soy* 80c15; *acquer* 156a2; ou 159a7. Inorganic 't' final appears in *peut* 195b2.
- 'S' final is lost: *de la*12; etc.; *le* 26c16; 123b13; etc.; *me* 27b6; 34b3; *pluseur* 35d11; *tousjour* 69b12; *ver* 149b9; *su* 199a6; etc. Inorganic 's' final is found in *trops* 123b3.
- 'S' is written for 'c': *intelligenses* 38c3; *se* 41b4; *ses* 44d14; *commensast* 18c21 etc. 'C' is written for 's': *espece* 18d13; *ciecle* 34d9; 65c18; *chace* 71b16; *trespace* 72b11; *celon* 81d5 etc.
- Palatalised 'l' is written 'l' or 'll': *mervelleuse* 11c7; 68d4; 68d10; etc.; *alleurs* 14b7; 56a7; 138b4; *parelles* 21a8; 106c2; *cornelle* 65b8; *melleur* 35b15; 73c10; 126b16; etc.; *merveller* 76d13; 145a3; *parellement* 110c11; *divinalle* 131a3; *mileu* regularly.
- 'C'[a] > 'c': *canel* 10a6; *camus* 32b8; *camuseté* 32d19; *camuse* 32a2; *carriere* 36c11; *france* 73d8; 74b6; *candele* 130a11.
- 'C' for francian 'ch' is limited to forms of 'prochain' and 'approcher' except for *empeecement* 39d8; *france* 73d8; 74b6.
- 'Ch' for francian 'c' appears in *cheste* 27b6; *lechon* 57a3; *commenchast* 106d5; *chiel* 128b16; *bachim* 117b3; 197c9; *petiteche* 180a11.
- Doubling of consonants results in such forms as: *a pparler* 48a14; 61d12; *a ccorupcion* 69a9; *dissoit* 61a6; *apprés* 71b14; *vraysemblables* 58a2-3; *a ssoufrir* 123b10; *dispersses* 151a13; *la ssienne* 195a11.
- The feminine article appears at times as 'le': *le isnelté* 21b17; *le heure* 56a4; *le immensité* 69d2; *le elevacion* 81a3; *le fin* 83a1; *le intencion* 113c17; *le oeuvre* 136a11; *le ymaginacion* 142c13; *le eaue* frequently.
- The first person plural '-ons' appears as '-on': *ymaginion* 18a3; 82d13; *meton* 18b1; 50a6; *poson* 59b4; *dirion* 76d6; *dision* 76d7; *voion* 77a14; *oion* 123c8; *devon* 132b9; *verrion* 138a6; *pourrion* 130b3; 139a14.
- The northern forms of the verb appear in: *aroit* 4a16; *argurons* (fut) 17c10; *siece* (pres.subj.) 49b11; *vaïr* (veoir) 44a15.
- Other dialectal forms: 'ell' for 'elle' which occurs frequently; the spelling 'oo' and 'u' before palatal 'l' and labial consonants: *vuil* 44b1; 46a1; 46d2; etc.; *oovre* 30d11; *oveques*, *ovec* almost invariably; *ouyl* 129d14; 134d8; 141b1; etc.; *ouylz* 130b2; *fuylle* 174a2; *fuylls* 197c14; the reduction of 'ue' to 'e' in *viel* 68a4; 138b8; 139d12; etc.; *vielle* 50a4; 51d3; *auvroit* 148a7; *fu* for *feu* 7d18.

### *Manuscript D*

Paris, Bibl. Nat. Ms. Franç. 1083 (anc. 7350, Colbert 3230). Parchment, 216 folios, 345 × 215 mm., early 15th century, 2 cols. of 50 lines. Fols. 1-122, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*, followed by *Table des choses notables* 122'-125; fols. 126-147, *Traitié de l'espere*; fols. 147-171, *Le Livre des jugemens d'astrologie selon Aristote*,—inc. 'Des signes les uns sont appelléz masculins ou de masculin gendre . . . exp. . . 'des planetes et par les eclipses qui aviennent en l'annee'; fols. 171-216, five astrological treatises the first four of which deal with *Le Livre Messehallach*, translated by John of Spain, and the last *Judgemens d'astrologie* by Zehel translated from Latin into French. Text and commentary of the *Du Ciel et du monde entresuivant* indicated by T and G. Clear text in lettre bâtarde. Blank spaces left for miniatures and geometrical figures none of which were executed. Ornamental capitals. It is this manuscript rather than A, which is on Reserve, and which is much inferior to A or C in readings and correctness that



is used by Borchert, Duhem, Thorndike, Meunier etc. to illustrate Oresme's doctrine.

Characteristic of *D* is the general use of 'l'an',<sup>1</sup> the appearance of the present participle in '-ent', the third person plural present indicative in '-ant', the almost exclusive use of 'glouse', 'chouse'.

Besides 'glouse' and 'chouse', tonic open 'o', lat. 'au' and checked tonic open 'o' before 'z', 's' and effaced 's' closed to 'u' very frequently especially in forms of 'poser'. Other examples are: noustre 66c17; 70d6; 71b7; etc.; repoux 67c21; 90d8; etc.; toust 74a9; 77c13; 85a12; etc.; doux (dos) 85c3; approuchant 91a5; groux 92a9; 100a6; fousse 103a14; enclouse 100c8; 100c13 etc.

'Tee' > 'ie': not numerous but there are a few cases: verifie 58c9; touchie 35d10; apeticies 36c9; percie 48c16; envie 61d13; appropries 67b7; glorifie 92a1; fichies 115c14; 115d7; 15; etc.; lessies 145a10; segregie 173d12; etc.

'Eau' > 'iau': tonniau 28c2; oisiaux 28d7; chastiaux 139b8.

'Ai' > 'a': trasist 27c5; prochaneté 101c4; passible 102d12; rason 132c15; rasonnable 142a13.

'Ui' > 'u': produce (produise) 92b7; reducte 94d2; plue 102d10; 154a7; plues 115a10; entroduce 188c14.

'Oi' > 'o': estolle 68d11; glore 68d18; moennent 114b2; moennes 117a12; 128a17; 128d7; etc.; moennement 126a7; 143b11; moen 122a16; 125a8; 17; etc.; moens 133a13; 16; 17; etc.; voement 144b3.

'Ie' > 'e': darrere 76d17; 77a7; matere 112c7; 144c3; querent 146c14; querant 148a4.

'An' for 'en' is very frequent; especially in the suffix '-ence', and in the various forms of 'sembler' and 'commencer'. Other examples are: ancians 1a13; estancelle 25c18; angelee 36d15; mandre 46b1; 55d7; 56a11; etc.; aventure 47d2; 50a13; 50b11; etc.; example 48a17; 48d3; 99c12; etc.; il entant 49c11; 151a16; volanté 69d4; 71c2; 72c2; etc.; pansee 87a6; serpan 88b11; essance 94b10; prandre 100c7; inconvenient 147b3 etc. On the other hand, 'en' appears frequently for 'an': distance 43c1; sens 47a3; 47d12; 48d8 and generally; enciens 67b6; 13; 67d15; etc.; avencer 69b12; engels 71c8; davent 75c13; 76b4; 85b7 etc.; demande 78a9; sentté 133a3; avença 142a11; enfens 146d7 etc.

'Oi' is written 'oe' in: voez 73a5; 122d15; 123a5; etc.; croez 97b17; 18; moeste 111d4; amoetist 120d11; povoe 146b10; coeffe 153d7.

'Ui' is written 'ue' in: puese 72a8; 94c3; cuede 72d2; 104c10; etc.; cueder 74c7; 75b21; 75d3; etc.; cuedoient 77c16; 111b9; etc.; ensuevroit 82d5; 93d13; 94a14; etc.; ensuet 92b5; vuiede 93a7; 99a6; 7; 10; destruesoient 123b11; destruesist 124b3; bruerait 138c4; leutier 133a3.

'Ai' is written 'ae' in: vaessel 101a9; 103a7; 103b3; etc.

'Ai' is written 'e' frequently, and finally in diré 74d14; 112d4; 118c17; etc.; mettre 138b10; respondre 140b1; decleré 156a7. On the other hand, 'ai' is written for 'e' in naïf generally; lay 23c7; lay (pro.obj.) 33c14; universailment 51b8; aistre 75a13; ait (est) 93c12; nay 123c7; tounairre 123b12; 124d8.

'Oi' is written 'e' frequently: in the imperfect indicative, third person singular: creet 38a4; 92a1; 3; conformet 74d6; attribuet 97b13; enforcet 109d11; assigneent 113b9; poent 149d5; povet 152c11; approchet 155d9. On the other hand 'oi' appears for 'e': voirre 119c1; poisanteur 129c12.

Close and tonic 'o' > 'ou', 'o': heure 68b16; labour 73b7; 73c10; 73d17; etc.; soule 78c3; 133a4; 7; etc.; meillour 90d14; demore 110b10; pecheours 137b9.

'Oi' > 'ai': laiz 4d6; 67d17; retournait 8d3; eschaufait 24a9; voaise 86b17;

<sup>1</sup> On plates 90, 407, 1083, the *Atlas Linguistique* gives à (we) for l'Orne, the neighboring territory of Calvados, La

Manche, Ille-et-Vilaine and for some sections of the East.

nouaise 124a13; 125b8; mains 197c10. On the other hand, 'oi' appears for 'ai' in poiens 6b15.

Intrusive 'i' appears in 'approcher' and its forms, generally in the suffix '-esce', and with 'e' with the value of open 'e' as in meittre 58a12; Greice 67c2; cleir 68d15; 119c1; 137a10; breiche 88a16; seic 101c5; 10; 111d3; sceit 104c8; 14; espeisse 117b14; meinant 135a1; approche 102d1; 104d4; 9; approchasent 108d5; approchant 108c19; 117d14; 133d16. Other examples are: orloige 69b15; 132d5; cieulz 89b13; parfaice 96c14; thesmonaige 97a3; suymes 115a11; 123a11; feussient 115c12; faibles 117b19; taiche 118a15; 118c6; 119c11; saige 132a6; saiges 145c4; visaige 153d5; 154a6 etc.

'E' > 'ey': prouvey 10c15; moitiei 46d7; 60b17; monstrey 49d7; 50c17; 55b11; etc.; declarey 55b6; piey 55b13; ley 55b13; moittiei 60b15 etc.

'N' is lost in gradeur 143c9; an inorganic 'n' appears in sencunt 125c11; differencens 190d6; 'n' is written 'm' in selom 157d1; emflee 190d6; nom 161a7; 173a17; 207a10; emsemble 184a12; 200b12; emsamble 201d6.

'L' is lost in: 'i' for 'il' 32c13; 32d13; 38b15; etc.; naturement 74d11; 103b6; 104a2; etc.; continuement 94b6; pungie 151b10; ques 179c2. An inorganic 'l' is added in: 'il' for 'y' 34a15; 79c5; 195d2; 'ly' for 'y' 103c15; 161a10; plaisiblement 125b8; quil for qui 158d17; 187b16. 'L' is differentiated to 'n' in n'en 171d6; 186a10; 196d5.

'R' is lost in monsterra 24a8; monstre 146a8; couvecle 194b17; tetracedon 203b8. 'R' inorganic appears in: ordrener and its forms; repours 73b17; presumpcieurs 104c9; tournairre 123b19; merueilleurs 127a2-3. Metathesis occurs in order 203d3.

'T' initial becomes 'th' in: themoigne 73a13; thesmoinaige 97a3; thesmoing 123d6; fanthasie 144d10. 'T' final is lost in: me 27c6; peu 65d15; son 68a9; 113a6; 113c1; etc.; es 74a5; 81a16; tan 107d13; don 112d3; compos 96c6; 105c16; 169b9; suppos 204b12; ai 205a3; on 208b16. Cf. however son(t) 123c6.

'S' final is lost frequently in the plurals of nouns and adjectives and in such forms as: de 5b2; 17c2; 3; etc.; le 15b12; 26c16; 18; 47b4; etc.; aveque 58c5; donque 58d16; illueque 62a11-12; dever 83a1; sen 95a5; sou 127b9; plusieurs 191c15; for 192c12; 195b2; 195c4; etc.; sique 192c13; 195c4. Medial 's' is lost in et for est 13d9; 34d4; 42c3; etc.; and in ait for est 93c12.

Inorganic 's' is added frequently to nouns and adjectives and appears also in: des 4c17; 82c16; etc.; comme 55a1; 191a8; encores 56b3; entendres 60c14; pars 67b7; cars 74a5; celons 86b4; ensembles 105d13; mandres 169c9; entres 186d5. Inorganic 's' often appears in such words as espicicles, esglise, espitre, esclipse perhaps to indicate quality or quantity of the vowel.

'S' is written 'c' in: ce (adv.) 93d10; 104d5; 109d8; etc.; (pro.) 42c5; 56c18; ces 13c20; 37c1; 67c16; etc.; pincer 69b3; selon 81d5; 100b15; apparoice 102b14; ceul 105d9 etc. 'S' is written instead of 'c' in: se 21b14; 52b14; 72b14; etc.; ses 44d14; 47c3; 70d18; etc.; conveoir 38d14; sercle 86b9; assier 102c5 etc.

'C'[a] > 'c': canel 10a6; 195c3; camus 32b8; camuseté 32d19; camuse 33a2; carriere 36c11.

'C' appears for Francian 'ch' in aproce 79a7; proceine 186d2.

'Ch' appears for Francian 'c' in lechon 57a3; chocheront 204a1.

Doubling of consonants is frequent; ensuive 21b17; a partir 29b2; creusse 37a4; ainssi 49d12; 160c12; 164a4; possé 56a14; horrologe 71a5; voullément 76c9; mottives 70d16-17; nottifier 81b4; Affrique 87b10; vermm 132c8; sentté 133a3; genrrres 193a10; genrrre 198a11 etc.

The feminine article 'le' is not frequent but appears occasionally: le tres belle estoille 14c2; le heure 56a4; le ysnelleté 94b14; 101c4; 107a2; etc.; le espere 114c2; le oeuvre 136a11 etc.

The first person plural '-ons' appears as '-on' in: ymaginon 18a3; meton 18b1;

50a6; poson 59b4; 102a5; etc.; allon 73a5; dirion 76d6; dison 76d7; 89d7; 104d13; voion 77a14; 81c4; avon 77b10; 89d3; 110c5; pouson 87d2; 89a16; apercevon 117b2; pourrion 130b3; 139a14; povon 132a11; verriion 138a6.

The Northern forms of the verb appear in: aroit 4a16; 148a7; 207c15; conveneroit 22d2; tenroit (A creroient) 32a11; aroient 93d3.

In the future and conditional 'e' falls in: argurons 17c10; monsterra 24a8; demorra 56a5; 163b9; 198c7; demorroit 56a10; 98a19; etc.; dura (fut) 65b3; demorroient 88a16. Epenthetic 'e' appears in: mouveroient 7a5; 16b8; 37b3; etc.; movera 21a14; 156b10; mouveroit 21b5; 21c18; 22a1; etc.; mouveront 71a12.

In addition to these characteristics that point to the Northern or Northeastern dialect are the following forms: ell a 57a6; Auverroys 47b17; chaulleur 111d5; 115a17; feuvre 113a8; douquel 84a10; lesqueulz 100a4; fu for feu 191a2; leus for lieus 192a7; seicle 65b *passim* and seicles 65b3; 8; 65c *passim* which show the failure of open tonic 'e' to diphthongize before a palatal element.

### Manuscript E

Paris, Bibl. Nat. Ms.Franç. 24278 (St.Victor 221). Parchment and paper, 146 folios, 295 × 210 mm., 15th century,<sup>1</sup> full-page text in 44 lines. Bound in embossed calf-skin with wooden boards. Fols. 1-135, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*; fols. 136-138, *Table des difficultés* (des choses notables); fol. 139 blank; fol. 140 begins 'la moitié du lonc et la sixte partie du lay' from ch. 37 of *Le Traitié de l'espere* ending at fol. 145; fols. 145-146 contain a list of astronomical terms with reference to chapters in the *Traitié* where these are defined; fol. 146: 'Iste liber est sancti Victoris parisiensis; amori gratia eum reddat'. The inside cover bears the old number of Claude de Grandrue 'MMM 22', and the following: "Liber de celo et mundo Aristotelis ex precepto Karoli quinti quondam francorum regis per magistrum nicholaum oresme de latino in gallicum translatus, et commentatus, continens iiii libros partiales quorum primus i., secundus 42, trinus 104, quartus 120. Item Oresme in gallico tractatus de Spere continens quinquaginta capitula 140". Fols. 140-153 of the old pagination are lacking. Text and commentary *entresuivant* indicated by Glo. and Glose; Tex. and Texte. Good *lettre courante*, many folios deeply stained and partly illegible. Figures are not executed in the spaces left for them; no ornamentation; gold and colored capitals begin books; chapter initials in color.

'Tee' > 'ie': occurs rarely except in 'fichies': percie 48c16; envie 61d13; lessies 145a10; despecie 153a7; traictie 162b7 etc.

'Oi' > 'ai': mains 24d18; nientmains 30a5; lais 67d17; eschaufait 24a9; pouvaient 124d15.

'Oi' > 'o': gloire 69a5.

'Ai' > 'a': nascence 5a7; exemplaire 6c8; trasist 27c5; raisonablement 144d3; rason 176c5.

Tonic close 'o' > 'ou': labour 73b7; 73b12; 73c5; etc.; pecheours 137b9.

'E'[i] does not break: seicles 66a14; 66b4; seicle 66b4; 66b10.

<sup>1</sup>The handwriting and the format of E resemble closely those of B.N. Ms. Franç. 24280, containing *Le Livre de Ethiques*, also from St. Victor and of approximately 1440-50 (Cf. A. D. Menut, *Maître Nicole Oresme Le Livre de Ethiques d'Aristote* (New York), 1940), pp. 50-51). The general appearance of the script seems to bear out this date. It has the appearance of 14th century cursive hand having become calli-

graphical and traced by a hand well accustomed to such a script, a hand which is not in vogue until the 15th century. There is one character that may be singled out, a figure 7 'r', a form which is current in the 15th century cursively formed humanistic hands. The other letter forms are such that they could have been written much earlier.

- 'E' from latin 'a' > 'ie': frequent in forms of 'talis' and 'qualis': lesquieux 28a13; 72b12; 99d1; 100a4; etc.; tielz 37b8; 76c2; 95a18; 95d15; etc.; quieulxconques 44c10; desquieux 44d8; 87a18; lesquieulx 65b17; 69a4; desquieulx 67b14; 108c11; quieulx 69d7; lesquielx 99d2; 102b1; etc.
- 'An' for 'en' is frequent: example 8b8; estancelle 25c18; differans 28a16; circumference 33c7; volanté 73d8; vanter 88b6; crestians 88b7 etc. On the other hand: enciennement 76c9; avencer 109a22; enciens 119d9; avença 142a11.
- 'E' is raised to 'i' in: milleur 35b15; 137c14; milieur 137b18.
- 'Oi' is written 'e' in creet 38a4; 92a1; 92a3; conformet 74d6; appercevent 123a16; 123b14; etc. On the other hand voirre 102c5; 119b9; 119c1; poiseleur 129c12.
- 'Ai' is written 'e' infrequently. On the other hand: lay 23c7; effait 92a12; nay 111b16; naif regularly, effais 114a3; tonnaire 123b12; 19; 124d6.
- 'Oe' is written for 'oi' in: moeste 111b20; 114d16; amoetist 120d11; oiseau 124d17; 156b6; voes 126b15; coeiffe 153d7.
- 'Oo' is written for 'o' in: coote 48a11; 48a17; cootes 110d11; 119d15; 120a3.
- Intrusive 'e' appears in mielieu 90b18; 110d3; planetes 75d14; 77a11; voies 167d3.
- Intrusive 'i' appears in: langaige 5b13; Greice 67c2; breiche 88a16; feible 107d17; taiche 118a15; 118b10; 118c6; etc.; saige 132a6; saiges 145c4 etc.
- 'R' inorganic appears in: angre 71b13; 71c3; angres 31b11; 71b5; 72d13; estré 91c2; tourjours regularly; durer 126d3; ordrenance 144a7; monstren 172c4.
- 'R' is lost in considere 129a8; monstre 146a8; convecle 194b17.
- 'N' inorganic is added in: cen 81d19; quadrangle 97b20; muent 108b6. 'L' is dissimilated to 'n' in: n'en 171d6; 196d5.
- 'N' is written 'm' in: redombde 91d18; comdempse 112b17; but non for nom 169b4.
- 'L' is lost in: semblable 110b14; i for il 38b15; 167c10; 183c1; etc.; pungie 154a5; Inorganic 'l' added in: il for y 79c5; quil for qui 28a4; 158d17; 159c8; flable 74c19; ly for y 161a10.
- 'T' initial > 'th' in: thouchié 110c8. Final 't' is lost in: preceden 12a17; ces 4c20; pue 90b9; 109d9; 159d3; on 183a14. Inorganic final 't' added in: aut 1b22; out 5d15; soit 19c7.
- 'S' medial is lost in: et 12b4; 13d9; 34d4; etc.; moite 13b20; peüt 17a3; 21a19; 27c2; etc.; souffit 23c12; meüt 94a13; fit 95b5; 41d3; ynel 100b18; albatre 119c16; satisfaction 123a8 etc. Final 's' is lost frequently in the plurals of nouns and adjectives and in: le 13b8; 15b12; 26c16; 18; etc.; de 33d12; 40d17; 57b8; etc.; san 60b6; aveque 8b3; 58c5; me 96c2; elle 16b8; 59d5; 82d3; sou 127b9; somme 154b7; au 159c6; jusque 194d5 etc.
- Medial 's' is added to indicate quality and quantity of vowel in words such as: esglise 1a4; chapistre 20d16; espicicle 70b11; 78c2; 93b9; etc.; esclipsé 92a14 etc. Inorganic medial 's' is found in: est 42a19; 102d5; aist 49c13; 53b15; 77a15; etc. Final inorganic 's' appears in: les 13a10; 124c6; des 40d1; 66a8; 82c16; etc.; ensembles 105d13, etc., and with nouns and adjectives.
- 'S' is written instead of 'c' in: ses 44d14; 47c3; 70d18; etc.; ce 21b14; 29a9; 41b4; etc.; mension 54d15; 58a7; 72b6; desa 86b12; assier 102c5; etc. 'S' is written by 'c' in: ces for ses 3d12; 13c20; 67c16; etc.; ce for se 16b6; 18d11; 22c2; etc.; and in such words as ravice 141c6; appareücent 149a12; disperces 151a13; etc.
- 'C'[a] > 'c': canel 10a6; camus 32b8; camuseté 32d19; camuse 33a2; carriere 36c11.
- 'Ch' appears for Francian 'c' in: lechon 57a3.
- Palatalized 'l' is spelt 'll' or 'l' in: mileu 20b and 20c and regularly; oeul 134d8; 135c6; oelx 130b2; milleur 137c14.
- Doubling of consonants is frequent especially after 'n' as in: planttes 13d15; ainssy 16c13; 16d14; 109d13; etc.; enffermeté 29a16; enfforcement 30a8; 106a15; enffant 41b1; enffans 51b17; 51c5; 66d3, etc. Doubling of intervocalic

- consonants results in such spellings as: vraisemblables 57d9; dissoit 66d3; pollie 69b2; 78c13; vellocité 69b3; 4; regullierement 69b11; vollement 76c9 etc. Initial doubling is seen in: ssemblable 154a3, la fin 156b3, etc.
- The first person plural ending '-ons' appears as '-on' in: ymaginon 18a3; poson 59b4; 161a13; 87d2; 89a16; etc.; allon 73a5; dirion 76d6; voion 77a14; avon 89d3; 110c5; dison 89d7; 96a15; 104d13; appercevon 117b2; pourrion 130b3; verriion 138a6.
- The feminine article appears as 'le' infrequently as in: le tres belle estoille 14c2; le isnelté 94b14; le .viii.\* espere 128c4. The feminine subject pronoun appears as: ell 57a6.
- The Northern forms of the verb appear in: aroit 4a16; venroit 8c6; ara 47a17; aroient 93d3; chaïr 75a3; peult appears often for peut. The present participle appears in '-ent' in: affebloient 62a19; efforcent 106c1; 4; 6. The third plural present indicative appears in '-ant' in: descendant 151d7; distribuant 179a2.
- In the future and conditional 'e' is lost in: argurons 17c10; demourroit 56a10; dura 65b3; demourroient 88a16; demorroit 98d18; 162c15; demourra 163b9; 198c7; norra 190c11. In the future and conditional an epenthetic 'e' appears in: mouveroient 16b8; 37b3; movera 21a5; 21a14; mouveroit 21b10; 21c5; 21c18; etc.; mouvera 24c14; mouveront 71a12.
- To be noted also is the reduction of 'oeu' to 'o' in 'oil' 129d14; of 'ie' to 'e' in querent 146c14; of 'iu' to 'u' in plue 154a7; the metathesis of 'er' to 're' in esprevier 160c8; the spelling 'eu' for 'ui' in leutier 133a3; brueroit 138c4 and the form feuvre 113a8.

### *Manuscript F*

Paris, Bibl. de la Sorbonne Ms. 571 (Louis-le-Grant, 191 I, 2-Ms. 1, II, 7). Parchment, 234 folios, 302 × 205 mm., in two columns of unequal length. Clear *lettre bâtarde*, 15th century. Fols. 1-226, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*, text and commentary *entresuivant*; fols. 226<sup>v</sup>-234<sup>r</sup>, *Table des choses notables*. Geometrical figures not executed, no miniatures, gold and colored capitals.

- 'Iee' > 'ie': 'fichie' and 'fichies' are used regularly with 'estoille' and its plural. Other examples are: froisie 107d9; enforcie 108d18; empeechie 113c10; appeticie 113c10; taillie 117d6; appropriie 128d15; mucie 131c12; lessies 145a10; lessie 149c6; despecie 153a7; plungie 154a5; escuillie 166d2 etc.
- 'Eau' > 'iau': tonniau 28c2; iauie 28c3; oysiaux 28d7; nouviau 45a7; biauté 68c19; 68d17; ouesyau 124d17; vaisiau 129b8; chastiaux 139b8.
- 'Ie' > 'i': lumire 115b4; moity 130a4; 5; possit 132d9; sige 136d3; virge 200b11; 203a14.
- 'Ie' > 'e': moitey 110a5; 127a15; 16; etc.; requerent 132c3; 132c16; aquert 134a16; 134b3; 134d8; acquerent 134d4; requert 141a12; 15; querent 146c14; 148a4; enquerent 145d8; millers 154c2; enquert 167b9; 180b12; 180d2.
- Tonic close 'o' > 'ou': liquor 155a14; erreur 158d10; soult 197d13.
- 'Ai' > 'a': ballie 14b11; vassel 199d10.
- 'Oi' > 'o': Gregore 113d8; Istore 122b14; hystores 206a15.
- 'Ui' > 'u': bruroit 138c4.
- 'Ai' > 'oi': lays 4d6; 67d17; lais 40a8.
- 'Oi' > 'ai': poiens 4d8; 117b19; 159a11; atroit 30c10; essoierons 91a15; soit 105b9; diroy 118c17; comparoison 171d9; estroit 173d6; 174b13.
- 'Oei' > 'oi': oyl 44a15; fuylle 174a2; fuylls 197c14.
- 'E' < 'a' > 'ie': lesquieulx 28a13; quielx 31d18; desquielx 202d5.
- Open 'e' checked > 'ie': tiexle 97b3.
- 'E' is raised to 'i' in: ligier 99a11; 104c16.
- 'Ai' > 'e' is frequent. Inversely 'e' is written 'ay': lay 4a7; 55b13; naiz 32b9;

- nais 32d19; lay (pro.) 33c14; monstray 72d6; ailles 72c8; nay 111a14; 111b16; 166b9; monstray 159d3; naif ordinarily.
- 'Oi' is written 'e' frequently as in pover; mover and such forms as: prenostiquent 76c10; assigneent 113b9; recepvent 119c9; apparer 117a9; sef 148a7; 148b3; cheer 149c6; 154d11; lessiet 154d11.
- 'An' is frequent for 'en' especially in 'sembler' and its forms: and in examplaire 6c8; differans 25c2-3; violance 98c12; recommander 104d12; commant 123c5; commencement 151a6 etc.
- 'Oi' is written 'oe' in: parfoes 9a10; voez 122d15; 123a13; ouesyau 124d17.
- 'Ai' is written 'ae' in: paes 126c1; 146d3; vaessel generally.
- 'Oeu' is written 'oo' in: oovre 30d11.
- Intrusive 'e' appears in foies 7a7; 14c14; 35d9; etc.; poies 20a18; 42d11; 196a10; Juies 40a9; poyes 107b12; 199a12; boyes 111b16; boies 112d14; voies 123a5; 126b15; voiez 123a10; etc.; moies 152b15.
- Intrusive 'i' appears in: usaige 4b18; langaige 5b13; 14d5; 33b12; Saige 62c18; martelleis 123b2; tonneirre 123b18; feive 106c18; geicte 9a3; effeys 114a3; freit 121b2 and its compounds; creistre 129d15; 130a8 and its compounds; franceys 156c1; in the present subjunction forms faissent 161a13; faicent 161a14 etc.
- 'E' > 'ey' frequently: pey 23b5; ley 23c7; appliquey 95a12; piey 100b6; 117c21; etc.; donney 106c11; signey 106c11; avancey 108c8; moitey 110a5; 127a15; 127a18-127b1; touchey 110c8; 120b9; 126d14; etc.; fichiey 111d11; 118a7; traictey 119a8; 126a15; 127c10; etc.; moitney 127a13; moytey 127a14; causey 124c13; empechey 148c16; couchey 144d1 etc.
- 'I' for y 27d2; 34a15; 62c6; etc.; i for il 32c13; 32d13; 38b15; etc.; li for y 102c16; quil for qui 92c11.
- 'R' is lost in mabre 114a16; creinde 137c3; tetacedron 176a9; cecle usually; dissimilated to 'l' in reguliele 175d12; chapitle 205d2. Inorganic 'r' appears in lieurs 109a6; entendre 203a3.
- 'T' final is lost in parfaisan 149d6-7. Inorganic 't' is found in peut 195b2.
- 'S' final is lost in plurals of nouns and adjectives and in: le 26c16; 18; 97c6; etc.; de 91b17; 150b16; ver 101a14; su 199a6.
- Medial 's' is lost in: et 7b9; 34d4; etc.; resistat 129c11; descendit 103b10.
- Inorganic final 's' is added in: encores 19a5; des 40d1; 161d2; etc.; trops 123b3; les 201b2.
- Inorganic medial 's' is added in: mixstes 11b2; est 109a3; 117a15; lestre 142a2.
- 'S' is written for 'c' in: secle 4d4; 86b9; ses 6a4; 94d11; etc.; se 41b4; 68b7; etc.; commensassent 47b18.
- 'S' is written 'c' in: ces 87c8; ciecle 34d9; faicent 161a14 etc.
- 'C[a]' > 'c': camus 32b8; camuse 33a2; camuseté 32d19; siece 49b11; brecque 88a16; calamel 194b11.
- 'C' for Francian 'ch' is common in forms of 'prochain' and 'approchier': proceain 97d13; procein 98a4; 101c8; 102c13; approcier 102c14; 133b6; 133d5; approcast 133c19; approcoit 155d9.
- 'Ch' for Francian 'c' appears in: appetichié 13a6; lechon 57a3; petiteche 180c11; 184c8; bachin 197c9.
- Doubling of consonants is quite frequent: for example after 'n' in: ainssi 20d2; 35d11; 36d1; etc.; responsse 20d12; 21c16; 23a2; intervocalic: entroduissant 17b5; millieu 37c15; ceppendent 69b18; moitney 127a13; crerre 144d10; initially: a partir 29b1-2; autre ffoys 46c6; finally: mett (3 sing.) 114a7; 116b3; 116c17; etc.
- The first person plural suffix of the verb '-ons' appears as '-on': ymaginon 18a3; dision 76d7; dison 81c9; lesson 118c18; oiion 123c8; pourrion 130b3; 139a14; tempton 131a7; devon 132b9; verriion 138a6; poson 161a13.
- The feminine article appears fairly frequently as 'le' in: le isnelté 21b17; 94b14;

le plus merveilleuse 68d10; le immensité 69d2; le intencion 113c17; le ymaginacion 142c13; le viii<sup>e</sup> espere generally; le eaue 160b16; 176b9; etc.; le extremité 181c2; 187a3; le habilité 198c10.

The present participle appears with the suffix '-ent': traversent 4b5; resistant 46d4; descendant 97d8.

The third person plural present indicative appears in '-ant': procedant 102a5.

The Northern forms of 'avoir' appear: aroit 4a16; aroient 93d3.

The conditional and future appear with epenthetic 'e': mouvera 21a14; mouveroient 7a5; 37b3; mouveroit 21b5; 156b10; mouveront 71a12; arderoit 103c7; voier 130b2; 130b3; 152c11 etc.; deveroit 195b11. The future and conditional appear with the loss of 'e': argurons 17c10; demourra 56a5; 163b9; 198c7; demourroit 98d18; 162c15; demourroient 73a8; 88a16; 199b7; demourront 175c8.

Other dialectal forms characteristic of manuscripts of the North and Northeast are: mileu which is general; vielle (3. sing subj.) 120d2; etc.; loig 138c4; je viel 138b8; 142a14; 156c4; etc.; oyseu 156b6; fielle 174a7; blancher 186b5; liquer 199c4; conveux 15a8; creous 129b3.

## VII. RELATIONSHIP OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

THE manuscripts of *Du Ciel et du monde* are divided into two main groups, one of which is represented by A, the other by BCDEF.<sup>1</sup> This grouping is discernible in differences of readings which are, however, virtually the same in meaning,<sup>2</sup> in omissions that are common to BCDEF and which do not occur in A,<sup>3</sup> in omissions that appear in A and which do not occur in BCDEF.<sup>4</sup> In many cases A differs in readings from the other group and in these readings A is definitely correct;<sup>5</sup> on the other hand, A is incorrect in certain cases and the correct readings are supplied by BCDEF.<sup>6</sup>

Within the group BCDEF, a comparison of the readings of D and E establishes their close relationship. Moreover, it is fairly clear that E is derived directly from D.

28b3	ABCF	a milieu ou au centre
	D	a milieu ou a centre
	E	a milieu ou au centre (corrected from 'a centre').
46c13	ABCF	de matiere ou en matiere
	D	de maere ouen matiere
	E	de maere ou en matiere (corrected from 'maereouen matiere').
47b1	ABCF	nous avons a dire ce qui
	D	nous avons a drece qui
	E	nous avons a dire qui (corrected from 'a drece qui').
61a6	ABCF	celum unus erat
	D	celum unus unus erat
	E	celum unus ..... erat (corrected from 'celum unus unus erat').

<sup>1</sup> Manuscripts A and E show a resemblance in readings against BCDF to folio 12a. From that point on E shows the same readings as BCDF. Cf. 1519-20, 1d18-19, 1c17, 3c2, 4a12, 4b9-10, 5b4, 6c11, 10b12-13, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 14d16-17, 20a5-6, 29a8, 44a15, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 14a9, 18c4, 29d10, 30b3, 32d6, 38b6, 44c8,

etc.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. 1d15-16, 29a13, 54a15-16, 20d5-6, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. 26d16, 34a8, 39c10, 39c16, 41b-14, etc., especially 170c3, 171c17.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. 3c2, 5d13, 9b10, 14c14, 14d3, etc. These differences are ordinarily of minor importance and may be scribal.

- 62a13      *ABCF* et de ce est signe  
               *D* et de cest signe  
               *E* et de ce est signe (*corrected from 'et de cest signe'*).
- 71d12-13   *ABCF* comme corps, figurable indifferenment  
               *D* comme corps figurable se peut diviser indiff.  
               *E* comme corps figurable se peut diviser indiff. (*'Se peut diviser' is marginal in D, perhaps a gloss; E has it in the text'*).
- 73a8        *A* demorroient  
               *BF* demoureroient  
               *C* demouroient  
               *D* denoureroient  
               *E* denoureroient (*corrected from 'demoureroient'*).
- 84d8        *ABCF* resgarderoient equalment la terre  
               *D* resgarderoient equivalencelement la terre (*corrected from 'equalement'*).  
               *E* resgarderoient equivalencelement la terre
- 98c13       *ABF* eminence  
               *D* en mience  
               *E* enminence (*corrected from 'enuence'*).
- 114b2-3    *ABCF* engendrer chaleur moiennant tel mouvement  
               *D* engendrer chaleur moennent tel mouvement  
               *E* engendrer chaleur moienant tel mouvement (*corrected from 'moement'*).
- 128d13     *A* il font leurs cours aussi comme en un m.  
               *BCF* il font leur cours ..... en un m.  
               *D* il font leur corps ..... en un m.  
               *E* il font leur cours ..... en un m. (*corrected from 'corps'*).
- 165d11     *ABCF* Ce est la rayson d'Aristote en sentence  
               *D* Ce est la rayson de Arsitote mais en sentence  
               *E* Ce est la rayson de Aristote mise en sentence (*corrected from 'mais'*).
- 166d16     *ABF* ne eüst commencement  
               *CD* ne out commencement  
               *E* ne eust commencement (*corrected from 'out'*).

There is evidence, moreover, that the group *DE* are closely related to *C* and may even be derived from *C* or from a very closely related manuscript.

- 7c1        *AB* Et je di celui estre  
               *C* Et je di de celui estre (*'lui' of 'celui' marginal*).  
               *D* Et je di de celui estre  
               *E* Et je dy de celui estre (*'de' superscript*).  
               *F* Et je dy estre de celui (*'de' superscript*).
- 18b2       *AB* et se separe  
               *C* et se separe (*in margin 'se' which might easily be read as 'je'*).  
               *DE* et je separe  
               *F* et .. separe



18c11-12	ABF	et que de .g.
	C	et que de .g. ( <i>in margin the abbreviation of 'que' which might be read as 'a'.</i> )
	DE	et .a. de .g.
22a14	AF	par le XII°
	B	.....
	C	par le XII° ( <i>has been corrected from XI°.</i> )
	DE	par le XI°
51c20	ABF	et c'est ce qui est moien
	C	et c'est ce qui est moien ( <i>'c'est' marginal.</i> )
	DE	et .... ce qui est moien
53b15	ABF	de .a. que aucune foys n'ait esté
	C	de .a. que aucune foys n'ait este ( <i>'que aucune foys' marginal.</i> )
	DE	de .a. ... .. n'ait este
60a4	ABF	et se aucun disoit
	C	et se aucun disoit ( <i>'et' marginal.</i> )
	DE	.. se aucun disoit
66a14-15	A	siecles dont les uns contiennent les autres
	B	siecles .... les uns contiennent les autres
	C	siecles dont les uns contiennent les autres ( <i>the abbreviation of 'dont' has been corrected and might be read as 'quant'.</i> )
	DE	siecles quant les uns contiennent les autres
	F	siecles qui ... .. contiennent les autres
69a15	ABF	Bernardus
	C	Benardus
	D	Bernardus ( <i>'Benardus' corrected to 'Bernardus'.</i> )
	E	Bernardus
76b20	AB	celle que l'en met
	F	celle qui l'en met
	C	celle que le met
	DE	celle qu'elle met

There is evidence too, along with the above, that *DE* were derived from *C* or a closely allied manuscript before *C* was corrected.

114c2	AB	Après le ciel en descendant est l'espere
	C	Après le ciel en descendant le ciel est l'espere ( <i>'le ciel' marginal.</i> )
	DE	Après .. ... en descendant le ciel est l'espere
	F	Après .. ... en descendant .. ... est l'espere
116a7-8	AF	mes que telz dis sont desraisonnables
	B	mez ... telz diz sunt desraisonnables
	C	mes que tels dis sunt desraysonnables ( <i>'que' superscript.</i> )
	DE	mes ... tels dis sont desraysonnables
126a17- 126b1	ABF	fussent en samblable
	C	fussent en semble <sup>ble</sup> ( <i>'ble' superscript.</i> )
	DE	fussent en semble
128a18- 128b1	AB	plus prochaine ou souverain ciel
	C	plus prochaine "au ciel" souverain ( <i>transposition sign with 'au ciel'.</i> )

- DEF** plus prochain au ciel souverain
- 151b17-18    **AB** elle ne descendroit pas seulement tant que  
               **C** elle ne descendroit pas "tant" seulement .... que (*transposition sign with 'tant'*).  
               **D** elle ne descendroit pas seulement tant que (*'tant' has been crossed out*).  
               **E** elle ne descendroit pas tant seulement tant que  
               **F** elle ne descendroit pas tant seulement .... que
- 151c15        **AF** et approche de figure sperique  
               **B** et approche de figure sperique  
               **C** et approche de "sperique" figure (*transposition sign with 'sperique'*).  
               **DE** et approche de sperique figure
- 189c11        **ABF** Ce est a entendre  
               **C** Ce est a en / fol. 137b (*the scribe failed to enter '-tendre' on fol. 137c*).  
               **DE** Ce est air

Perhaps the connection of *C* to *DE* may be best seen from the following examples.

- 22b1          **AB** Après il reprouve  
               **C** Apres il reprove (*The badly written 'il' may easily be read as 'je'; 're' of 'reprouve' is superscript*).  
               **DF** Apres je reprouve  
               **E** Apres je prove
- 49d2          **ABF** et que cez puissances  
               **C** et que cez puissances (*scribe ends line and 'q cez' jammed together*).  
               **D** et quitez puissances  
               **E** et que telz puissances (*corrected from 'quitez'*).
- 132c12        **AB** Et si est par la raison de l'ame  
               **C** Et si est par la raison de l'ame (*'honme' in margin as gloss. 'Par' ends line in C and 'honme' is in margin directly opposite*).  
               **DEF** Et si est honme par la raison de l'ame

*A* and *C* show a striking enough resemblance in readings to warrant a common parentage, yet the divergencies are sufficient to indicate different originals. There is a lengthy lacuna in *C* (83a-105b) and other minor omissions peculiar to *C*. On the other hand, there are omissions common to *AC* but which in *C* have been filled in by another hand either at the margin or at the top of the folio. Cf. 36d13-14, 39b9-10, 60c13-16, 62b17-19, 78a6-9. Only 62b17-19 and 78a6-9 indicate a possible source for the correction of *C*.

- 62b17-19     **BF** lez uns sunt engendrants et lez autres conservans  
               **C** les uns sunt engendranz et les autres conservanz  
               **D** les uns sunt engendrants .. les aultres conservans  
               **E** les uns sont engendranz .. les autres conservans
- 78a6-9        **B** et .. pourroit estre colore par la sainte Escripiture qui dit de Dieu: qui fecit celos in intellectu; et en autre lieu dit du solail: in entuitu pergit spiritus; et iterum: sol cognovit ooccasum....

- C** et ce pourroit estre couloure par la sainte Escripture qui dit de Dieu: qui fecit celos in intellectu; et en autre lieu dit du solail: in circuitu pergit spiritus; et iterum: sol cognovit occasum suum
- D** et ce porroit estre coloure par la sainte Escripture qui dit de Dieu: qui fecit celos in intellectu; et en autre lieu dit du solail: in circuitu pergit spiritus; .. item: sol cognovit occasum suum
- E** et ce pourroit estre couloure par la sainte Escripture qui dit de Dieu: qui fecit celos in intellectu; et en autre lieu dit du soleil: in crecruitu pergit spiritus; .. item: sol cognovit occasum suum
- F** et ce pourroit estre couloure par la sainte Escripture qui dit de Dieu: qui fecit celos in intellectu; et en autre lieu dit du solail: in circuitu pergit spiritus; .. item: sol cognovit occasum suum

Again, at 111b19 *A* has copied 'il est pres du feu' in its wrong position; *C* has copied it in the same place but expunged it and then has copied it in its proper place with *BDEF*.

It will be seen therefore, that *AC* are closely related but that *C* has been corrected and that the divergencies between *A* and *C* are traceable to a large extent to the corrector. Is it possible to trace the corrector from the evidence of the extant manuscripts? In the above two cases, the corrections point to *BF* and in the second to *B*. Perhaps other examples which show the resemblance of *A* and *C* after the correction of *C* may bring light, especially if we bear in mind that *DE* are derived from *C* after its correction.

- 34b1      *ADEF* est possible que il y soit fait  
             *B* est possible que il .. soit fait  
             *C* est possible que il i soit fait ('i' superscript).
- 41b4      *A* mais nientmoins ce seroit touzjours un meisme(s)  
             *B* .... nientmoins .. ..... une meisme  
             *C* .... nientmoins ce seroit touzjours un meisme ('ce seroit touzjours' at the top of the folio in another hand).  
             *DF* .... nientmoins ce seroit un meisme tousjours  
             *E* .... nientmoins se seroit ung mesme tousjours
- 41d5-6    *A* seullement quant au ciel et naturelment  
             *BDF* seulement et quant .. .... et naturelment  
             *C* seulement .. quant .. .... et naturelment ('et' before quant' has been deleted).  
             *E* seulement et quant .. .... est naturelment
- 47d13    *ADEF* quar par la glose du chappitre  
             *B* car par la chose du chapitre  
             *C* car par la glose du chapitre (corrected from 'chose').
- 76a19-20 *A* augmentacion precede les autres  
             *B* augmentacion precede tous lez autres  
             *C* agmentacion precede .... les autres ('touz' has been deleted).  
             *D* augmentacion precede touz les autres  
             *E* augmentacion precede tous les autres  
             *F* agmentacion precede .... les autres

- 107c3      **ADEF** Item et pour ce que en mouvement naturel  
               **B** Item .. . . . en mouvement naturel  
               **C** Item .. . . . en mouvement naturel (*'pour ce que' has been deleted*).
- 108a13-14      **AF** sanz varier la proporcion et l'isneleté  
                   **BDE** sanz varier la proporcion .. l'isneleté  
                   **C** sanz varier la proporcion .. l'isneleté (*'et' has been deleted*).
- 142b6            **A** mes son lieu ne vient pas a lui  
                   **B** mez son lieu ne va pas a lui  
                   **C** mes son lieu ne vient pas a lui (*'va' is corrected to 'vient'*).  
                   **DEF** mes son lieu ne va pas a lui
- 148a10           **A** Il leur sembloit que se une pel  
                   **BDEF** Il leur semble que se une pel  
                   **C** Il leur sembloit que se une pel (*'semble' has been corrected to 'sembloit'*).
- It is fairly clear then from these examples and from the foregoing that C has been corrected and through the corrections approaches A. If we bear in mind that DE are derived from C after its correction, then the above examples will show that of the extant manuscripts it is closest to B. Further examples tend to bear this out.
- 45a6            **A** en chascun movement  
                   **DEF** en chascun mouvement  
                   **BC** en chascun moment
- 67b6            **A** et par aventure selon lui  
                   **B** et par aventure selon lupra (*after 'selon' there is a word which can be read as lup<sup>ra</sup>*).  
                   **C** et par aventure selon lupre  
                   **D** et par aventure selon luy (*'pluseurs' has been deleted after 'selon'*).  
                   **EF** et par aventure selon lui
- 125a2           **AF** touz les cielz meuz font son sensible  
                   **B** tous lez cielz meus font son semblable  
                   **C** tous les cielx meus funt son semblable (*'ble' of 'semblable' begins a new line*).  
                   **D** touz les cielz .... ensemble font son  
                   **E** tous les cielz .... ensemble font son
- 137a4           **A** du monde, et creent ceci  
                   **BF** du monde et creont ceci  
                   **C** du monde et cre ont ceci  
                   **D** du munde et croient cecy  
                   **E** du monde et croient ceci
- 188a10          **ADEF** que tel element  
                   **B** que tel mouvement  
                   **C** que tel element (*corrected from 'mouvement'*).
- 196a13          **AF** peser sus soy assi comme  
                   **B** peser sus soi si comme  
                   **C** peser sus soy si comme (*corrected from 'aussi'*).  
                   **D** peser sus soy aussy comme  
                   **E** peser sur soy aussy comme
- 192a1-2        **AF** prouvé que le lieu de bas est certain

## MEDIÆVAL STUDIES

- B** prove que le lieu de cibas est certain  
**C** prouve que le lieu de bas est certain (*corrected from 'cibas'*).  
**D** prove que le lieu de bas est certain  
**E** allegue que le lieu de bas est certain
- 201d7-8    **AF** ne ont dehors qui resiste  
               **B** ne ont dehors eulz qui resiste  
               **C** ne ont dehors .... qui resiste (*'eulz' has been deleted*).  
               **DE** ne ont dehors .... qui resiste

It is difficult to link up  $F$  with any manuscript within its own group. Numerous omissions, additions and inversions show its own independence. It shows relationship now with  $DE$ , now with  $B$  and  $C$  and occasionally with  $A$ . The following examples show perhaps that it is closer to  $B$  and to  $C$ .

- |           |            |  |
|-----------|------------|--|
| 1c15      | <i>AE</i>  | aucuns cuideroient   |
|           | <i>BCF</i> | aucuns cuidoiert ,   |
|           | <i>D</i>   | aucuns cuident   |
| 48d4      | <i>A</i>   | c'est impossible que fust nomper                           |
|           | <i>B</i>   | ce est impossible que il soit nomper                       |
|           | <i>CF</i>  | ce est impossible que il soit nomper                       |
|           | <i>DE</i>  | ce est impossible que il est nomper                        |
| 54a3      | <i>A</i>   | que .z. peust ester en verite aveucques .i.                |
|           | <i>BCF</i> | que .z. peuvent estre en verite onques .i.                 |
|           | <i>DE</i>  | que .z. peuvent ester en verite ou que .i.                 |
| 57a15     | <i>ADE</i> | ou .xxviii.* chappitre                                     |
|           | <i>BF</i>  | ou .xxix. ch.  |
|           | <i>C</i>   | ou .xxviii.* chapitre. ( <i>corrected from 'xxviii.'</i> ) |
| 57c13     | <i>ADE</i> | ou .xxviii.* chappitre                                     |
|           | <i>B</i>   | ou .xxix. ch.  |
|           | <i>CF</i>  | ou .xxviii.* chapitre ( <i>corrected from 'xxviii.'</i> )  |
| 59d13     | <i>BCF</i> | omit 'et donques ceste chose puet non estre.'              |
| 68c18     | <i>A</i>   | merveilleux en excelle de bien                             |
|           | <i>B</i>   | merveilleux en celle de bien                               |
|           | <i>C</i>   | merveilleus en celle de bien                               |
|           | <i>D</i>   | merveilleus excellent de bien                              |
|           | <i>E</i>   | merveilleux et excellent de bien                           |
|           | <i>F</i>   | merveilleux en celle de bien                               |
| 70b2-3    | <i>A</i>   | et par les autres aucteurs d'astrologie                    |
|           | <i>BCF</i> | et par les autres anciens d'estrologie                     |
|           | <i>DE</i>  | .. .. .  |
| 105b18    | <i>A</i>   | convient passer outre et dire                              |
|           | <i>BCF</i> | convient penser outre et dire                              |
|           | <i>D</i>   | convient pouser .... et dire oultre                        |
|           | <i>E</i>   | convient poser ..... et dire oultre                        |
| 131d13-14 | <i>A</i>   | une singuliere estoille                                    |
|           | <i>BCF</i> | une seule estoille   |
|           | <i>DE</i>  | une ..... estoille ( <i>space left unfilled</i> ).         |

Of the two, *F* shows perhaps more relationship with *C* than with *B*. Compare, however, 32d9, 36d11, 46c4, 61d7, 62c3, 93b18 etc.

- 4c13-14    *ABDE* est parfaite quar elle a  
             *CF* est parfaite quant elle a (*C* has 'car' in margin but 'quant' of the text is not deleted).
- 20b4        *AB* exclude  
             *C* excude  
             *DE* excuse  
             *F* exclude (corrected from 'excude').
- 27d10       *A* qui sont de commun cours  
             *B* qui sunt de commun cours  
             *C* qui sunt de commun courps cours ('courps' not deleted).  
             *DE* qui sunt de commun ..... cours  
             *F* qui sunt de commun ..... cours ('corps' before 'cours' has been crossed out).
- 33b12       *ABDE* une distinction qui avoit lieu  
             *C* une distincte que qui avoit lieu  
             *F* une distinction que qui avoit lieu
- 42c16       *A* nous disons une chose estre possible  
             *B* nous dirons une chose estre possible  
             *C* nous disions une sous une chose estre possible  
             *DE* nous disions une .... .. chose estre possible  
             *F* nous disions ... soubz une chose estre possible
- 44a13       *A* pour leur trop petitesce  
             *B* pour leur tres petitece  
             *C* pour leur tres grant petitece ('tres' superscript in another hand).  
             *DE* pour leur tres ..... petitece  
             *F* pour leur .... grant petitece
- 72c12       *AB* l'espace moienne  
             *CF* l'espace moinne  
             *D* le espace moienne  
             *E* l'espace moienne
- 78b16       *ABDE* d'une planete  
             *CF* d'une plane
- 78c14       *ABDE* ou .xx.<sup>o</sup> chappitre  
             *CF* ou .ix.<sup>o</sup> chapitre
- 109a2       *ABDE* sa permanence  
             *CF* sa permence
- 155a2       *A* que elle aquiert par  
             *B* que elle acquer par  
             *C* que elle aquer par  
             *DE* qu' elle a acquis par  
             *F* qu'elle a quar par

To sum up: The extant manuscripts of *Du Ciel et du monde* are divided into two groups,—*A* and *BCDEF*. *E* is derived directly from *D* and *DE* are derived from *C* after it was corrected. There are some indications that *C* was corrected from a manuscript related to *B* and that before *C* was corrected it bore a rather

close relationship to *A*. It is difficult to link *F* directly with any of the manuscripts within its own family but evidence points to its rather closer relationship to *B* or to *C* with the greater possibility of *C*.

# VIII. WORD STUDY

THE works of Nicole Oresme constitute a land-mark in the history of French lexicography. As the first, or at least one of the first, to adapt the vernacular as a vehicle for mathematics, astrology, political, economic and natural philosophy, he was driven by necessity to translate from the Latin into the French words and expressions that had as yet no equivalents in the vulgar literary language. The majority of his neologisms have been recognized by French lexicographers and incorporated in the standard dictionnaires, etymological and otherwise. However, in preparing the text of *Du Ciel et du monde*, the editors have encountered many words not listed in the usual dictionnaires; others that correct the year or period indicated by these dictionnaires as the date of their first literary appearance; others that tend to confirm the date assigned to their appearance. The following lists make still more apparent the extent of Oresme's contribution to the French language. Many of the words are learned or semi-learned in character; some of them have disappeared from common usage; others are still in current use in philosophical and mathematical works.

## SIGLA

- DG ..... A. Hatzfeld et A. Darmsteter.  
*Dictionnaire Général de la langue française*. 2 vols. Paris, 6<sup>e</sup> ed., 1920.
- Godefroy ..... Frédéric Godefroy.  
*Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française et de tous ses dialectes du IX<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*. 10 vols. Paris, 1881-1902.
- Littre ..... E. Littré.  
*Dictionnaire de la langue française*. 4 vols. et supplément. Paris, 1883.
- OB ..... O. Bloch.  
*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*. 2 vols. Paris, 1932.
- AD ..... Albert Dauzat.  
*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*. Paris, 1938.
- Gamillscheg ..... Ernst Gamillscheg.  
*Etymologisches Wörterbuch der französischen Sprache*. Heidelberg, 1928.
- Tobler-Lommatz .. Tobler *Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch* hrsg. von Lommatz. Berlin, 1925- (A-E)

ABNEGATION, subst.

(DG 1492; OB 1488; AD fin du XV<sup>e</sup>.)

Or, pousons donques que .e. soit une chose moienne entre .a. et .b., c'est assavoir par *abnegacion*, et que . . . (51d12-14)

ABREVIATION, subst.

(DG 1411; OB 1391; AD fin du XIV<sup>e</sup>.)

Ce est l'*abreviacion* de cest chapitre. (89d16)

ACCIDENTAL, adj.

(DG XVI<sup>e</sup>; OB *accidentel*, XIII-XIV<sup>e</sup>, parfois *accidental* au XVI<sup>e</sup>; AD var. de *accidentel*, XVI<sup>e</sup> et Cotgrave.)

est il dit estre meü de puissance ou de possibilité *accidental*. (189a13)

ADHERER, verb.

(OB XIV<sup>e</sup> au sens physique; XV<sup>e</sup> sens figuré; AD XIV<sup>e</sup> au sens physique; 1405 sens figuré; DG does not date the figurative sense.)

Mes il se *adheroient* a leurs raysons et opinions . . . (136d17)

ANAGOGIQUE, adj.

(DG XVI<sup>e</sup>; OB and AD do not list.)

Et en ceste maniere ou sens que les docteurs / appellent *anagogique* seroit . . . (202c15-202d1)

ANGULAIRE, adj.

(DG, OB, AD 1511.)

Se le ciel estoit de telle figure *angulaire* et il fust meü circulairement . . . (99a4-5)

Et ainsi seroit il de quelcunque autre / figure *angulaire*. Tiexte. Samblablement se le ciel estoit d'autre figure que *angulaire* et que . . . (99a11-99b3)

Cf. also 170b18; 179a9.

APPARENT, adj.

(DG l'ancien français emploie *aparant* part. de *aparoir*, XII<sup>e</sup> (Wace); *apparent* XIV-XV<sup>e</sup>; OB XIV-XV<sup>e</sup>; AD apparent (*aparant*) XII<sup>e</sup>.)

Et semble que rayson face tesmoignage et que elle s'acorde as choses apparantes, et les choses *apparentes* a rayson . . . (14a8-9)

Et des poles, celui qui est *apparent* sus nous . . . (81b16)

et pour les evader sont .ii. opinions plus *apparentes* entre les autres . . . (83c5-6)

APTE, adj.

(DG XIII<sup>e</sup> *ate*; OB XV<sup>e</sup> (*apt* dans un texte juridique d'Angleterre); AD *ate* XIII<sup>e</sup>, *apt[e]* XV<sup>e</sup>.)

car de toutes figures la sperique est la plus utile, *apte* et abile a mouvement de corps . . . (117d2-4)

mais il deüssent querir pour melieu ce qui est *apte* et convenable a ce que illecques soit la chose. (137c5-6)

ARQUER, verb.

(DG XV<sup>e</sup>, Paré; so also OB and AD.)

Mes la ligne qui divise la partie enluminee de l'obscur en eclipse est touzjours boque devers la partie obscure et convexe ou *arcué* devers la partie enluminee. (152b10-12)

ATINTER, verb.

(DG 1446 quoted from Godefroy I, 475b; not listed by OB or AD.)

Item, je pouse [que] la roe appelée .d. soit tellement *atintee* ou dispousée par contrepoids et autrement . . . (46b11-12)

ATTENUATION, subst.

(DG 1520; OB 1501; AD début XVI<sup>e</sup>.)

Et un autre fust qui ne peüst venir ne approchier a parfaite santé, mais par courir ou par *attenuacion* ou evacuacion, il attainsist a . . . (133d5-6)

ATTENUER, verb.

(DG, OB, AD XV<sup>e</sup>, Commynes.)

Et donques Aristote ne reprove souffisanment la seconde response, se



ainsi n'estoit que aveques tout ce qu'il dit l'en supposast que pesanteur puet estre tant *attenuée* et tant remise que naturellement elle ne pourroit durer plus . . . (20d11-14)

aussi comme se santé estoit fin et un homme fust tousjours parfaitement sain, et un autre en approchast par estre *atte-* / *nué*, et l'autre par estre *attenué* et par courir . . . (133c17-133d2)

AUBIN, subst.

(AD 1544; DG and OB do not date.)

Que l'element de le aer est figuré presque aussi comme l'*aubin* d'un euf . . . (206b5-6)

A L'AVENANT, adv.

(AD XV<sup>e</sup>; DG and OB do not date.)

Et se aucun disoit que il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que cest grant aer aussi comme il a plus de terre que la petite eaue, aussi a il a l'*avenant* et selon porporcion plus de feu et de legiereté . . . (197a6-8)

BRIEVETE, subst.

(OB XV<sup>e</sup> d'abord *brieté*, XIII<sup>e</sup>; AD *brieté* XIII<sup>e</sup>, Br.Latini, refait au XV<sup>e</sup>.)

Et ceste voie est plus concordable a raison et aus experiences que celles que les autres mettent, lesquelles je ne recite pas a present pour cause de *brieffté*. (115b9-12)

CALOMNIER, verb.

(DG XVI<sup>e</sup>, Aymot; OB and AD 1425.)

et pour reprimer la curiosité ou presompcion d'aucuns qui, par aventure, la voudroient *calumpnier* ou impugner . . . (203b11-13)

CEDER, verb.

(DG, OB, AD 1504.)

et ce que est mole *cede* en ses parties quant il est touchié. Et donques est chose molle divisible. Glose. Et, par consequent, point ne peut estre mol et donques il ne peu(s)t estre dur, car il [est] dont les parties ne *cedent* pas au touchement. (160d12-16)

et pour ce n'en font compte les aucteurs qui mettent que la chose qui noe fait *ceder* souz elle autant pesant de eaue comme elle poise. Et nientmoins, quant la liquer est forment continue et tenante ensemble, la chose qui noe en elle n'[e]n fait pas *ceder* souz soy tant pesant comme elle poise . . . (199c1-5)

Cf. also 201c3; 201d8.

CENTRAL, adj.

(DG 1545; OB and AD 1503.)

il dit *aucuns* pour les parties *centrales* de la terre . . . (61b2)

CHAOS, subst.

(DG XV<sup>e</sup>; OB XIV-XV<sup>e</sup>, Chr. de Pisan; AD fin du XIV<sup>e</sup>, Chr. de Pisan.)

Ce fut un theolgien des poiens qui bailla sa science en poëtrie et mettoit que toutes choses furent faites d'une matiere confuse appelée *chaos* . . . (159a11-13)

CIRCONSTANT, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB or AD. Tobler-Lommatz list their first example from *La Vieille* by Jean Lefevre; Godefroy from Froissart.)

car lors la fredeur ou moisteur de l'aer *circunstant* le corrupt, . . .  
(173a5-6)

CIRCUITE, subst.

The learned form of *Circuit* (OB and AD 1257) is used consistently throughout by Oresme. *Circuit* does not appear. Laurent (*Romania*, XLV (1939), p. 167) has noted the occurrence of the form *circuite* in the *Eschez Amoureux* of the 15th century.)

COLLIGANCE, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Godefroy or Tobler-Lommatz; Littré's first example is from the *Charles V*, ii, 63, of Christine de Pisan.)

desquelles est composee musique humaine et sensible laquelle se conforme et a une *colligance* et // affinité a la musique celestiel. (126d16-127a1)

COLLIGATION, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB or AD. Godefroy lists his first example from P. des Crescens, *Profitz Champ*, published in Latin in 1471, then translated into French and published 1516. Tobler-Lommatz refer to Godefroy.)

Et donques est ce bien signe que ou ciel est musique et que entre elle et musique humaine de laquelle elle est cause sous Dieu est *colligacion*. (127b7-9)

COMPACT, adj.

(DG and OB XIV-XV\*, Christine de Pisan; AD XIV\*, Chr. de Pisan.)

de tant comme feu est en matiere plus grosse et plus *compacte* et moins subtile, de tant est il plus violent . . . (103d2-3)

Item, et pourquoi une chose qui est *compacte* et plus pesante, si comme pierre ou fer ou plum, donne plus fort coup et est plus fort gecté que une moins *compacte*, comme seroit drap ou laine, car la cause est pour ce que telle chose *compacte* reçoit plus l'impression de celle qualité nouvelle . . . (107b6-10)

il a en soy pou ou nul de telz pores ou aer soit enclos pour ce que il est ferme et *compact*. (191a13-14)

COMPLICATION, subst.

(DG XIV-XV\*, Guy de Chauliac; OB XIV-XV\*; AD XIV\*.)

Et dient que d'un corps ne sont pas faiz pluseurs par corrupcion ne de pluseurs un par generacion, mais tous corps sont faiz par la *complicacion* et circumposicion ou applicacion de ces indivisibles. (169d11-14)

CONCURRENCE, subst.

(DG and OB XIV-XV\*, E.Deschamps; AD fin du XIV\*, G. (sic) Deschamps.)<sup>1</sup>

Item, le solleil et la lune et les estoilles par la *concurrence* et configuracion de leurs lumieres et de leurs influences sont causes des choses de cy bas. (57b14-16)

et donques convient il que ces lignes, se il estoient pourtraictes, eüssent *concurrence* ou milieu et ou centre. (191d7-8)

<sup>1</sup>The word occurs in *La Fiction du Lyon*, 948 (*Oeuvres complètes d'Eustache Deschamps*, Soc. des Anc. Textes fr., ed. Gaston Raynaud, Paris, 1893, VIII, p. 276). Raynaud is of the opinion, based on an historical

allusion, that this work, left unfinished by the poet at his death in 1410, cannot be earlier than 1382 and that this date is but a *terminus a quo*. (Cf. II, p. 160).

CONCURRENT, adj.

(OB XVI°, le sens moderne; AD XVI°, 'accourant ensemble' et sens moderne.)

Item, l'influence des corps du ciel dont les rays sont *concurrrens* vers le centre de la terre doit yleuques faire action et alteration. (61b14-15)

Et ce je entent du premier ciel et du premier mouvement, car es cielz qui sont sous ce premier plusieurs movemens conviennent et sont *concurrrenz* en un. (105c12-14)

Une autre cause est *concurrente* . . . (117a7)

CONDITIONELLE, subst. with the meaning of 'a result depending on the truth of another result'.

(DG, OB and AD date only the adjectival use and assign it to Oresme; Godefroy, to whom Tobler-Lommatz refer, lists only the adjectival use as from Oresme; DG and Littré list the substantive use but assign no date.)

Après il met sa raison qui contient .vi. *condicioneles* ou .vi. consequences. (89d9-10)

Et pour ce, je conclu et di que ceste consequence ou *condicionelle*: se generacion est, plusieurs movemens celestielz sont, n'est pas simplement necessaire . . . (95d10-12)

CONNOTATIF, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Godefroy or Tobler-Lommatz. Littré lists but does not date.)

Quar selonc leur oppinion ceste masse est perpetuelle et c'est le monde, se il ne vouloient dire que cest masse est une foys monde et autre foys n'ôn. Et donques *monde* seroit un nom accidentel et *conn[o]tatif* et ce est faulz. (41b15-17)<sup>2</sup>

CONNTER, verb.

(Not listed by any of the dictionaries consulted.)

et telz moz impropres et aussi comme poëtiques ne segnefient autre chose que la pure substance de la matiere en *connotant* ou denotant que, quant est de soy, elle est indifferente a tote forme. (61d14-17)

CONDITEUR, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Littré or Gamillscheg; Tobler-Lommatz give as their first example *La Vieille* by Jean Lefevre; Godefroy with the meaning of 'fonditeur' the *Somme Rurale* of Boutellier.)

Dieu qui est aucteur, *conditeur* et gouverneur de nature peut faire // que corps humain repose sus les cielz. (103b13-103c2)

CONFUSEMENT, adv.

(DG XV° confusement, 1611 confusément, Aymot confusée-ment; OB not listed; AD confusément 1539, Rob.Estienne.)

et me samble que l'en ne peu(s)t pas bien proprement comprendre ne aviser distinctement ceste figure mes *confusement*, si comme aucuns ymaginent . . . (118b5-7)

CONFUTER, verb.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Godefroy. Littré XVI°, Marot; Tobler-Lommatz *La Vieille* by Jean Lefevre.)

Et ainsi ce que j'ay dit par esbatement en ceste maniere peut aler a

<sup>2</sup> BCDF connotatif; E connotatist.

*confuter* et reprendre ceulz qui vouldroient nostre foy par raysons impugner. (144c3-5)

CONJONCTION, subst.

(OB terme d'astronomie XIV-XV<sup>e</sup>, E. Deschamps; AD le sens astr. (XIV<sup>e</sup>, Deschamps) s'est formé en français; DG XII<sup>e</sup> with the meaning of 'union' especially 'union charnelle'. No date is assigned to the astronomical use.)

quant les centres .b. et .c. et .d. sont en *conjonction* precisement en une ligne. (46c7)

Et donques une *conjonction* de telz corps du ciel telle que onques ne fu semblable puet estre cause d'aucune qualité ou substance telle que onques ne fu semblable . . . (57c1-3)

si comme devant dit est de la *conjonction* de .iii. estoilles. (57d2-3)

aucune fois par ligne circulaire concave, si comme vers la *conjunction* devant et après . . . (152b7-8)

CONSISTANCE, subst.

(DG écrit anciennement *consistence* sous l'influence du lat. schol. 1425, Ol. de la Haye; OB XVI<sup>e</sup> (*consistence*, cf. le latin médiéval *consistentia*); AD *consistance* XVI<sup>e</sup>.)

avant que il fust fait, il convenoit que aucune *consistence* ou matiere fust de quoy il fu fait. (41c3-5)

CONSONANTE, subst.

(DG art. *consonne* 1572—on trouve ordinairement au XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> *consonant*, *consonante*; OB art. *consonne*, 1529,—au XV<sup>e</sup> et au XVI<sup>e</sup>, plus souvent *consonant(e)*.)

Et aussi comme les vocales ont son sans les *consonantes*, semblablement forme peu(s)t bien estre sans matiere . . . (167d12-14)

CONTIGU, adj.

(DG, OB, AD 1413.)

Aristote prent yci *continu* ou *continué* largement pour ce que est *contigu* et prochain sanz moien . . . (98a3-4)<sup>3</sup>

CONVENIENT, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Littré or Tobler-Lommatz. Godefroy's first example is from Greban, 1452.)

Item, le ciel ne puet crestre, quar tote chose qui prent cressance, c'est de chose *conveniente* qui vient dehors et est resoluée en la matiere. (13c4-6)

COPEAU, subst.

(DG au XVI<sup>e</sup> on voit apparaître la forme *copeau*. Au moyen âge et jusqu'au XVI<sup>e</sup> on écrit presque tousjours *coipeau*; OB antérieurement *cospel* XII-XIII<sup>e</sup>, *coispiiaus* XIII<sup>e</sup>, *coppiau* 1387, *coupeau* XVI<sup>e</sup> puis *copeau* déjà relevé au moyen âge; AD *cospel*, *cois*—XII-XIII<sup>e</sup>.)

et, par consequent, il s'ensuiroit que elle fust toute couverte de eaue se n'estoit, par aventure, le *coupeau* d'aucune haute montaingne. (153c8-10)

COPULATIVE, subst.

(Not listed by OB or AD. DG lists the adj. *copulatif* XIV<sup>e</sup> (Oresme). The noun with the meaning of 'conjonction' is listed by Godefroy. His first example is from E. Deschamps.)

<sup>3</sup> A continu; F contingu.

et si est possible qu'elle ait fin, quar chascune de ces .ii. propositions par soy est possible, et la *coupulative* des .ii. est impossible . . . (51a14-16)

DECOURIR, verb.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré. Godefroy lists his first example from *Coust. de Norm.* ed. 1483.)

Aussi il appert es sêetes qui sont traictes, et par ce elles sont fetes chaudes comme feu en tant que le plun qui est en aucunes remet et *decourt* . . . (111c2-4)

DEMI-CERCLE, subst.

(DG 1539; OB vers 1537; AD not listed.)

Et que le mouvement qui est selon *demycerle* de .a. jusques a .b., fust contraire au mouvement qui est de .b. jusques a .a. selonc cest *demycerle*. (15b10-12)

Semblablement, se aucun faisoit un cercle et metoit que le mouvement qui est par un *demycerle* est contraire au mouvement qui est par l'autre *demycerle*, si comme qu'en tout le cercle le mouvement qui est de .e. a .z. par le *demycerle* signé par .i. soit contraire a l'autre qui est de .z. a .e. par le *demycerle* signé par .t. (15d1-5)

Et verité est que ceste porcion est plus grande que le *de[mi]cecle* . . . (82d15-16)

Cf. also 87a17; 127a8, etc.

DESCENTE, subst.

(DG, OB and AD 1304 au sens de 'succession'. DG lists the meaning 'action de descendre' but gives no date. Godefroy's first example with the latter meaning is 1574; Tobler-Lommatz refer to Godefroy; Littré's first example is from Marot of the 16th century.)

.ii. choses sont a considerer ou ciel, c'est a savoir mouvement et circuite, et .ii. es choses pesantes, c'est a savoir mouvement et *descente*, et pareillement es legieres. (110c9-11)

DESCRIPTION, subst. with the meaning of 'tracing a line'.

(No such meaning is listed in Godefroy, Tobler-Lommatz; DG, OB and AD XII\* with the modern meaning of 'description'; Littré lists the geometrical use but assigns no date.)

Et par le mouvement de ceste ligne seroit [descripte] une superficie divisible selonc longitude et selonc latitude, et ceste *description* est ce que il appelle passer en autre espesce de magnitude. (5d12-15)

DEVENIR, verb, with the meaning 'to arrive'.

(OB le sens d'*arriver* qu'on relève parfois au XV\* et au XVI\* siècle . . . vient de *venir*.)

toute chose continue est divisible et composee de parties qui sont touzjours divisibles sanz ce que l'en puisse *devenir* a parties qui soient simplement tres petites . . . (17b10-12)

Et ainsi, en procedant, il convient par neccessité *devenir* a une chose qui repose par nature . . . (164a4-5)

Mais de ces elemens, se un est meü de l'autre par violence, il convient *devenir* a un qui sera meü selon nature . . . (164b8-9)

DIFFERENT, adj.

(DG and AD XIV\*, Froissart; OB vers 1350.)

et pourquoi les plantes et les bestes et les corps et les meurs des gens sont tant *differens* d'orient en occident qui ont presque un meïsme résart au soleil . . . (84a6-8)

selon ce que elles sont meües de plus ou de moins de mouvemens et environ centres ou sus poles *differens* et distans plus ou moins. (106a7-8)  
Et la cause de telles impotences est pour ce que les bestes sont composees, par aventure, de choses teles qui ont lieus propres *differens*. (109a5-7)

DIFFINIR, verb.

(DG, OB, AD XV\*, Villon.)

Et pour ce que tout corps est continu, [il]*diffinist* après *continu* . . . (3c7-8)

totevoies elle est nommee et diffinee<sup>1</sup> ou determinee par la superabondance . . . (42d15-16)

Et par cest nombre est determinee et diffinee<sup>1</sup> la possibilité de elle . . . (43a15-16)

DISPERS, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD or Gamillscheg. Godefroy, to whom Tobler-Lommatz refer, lists as his first example J.Molinet, *Chroniques*, XVI\*.)

et ainsi les petites parties de terre qui estoient esparties et *disperses* de toutes pars furent meües au milieu . . . (151a12-14) . . . . .

DISTINGUER, verb.

(DG 1426; OB and AD 1385.)

Après il *disti[n]gue* mos dont aucuns n'ont pas proprement equivalent en françoys . . . (42a8-9)

Et ces hemisperes sont *distinguez* et congneüs plus principalement par le elevacion de[s] poles. (81a2-3)

La tierce est ignorance et fatuité, car il ne scet *distinguer* entre ce que est fort et ce que est legier a savoir. (104c15-16)

car ceulz qui mettent maniere par quoy les .iiii. elemens peuent estre *distinguez* parlent plus subtilment . . . (184c9-11)

DISTRAIRE, verb.

(DG and OB XIV-XV\*, E.Deschamps; AD XIV\*, Deschamps.)

Et ainsi en chascun gerre ou maniere de corps, un est plus de legier divisible et peu(s)t plus legierement estre *distrain* et l'autre moins. (198a11-13)

Et pour ce que pesanteur a ou est une vertu selon la- // quelle le corps pesant est meü en bas et les corps moiens sont continuz et resistant que il ne soit *distrains* ne diviséz, l'en doit ces .ii. choses comparer une a l'autre. Car se la vertu de la pesanteur excede la vertu qui est ou moien par laquelle il resiste que il ne soit *distrain* et diviséz, le corps pesant passera par cest moien . . . (198b17-198c6)

Cf. also. 199a3; 199c1.

DUALITE, subst.

(DG and AD 1585; OB 1835.)

car il mettent ceclé aussi comme un ou selon unité et triangle selon *dualité* ou aussi comme .ii. . . . (97b11-12)

DUODECEDRON, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg, Tobler-Lommatz or Littré. Godefroy lists one example from Jean de Meung, *Richel.* 1624, with the meaning 'roue'.)

Le quart est de .xii. faces dont chascune est de .v. angles et de .v. costés equalz et est appellé *duodecedron* . . . (176a12-14)

<sup>1</sup> BCDEF diffinie.

ce est a savoir le ciel de ceulz qui sont de figure appelle[e] *duodecedron* . . . (176b7-8)

Item, se il estoit ainsi, il s'ensuiroit par neccessité que ces .xii. pyramides adjoustéz ensemble feissent un corps regulier de .xii. faces trigones et seroit *duodecedron*; et ce est impossible, car les .xii. faces de *duodecedron* sont pentagones . . . (178b6-9)

ENONCER, verb.

(DG and AD 1611, Cotgrave; OB 1611.)

Quar cest nom *pardurable* fu par les anciens *enoncié* et apropié a la divinité . . . (34c16-17)

EPICYCLE, subst. and adj.

(DG lists the noun as of the 14<sup>th</sup>, *epiticle* (corr. *epicicle*) from G. de Guilleville; Godefroy in his *Supplément* refers to DG. Not listed by OB, or AD; Gamillscheg, 16 Jhrts.)

si somme qui signeroit un point en la circonference d'un *epicicle*, cest point pourroit descrire une ligne droite par son propre mouvement circulaire environ le centre de l'*epicicle* et par le mouvement de l'*epicicle* environ le centre du grant cercle. (8d6-10)

il convient par neccessité mettre que aucuns des cielz sont excentriques et aucuns *epycicles*. (70a15-16)

et pose pour exemple que la lune soit en son ciel *epicicle* et si est elle, car elle est fichiee pres de la circonference de son ciel *epicicle*. (70b14-16)

Cf. also 12d17; 46b2; 78b6; 78c2; etc.

EQUIVALEMENT, adv.

(Listed only by Littré without date.)

Comment un angel peu(s)t estre en un meisme temps en ciel et en terre et en plus de cent mille lieux distans sans tenir plus de lieu ou d'espace *equivalement* que l'espace d'un pié. . . (205c5-7)

EPAISSEUR, subst.

(DG 1539, R.Est.; OB 1503; AD 1503, G. de Chauliac.)

et di, quant au premier, que les estoilles sont la plus dempse ou la plus espesse partie de leur ciel et non pas de dempsité ou *espesseur* qui soit de telle nature ou de telle maniere comme est l'*espesseur* des corps de cibas . . . (112b3-6)

sanz quelcunque profundité ou *espesseur* . . . (159b13-14)

ETEUF, subst.

(DG *estuis* XII<sup>e</sup>; OB not listed; AD *stui* XII<sup>e</sup>, nombreuses var. en anc. fr.; 'f' final XVI<sup>e</sup>, par fausse regression; Gamillscheg, in der heutigen Form seit dem 16 Jhrdts. Altfr. seit dem 12 Jhrdts. *estuet*, *estueil*, *estui*.)

et pour ce sont de telle figure les pierres d'engin et les pelotes ou *esteufs* dont les enfans se esbatent. (129c6-7)

Et espere est en .viii. pyramides semblables, si comme il appert par les .viii. pieces d'une pelote ou d'un *esteuf*. (170c10-11)

EVADER, verb.

(DG and AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, *Modus*<sup>5</sup>; OB XIV<sup>e</sup>.)

Pour telles difficultés *evader*, il convient mettre une de .iii. voies . . . (82c16)

<sup>5</sup>Les Livres du Roy *Modus*, ed. Gunnar Tilander (Soc. des Anc. Textes fr.) Paris.

1932. Finished at the end of 1376 or at the beginning of 1377. Cf. Introduction, p. xlv-1.

Et par ce est *evadee* la premiere difficulté devant touchie. Mes encore demeurent les autres . . . (83c4-5)

EXCELLEMENT, adv.

(DG 1539, Rob. Est.; Not listed by OB or AD.)

Item, il est *excellenment*<sup>o</sup> merueilleux en qualité et biauté, car il est tres parfaitement pur et net . . . (68d14-15)

Or est il certain que le mouvement du ciel est tres *excellanment*<sup>r</sup> plus ysnel vers l'equinocial . . . (101c5-6)

et a en Soy les dons glorieus tres *excellément* et merueilleusement outre mesure . . . (202a3-4)

EXCEPTE, prep.

(DG no date assigned; OB XIV-XV\*, Froissart; AD XIV\*, Froissart.)

et *excepté* la violence, c'est aucunement semblable . . . (71a4-5)

et ainsi des autres differences, *excepté* desus et dessous . . . (83b18)

Il touche toutes les consequences desus mises *excepté* la premiere. (91c15)  
sanz quelcunque alteration, *excepté*, par aventure, rarefaction et condempacion . . . (201c5-6)

EXERCITER, (se), verb.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD or Gamillscheg. Godefroy lists as his first example of the reflexive use E.Deschamps.)

ce est a dire que entendement humain qui *se excercite* et estudie en telles nobles questions . . . (132a3-4)

si comme nous // voions es corps humains que un corps a santé sans *soy excerciter* et un autre corps a santé . . . (132d17-133a2)

Et met de ce exemple ou .xii.\* de *Methaphisique* de un honme qui *se excercite* en aucun artifice principalement pour garder sa santé . . . (134c12-13)

je les veul ici reciter afin que ceulz qui ont noble engin *se puissent excerciter* a les exposer . . . (156c4-6)

EN GENERAL, adv.

(DG no date assigned; OB la locution *en general* date du XV\* s. environ. AD *en général*, loc. adv., XV\* s.)

Et donques, *en general*, sont .iii. corps simples . . . (14d13)

Et la cause est, *en general*, car le[s] excés de la vertu motive sus la resistance . . . (106c13-14)

FRAYEMENT, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré; Godefroy's first example is from Jean Martin, *Vitruve* of the 15th century.)

Je di donques que ce n'est pas voir generaument que tout mouvement soit cause de chaleur, mes seulement tout mouvement ouquel est faite vehemente confricacion ou *freement* d'un corps a autre et violence et es parties ou est la confricacion. Et ce appert assés par les experiences desus mises et par autres, si comme de la confricacion des instrumens ou ferremens des charpentiers et des roes et des moles ou telles choses par la confricacion ou *freement* desquelles est engendree chaleur et aucune fois feu. (113b11-18)

GENETIF, subst.

(DG and AD XIV\*, Jean Lefevre; OB not listed.)

<sup>o</sup> BCDEF excellentement.

<sup>r</sup> BDEF excellentement.



et par le secont *celum* il entent la noviesme [o]u octiesme espere qui contient toute la masse des autres cielz qui est entendue, parce que il di(s)t tiercement *celi* en *genitif* singulier. (66a3-5)

GRAVITE, subst.

(DG not dated; OB au sens physique de 'pesanteur' XVI°; AD phys., XVI°.)

Item, ceste dominacion est a entendre quant as qualités motives lesquelles sont *gravité* et levité, ce est a dire pesanteur et legiereté. (9a7-8)

Et pour ce, le premier corps, c'est a savoir le ciel, n'a en soy quelconque(s) legiereté ne quelconque(s) *gravité* ou pesanteur . . . (12d3-4)

GREC, subst.

(DG not dated; OB XVI°; AD XVI°.)

Et de ce dist Remigius ou comment sus un livre que fist Marcianus Cappella que le[s] *Grecs* disoient que chascun homme a un tel ange . . . (71c4-6)

Item, Remigius en son comment sus Marci[a]n recite comment les *Grecs* disoient que les bons angelz forment les corps . . . (112b14-15)

que il n'est homme mortel qui onques veïst plus bel ne meilleur livre de philosophie naturele que est cestui, ne en ebreu, ne en *grec* ou arabe . . . (203c7-9)

HEXACEDRON, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg, Godefroy or Littré; DG lists *hexaèdre* 1701.)

Le secont a .vi. faces dont chascune est quadrangle quarré et est comme un dé et est appellé *cubus* ou *exacedron*. (176a10-11)

*cubus* ou *exacedron*. (176c3)

l'autre est cube ou *exacedron* . . . (203b9)

HEXAGONE, subst.

(DG XVI°, Rab.; OB and AD 1534, Rabelais; Laurent Romania LI (1925), p. 33, 1450.)

La [quarte] par .vi. appelle[e] *exagone* . . . (96c1-2)

et la tierce est *exagone* qui a .vi. costés et .vi. angles equalz. (176b15-16)

ce est a savoir trigone, quadrangle et *exagone* . . . (177a7-8)

Item, de *exagone* qui a .vi. angles equalz chascun vaut un angle droit et la tierce partie d'un angle droit, et donques les .iii. valent .iiii. angles drois et, par consequent, .iii. *exagones* peuent estre appliqués environ un point . . . (177c2-5)

cf. also 177c8; 178a13; 178b4; 200d6.

ICOCEDRON, subst.

(DG and AD 1542, Bovelles; OB not listed.)

Le quint a .xx. faces, chascune triangulaire equilatera et est appellé *ycocedron*. (176a15-16)

le aer de ceulz qui sont de figure dite *octocedron* et l'eau de *ycocedron* et la terre de cubes. (176b8-10)

et font un corps regulier appellé *ycocedron*. (178b14)

Item, cest corps di(s)t *ycocedron* a .xx. co- // stés et .xii. angles corporelz . . . (178b16-178c1)

Cf. also 178c3; 178c5; 178c7; 178d3; 178d5.

IMAGINABLE, adj.

(DG 1579, F. de Foix; OB XV-XVI°; AD XV°; P. Laurent Romania LI (1925), p. 40, 1450, *Eschez Amoureux*.)

Et pousé que le ciel ne soit pas de telle figure et que nature ne le pourroit faire, tutevoyes est ce chose *ymaginable* sanz contradicion et que Dieu pourroit faire. (39a4-6)

Et tel procès est *ymagynable* sanz contradicion et possible a puissance infinie. (60c8-9)

IMPERCEPTIBLE, adj.

(DG and AD 1425, de la Haye; OB 1425.)

quar par une partie de mouvement laquelle seroit insensible et *imperceptible*, pousé que el[le] fust .c. mile foyz plus grande . . . (44c8-10)

combien que elle soit aucune foyz *imperceptible* ou insensible . . . (102c6-7)

noientmoins tel son seroit *imperceptible* a nous et ne pourroit estre ouï . . . (124c3-4)

comme l'isneleté des estoilles qui est *imperceptible* excède l'isneleté de la foudre. Et donques par plus forte raison le son des estoilles seroit *imperceptible*. (124d6-8)

IMPERTINENT, adj.

(DG and AD XIV\*, Bouteillier; OB XIV\*.)

car le repos de la terre est du tout *impertinent* au mouvement de ceste estoille sanz a ce nuire ou aidier. (93b4-5)

IMPLIQUER CONTRADICTION

(OB XVI\*.)

tutevoies ce ne enclot ou *implique* quelconque(s) *contradiction* ne aucune repugnance quant est de soy . . . (46c14-15)

Autre est quant la *contradiction* est *impliquee* . . . (48c2)

en tant que aucune foyz est doute se la proposicion *implique contradiction* ou non . . . (48c5-6)

tutevoies il appert par demonstracion evidente et par rayson neccessaire en lumiere naturelle que les instances devant mises sont possibles quant est de soy sans *impliquer* [contra]diction. (57d12-14)

Cf. also 57d8; 94c5.

INCREDIBLE, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré; Godefroy's first example is taken from J. Marot, beginning of the 16th century.)

et que les lieux desus diz soient prochains ce n'est pas chose *incredible*, car ceulz qui ce dient . . . (153a10-11)

INDIFFERENCE, subst.

(DG 1629; OB 1523; AD XVI\*.)

Et se elle ne se pavoit deviser, elle ne se mouvroit pour l'*indifference* et seroit aussi comme un fer entre .ii. aïmans . . . (27c11-12)

et comme celui qui avroit tres grant fain et tres grant soif equalment et avroit pres de soy equalment a amengier et a boire, semblablement il disoient que par tele *indifference* repose la terre ou milieu. (148a5-9)

INTITULATION, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, or Gamillscheg; Littré XVI\*, Carloix; Godefroy's first example is taken from de la Bouitière, *Trad. de Suetone*, ed. 1569.)

En ces .iiii. livres sont choses bien notables desquelles plusieurs peuent estre trouvees par l'*intitulacion* des chapitres et par la table qui s'ensuit ici . . . (203d1-3)

INESTIMABLE, adj.

(DG XIV\*, Menagier; OB XIV\*; AD XIV\*, Boutellier.)

homme ne pourroit ymaginer ne penser comment l'isneleté du ciel est merveill[eus]ement et excessivement grande et aussi comme inopinable et *inestimable*. (143c10-12)

INFLUER, verb.

(DG XIV-XV\*, Chr. de Pisan; OB XIV\*-XV\*, E. Deschamps; AD XIV\*, E. Deschamps.)

Et selon l'auteur *Des Causes*, la cause qui est premiere *influe* et fait plus a l'effect que celle qui est secondaire. (121b4-6)

INHERENCE, subst.

(DG XIV-XV\*, *inherance*, Gloss lat. fr. dans God. Suppl.; OB 1762, une première fois au XIV-XV\*; AD XIV\*, Godefroy, rare jusqu'au XVIII\*.)

Item, quelcunqe ange n'est pas ou corps ou es corps qui sont ou lieu ou il est telement que il soit en eulz par informacion, si comme ame humaine est en son corps, ou par *inhere[n]ce* ou adherence ne par appropriacion, tele comme aucuns philosophes . . . (71b9-12)

Mais que ces intelligences soient ames du ciel du soleil et que elles soient unies au corps de ce ciel par informacion ou par *inherence* ou autrement . . . (78a18-20)

INSTANT, subst.

(DG XVI\*, Rabelais; OB and AD XVI\*.)

en laquelle es- // pace il seroit par un tout seul moment ou *instant* indivisible. (72c18-78d2)

Et donques se ceste vertu n'avoit resistance, elle mouvroit le ciel soudainement en *instant* ou mo- / ment indivisible . . . (73c18-73d1)

Item, par semblable il convendroit que le temps, qui est chose continue, fust composé de *instanz* ou de momens indivisibles. (162a4-6)

LAPS, subst.

(DG XV\*, Commynes; OB 1426; AD XV\*.)

Et soit posé, si comme il est possible, que ce fust par un degré et que après par grant *laps* de temps et par semblable maniere fust plus // élevé par un autre degré . . . (154b14-154c1)

LONGITUDE, subst.

(With the meaning of length, DG, OB and AD assign the word to Oresme. In its geographical and modern use, they assign it to Finé, 1543. In the case of *latitude* the geographical use is assigned to Oresme. There are a few passages in the text that seem to indicate that *longitude* is used by Oresme with a geographical connotation.)

Il veult dire que orient et occident sont les costés du ciel et les poles sont les bous du ciel. Mais ici est une doubte, car selon ce que dit est, la *longitude* du ciel est de pole a pole et la latitude seroit d'orient en occident. Et les astrologiens mettent, au contraire, la *longitude* est d'orient en / occident et la latitude de pole a pole. (81a18-81b1)

Et samble par raison que il convient que il soit, car autrement l'en ne pourroit reduire a cause celestiel aucunes diversités qui sont en terre selon *longitude*, c'est a savoir en procedant d'orient vers occident ou, au contraire, sans approchier ou esloingnier des poles . . . (84a1-5)

MERIDIEN, subst.

(OB comme terme d'astronomie, XVI\*; AD astron. XVI\*, Devaulx.)

Et par l'incommensurableté desus dicte, puet estre que le solleil en un *merid[i]an* est si loing de la terre que onques ne puet ne ja ne porra estre autrefois si loing en cest *meridian*. (45a11-14)  
 il avenoit que en ce *meridian* la lune estoit le plus pres de terre que elle puisse estre . . . (45b5-6)  
 il est possible que .iii. planetes soient conjointes precisement en un *meridiain* ou corporelment . . . (57b3-4)  
 se aucun ne disoit que quant une estoille est ou *meridian* d'Arym . . . (84c17-18)  
 l'autre souz le *meridian* du milieu de terre habitable . . . (87a18-19)

MILLIEME, adj.

(DG not dated; OB and AD XVI\*.)

chascune chose, tant soit petite, est grande ou regart de la .m.\* (*BCDEF millieme*) partie de elle . . . (36c3-4)

MIXTIONNER, verb.

(DG 1397, *Archives de Tournai* dans Godefroy sous *mistionner*; OB and AD do not list.)

Et donques appert que un corps mixte ou *mixtioné* equalment de ces .ii. qualités motives ne puet durer . . . (9b11-13)  
 mais se elle estoit vers une partie de pur or et vers l'autre fust *mixtioné* de plus legier metal, le centre et le milieu de sa pesanteur ne seroit pas le centre de sa quantité. (153c2-5)  
 et que le aer et le feu sont composés et *mixtionés* de corps invisibles de parties semblables et sont de tous telz corps assembléz ensemble . . . (168d14-16)  
 Cf. also 173d5; 182d13; 190d10.

MOBILE, adj.

(DG not dated; OB 1564; AD 1564, Thierry.)

destre et senestre et les autres differences sont corporelles et de corps ou en corps *mobiles* et divisibles. (83c15-17)  
 car tout corps est *mobile* ou mouvable, si comme il fu dit ou secont chapitre du premier . . . (84a15-17)  
 Item, ce n'est pas dit selon raison que un corps qui est *mobile* selon lieu soit perpetuel . . . (91b6-7)  
 car ceste pierrete conjointe a la mole fait .i. corps *mobile* avecques elle . . . (106d6-7)  
 Cf. also 179a6; 179a8; 179a16; 179a18; 186a9; 186c7; 189b16.

MOYENNANT, prep.

(DG 1408; OB not listed; AD pièce de 1408.)

Et la terre pure a puissance de engendrer chaleur *moienmant* tel mouvement et telle violence. (114b2-3)

MOYENNEMENT, adv.

(OB and AD not listed; the first example in Godefroy with the meaning of 'at intervals' is taken from Froissart.)

la plus haute espere resone le plus gros son ou le plus bas et les autres *moiennement* par ordre touzjours la plus basse plus acusement. (126a6-8)

MOTEUR, subst.

(DG, OB and AD XV-XVI\*.)

et ceste qualité ou reteur fait aide en mouvement naturel et meut la chose meüe viole[n]tement quant elle est separee du premier *moteur* ou motif. (106d11-13)

Et le souverain et principal *moteur* est Dieu qui ainsi les demaine comme ses instrumens . . . (135a6-8)

MOUVER, verb.

(OB *art. mouvoir*: ceux du Nord qui l'ont gardé l'ont refait en *mouvoir*, attesté en français littéraire au XVI<sup>e</sup>s., enregistré dans les dictionnaires comme terme technique; AD *art. mouvoir*: var. techn. (XVI<sup>e</sup>s.), par chang. de conj.; DG XVI<sup>e</sup>s.)

Et pour ce, un ange peut estre en un lieu sans soy *mouvoir* nonobstant que en ce lieu plusieurs corps succedent un après l'autre . . . (71b13-15)

Secondement, un ange peu(s)t delessier du tout et soy departir du lieu où il est et soy *mouvoir* et transporter en un autre lieu . . . (72b9-10)

Car ce est meilleur et plus noble condicion *mouvoir* sanz labour et sanz poine que autrement. (73c10-11)

Je di que, selon droit ordre de // mouvement circulaire, sa destre main doit aler ou *mouvoir* vers le devant de lui . . . (85b11-85c2)

Cf. also 92b11; 106c19; 129c14; 206b13.

NONOBTANT, adj.

(DG adj., prep., adv. Oresme XIV<sup>e</sup>s. *Ethiques*. However the example given shows only the prepositional use; OB 1418; AD not listed.)

*nons-obstans* (CDE *nonobstant*) cestes raisons, aucun pourroit dire que la lune n'est pas parfaitement sperique . . . (130c11-12)

*nonobstans* (BDE *nonobstant*) les raisons au contraire, car ce sont persuasions qui ne concludent pas evidamment. (144b12-13)

NON-EXISTENT, adj.

(OB XVIII<sup>e</sup>; DG and AD do not list.)

Et ce appert par ce qui est dit devant, quar de ce qui est tousjours existent et de ce qui est touzjours *non existent*, une chose est moienne laquelle ne s'ensuit a l'un ne a l'autre. (53a12-15)

NUBILEUX, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré; Godefroy lists his first example from L.Labé, *Oeuvres*, 1555.)

Item, en cest aer *nubileux* ici bas appert aucune fois un secont arc contenant le premier . . . (203a9-10)

OBSERVATION, subst.

(DG 1549, R.Est.; OB 1549, une première fois au XV<sup>e</sup>; AD XV<sup>e</sup>s.)

Or est il ainsi que pour salver les apparences des mouvemens du ciel lesquelles ont esté appareciées et cogneües ou temps passé par *observations*, il convient par neccessité mettre . . . (70a13-15)

Et samblablement dient des autres planetes les anciens Egipcien et Babiloniens qui ont jadis et par plusieurs ans pris garde a telz choses et en ont faites *observacions*. (131d4-6)

OCCIRE, verb.

(DG anc. fr. *ocire* devenu *occire* par réaction étymologique. No date; OB anc. fr. *ocire* usuel jusqu' à la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup>s. refait en *occire* d'après le latin *occidere* au XVI<sup>e</sup>s.; AD *ocire*, XII<sup>e</sup>s., -cc-, XVI<sup>e</sup>s. d'après le latin.)

car, ce pendant, ceulz qui estoient contre Gabaoon furent *occis*. (95b2-3)

## OCTOCEDRON, subst.

(DG *art. octaèdre*: 1542, Bovelles; OB and AD do not list.)

Le tiers a .viii. faces dont chascune est triangle equilater et est appellé *octocedron*. (176a11-12)

le aer de ceulz qui sont de figure dite *octocedron* . . . (176b8-9)

## OCTROYER, verb.

(DG *otroyer* XII<sup>s.</sup>, écrit plus récemment *octroyer*; OB XV<sup>s.</sup>; AD *otreier* XII<sup>s.</sup>, Roland, oc, XV<sup>s.</sup>, d'après le latin *auctor* et der. In the first book of the *De Celo* the following forms are found.)

A	otrier	BCDE	octroier				(27c7)
AC	octrier	B	octroyer	D	octroier	E	otroier (28d19)
ACDE	octroiroit	B	otroit				(38c13)
ABD	octroier	C	otrier	E	otroier		(47d12)
ABDE	octroier	C	octrier				(49b2)
ABD	octroier	C	octrier	E	otroier		(60c11)

## OCTUPLE, adj.

(DG 1532, Ch. Est.; not listed by OB or AD; P. Laurent, *Romania* LXV (1939), p.177, milieu du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle, *Eschez Amoureux*.)

Et semblablement, se par les parties propo[r]cionelles d'une heure une matiere estoit en la premiere rarefïee ou estendue au double, et en l'autre après en quadruple et puis a l'*octuple* et ainsi ensuiuant . . . (60c4-7)

## ORDINAIRE, adj.

(DG XIII<sup>e</sup> but the example listed is *ordenaire*; OB 1381, alors d'après l'adverbe *-ement* attesté; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>.)

Et ce tenoient les paiens, si comme il appert en une glose *ordinaire* sus Jeremie ou est allegué . . . (68b3-4)

## OVALE, adj.

(DG XVI<sup>e</sup>, Rabelais, *ovale* for masc. and fem. 1642; OB 1546, Rabelais; AD *-al* 1546, Rabelais.)

Après je di que se ainsi estoit que les cielz des planetes fussent de telle figure o- / *vale* . . . (99c18-99d1)

Tiercement, je di que se le derrenier ciel estoit de telle figure *ovale* ou comme est un oeuf . . . (99d5-6)

## PANSPERME, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Godefroy. Littré lists *panspermie* but does not date.)

Et disoient que l'aer et l'eaue et les autres different selon grandeur et petitece et que leur nature est *pansperme*, ce est a dire toute semence de touz les elemens. (170a9-12)

## PARCE QUE, conj.

(OB and AD XV<sup>s.</sup>, Commynes.)

si comme aucuns anciens cuiderent que ce monde eüst commencement *parce que* tout estoit devant en une masse confuse . . . (35d2-4)

Et ce qui a puissance [a] temps infiny est déterminé aucunement *parce que* rien n'est plus. (54b8-9)

une est car il eschaufe le haut aer *parce que* le ciel meü meut le feu and le feu fait en le aer confricacion . . . (115b1-3)

et appert legierement *parce que* la partie de elle qui regarde le soleil luist et l'autre non, et *parce que* quant elle est eslipse[e] . . . (118d3-5)

Cf. also 126b4 etc.

PAREILLEMENT, adv.

(DG and AD XV<sup>e</sup>, Ch. d'Orléans; OB not listed.)

.ii. choses sont a considerer ou ciel, c'est a savoir mouvement et circuite, et .ii. es choses pesantes, c'est a savoir mouvement et descente, et *pareillement* es legieres. (110c9-11)

PENTHAGONE, subst.

(DG and OB 1542; AD 1542, Bovelles.)

La tierce / par .v. appelle[e] *penthagone* . . . (96b20-96c1)

Le quart est de .xii. faces dont chascune est de .v. angles et de .v. costés equalz et est appellé *duodecedron* et chascune de ses faces est appellee *penthagone*. (176a12-14)

Item, de *penthagone* qui a .v. angles equalz . . . (177b8)

car les .xii. faces de duodecedron sont *penthagones* et de .v. angles, si comme il appert en geometrie. (178b9-10)

PERTINENT, adj.

(DG XIV-XV<sup>e</sup>, Chr. de Pisan; Ch. V, (1403); OB and AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, Chr. de Pisan.)

ausquelles je respondray telement que par ce l'en pourroit respondre a toutes autres a ce *pertinentes*. (140b2-3)

PHILOSOPHISME, subst.

(DG mot dû à Arnould (1612-1694); Littré XVII<sup>e</sup>, based on DG; OB, AD, Godefroy, Gamillscheg do not list.)

Et pour ce, est ce un *philosophisme*<sup>s</sup> ou question dont touz les anciens sont esbahis et merveilliéz. (145a12-14)

PLAGE, subst.

(DG XVI<sup>e</sup>; OB 1553; AD 1553, Belon.)

Autre cause est car celle partie de terre ou celle *plage* qui regarde le pole antartique . . . (88d3-4)

POILE, subst.

(DG not dated; OB d'abord *paele* au XV<sup>e</sup>s., d'où *poi(s)le*, id., au moment où *oi* a hésité dans la region parisienne entre les deux prononciations *oè* (écrit *oi*) et *è* (écrit *ai*); AD *paele* XIII<sup>e</sup>, E.Boileau.)

Mais maintenant l'en fait doubte pourquoy une grant piece de fer ou de plum qui est de figure laee noe en l'eau. Glose. Si comme un bacin ou une *poile*. (197c7-9)

POINTU, adj.

(DG, OB and AD 1420.)

Mais ces ici ne determinent pas quelle figure ont les corps que nous appellons elemens fors seulement que au feu il assignent figure de pyramide, ce est a dire *pointue*. (170a7-9)

POLITURE, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré; Godefroy's first example is taken from G. Paradin, *Cron. de Sav.*, ed. 1552.)

car chascun des corps mixtes que nous voions est composé d'autres dont

<sup>s</sup> C *phophisme*; BDEF *sophisme*. OB XII<sup>e</sup> sous la forme *soffime*, au sens de ruse; le sens usuel aujourd'hui a été repris au latin ou au grec vers le XVIII<sup>e</sup> s; AD *sof-*

*fime* XII<sup>e</sup>, ruse; sens actuel repris au latin, 1549, R. Est.; DG *soffime* XII<sup>e</sup>, does not date the use of the word as 'argument captieux'.

nul ne peut telement recevoir regularité ne *politure* si diliganment faite comme peut la nature du corps circulaire . . . (102b14-17)

PORTATIF, adj.

(DG and AD XIV\*, *Modus*; OB XIV\*.)

Et ainsi dirions nous que / la possibilité *portative* d'aucun homme est déterminée par .c. livres . . . (43a20-43b1)

POULS, subst.

(DG *pols*, *pous* écrit plus récemment *pouls* par réaction étymologique; OB refection graphique qui date du XVI\*s. de *pous*; AD 'I' a été adjouté au XVI\*s. d'après le latin.)

Et telle circulation n'est pas inconveniente, aussi comme l'en droit que l'en s[ce]t que le cuer est chaut parce que le *poulz* est hastif comme par signe, et ce que le cuer est chaut est cause de ce que le *peuls* est hastif. (105b8-11)

PRECIS, adj.

(DG and OB XIV-XV\*, Chr. de Pisan; AD XIV\*, Chr. de Pisan.)

Mais ce est differentement, car tout corps occupe et emplist lieu et pour ce ne peuvent par nature plusieurs corps estre en un lieu propre et *precis*. (69d13-15)

Item, il ne convient pas que selon ce que les planetes sont plus basses et plus loing du souverain ciel que elles soient pour ce meües plus isnelement de leur propre mouvement proporcionement ou selonc proportionalité *precise*, car aveques ce est a considerer . . . (129a4-8)

PREDOMINANT, adj.

(DG 1599; OB and AD do not list the participial adjective but along with DG list the verb *predominer*, 1580, Montaigne.)

et que le corps compost soit meü selonc le mouvement du simple element qui est *predominant* et a la seingnourie en tel corps compost. (8a11-13)  
quar le mouvement d'un corps compost et mixte est selonc la nature du simple corps qui en tel mixte est *predominant* et a seingneurie. (9d1-3)

PREEXISTER, verb.

(DG XV\* se deduit de l'existence de *preexistent* à cette époque; OB XV\*, rare avant le XVIII\*s.; AD XV\*, rare jusqu'au XVIII\*s.)

Mais posé que corps ne puisse estre fait fors d'autre corps *prëexistent* ou precedent par generacion natu- / rele . . . (167a17-167b1)  
il s'ensuit que .ii. corps seront ensemble par tout un lieu, ce est a savoir celui qui est fait de nouvel et le *prëexistent* ou precedent. (173a17-19)

PRENOSTIQUER, verb.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré. Godefroy's first example is from the *Matheolus* of Jean Lefevre.)

Et anciennement, Hermes, en *prenostiquant* les maulz qui estoient a venir en Egipte, disoit . . . (73a6-7)

Anciennement aucuns par le chant et par le vol ou volement des oiseaux divinoient et *prenostiquoient* d'aversité et de prosperité, de maladie et de santé, selonc ce que il vouloient a destre ou a senestre. (76c9-11)

PREPARATIF, adj.

(DG Chr. de Pisan, *Ch. V.* (1403); OB XIV-XV\*, Chr. de Pisan; AD XIV\*, Chr. de Pisan.)



Et ceste alteracion est dispositive et *preparative* a la generacion de l'aer  
... (188c11-12)

DE PRIME FACE, adv.

(OB la locution *de prime abord* a été formée sur le modèle  
*de prime face* 'a premiere vue' 1448.)

Car qui les resgarde *de prime face*, il samble que elles ne se mouvent.  
(124c11-12)

Et toutevoies, ce semble // *de prime face* autant ou plus contre raison  
naturelle ... (144b15-144c2)

PROCHAIN, subst.

(DG does not date; OB usual surtout depuis le XVI<sup>s.</sup>; AD  
d'abord eccle., XVI<sup>s.</sup>)

Et est certain que chascun des elemens, en prenant tousjours la distance  
vers en haut, a telle proporcion a son *prochain*, quant a tendre ou a  
aprochier a figure sperique, comme l'eau a a la terre. (102c12-15)

PRODUIRE, verb.

(DG and AD XV<sup>s.</sup>, Mart. d' Auvergne; OB XV<sup>s.</sup>)

car ce feu ne art ne eschaufe ou altere quelcunque autre chose et ne  
*produit* nul effit ... (92a11-12)

car selon verité, tout ce depent de la volenté de Dieu franchement sans  
ce que il soit aucune neccessité que Il face ou *produise* telles choses ou  
ait faites et *productes* perpetuellement ... (92b6-8)

PROFOND AND PROFONDEUR

DG, OB and AD agree in dating *profond* 1539 and *profondeur* 1538.  
P.Laurent has found *profond* in the *Champ Fleury* of Tory, ed. 1529; this  
he notes as the 'premier exemple connu du mot, jusqu' à nouvel ordre'.  
*Romania* LI (1925), p. 42. Laurent further dates the change from *par-*  
to *pro-* as falling roughly during the period 1510-1550. *Ibid.*

Only one example is found in the *Du Ciel* and that in C:  
car aussi nous voions que parmi eau qui est bien clere, se elle est moult  
*profunde* (all other mss. *parfonde*) la lumiere du soleil ne descent pas  
... (119c6-8)

Laurent has met the word *profondeur* in A.Greban, *Oraison a la Vierge*  
of the middle of the 15th century. Cf. *Romania* LXV (1939), p. 179. He  
further confirms his theory that the change from *par-* to *pro-* takes place  
between 1510-1550. *Ibid.*

In the *Du Ciel*, *profondeur* is found in all mss. except A which uses  
*parfondeur* consistently throughout: thus

A parfondeur	BCEF profundeur	D profondeur	(4a12)
A parfondeur	BCDEF profundeur		(76a11)
ABDF parfondeur	E profundeur		(101b16)
ABCDEF parfondeur			(101c2)

PSAUME, subst.

(DG anc. fr. *salme*, *saume*, *psaume* par réaction étymologique;  
OB XV<sup>s.</sup>, au moyen âge surtout *saume*; AD XV<sup>s.</sup>, d'abord  
francisé en *saume* XIII<sup>s.</sup>)

Et a ceste grace recevoir, le Prophete exitoit ceulz d'occident ou .xlviij.  
*Psalme* ou il di(s)t selon le hebreu ... (88c4-6)

PULSIF, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg, Godefroy, or Littré.  
To be distinguished from *poussif* listed by these dictionaries)

as of the 13th century with the meaning of 'heavily breathing'.)

je di que il ne pourroit estre vertu *pulsive* quelcunque si petite ou vertu motive dehors tant fust petite qui ne peüst mouver ou faire roueler ceste espere . . . (129c12-14)

RARE, adj.

(DG 1539, R.Est.; OB 1539, *rere* une fois au XIV<sup>e</sup>s., Bersuire; AD 1539, R.Est., var. francisé *rere* au XIV<sup>e</sup>s.)

et que ce fust tres pur element tant *rare* ou tant cler que nature ne le peüst faire plus *rare* ou plus cler . . . (162b13-14)

Item, il ne pourroit estre plus estendu ne estre plus *rare* ne plus cler. 162c9-10)

Item, selon ce que il veulent, subtil et *rare* sont une chose et aussi espés et gros sont une chose . . . (171a10-11)

Cf. also 171d13; 201d9.

RECLUSION, subst.

(DG, OB, AD 1642, Oudin.)

Et pour ce, telles choses ne pueent touzjours durer par nature ne passer certains termes, . . . se ainsi n'estoit que l'action des contraires fust suspendue ou naturellement et a temps par aucune *reclusion*, si comme l'en dit de ceulz qui dormirent en Sardine . . . (54d11-15)

REFRACTION, subst.

(DG and AD XVI<sup>e</sup>, Paré; OB 1555.)

et les raiz ou lumiere du soleil ne autre ne passe[nt] tout oultre parmi telz corps / se il ne sont tenves, car en telz corps la lumiere se parfonde pou ou nient, mais elle retourne par reflexion ou par *refraction*. Et se telz corps sont bien poliz, les raiz de lumiere retournent ou sont froissiez par un meisme ordre, et ainsi telz corps sont mireurs. Et se il ne sont poliz, la reflexion ou *refraction* est faite sans ordre . . . (119a11-119b6)

REMOT, adj.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg or Littré; Godefroy's first example is taken from *Myreur des Histoir.*, J. de Outremeuse.)

Et la puissance *remote* ou lointene est sanz commencement et sanz fin et est la matiere premiere . . . (56c1-2)

REPETITION, subst.

(DG 1385; OB XV<sup>e</sup>s., au sens usuel aujourd'hui, depuis 1382, comme terme juridique; AD 1385, DG, jurid.)

Ceste raison quarte n'est fors conclusion et *repeticion* des raisons devant mises . . . (197b11-12)

REVOLU, adj.

(DG and AD XV<sup>e</sup>, Greban; OB XV<sup>e</sup>.)

Et se aucuns dient que la terre est ou centre du monde et que elle est *revolute* et meüe en circuïte environ le pole . . . (138a14-15)

Les autres mettent que elle est ou milieu et que elle est tournée et *revolute* environ son centre . . . (148d4-5)

SEGREGATION, subst.

(DG 1550, Meigret; OB not listed; AD 1550.)

Et ce appert clerement, car terre et feu sont fais de telz corps par *segregacion* et par resolucion. (168c10-11)

car il dient que l'element qui est fait de l'au- / tre estoit en cel autre et en est estroit par *segregacion* ou separacion . . . (173c18-173d2)  
l'eau, quant elle est segregiee et separee de l'aer, soit faite plus pesante seulement parce que elle est plus comprimee par telle *segregacion* (173d12-14)  
Cf. also 174a10; 174b2; 174b9; 174b12; 174b18.

SEGREGER, verb.

(DG 1552, Ch. Est.; OB not listed; AD 1552.)

Et il convient que il octrient et dient que l'eau, quant elle est *segregiee* et separee de l'aer, soit faite plus pesante . . . (173d11-13)

SEMI-DIAMETRE, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg, Godefroy or Littré.)

Et par ce appert que l'air puet naturellement descendre et monter par le s[e]mydiametre de l'espere des elemens. (10a13-15)  
et soit le *semydiametre* de elle d'un pié . . . (23b9)

Et donques la terre devers le centre est fondement de ceste ou sont les transmutacions, quar le lieu de generacion est en un moien du *semidia-*  
*metre* de l'espere des elemens . . . (62b12-14)

Cf. also 192c13; 194d4.

SESQUIALTERE, adj.

(DG and AD 1484, Chuquet; OB 1484.)

et celle qui ce feroit en .iiii. jours seroit plus grande que n'est .viii. en une proporcion qui n'est pas en nombres et est appellé *medi[e]tas sequialtere*. (21c9-10)

item, entre .ac. et .ad. la moitié de proporcion *sequialtere*, laquelle *sequialtere* est de .iii. a .ii. . . (127a16-17)

si comme en .viii. et .xxvii. qui sont premiers cubiques sont .xii. et .xviii. moiens selon proporcion *sequialtere* continuele. (194a7-9)

SYMBOLE, adj.

(None of the dictionaries consulted give the meaning required—like or agreeing. OB lists *symboliser* XIV's. au sens de 'avoir du rapport avec, s'accorder avec', seul sens jusqu'au XIX's. The meaning given by the *Mer de Histoires*, 1488, to the noun- *morceau* or *porcion* and recorded by OB and AD does not seem to apply.)

Tiexte. Et ce qui contient est aucunement espece, ce est a dire forme ou perfection a la chose que il contient; et pour ce, estre meü a son lieu est estre meü a son semblable, car les elemens qui sont ordenéz et contiennent l'un l'autre sont semblables aucunement, si comme l'eau a l'aer qui la contient et l'aer au feu. Glose. Es qualités *symboles*, car le feu et le aer sont / chاوز, et le aer et l'eau sont moistes, et l'eau et la terre sont fredes. (187a14-187b2)

SIXAIN, subst.

(DG, OB, AD record the word with the meaning 'une sorte de petite monnaie' 1299 and refer to Godefroy; Godefroy, *Suppl.*, lists one example with the meaning 'assemblage de six objets de même nature' with the date 1362. None give the date for its poetic application.)

Et ces .xxiiii. vers par .iiii. *sisennes*, je les veul ici reciter . . . (156c4-5)

SEXTIL, adj.

(DG and AD 1690, Furetière; OB not listed.)

car, selon les astrologiens, es corps du ciel sont .iiii. principaulz resgars, c'est a savoir le *sixtil* ou sixte, et le quart, et la trine ou tiers et l'opposite . . . (127a3-5)

item, la ligne .*ae.* qui soit le resgart *sextile* ou sixte. (127a10-11)

SOUSCONTRAIRE, subst.

(Not listed by DG, OB, AD, Gamillscheg; Littré lists but does not date; Godefroy lists one example used as an adjective from Oresme, *Politiques*.)

Et pour ce convient par neccessité que les negacions des .ii. con[tradictaires], c'est assavoir des .ii. *subcontraires*, soient dictes d'une meisme chose . . . (51c7-9)

SPHERE, subst.

(DG XIII<sup>e</sup>, *espere*; OB 1546 antérieurement *espere* depuis le XIII<sup>e</sup>s.; AD Rab., 1546, *espere* XIII<sup>e</sup>.)

et par le secont *celum* il entent la noviesme [o]u octiesme *espere* (*DE spere*) qui contient toute la masse des autres cielz . . . (66a3-4)

Par le premier corps il entent tout le ciel ensamble qui est meü de mouvement journal, ou le .viii.<sup>e</sup> *espere* (*BE spere*) laquelle il reputoit la premiere. (108b9-10)

SUBDIVISER, verb.

(DG, OB, and AD XV<sup>e</sup>.)

Et chascun de ces .iii. degrés moiens a grant latitude et peu(s)t estre devisé et *subdivisé* en pluseurs. (134a11-13)

SUCCEDER, verb.

(DG XIV<sup>e</sup>, *Modus*; OB XVI<sup>e</sup>s. au sens moderne; a eu aussi le sens de 'parvenir à' encore chez Montesquieu mais la construction transitive qu'on rencontre au XIV<sup>e</sup>-il n'eurent nuls enfans qui succedassent le royaume—a rapidement disparu; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, *Modus*, d'abord 'parvenir à, puis arriver d'une manière favorable', XVI-XVII<sup>e</sup>s.; sens actuel XVI<sup>e</sup>s.)

nonobstant que en ce lieu pluseurs corps *succedent* un après l'autre . . . (71b14-15)

Et par ce s'ensuit que quelcunque partie du ciel vient de nouvel et *succede* en cel orient desus dit . . . (83b15-16)

Et pour ce, cel orient est la destre partie du ciel, et quelconque partie *succede* en cel orient elle est fete destre . . . (83c10-12)

Et se le ciel avoit angle et supereminence qui fust meüe circulairement, cest angle ne demoureroit pas en un lieu, mes la ou il avroit esté devant et dont il seroit parti ne *succederoit* quelcunque corps . . . (98d17-20)

SUPPLEER, verb.

(DG not dated; OB and AD XVI<sup>e</sup>.)

*Supple*: car chose violente ne peut estre perpetuelle. (75a10)

Or convient *suppleer* que la ou sont touz mouvemens, augmentation precede les autres. (76a19-20)

SUPPLIER, verb.

(DG not dated; OB XIV-XV<sup>e</sup>, Froissart; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, Froissart.)

Si comme se un vouloit empetrer une grace du prince, se il convenoit que il *suppliait* a un et cestui a l'autre et l'autre ou tiers ou au quart, et le quart ou le quint au prince, ce seroit plus fort que se il la pavoit obtenir sans moiens par *supplier* au prince. (133a14-17)

SUSPENS, adj.

(DG, OB, AD XV°.)

D'autre partie, posé que il fust tres ardent, ce n'est pas impossible simplement que le vaissel qui seroit lasus fust de matiere incombustible et qui ne pourroit arder, ou que par vertu divine l'action de ce feu fust *suspense* tellement comment il fu en la fornese de Nabugodonosor. (103d10-14)

TENUITE, subst.

(DG 1526; OB and AD 1490.)

Item, pourquoy aucunes choses terrestres pour leur petite quantité, si comme poudre, et aucunes autres pour la *tenuité* ou tenuëce de leur figure, si comme feuilles d'or . . . (197c11-14)

TETRACEDRON, subst.

(DG 1542, Bovelles; OB and AD not listed.)

Le premier est de .iiii. faces dont chascun[e] est triangle de costés equalz et est appellé pyramide et plus proprement [*t*]etradedron car infiniz pyramides peuent estre qui ne sont pas corps reguliers. (176a7-10)  
un est pyramide ou *tetradedron* . . . (203b8)

TITUBATION, subst.

(DG XVI°, Rab.; OB and AD 1552, Rabelais.)

Et de // corps sperique par soy .ii. mouuemens peuent estre: un est circumgiracion et l'autre volutacion ou *titubacion*. (116b20-116c2)

TOUTE-PUISSANCE, subst.

(DG XVI°, Montaigne; OB and AD 1580, Montaigne.)

combien que Dieu pourroit faire, et peüst avoir fait tellement de sa *toute-puissance* (E de toute sa puissance) ou du tout anichiler ce monde, et après creer un autre. (35d11-13)

Je conclu donques que Dieu puet et pourroit faire par toute sa puissance (BCDEF par sa *toute-puissance*) un autre monde que cestuy . . . (39b14-15)

et ce est a l'exemplaire de Dieu le createur qui a en Soy eternité et immensité et *toute-puissance*. (66c8-9)

car son eternité est sanz succession et son immensité sanz extension et sa *toute-puissance* sanz intension. (66c12-14)

Cf. also 72c12-14; 176b3.

TRIANGULAIRE, adj.

(DG 1530; OB and AD 1488; Laurent, *Romania* LI (1925), p. 45, 1450, *Eschez Amoureux*.)

Le quint a .xx. faces, chascune *triangulaire* equilatera et est appellé *ycocedron*. (176a15-16)

Mais une autre figure est tele, ce est a savoir pyramide, qui a .iiii. faces *triangulaires* et .iiii. angles . . . (177d10-11)

Et de pyramide chascun angle est contenu de .iii. angles superficielz *triangulaires* dont chascun vaut .ii. tiers de angle droit. (178a2-4)

TROPIQUE, subst.

(DG XVI°, Rabelais; OB and AD 1546, Rab.)

car la partie du ciel en laquelle cuerent les planetes entre les .ii. *tropiques* ou sous le zodiaque a plus grande estente ou distance . . . (81b5-7)

Et le soleil, selon l'esdreccement de ses rayz, est plus prouchain des parties des elemens qui sont entre les deux *tropiques* et sous la partie du ciel la ou il a son cours . . . (101c7-9)

UTILE, adj.

(DG 1539, R.Est.; OB 1539, une première fois *utle* au XII<sup>e</sup>. Paraît avoir été rare au moyen âge; AD *utle*, forme francisé, XII<sup>e</sup>, St. Bernard; rare en anc. fr.)

car de toutes figures la sperique est la plus *utile*, apte et abile a mouvement de corps qui est meü en son lieu . . . (117d2-4)

VESTIGE, subst.

(DG 1552, Ch. Est.; OB 1488; AD 1488, *Mer des Hist.*)

Et pour ce fu dit que le createur veult estre magnifié selon cest nombre, et ce nouz enseig- // ne nature en laquele est relucente la fourme, *vestige* ou estrace de Dieu. (6b16-6c2)

II.

The following group of words are registered in DG, OB and AD as appearing before the *Du Ciel et du monde*. These dictionaries, however, indicate that their appearance is rare until much later than Nicole Oresme, or that prior to his time, they had appeared but once. We list them as further evidence of their use to add to the number of their appearances before the 16th and 17th centuries.

DEMONSTRATIF, adj.

(OB 1761, Moliere, une première fois vers 1350; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>s., rare jusqu'au XVIII<sup>e</sup>s.; DG lists its first example from the *Ethiques* of Nicole Oresme; Godefroy lists his from F. Meunier.)

Par aventure que ces raysons ne sont pas purement evidentes ne simplement *demonstratives* sanz autre chose supposer . . . (19a3-4)

Et pour ce, par aventure, les raisons que Aristote fait a ce propos ne sont pas toutes *demonstratives*, combien que la conclusion soit neccessaire. (160d1-3)

Et comme dit est, par aventure, ne sont pas toutes les raysons d'Aristote a ce propos *demonstratives*. (161c6-7)

Et tout ce appert par raysons *demonstratives* et sensiblement . . . 178c9-10)

DENOMINATION, subst.

(DG XIII<sup>e</sup>s., *Rom. de Moine* dans God. *Suppl.*; OB XVI<sup>e</sup>s., une première fois au XIII<sup>e</sup>s.; AD XIII<sup>e</sup>s., Godefroy, rare jusqu'au XVI<sup>e</sup>s.)

les anciens l'appellerent etheir et li metoient ceste *denominacion* en segnefiant que il court et est meü . . . (14d2-4)

Et selonc ceste rayson, la fin de tout le monde et tout le temps et la perfection qui contient infinité est pardurableté, et prent sa d[en]omina-  
cion ou est ainsi dicte de ce qu'i est chose immortelle et divine. (34d2-5)

DESIGNER, verb.

(DG *dessiner*, XIV<sup>e</sup>, does not date *designer*; OB XIV<sup>e</sup>s., sous la forme *dessiner*; ne paraît pas usuel avant le XVI<sup>e</sup>s.; AD *desinner* XIV<sup>e</sup>s., G., rare jusqu'au XVI<sup>e</sup>s.)

Quant la chose en quoy la puissance finie puet ou a quoy elle elle comparee est *designee* par nombre, si comme en disant .c. livres . . . (43a12-13)

je demande de quelle quantité il convient que tel corps soit et l'en ne pourroit assigner ou *designer* quantité si petite que mendre, combien que fust, ne souffisist par samblable raison. (92d13-15)

et aveques toute la masse de la basse partie du monde devant *desinee* qui est meüe de mouvement journal . . . (139c9-10)

DIVISER, verb.

(DG forme refaite de *deviser*, XII<sup>s.</sup>; OB refection de *deviser* d'après le latin *dividere*; jusqu'au XVI<sup>e</sup> *diviser* est rare; AD XII<sup>s.</sup>; rare jusqu'au XVI<sup>s.</sup>) In A are found the following:

devisé (48c14)  
divisé (86b2; 172d5; 172d10; 174c15)  
divisee (87a17; 194d6)  
divise (179c12)  
diviserait (179c13)

DIAPASON, subst.

(DG XII<sup>e</sup>, *Thebes*; OB XII<sup>e</sup>, mais paraît peu usuel avant le XVII<sup>s.</sup>; AD XII<sup>s.</sup>, rare jusqu'au XVI<sup>s.</sup>)

Et de ces .iiii. proporcions une est *dyapason* ou double qui est de .ii. a .i. . . (125d17-18)

PERCUSSION, subst.

(DG XIV<sup>e</sup>, *Somme Gautier*; OB vers 1330, rare avant le XVIII<sup>s.</sup>; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, *Somme Gautier*, rare jusqu'au XVIII<sup>s.</sup>)

Item, il di(s)t: *propter plagam*, c'est a dire pour la *percussion* selon les expositeurs, que il eschaufe combien que la *percussion* ou confricacion, que les parties de l'aer qui est un corps mol font les unes contre les autres . . . (113d2-5)

car ce que est meü en corps meü continuellement et samblablement et sanz faire plaie, c'est a dire *percussion* et division . . . (124a4-6)

Et briefment, il appert ou secont de l'*Ame* que son ne peu(s)t estre sans ce que division soit faite et *percussion* et violence. (124a14-16)

Item, en tout son sont *percussion* et division . . . (125a6-7)

PERSPECTIVE, subst.

(DG XIV<sup>e</sup>, J. de Vignay; OB vers 1327, rare avant le XVII<sup>s.</sup>; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, *Mir. Hist.*)

Et la cause est assés legiere a entendre, car, selon la science de *perspective* et selon experience . . . (118d15-16)

Mais se il est de tel corps ou de tel, ce jugement est fait par les sens de dedens, si comme il met en *Perspective*, et sont telz sens souvent deceüs . . . (144b4-6)

POLE, subst.

(DG 1372, Corbichon; OB 1372, Corbichon, rare avant le XVII<sup>s.</sup>; AD 1372, Corbichon, rare jusqu'au XVII<sup>s.</sup>; P. Laurent, *Romania* XLV (1939), p. 177, 1338, *Le Roumant de la Fleur de Lis*. Laurent's examples, however, are both *pol.*)

si comme tout le ciel, fust meüe de orient en occident sus .ii. *poles* si comme le *pole* artique et le *pole* ant[ar]tique, et aveques ce que le ciel fust meü sus .ii. autres *poles*, un ymaginé en orient et l'autre en occident, en tant que, par procès de temps, le *pole* artique venist par cest mouvement la ou est le *pole* antartique . . . (16c6-10)

Cf. also 17a5; 19b16; etc.

SCINTILLER, verb.

(DG XIII<sup>e</sup>, *Rose*; OB XIII<sup>s.</sup>, *Rose*, rare avant le XVIII<sup>s.</sup>; AD XIII<sup>e</sup>, *Rose*, rare jusqu'au XVIII<sup>s.</sup>)

Et par aventure, c'est la cause pourquoy il samble que les estoilles fichiees

*sintillent* et oilletent et les planetes ne *sintillent* pas, car elles sont pres . . . (116d8-10)

Et de ce que les estoilles semblent *sintiller* ou ouilleter . . . (117a12)

de ce que le soleil nous appert tournier et les estoilles *sintiller* ou ouilleter . . . (141d8)

Pour quelle cause les estoilles semblent aucune foiz *sintiller* et ouilleter . . . (206d10)

SECONDAIRE, adj.

(DG 1372, Corbichon; OB 1372, rare avant le XVI<sup>e</sup>s.; AD 1372, Corbichon.)

la cause qui est premiere influe et fait plus a l'effect que celle qui est *secondaire*. (121b5-6)

SIRENE, subst.

(DG not dated; OB *sirene* XVI<sup>e</sup>s., une première fois XII<sup>e</sup>s., écrit *syrene*; AD *sy-* XII<sup>e</sup>s., B, var. francisée *sereine* en anc. fr.)

Et de ce recite Macrobes que Plato disoit que en chascune espere du ciel est une *syrene* qui chante a Dieu . . . (126d5-6)

SOLSTICE, subst.

(DG XIII<sup>e</sup>, Jean de Meung; OB XIII<sup>e</sup>, Jean de Meung, rare avant le XVII<sup>e</sup>s.; AD XIII<sup>e</sup>, Jean de Meung, rare jusqu'au XVII<sup>e</sup>s.)

Et ce appert clerement, car il descript mendre cecele en .i. jour naturel quant il est es *solstices* que quant il est en l'equinocal . . . (106a2-4)

STATIONAIRE, adj.

(DG 1372, Corbichon; OB 1611, une première fois en 1372; AD 1372, Corbichon, rare en moyen fr.)

Et selon ce, aucunes sont *stationaires* et plus directes et retrogrades et en telles dispositions qu'i ne peuent estre sanz irregularité de mouvement. (106a8-10)

TARDIVETE, subst.

(DG 1539, R.Est.; OB 1539, une première fois vers 1327; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>s., *Mir.Hist.* vers 1327; P.Laurent 1529, *Romania* LI (1925) p. 45.)

Et par ceste maniere et non par autre quelcunque, l'en peut rendre cause de toutes les apparences et de toutes les experiences que l'en voit en mouvemens violens, soient droit en haut ou droit en bas ou en travers ou circulaires, quant a leur isneleté et *tardiveté* et reflexion ou retour . . . (107a13-17)

TRANSFORMATION, subst.

(DG XIV<sup>e</sup>, R. de Presles; OB XVIII<sup>e</sup>s., une première fois au XIV<sup>e</sup>s.; AD XIV<sup>e</sup>, R. de Presles.)

Et n'est rien permanent ne fichié fors celle seule chose de laquelle toutes les autres sont faites par *transformation*. (159b2-4)

### III.

The following words are listed by Godefroy. The first and in some cases the only example of the words is taken from the *Du Ciel et du monde*. In general they are archaic and technical terms.

ALTERATIF, adj.

Item, aussi comme le subject qui peut estre alteré et celui qui peu(s)t



estre augmenté different en tant comme telz, [aussi different] la vertu *alterative* et la vertu augmentative. (186b11-13)

CAMUSETÉ, subst.

quar se *camuseté* est courveté en neis ou en char, et char est la matiere de *camuseté* . . . (32d19-20)

CIRCUMGIRACION, subst.

Et de // corps sperique par soy .ii. mouvemens peuent estre: un est *circumgiracion* et l'autre volutacion . . . (116b20-116c2)

et il n'est pas ainsi car se elles fussent meües seulement par *circumgiracion* ou tourniement, elles demourassent . . . (116c8-10)

Et ce dient touz les desus diz et que elle descent en bas par la force et violence de la *circumgiracion* ou revolution du ciel . . . (146c3-5)

CORRUPTIF, adj.

et est une qualité active et corruptive de chaleur . . . (121a14)

GENERABLE, adj.

Il convient premierement deviser comment nous disons aucunes choses estre ingenerables et *generables* . . . (41d17-18)

il s'ensuit que aucune chose ait esté *generable* et puet avoir eü commencement par temps infiny. (56c8-9)

et d'estre après se elle est *generable* ou puis commencer a estre. (56c18-19)

Cf. also 172c4; 173a9; 173a11.

GIRATION, subst.

Par tele *giracion* ceulz qui viennent le blé font venir les pierretes ou milieu du van. (146c8-9)

Mais, posé que la velocité ou isneleté de la *giracion* ou revolution du ciel . . . (146d10-11)

Et l'en ne peut dire que ce fust la *giracion* ou revolution du ciel . . . (147a15-16)

Cf. also 147b13; 147b15; 164a9; 164a11.

INTERSEQUER, s', verb.

quar en une plaine superfice l'en peut ymaginer .ii. lingnes qui se *intersequent* en un point . . . (4b2-3)

LEVITE, subst.

Item, ceste dominacion est a entendre quant as qualités motives lesquelles sont gravité et *levité*, ce est a dire pesanteur et legiereté. (9a7-8)

OEILLETER, verb.

Et, par aventure, c'est la cause pourquoy il samble que les estoilles fichiees sintillent et *oilletent* . . . (116d8-9)

Et de ce que les estoilles semblent sintiller et *oilleter*, je cuide que avecques ce que elles sont loing, que le mouvement d'aucunes exalacions ou vapeurs parmi lesquelles nous les voions, soient cause de telle apparence. Et pour ce et selon ce, elles samblent aucune fois *oilleter* et aucune fois non . . . (117a12-16)

Cf. also 141d8; 206d10.

RECEPTIBLE, adj.

Et pour ce que un me- / isme corps subject est *receptible* ou peu(s)t recevoir santé et langueur, se il est meü selon ce ou en tant comme il est *receptible* de santé, il est meü et transmué en santé. Et se il est meü

selon ce que il est *receptible* de enfermeté, il sera meü a enfermeté.  
(187c18-187d5)

SOUSQUADRUBLE, adj.

Et je le monstre et prouve, posé que une puissance esmeuve une resistance par certaine isneleté; et supouse qu'il est possible que une puissance soit mendre telle que elle puet mouvoir ceste resistance par isneleté sous-double precisement, et une autre qui puet ce par isneleté *subquadruble*, et une autre . . . (21b2-6)

SPISSITUDE, subst.

Troys dimensions ou mesures sont longitude et latitude et *spissitude* ou parfondesce . . . (4a6-7)

sanz parfondeur ou sanz *spissitude* . . . (4a12)

Et se l'en ymagine une autre ligne traversant selonc *spissitude* ou parfondesce . . . (4b4-5)

Cf. also 4b17; 4c3; etc.

SUPEREMINENCE, subst.

Et se le ciel avoit angle et *supereminence* qui fust meüe circulairement . . . (98d17-18)

Et ceulz qui frequentent la mer apparçoivent bien que la superfice de elle n'est pas droite ne plaine, mais a *supereminence* et boce et tent a rondesce. (102b7-9)

sanz aucune inequalité ou asperi[t]é et *supereminence* . . . (102c2-3)

TRIGONE, subst.

ce est a savoir, *trigone* ou triangle . . . (176b14-15)

ce est a savoir, *trigone*, quadrangle . . . (177a7-8)

Item, il appert par geometrie que chascune angles de *trigone* vaut .ii. tiers de angle droit, et donques .vi. telz angles valent .iiii. angles drois, et, par consequent, .vi. *trigones*, comme sont .a. et .b. et .c. et .d. et .f. et .g. rëemplissent espace environ le point .e. (177b4-8)

Cf. also 182b9; 184b19; 200d5.

VOLUTATION, subst.

Et de // corps sperique par soy .ii. movemens peuent estre: une est circumgiracion et l'autre *volutacion* ou titubacion. (116b20-116c2)

et ces figures sont de legier mobile[s] de mouvement appellé *volutacion* qui est comme roeler ou tumber. (179a17-19)

IV.

The following words are not found in any of the dictionaries consulted.

ANNIHILABLE, adj.

Et a propos, Plato disoit que les intelligences ou angelz eürent commencement et sont de leur nature corruptibles ou *adnichilables*, mais la bonne volenté de Dieu . . . (47d6-8)

Il met ceste conclusion principalement contre Plato, qui disoit que le monde et les anges eürent commencement et sont *anichilables* quant est de leur nature . . . (58d3-5)

ARREGNER, verb.

(It is possible that the word is *arranger*. However, it is more probable, considering its coupling with *atteler*, that it is a derivative of *rene* < *retina*, i.e., *ad-retina-are* 'to bridle'.)

Si comme selon les fables des poiens et des poëtes qui mettent que le soleil rouele et est tiré et meü comme la roe d'un char par // .iiii. chevaux,

lesquelz l'aube du jour attelle et *arregne* au matin, si comme Ovide descript.  
(117b19-117c3)

ASACIER, verb.

(Some such meaning as 'seized upon' seems required by the text. It is possible that this is a form of *essalcier* < *exaltiare*. Godefroy lists a form of it—*assacier*—with the meaning 'élever, exalter, élever en honneur, en dignité.' There is a possibility that it is a word coined by Oresme from *ascitus* from *aiseo*, 'to assume or appropriate'. The difficulty lies in the shift of 'i' to 'a'.)

Après je di que a parler proprement, ceste matiere n'est enviee ne *asaciee* de quelconque(s) forme et n'a en soy inclinacion ne appetit ou autre qualité qui li soit propre . . . (61d12-14)

CIRCUMPOSITION, subst.

Et dient que d'un corps ne sont pas faiz pluseurs par corrupcion ne de pluseurs un par generacion, mais tous corps sont faiz par la complication et *circumposicion* ou applicacion de ces indivisibles. (169d11-14)

COME, adj.

(Used in conjunction with 'estaille' as a synonym for 'comete')

Item, les impressions appellees estoilles courantes ou qui cheent: *stelle cadentes*, ne les estoilles co[m]ees ou les commetes qui sont en l'aer . . . (112a9-11)

et il ne s'ensuit pas, car les estoilles *comees* sont meües aussi comme l'aer ou elles sont . . . (112a15-16)

Au secont, des estoilles *comees* et[c]., je di que ce n'est pas samblable, car Aristote monstre ou premier de *Metheores* comment les cometes sont d'autre matiere et d'autre nature que n'est aer. (112c10-13)

CONTINENCE, subst.

(The meaning demanded is other than listed in the dictionaries. In the text cited the meaning demanded seems to be connected with 'contain', not in the sense of 'containing oneself' but of 'containing another'.)

Et donques aussi comme le ciel qui contient un autre ciel est dit *celum celi*, et aussi de pluseurs peut l'en dire *celum celorum* et *celi celorum* par *continence* local, semblablement di(s)t l'en des siecles dont les uns contiennent les autres par *continence* de duracion . . . (66a12-15)

CONTRE-METTRE, verb.

(Godefroy lists one example of the reflexive use from E. Deschamps. Tobler-Lommatz refer to Godefroy.)

Et encore afferment ces philosophes que une autre terre est opposite a ceste et que le feu est ou milieu entre ces .ii. terres, et celle autre terre il l'appellent *Antistona*, ce est a dire *contre-mise*. (136d9-12)

ENVIER, verb.

(The meaning demanded by the context is 'enlivened'. Apparently Oresme has coined the word from *vita*: *in-vita-are*.)

Après je di que a parler proprement, ceste matiere n'est *enviee* ne *asaciee* de quelconque(s) forme . . . (61d12--13)

ESQUARRETEL, subst.

(with the meaning of 'square'—an instrument for squaring. Godefroy lists *escartelage* and the verb *escarteler* but not this

form. It is likely from some such form as *ex-quadratellum*.)  
Angle drect est si comme l'angle d'un instrument a mazon appellé *esquar-*  
*retel* . . . (97b14-16)

COMPLEXIONEL, adj.

(with the meaning 'elemental', that is, one of the elements.)  
Et je cuide que le aer qui est enclos es pores du fust et qui ne est pas  
de sa nature face plus a ce que le fust noe que ne fait son aer *com-*  
*plexionel*, qui est en lui selon vertu, comme les elemens sont en corps  
mixte. (191a5-8)

CONSONANCIER, verb.

(Godefroy and Tobler-Lommatz list a noun *consonancie* but  
not the verb or the participle.)  
Quelles proporcions sont armoniques et quelles non, et quelles sont *con-*  
*sonancias* et quelles non . . . (207a9-10)

FALSIGRAFIME, subst.

(with the meaning of 'false argument', a word coined pre-  
sumably from *falsum* and the Greek root *graph-* to write.)  
Et a ce prouver Averroiz fait un *falsigrafime*, ce est a dire une fause  
rayson, qui est tele en sentence. (177d11-13)

GITIF, adj.

(with the meaning of 'tranquil' or 'at rest' from the latin  
*jacere*.)  
Mais pour ce que figure angulaire est pou *gitive*, elle est eschaufante et  
embrasante; et pyramide est toute angle, car de toutes les figures regu-  
lieres elle a les angles plus acuz . . . (179a8-11)

INDUCER, verb.

(with the meaning 'to lead' apparently from *in-duc-are*.)  
Et pour ce, par aventure, quant / le saint Esperit nous vouloit par son  
prophete *inducer* et mener a la petite cognoissance que nous povons avoir  
de ces choses . . . (66c18-66d2)

PIERRES D'ENGLIN, subst.

(The meaning demanded by the context is an object spherical  
in shape. The word in this case seems to refer to a smooth  
stone prepared for a sling-shot or possibly for use in a siege-  
piece of artillery. Littré lists *pierre d'artillerie*—'pierre arron-  
die qui servait primitivement de boulet'.)  
mes elle est tres habile a mouvement qui est fait par violence ou par vertu  
dehors, et pour ce sont de telle figure les *pierres d'engin* et les pelotes ou  
esteufs dont les enfans se esbatent. (129c5-7)

SUPERCELESTIEL, adj.

Une autre maniere est que telz corps fussent en un corps *supercelestiel*  
ou ciel aussi comme nous sommes maintenant en le aer . . . (201c1-3)  
Et pour ce, je lui demande pourquoy Dieu qui est tout puissant ne peu(s)t  
faire sus les cielz chose presque samblable, ce est a savoir ou ciel *super-*  
*celestiel* ou seront les corps salvéz . . . (202c6-8)  
Et par ce sembleroit que le Sage a la lettre entende de cest arc *super-*  
*celestiel*, car celui n'est pas si glorieux que nous voions ici bas en aer  
tenebreux . . . (203a2-4)

V.

The following words were used by Oresme with their philosophical connotation. Some of them are listed in the dictionaries but with a meaning other than that given them by Oresme; others were used by Oresme before the date usually assigned to their first literary appearance.

CONCEVEMENT, subst.

(with the meaning of 'operation of the understanding' as opposed to that of the imagination.)

Briefment, combien que honme en universel ne soit autre chose fors cestuy et cestuy, toutevoies la consideracion et l'intencion ou *concevement* de l'entendement est autre de honme en espece et [de] cestuy ou de cestuy . . . (32b15-17)

Quar, comme dit est, le *concevement* universel, comme seroit dire soleil ou monde, est commun et indifferent a plusieurs supposts qui sont ou qui pourroient estre. Mais le *con[cev]ement* particulier, comme dire ce soleil ou ce monde, est propre et ne pourroit represanter autre soleil, pousé que il fust, ne autre monde. (32d9-13)

FINI, adj.

(with the meaning of 'finite'. DG and Littré list the meaning but do not date.)

Mais il est certain que, se les simples sont *finis*, le corps qui est compousé de eulz est *fini*, car le cors qui est composé de corps *finis* en multitude et en quantité est *fini* en multitude et en quantité . . . (17c4-7)

Item, se de temps *fini* l'en oste partie *finie*, le residu est *finy*. Et se le temps est *finy* le mouvement est *finy*, et l'espace passee est *finie* et les autres choses semblablement. Or est le temps *finy* ouquel le ciel fait une circulacion et donques chascune partie de cest temps est *finie*. (17d15-19)

Cf. also 18a11; 18b1; 18b7; etc.

HABIT, subst.

(with the meaning of 'permanent and general existence'.)

Quar alteracion est mouvement selonc qualité et les *habis* des qualités et les disposicions, si comme sont santé et langueur, ne sont pas sanz transmutacion qui sont selonc passions. (13d9-11)

IMPRESSION, subst.

(An atmospheric influence, condition or phenomena. Used to translate the latin *phaenomena*.)

Mais en aucuns corps mixtes imparfés, legiereté habonde et a dominacion, si comme sont flamme, fume, exalacions et aucunes *impressions* dont est traité ou livre de *Metheores* . . . (9a14-16)

Item, les *impressions* qui semblent estoilles qui cheent selonc droit mouvement . . . (12d17-18)

celle superficie de l'aer est bien loing de la ou sont vent et pluie et autres *impressions* . . . (102d9-10)

Cf. also 112a9; 115a6; 118c5; 202b6.

INTELLIGENCE, subst.

(Designates spiritual beings as contrasted to corporeal beings.

Cf. *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, A. Lalande, II, Paris, 1928, p. 1027.)

Et les autres substances incorporelles appelees *intelligences* sont ou ciel et non ailleurs . . . (14b6-7)

Et donques, se un autre monde estoit, il convendroit que le premier

mouvement de ce monde fust fait par une autre *intelligence* et d'autre espesce que celle qui fait le premier mouvement de cest monde. (31a12-14)  
Et les *intelligences* qui les mouvent sont plusieurs selonc Aver[r]oïs et appert ou .xii.\* de *Metaphisique*. Et donques convient il dire par neccessité, selonc Aver[r]oïs ou que ces *intelligences* immaterielles sont plusieurs en une espesce differentes en nombre, ou que plusieurs *intelligences* de diverses espesces meuvent plusieurs corps . . . (31b4-8)

Les *intelligences* ou angelz eurent commencement . . . (47d6-7)

Cf. also 34c11; 37b3; 38c3; etc.

INTENSION, subst.

(A quality or variable property in which it is possible to distinguish degrees of intensity.)

car son eternité est sanz succession et son immensité sanz extension et sa toute-puissance sanz *intension*. (66c12-14)

et est ceste transmutacion successive en .ii. manieres: une est selon les parties de la matiere du subject et selon extension; l'autre est selon les degrés ou *intension* de chascune tele qualité. (188c8-11)

et leur puissance est aucunement divisible selon degrés ou *intension*. Mais de Dieu la duracion est eternité indivisible et sanz succession de laquelle fu dit ou .xxiii.\* chapitre du premier; sa posicion, ce est immensité indivisible et sanz extension de laquelle fu dit ou secont chapitre du secont; et sa toute puissance ou perfection est plus que infinie et indivisible sanz *intension*. (200c8-14)

PASSION, subst.

(It is to be noted that Oresme uses the word to denote the Categories of Aristotle; it is synonymous with 'accidents'. The philosophical meaning usually listed by dictionaries is that of 'mouvement or modification of the soul'—the more modern meaning. Cf. Lalande, *op. cit.* II, *art.* Passion, pp. 563-564.)

La science naturele, presque toute, est des corps et des magnitudes qui sont, et de leurs passions ou qualités . . . (3a2-3)

les habis des qualités et les dispositions, si comme sont santé et langueur, ne sont pas sanz transmutacion qui sont selonc *passions*. Glose. C'est a savoir, selonc qualités actives et passives. (13d9-12)

Cf. also 160a9; 160a12; 186a7; etc.

SIGNATION, subst.

(A mental and imperceptible assertion relative to some fact.)

Divisible est dit en .ii. manieres: une par separation de parties realment, et l'autre par *signacion* de entendement. (3a10-11)

Mais tout continu ou magnitude est divisible par *signacion* en en- / tendement en parties touzjours divisibles . . . (3c16-3d2)

Quant a parler proprement, il n'a fin ne commencement fors par *signacion* volontaire . . . (35c8-9)

Cf. also 67c18.

SUPPOT, subst.

(A substance in so far as it is considered as a complete and individual substance. Used to translate the scholastic *suppositum*. Cf. Lalande, *op. cit.* II, p. 839. AD notes the philosophical usage as of the XIV\*, Chr. de Pisan; DG XIV-XV\*, Chr. de Pisan.)

Et pour ce, selonc la verité, il est possible que d'une espesce esperituelle et immaterielle soient plusieurs *supposts*, si comme sont plusieurs ames humaines et plusieurs angelz. (31b9-11)

Et de toutes choses dont l'en puet considerer, aucune forme selonc elle et aucune espee de telle chose sont de fait plusieurs *supposts* singuliers ou pueent estre. (32c9-11)

le concevement universel, comme seroit dire *soleil* ou *monde*, est commun et indifferent a plusieurs *supposts* qui sont ou qui pourroient estre. (32d9-11)

Cf. also 33a11; 78a3; 115d13; 121c17; 204b11.

# VI.

The following compound words, not listed in the dictionnaires, are found in the *Du Ciel et du monde*:

- Demi-circuite (154c4)
- Demi-espere (BC) demie espere (ADE) (80d20)
- Demi-jour (19a12)
- Non-corps (167a10); (173a12); (173a15); (173c2); (175c11); (175c13)
- Non-corrompu (58d12-13); (59a3); (59a5); (59a12)
- Non-devisée (42a5)
- Non-engendré (42a19)
- Non-estre (47b10); (47b12); (47b12-13)
- Non-faisable (42d6)
- Non-naturel (25a14-15)
- Non-cubique (174c16)
- Non-pyramide (174c17)
- Non-pesant (165c9); (165d4); (165d6); (165d9)
- Non-possible (57d9-10)
- Non-resistant (165d5)
- Non-vif (85d18); (132c3); (132c16); (201a5)
- Entr'encontrer (se) (16a9)
- Entr'empescher (se) (16a9-10)
- Entre corrompre (se) (91b4)
- Entre eschauffer (se) (114b18-114c1)
- Entre intersequer (se) (97b16); (177a11-12)

# IX. INDEX TO PROPER NAMES

- Achaïe, 14c4.
- Adam, 60a12.
- Affrique, 87b10.
- Agathon, 60a13.
- Albert (the Great), 118a17; 118b4; 120b13.
- Algorisme de Proporcions*, 127b3.
- Almageste*, 70b2.
- Almena, 95b4; 7.
- L'Ame* (livre de), 124a15; 125a4; 7; 16.
- Anaxagoras, 1d6; 11c17; 14d6; 37b14; 40a8; 41a11; 41c1; 145d15; 165a2; 168d7; 10; 169a15; 183a13.
- Anaximander, 147c9; 170d11; 181b13.
- Anaximenes, 145d15; 159b7; 170d10.
- Antecrist, 42a19; 52a11.
- Apocalypse*, 72a14; 203a7.
- Apostle (l'), 58d15; 65b18; 65c12; 202d10.
- Archymenides, 8b15.
- Aristote, 1a1; 3d16; 4b12; 6a15; 6b3; 10b12; 10c8; 13; 14b16; 15a5; 15d9; 16a13; 19a17; 20d11; 21b7; 12; 24b3; 25b13; 25c5; 26b4; 27c8; 30c2; 31a16; 31b16; 33a11; 33b12; 34c11; 35a5; 35b2; 35c14; 35d10; 37b15; 37d10; 12; 14; 38a7;

10; 38b13; 38c13; 15; 38d10; 39a12; 39b16; 40a2; 14; 40b8; 41a7; 43b15; 44b6;  
13; 14; 47a6; 47b7; 8; 47c10; 17; 47d11; 48a17; 48c7; 48d4; 16; 49a2; 10;  
49b2; 49c14; 50a13; 50b4; 50c7; 15; 50d14; 18; 51a18; 52a6; 52b10; 52d19;  
53a16; 54b16; 55a2; 56d5; 16; 57a11; 16; 57b14; 58a1; 58b6; 58d16; 59a4;  
10; 14; 59d15; 61a3; 15; 62b3; 18; 62d5; 8; 65a13; 18; 65b13; 65d4; 66b16;  
66c2; 66d12; 16; 67a20; 67b3; 5; 17; 67c2; 4; 67d1; 7; 9; 68d16; 69c13;  
70a5; 13; 70b5; 70c4; 70d7; 73a12; 73c3; 11; 73d9; 75b11; 17; 75c14; 16;  
77d12; 78a5; 78d14; 79a15; 17; 79c6; 80a7; 80b4; 80c7; 80d4; 81d5; 82c7;  
82d6; 83b15; 83c8; 15; 84a15; 85a4; 85b3; 86a4; 5; 86d10; 15; 19; 87b7;  
87c1; 4; 7; 88d2; 15; 89b15; 90a12; 17; 90d18; 91a4; 91b22; 91d4; 92c14;  
92d7; 9; 10; 93c8; 94a12; 94b17; 94c16; 94d11; 95a7; 96a1; 97a10; 97d2;  
9; 98a3; 98c2; 98d16; 102d4; 103c15; 104c21; 105b15; 106a13; 107c7;  
107d1; 3; 108b17; 108c11; 108d12; 109b3; 109c5; 110b6; 111d8; 112a13;  
112b2; 112c11; 113c17; 113d7; 114d13; 115d17; 116b15; 116c17; 116d1;  
117b13; 117c12; 118a13; 120b3; 6; 11; 120d14; 121b5; 122b5; 122d11; 123a7;  
123b4; 123d10; 124b18; 126b8; 127c5; 127d5 134a13; 134b10; 134d3; 135b6;  
135c3; 136a7; 136c2; 138b2; 138d2; 5; 139d12; 140a5; 140d2; 141a3;  
6; 9; 141c4; 141d7; 142c13; 142d4; 7; 9; 143a11; 13; 143c3; 144d16; 149c9;  
149d15; 151a15; 151c13; 154a10; 154b6; 155b14; 156a4; 156b2; 157d15;  
158b12; 159a5; 159c2; 160d1; 161c7; 162b3; 8; 162d3; 13; 163a12; 165c11;  
165d11; 166c7; 167b5; 167d5; 168b6; 175b12; 176b10; 177a5; 177c14; 181d11;  
184d8; 10; 185d9; 187c9; 188b9; 189a14; 189b14; 190c12; 190d5; 192a11;  
192d13; 193a6; 193c11; 194a10; 194c15; 195a3; 11; 195c13; 196b3; 200b5; 6;  
201a3; 204a7; 11; 204b3; 12; 204c1; 7; 16; 204d2; 3; 13; 17; 205a13;  
16; 205b4; 7; 205c12; 13; 205d2; 3; 6; 9; 17; 206a7; 206c9; 206d14; 207a4;  
207b1; 207d1; 208b8; 18; 208c5; 11.

Arym (Arim), 83a3; 83b3; 4; 5; 83d12; 84a12; 84c4; 18.

Athlas, 74c10; 16; 18; 74d1; 81d7; 19; 82c1; 21; 82d9; 83b8; 14; 86b9; 14; 86c6.

Avennartha, 119a8.

Averrois (Averrois, Averroiz, Averrojz, Averois), 7a4; 31a9; 17; 18; 31b5; 6;  
17; 40a2; 7; 47a7; 47b7; 17; 47c10; 49b13; 49c5; 50d12; 51a20; 51b5;  
52a6; 55a2; 8; 55b2; 56b5; 16; 56d5; 58c12; 62b17; 62d5; 61b3; 65a18;  
65b11-12; 67a2; 67c2; 3; 67d9; 17; 68a10; 68d16; 70a5; 70d7; 73c7; 75a11;  
75b11; 75d13; 77d12; 18; 80c7; 80d8; 81d5; 83b15; 85b3; 87c4; 88a13; 88d3;  
90a17; 91c17; 96a5; 104c11; 18; 104d16; 106a11; 112a5; 116c21; 117b13;  
119a7; 120b12; 120c9; 18; 120d3; 4; 15; 121c5; 8; 16; 17; 121d2; 5; 122b11;  
124b18; 129d6; 131b15; 131c1; 132a14; 132b14; 132d10; 134c8; 140b11;  
142d5; 153a6; 163a11; 177d12; 178a12; 178d12; 200b5; 6; 204b11; 204d17;  
205a7; 13; 206d17 208a6.

Avicenne, 31b4; 120b13.

Auteur Roumain (Horace), 104c5.

Babiloine, 87d4; 5; 8.

Babiloniens, 131d5.

Barbares, 153a7.

Bernardus Silvester, 69a15.

Blancdurel, 120c3.

Boëce, 108c3; 126c8; 16.

Caldee, 40a4; 67c4; 65d2.

Canonique, 1a, 202a7.

Cassiodorus, 125b18.

Caucasus, 195c14.

Charles V, 1a2; 203c2.

Chartre de Joves, 137b4; 137c5.

Chatonet, 104c20.



*Cité de Dieu*, 14b18; 62d13; 65d2; 88b14-15; 95c12; 114a7.

Cypre, 152c12.

Daniel, 72c4; 201a8.

David, 201d7; 202d14.

*De Architectura*, 112d13.

*De Celo et Mundo*, 62d17; 157a2; 201c13.

*De Commensurabilitate vel Incommensurabilitate Motuum Celi*, 44d3; 45c12-13; 46c10-11.

*De Generatione et Corruptione (De Generatione)*, 9a11-12; 13a18; 60d15; 61c4; 91a17; 91b5; 21; 154a11; 158c11; 159b18; 168b8; 168d5; 169d7; 8; 193b7; 193c11.

Democritus, 25c11; 29b10; 145d15; 160b1; 164b3; 164d5; 169d6; 173c11; 16; 174b7; 179b13; 181b13; 182c13; 197d1; 12.

*De Ponderibus*, 103a10.

*De Saturnalibus*, 135c8-9.

*De Substantia Orbis*, 78a2.

*De Vetula*, 4c9.

*De la Nature des Dieux*, 14a11; 69b15.

*Des Causes (Liber de Causis)*, 91d13; 121b4.

*Des Merveilles de Hibernie*, 88b13.

*Des Mouvements des Bestes*, 75d5-6, 79b11.

Destroz de Marroch, 153a3.

*Du Ciel et du Monde*, 1a1; 157b3; 180b8; 203c1.

Dyane, 135c11.

Dyogenes, 170d10.

*Ecclesiastes*, 14c16.

*Ecclesiastique*, 95c14.

*Ecclesiasticus*, 60c14; 202d7.

Egypte (Egypte), 14c4; 22d12; 73a7; 152c12.

Egipcien, 131d5.

Empedocles, 1d6; 39d16; 40a11; 41a10; 15; 41c1; 74d18; 75a4; 104b12; 145b12; 146c17; 147a7; 11; 16; 147b1; 15; 164a7; 164c15; 165b1; 168d8; 169c3; 173c11; 15; 183a13.

Encheladus, 68b7.

Ephese, 39d16; 159b5.

Eraclitus (Heraclitus), 39d16; 40a12; 159b5; 8.

Esriture, 6d20; 14c5; 34c12; 35a9; 10; 36d11; 39b9-10; 50c8; 60c13; 62b9; 66a9; 68c13; 68d6; 13; 17; 69b14; 72c2; 75b15; 77a5; 77b16; 78a7; 92b13; 95a20; 95b17; 95c8; 12-13; 17; 122c2; 126c2; 17; 126d11; 127b11; 129b10; 131d11; 135a10; 140c6; 10; 14; 141d11; 201a6; 202d11; 206a15.

Espaigne (Hespaingne), 74c17; 87d6; 88a8; 10; 11.

*Ethiques*, 41a9; 62d10; 90a8; 159c3.

Euclide, 161d5; 176b4; 177a9.

Europe, 87b9.

Eustrace, 41a9; 62d10; 159c3.

Evangille, 71a13; 71b8; 201b7.

Ezechias (Ezechie), 14c7; 108c7; 140c12; 142a8; 10; 144a11.

Frague, 39d16.

France, 1a3; 203c3.

Gabaon, 95b3; 12; 14; 15; 95c4; 10.

Gades Herculis, 153a5.

Galien, 76c12.

- Garde de Joves, 137b4-5.  
 Gargan, 73a2.  
*Genesis*, 201a6.  
*Geometrie*, 174d12.  
*Giganchomachie*, 68b5.  
 Golias, 70d11.  
 Grece (Gresce), 40a3; 67c1; 2; 87b7; 8.  
 Grecisme, 5a3.  
 Grecs, 14a15; 33b13; 71c5; 95c8; 112b14.  
 Haly, 152d17; 153a3.  
 Heraclitus Ponticus, 138a17-138b1.  
 Hercules, 95b7; 95c5; 9; 135c11; 152d13; 153a2.  
 Hermes, 73a6.  
 Hesiodus, 159a10.  
 Inde, 87d4; 7; 8; 152d14.  
*Inter Omnes Impressiones*, 202c3-4.  
 Jeremie, 68b4; 200d11.  
 Jerusalem, 73a5.  
 Job, 39b10; 62b12; 74d5; 92d4; 126d1; 127b11; 201b16.  
 Johannes Damascenus, 92a16.  
 Josephus, 73a4.  
 Josüe, 14c6; 85a11; 92b12; 95a17; 95b12; 14; 95c10; 108c6; 140c11; 142a8;  
 144a4; 206a16.  
 Joves, 72c7; 135c10. Cf. Garde and Chartre.  
 Juis, 40a9.  
 Juno, 135c11.  
 Jupiter, 44d7; 95b4; 7; 95c15; 117a3; 127c8; 134b9; 10.  
*La Legende Saint Morice*, 71b9.  
*La Legende de Saint Michiel*, 72d18.  
*La Perspective*, 139a8; 144b6.  
 Leucippus, 25c11; 164b3; 164d5; 169d7; 8; 182c13.  
 Lisieux, 203c4.  
*Livre des Bestes*, 120d14.  
 Lucan (Lucain), 79c2; 88b12.  
 Macrobes, 120b12; 121a9; 126c17; 126d5; 11; 135c7.  
 Mahomet, 153a9.  
*Mappemonde*, 66b2.  
 Mare Atlanticum, 74c19.  
 Marcianus Capella, 71c5; 112b14.  
 Mars, 44d7; 127c8; 131c17; 131d2; 134b9; 135c11; 142c6.  
 Maures, 40a9.  
 Maximien, 61d6.  
 Mellissus, 158d4.  
 Mercure, 127c9; 128d12; 129a3; 131b17; 134b10; 135c11.  
*Methaphisique*, 31a6; 31b5; 38b14; 39c16; 67d5; 70c4; 70d7; 77b8; 78a14; 100b3;  
 121c5; 134c12; 167c11; 167d5.  
*Metheores*, 9a16; 11d3; 12d19; 69a12; 78d14; 91b22; 92c14; 101c3; 102d9; 112a12;  
 17; 112c12; 114c17; 115a4; 118a18; 121a15; 16; 122b5; 126b9; 137c12; 138d2;  
 195c13; 202c3.  
*Mistere des Nombres*, 5a11-12.  
 Mont de Gargan, 73a2.  
 Moÿse, 65d18.

Nabugodonosor, 103d14.

Nychole Oresme, 1a4.

Noë, 84c3.

Ogiges, 14c1.

Origenes, 35d13.

Ovide, 61a6; 65b8; 68d3; 74d3; 75b14; 98b3; 103a1; 117c4; 159a4; 13.

Paris, 51a17; 71d8; 93c16; 95a16; 155d6; 191a13.

Parmenides, 158d5.

Parnassus, 195c15.

Pepin, 120c3.

Pheton, 95b9; 10.

*Physique*, 3b5; 3d16; 5c20; 7a4; 13a18; 16b15; 17d8; 21a7; 21b7; 21d9; 22a19; 25b8; 28b12; 28c2; 15; 30a9; 30b5; 31a6; 33d6; 34c2; 37d10; 38d11; 39a12; 42a16; 54d16; 61a16-61b1; 62b4; 65a14; 74c4; 91b12; 91d4; 96a1; 96c12; 97a8; 98d16; 100a15; 104b15; 104c1; 108a3; 109c5; 15; 109d8; 134d3; 140b14; 158b9; 11; 159c13; 159d2; 4; 162b6; 162d3; 166c7; 166d4; 167a17; 170b5; 172d8; 173b4; 186c13; 187a6; 188a2; 189a5; 204a7.

Plato, 1d5; 6b1; 40a5; 16; 40d16; 41a8; 41d3; 47d6; 58d3; 59a2; 62d10; 12; 13; 65a7; 65b4; 95b9; 126d5; 138a16; 157c7; 8; 159b9; 159c2; 159d5; 160b2; 161c8; 164b15; 18; 181b14; 182a6; 194a5; 9.

Platoniens, 41a7; 103d8; 175a5; 183b5.

Plinius, 57c5; 122b13.

*Politiques*, 134d3.

Pomponius, 16d13.

Prague, 155d6.

Prescian, 66b1; 167d11.

Prophete, 62b11; 62c14; 66a6; 67b8; 71a8; 88c5; 91d11; 92b15; 145c4; 8; 201b2.

Ptholomee, 70b2; 131b15; 16; 138c6; 196a9.

Pythagoras (Pytagoras), 4c17; 75c10; 122c19; 123c12; 123d20.

Pythagoriens (Pitagoriens, Pytagoriens, Pithagoriens), 4c16; 5a4; 6a18; 75c9; 14; 76d13; 77c14; 87a13; 123a5; 123c12; 123d8; 136d6; 137a17; 137c3; 17; 158d17; 162a12; 17; 162b10.

*Questions Naturel*z, 9b4.

*Regimen d'Acues*, 76c12.

Remigius, 71c4; 112b14;

Romme, 71d8; 87d5; 9; 10.

Rouen, 1a4; 71d8; 156a11.

Sage, le, 62c18; 104c19; 132a6; 202a10; 202d11; 15; 203a3; 203b14.

Saint Augustin, 14b17; 62d12; 65d2; 88b14; 95c11; 114a6; 126c8; 16.

Saint Gregoire, 113d8.

Saint Jehan, 72c5; 203a7.

Saint Jerome, 35d14; 88b17; 95d2.

Saint Pierre, 202a6.

Saint Thomas d'Aquin, 123c14-15; 190d6.

Salamon, 68c11.

Sardine, 54d15.

Sathanas, 72a13.

Saturne, 44d7; 127c7; 134b8; 135c10; 136a8; 136b6.

Seine, 103b7; 199d13.

Seneque, 9b3.

*Sentences*, 72d6.

Simplicius, 123c5; 190d6.

Solinus, 16d13; 15.

Tales Milesius, 145b19; 145c4; 159b7; 170d11.

Themistius, 190d7.

*Theorique des Planetes*, 70b8.

*Traite de l'Espere (De l'espere)*, 89a8; 16; 127c10; 152a13; 152c1; 152d5; 153b6;  
155b2; 156a8; 156c1; 157a3.

Tulles, 14a11; 69b15.

*Tymeus (Tymeo, Thymeo, Thimeo)*, 41d2; 95b9; 138a16; 161d9; 164b18; 176d4;  
182a7.

Varro, 14b18.

Venus, 117a3; 127c9; 128d12; 129a3; 135c11.

Victruvius, 112d13.

Virgile, 5a1; 3; 68b12; 200d12.

Witelo, 139a9.

Xenofanes de Kolofe, 145b6-7.

Ypocras, 76c12.

Yppon, 170d11.

Ysaïe (Ysaÿe), 65c14; 68b11; 72c3; 5; 200d9; 202d5; 9.

*Ystoire des Lombars*, 54d16.

*Ystoire (Istoire) Naturelle*, 57c6; 122b14.

Ytalie, 136d6.

Yxion, 75b12.